Vellaiya Moopan v. Krishnammal — 1978 DIGILAW 271 (MAD)

ORDER.-The petitioner in these two revision petitions is the defendant in O.S. Nos. 26 of 1969 and 1487 of 1971 on the file of the District Munsif of Karur. 2. The defendant wanted reliefs under section 3 (3) of the Tamil Nadu Act XXI of 1972 and for this purpose he filed E.A.No. 169 of 1973 in O.S. No. 26 of 1969 and E.A.No. 168 of 1973 in O.S. No. 1487 of 1971. These applications were considered by the learned District Munsif of Karur and they were dismissed. As against the orders of dismissal, the defendant filed appeals before the District Judge of Tiruchirapalli, invoking the aid of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, as per the Code as it stood prior to the amendment by Act CIV of 1976. The learned District Judge opined that an order under section 3 (3) of the Tamil Nadu Act XXI of 1972 is not one which relates to the discharge of a decree and hence an appeal is not competent and the papers were returned for presentation to the proper Court. There seems to have been a move to review these orders and the defendant has not been successful in getting any favourable orders on such move. 3. In these two revision petitions, the question that would come up for consideration is as to whether the orders passed under section 3 (31 of the Tamil Nadu Act XXI of 1972 could be the subect-matter of an appeal by invoking the provisions of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, before the amendment, referred to above. 4. It would be relevant to extract section 3 (as a whole) of the Tamil Nadu Act XXI of 1972, which reads:- "Relief in payment of arrears of rent :- (1) (a) All arrears of rent payable by a cultivating tenant to the landlord and outstanding on the 30th June, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as arrears of rent), shall be deemed to be discharged, whether or not a decree or order has been obtained therefor, if such cultivating tenant...... (i) has before the date of publication of this Act paid to the landlord or deposited in the Court or before the competent authority to the account of the landlord, or (ii) pays or deposits in the manner specified in clause (b) within six months from the date of the publication of this Act, or (iii) is deemed to have paid or deposited under this Act; the whole of the rent due for the fasli year commencing on the 1st July, 1971, and ending with the 30th June, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the current rent.) (b) A cultivating tenant may- (i) pay to the landlord the current rent, or (ii) deposit in the Court or before the competent authority, to the account of the landlord, the current rent or if the rent be payable in kind, its market value on the date of deposit. (c) The Court in which, or the competent authority before which, the deposit is made shall cause notice of the deposit to be issued to the landlord and determine, after a summary enquiry whether the amount deposited represents the correct amount of the current rent due from the cultivating tenant. If the Court or competent authority finds that any further sum is due, it shall direct the cultivating tenant to deposit the further sum within the period specified in clause (a) (ii). If the Court or competent authority adjudges that no further sum is due or if the cultivating tenant deposits within the time referred to above such further sum as is ordered by the Court or competent authority the cultivating tenant shall be deemed to have paid the current rent for the purposes of this Act. 2. In any suit or proceeding pending on the date of the publication of this Act for the recovery of any arrears of rent, or for the eviction of a cultivating tenant for non-payment of any arrears of rent, the Court or competent authority shall, if the cultivating tenant pays or deposits, or has paid or deposited, or is deemed to have paid or deposited, under this Act, the whole of the current rent and on the application of the cultivating tenant, pass an order dismissing, without costs, the suit or proceeding in so far as such suit or proceeding relates to such recovery or eviction. 3. 3. If, before the date of the publication of this Act, any decree or order has been passed in any suit or proceeding: — (i) for the recovery of any arrears of rent; or (ii) for the eviction of a cultivating tenant for non-payment of any arrears of rent; the Court or the competent authority shall, if the cultivating tenant pays or deposits, or has paid or deposited, or is deemed to have paid or deposited, under this Act, the whole of the current rent and on the application of any person affected by such decree or order whether or not he was a party thereto, vacate the decree or order in so far as such decree or order relates to such recovery or eviction." The expressions used in sub-section (3) are: — "vacate the decree or order in so far as such decree or order relates to such recovery or eviction." Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 states that all arrears of rent payable by a cultivating tenant to the landlord and outstanding on the 30th June, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as arrears of rent), shall be deemed to be discharged, whether or not a decree or order has been obtained therefor, if such cultivating tenant satisfies sub-clauses 1 to 3 therein. If the cultivating tenant invokes the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 3, the result would be, any decree passed before the date of the publication of the Act will have to be vacated. Though the expressions used are: — "vacate the decree", there can be no doubt that in the context it will have reference only to ‘discharge the decree’ or to ‘satisfy the decree’. This construction will be legitimate if we remember that in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3, the expressions used are:.... " All the arrears of rent...... shall be deemed to be discharged." 5. It is only in respect of these "arrears of rent" sub-section (3) refers to a decree having been passed before the date of the publication of the Act. " All the arrears of rent...... shall be deemed to be discharged." 5. It is only in respect of these "arrears of rent" sub-section (3) refers to a decree having been passed before the date of the publication of the Act. It must be taken that the impact of any order to be passed under sub-section (3) of section 3 would be either to vacate, discharge or satisfy the decree or to negative the plea of the cultivating tenant for such vacation, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and there is a warrant for saying that such an order under sub-section (3) of section 3 would relate to discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. It would be pertinent to consider at this juncture the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act, (IV of 1938), and in construction of which provisions, certain decisions have been rendered by this Court. Under the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act, there is a specific provision, viz., section 25-A which lays down as to the orders from which an appeal would lie. Section 20 of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act speaks about stay of execution proceedings to enable the judgment-debtor to apply for the subtantial reliefs under section 19 of the said Act. The question came up for consider ration as to whether an order passed under section 20 of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturists Relief Act, would come within the ambit of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to be appealable. 7. In Desikachariar v. Ramachandra1a Full Bench of this Court laid down that on a combined reading of sections 47, 2 (2) and 96, Civil Procedure Code, it is apparent that an appeal from an order in execution would lie only if the following three conditions are complied with: (1) the order must relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree between the parties to the suit; (2) it shall conclusively determine the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy; (3) such conclusive determination of the rights is with reference to the Court in which such rights are decided. 8. 8. The Full Bench further observed at page 62 as follows: — “Though there is an apparent conflict of authority on the question to be decided the Judges accepted the principle that an appeal lies against an order staying or refusing to stay execution of a decree if the order conclusively determines the rights of the parties. They differed only in regard to the application of the principle to the facts of each case. It is, therefore, not possible to say that every order in a stay application is appealable. It would be appealable only if it involves a conclusive determination of the rights of the parties so far as the executing Court is concerned. In the present case, as I have already stated, very valuable rights of the parties are decided. In one contingency the temporary stay granted would be extended till the disposal of the application under section 19. If the decree is satisfied after scaling down under section 19, no question of further execution of the decree would arise. If amended, only the amended decree will be executed. Only if the application under section 19 is dismissed can the decree, as it stands, be executed. But till that contingency happens the judgment-debtor would be saved from further execution of the decree. Even from the point of view of the decree-holder his rights would substantially be affected.” 9. The ratio of the Full Bench has been followed subsequently by Kailasam, J., as he then was, in Sanjeevi Padayachi v. Radhakrishniah,1 as well as by Ramaprasada Rao., J., in Kamal Rowther v. Jayaram Gupta2 10. Once we remember the above principles, there is no difficulty in holding that the orders in question passed by the first Court relate to discharge or satisfaction of the decree and as such appeals would be competent. 11. Mr. R. Nandakumar, learned counsel for the respondent in these revision petitions relies on the dictum of Chandra Reddy, J., in Gonthireddi Lakshmidevi v. Jammi Raja Rao3 . But I find that the facts in this case are entirely different from the facts which came up for consideration in the decisions referred to by me earlier as well as the facts of the present case The Court below rejected the petition as not maintainable on the gound that the Agriculturists Relief Act itself does not apply to it. In that context the learned. In that context the learned. Judge felt that such an order cannot be the subject-matter of an appeal even under section 25-A of the said Act. In view of the discussion of the position of law, I have to hold that an appeal is competent as against the orders of the District Munsif of Karur. 12. Hence these revision petitions are allowed and the District Judge, Tiruchirapalli will entertain the appeal and dispose them of on metits. There will be no orders as to costs in these revision petitions.