Judgment :- 1. The appellants are the Branch Manager of M/s Orient Distributors, Cochin, and the Managing partner of the said concern. They have questioned the judgment of a learned judge of this Court who allowed the writ petition to quash Ext. P-3 order of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam, on an application filed by the 1st respondent under S.4 of the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972. The Deputy Labour Commissioner had dismissed the application on the ground that the conditions and circumstances which had to be established for the grant of the application were not satisfied; that there was no "suspension" as defined in the Act, which alone will justify the making of the application, and therefore the same was not maintainable. The learned judge took the view that the definition of the term "suspension" under the Act was quite wide and comprehensive, that the same was attracted, and that the conditions necessary for the award of subsistence allowance were satisfied. In the result, the learned judge allowed the writ petition and quashed Ext. P-3 and directed the Deputy Labour Commissioner to dispose of Ext. P-1 application afresh in accordance with law. 2. The 1st respondent was a Sales Assistant under the appellants. He was first transferred to the appellants branch on 3rd June 1974 to join at the branch on 1st July 1974. He did not obey the transfer or join at the branch. He was therefore relieved from his work at the Head Office and asked to join at Madras by an order dated 26th November 1974. This order, again, was not complied with. The 1st respondent neither joined at Madras nor worked in the appellants' office in Cochin. For this, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him, and enquiry was conducted by an Advocate, who, on 2nd July 1975, reported finding the 1st respondent guilty of the charges. Thereupon, on 30th July 1975, the 1st respondent filed Ext. P-1 application under S.4 of the Act, for payment of subsistence allowance, which has given rise to the proceedings sketched. 3. For this, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him, and enquiry was conducted by an Advocate, who, on 2nd July 1975, reported finding the 1st respondent guilty of the charges. Thereupon, on 30th July 1975, the 1st respondent filed Ext. P-1 application under S.4 of the Act, for payment of subsistence allowance, which has given rise to the proceedings sketched. 3. S.2 clause (f) of the Act defines the word 'suspension' as follows; "(f) 'suspension' means an interim decision of an employer as a result of which an employee is debarred temporarily from attending his office and performing his functions in the establishment where he is employed, such restriction being imposed on the employee on the ground either that a disciplinary proceeding has already been, or is shortly to be, instituted against him or that a criminal proceeding in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him is under investigation or trial;" We may also extract the definition of 'period of suspension' under S.2 (d) of the Act: "(d) 'period of suspension' in a case where express permission of the authority under sub-section (1) of S.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, is necessary before the employment of an employee can be validly terminated includes the period until such permission is obtained and termination of service is effected;" In order to attract the definition of 'suspension' under the Act, it is necessary to show not only that there was an interim decision to debar the employee temporarily from attending office and performing his functions; but it is necessary further to establish that such action was as a result of one of the two factors or circumstances, namely, an enquiry either instituted or to be instituted into disciplinary proceeding; or an investigation or trial of a criminal proceeding in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed. On the facts disclosed, we are unable to find that any of these conditions in the definition stand satisfied. We are not, in the first place, prepared to say that a transfer of an employee from one place to another amounts to debarring him from attending his office or performing his functions. On the facts disclosed, we are unable to find that any of these conditions in the definition stand satisfied. We are not, in the first place, prepared to say that a transfer of an employee from one place to another amounts to debarring him from attending his office or performing his functions. Instead of working at place A, he is asked to work and to perform his functions at place B. May be, that the transfer is an act of victimisation or is mala fide, or is really a punishment meted out to the employee. The employee concerned may be able to attack the transfer on these grounds. But to equate a transfer, made even in such circumstances, with suspension of the employee, appears to be opposed to the etymological as well as the legal sense of the terms. That apart, the requirement of the statute that the debarring of an employee from attending to his work must be causally related to either of the two factors, also does not seem to be made out. Neither the Tribunal nor the learned judge have found this causal connection. In the circumstances, we are unable to share the learned judge's view that the definition of 'suspension' under the Act is wide and comprehensive and covers a cessation of the work of the employee in whatever way or manner the same is brought about. This is what the learned judge observed: "This would indicate that no written order is necessary. In this case even according to the employer, the petitioner had been transferred to Madras with effect from 1st July 1974 which order had been served on him duly. He did not obey the order deliberately and quite unreasonably on his part and he was absenting without leave on several occasions as and when he liked and in defiance of the management. He had been relieved from the branch office at Ernakulam with effect from 1st December 1974. This would indicate that this is a case where the petitioner was debarred at least temporarily from attending his office in the particular branch office." We are afraid that the above analysis of the learned judge does not satisfy the requirements of the statutory interpretation. We are unable to hold that there has been any debarring of the 1st respondent from attending to his work or from performing his functions. We are unable to hold that there has been any debarring of the 1st respondent from attending to his work or from performing his functions. We cannot regard the transfer of the 1st respondent as having this effect 4. We allow this appeal and set aside the order of the learned judge and direct that O.P. No. 2938 of 1976 will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Allowed.