K.S. SIDHU, J.—This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ, order or direction for bringing up and quashing the order dated April 30, 1976, made in second appeal by the Government of Rajasthan under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, hereinafter called the Service Rules, dismissing the applicant from its service, and also for directing the said Government to reinstate the applicant in service with payment of emoluments due to him upto date. The facts, about which there is not much dispute, may be recapitulated here. 2. Ramesh Kumar Johari, the applicant, was appointed as a constable in the police department of the Government of Rajasthan in 1953 In due course, he was promoted as Head Constable. In 1972, he was posted as Head Constable to the Police Post, Delhi Gate, Ajmer. 3. On February 9, 1972, one Meghraj lodged a report with the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, complaining that his daughter, Premlata, a nurse, under training at that time in Jawahar Lal Nehru Hospital, Ajmer, was missing from his house since February 3, 1972 and that he suspected the hand of some staff members of the said Hospital in the disappearance of his daughter. On February 10. 1972, Premlata was recovered by the police from the residential quarter of the applicant at Ajmer. She made a statement to the police (see page 28 of the paper book) stating that on February 3, 1972, while she was on her way back from the hospital to her fathers house, she met Rajkumari, wife of the applicant, near Town Hall and that it was on Rajkumaris persuasion that she agreed to accompany her to her house that evening. Premlata stated in this context that Rajkumar has told her that her (Premlatas) Bhai Sahab (this was Rajkumaris way of referring to her husband) is ill and she must, therefore, visit her house. She further stated that on reaching the applicants house in the company of Rajkumari, she found that the applicant was lying ill and the applicants father was also present there. Rajkumari, it is alleged, insisted that Premlata spend the night at her house and go back to her parents house next morning. She also gave Premleta a glass of Sharbat to drink. According to Premlata, she felt dizziness after taking that Sharbat and went to sleep. Rajkumari, it is alleged, insisted that Premlata spend the night at her house and go back to her parents house next morning. She also gave Premleta a glass of Sharbat to drink. According to Premlata, she felt dizziness after taking that Sharbat and went to sleep. She woke up next morning and requested Rajkumari to let her go. She further told the police that Rajkumari then dissuaded her from going back to her parents house stating that since she had spent the night away from her parents house without their permission, they would not let her enter it again. She also complained that thereafter Rajkumari kept her wrongfully confined in her house and kept telling her that she would arrange to get a good job for her at Bhilwara. 4. On the basis of Premlatas statement, as mentioned above, the police registered a case against the applicant and his wife Rajkumari under secs. 342 and 366 I.P.C. on February 10, 1972. On investigation, the police submitted a report to the Magistrate concerned that there was no evidence to justify the prosecution of the applicant and his wife for any offence. The report appears to have been accepted by the Magistrate with the result that the applicant and his wife stood exonerated and released in that case. 5. This was, however, not the end of the applicants troubles. The Department of Police decided to institute an inquiry against him under the Service Rules. The Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, served upon the applicant the following articles of charge,— (1) That you, Shri Ramesh Kumar Johari, H.C. No. 38, while posted at O.P. Delhi Gate, P.S. Kotwali, Ajmer, were occupying a Government quarter in Kotwali premises, deceptively administered intoxicant and enticed and kept hidden one Premlata in wrongful confinement, without the knowledge of her father and your officers from 3-2-72 to 10-2-72. This act of yours amounts to misconduct: (2) That you. Ramesh Kumar Johari, H.C. No. 38, while posted at O.P. Delhi Gate, P.S. Kotwali Ajmer on the night of 3-2-72 offered some liquid with alcohol (intoxicant) to Premlata saying that it was Sharbat, on drinking which she remained unconscious throughout the night. This act of yours amounts to misconduct: (2) That you. Ramesh Kumar Johari, H.C. No. 38, while posted at O.P. Delhi Gate, P.S. Kotwali Ajmer on the night of 3-2-72 offered some liquid with alcohol (intoxicant) to Premlata saying that it was Sharbat, on drinking which she remained unconscious throughout the night. This act of yours is against law and amounts to misconduct; (3) That you, Ramesh Kumar Johari, H.C. No. 38, while posted at O.P. Delhi Gate, P.S. Kotwali Ajmer, on the intervening night of 3/4-2-72 deceptively made Premlata unconscious by giving her some alcohol mixed liquid and in the morning threatened her with the dire consequences by her parents and keep her hidden in your quarter til! 10-2-72; (4) That you kept Premlata in your quarter under threats and persuaded her to marry in Bhilwara without the knowledge of her parents. This act of yours amounts to misconduct and reflects your mala fide intentions." 6. The applicant denied these charges. 7. The Disciplinary Authority appointed Shri P.D. Upadhayay, Home Inspector, Ajmer, as the Inquiring Officer. The Inquiring Officer recorded the evidence produced on both sides. He prepared his report of inquiry on July 19, 1972 (See Ex.1 at pages 12 to 17 of the paper book). He exonerated the applicant of, all the articles of the charge-sheet, adding that, even according to Premlatas own showing, the applicant remained confined to sick-bed in his house throughout from February 3 to 10, 1972, and that the Sharbat allegedly containing alcohol or some other intoxicant had been given her for drinking by Rajkumari without the consent or knowledge of the applicant. On receipt of this report, the Disciplinary Authority went through it and expressed his disagreement with it. He prepared his own report (See Ex. On receipt of this report, the Disciplinary Authority went through it and expressed his disagreement with it. He prepared his own report (See Ex. 2 at pages 30 to 34 of the paper book), recording the following findings therein— (i) Rajkumari, wife of applicant, had practised deception on Premlata and thus taken her to her house on February 3, 1972; (ii) Rajkumari administered some intoxicant to Premlata in the form of Sharbat on February 3, 1972, as a result of which Premlata lost consciousness; (iii) Rajkumari kept Premlata confined in her house from February 3 to 10, 1972, on one pretext or the other; (iv) The applicant was sick from February 3 to February 10, 1972, but not to such an extent that he was not aware of the presence of Premlata in his house and what his wife was doing to her; (v) In the circumstances, it is proved that whatever criminal acts were committed by Rajkumari in applicants house in relation to Premlata, were committed by her in concert with and connivance of the applicant; and (vi) The fact that the applicant permitted his wife to keep in their house an unmarried young girl, who was stranger to the family for such a long time, clearly shows that the applicant was a partner in crime with his wife. It was on the basis of these findings that the Disciplinary Authority held that all the four articles of charge against the applicant were proved. The Disciplinary Authority served a notice on the applicant annexing thereto the report of his own findings requiring the applicant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The applicant filed his reply reiterating that he was sick throughout the relevant period and that he was not guilty of any misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied with the explanation of the applicant. By his order dated December 18, 1972 (see Ex. 3 at pages 18 to 22 of the paper book), he dismissed the applicant from service. 8. The applicant preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police from the order of dismissal mentioned above. The Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied with the explanation of the applicant. By his order dated December 18, 1972 (see Ex. 3 at pages 18 to 22 of the paper book), he dismissed the applicant from service. 8. The applicant preferred an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police from the order of dismissal mentioned above. The Deputy Inspector General of Police reviewed the evidence on the record and recorded his own findings, vide order dated May 9, 1973, as under:— (i) It is established on record that the applicant was sick throughout the relevant period and cannot, therefore, be said to be a party to the crime committed by his wife; (ii) The penalty of dismissal from service is not warranted in the facts of the case. 9. Consequently, the Deputy Inspector General of Police quashed the order of the Disciplinary Authority and instead inflicted on the applicant a minor penalty by reducing his pay to the minimum of the time-scale of the post of a Head Constable for a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement in service, with a further penalty, that the period of suspension shall be treated as period of leave without pay. 10. The applicant went in second appeal to the Government of Rajasthan from the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, inflicting the aforesaid minor penalties on him. The Government, vide order dated April 30, 1976, after consultation with the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and after service of notice on the applicant requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service on the aforementioned charges, actually dismissed him from service. 11. As already stated, the applicant has filed the present petition under Arts 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the aforementioned order of the Government of Rajasthan. He has prayed for the issue of a direction, order or writ for removing the proceedings of inquiry and quashing the order of the Government and for his reinstatement in service with back wages. The grounds, which were urged by counsel for the applicant before me are as follows,— (1) The Government of Rajasthan did not record its reasons in support of the order of dismissal: (2) The applicant has been dismissed for abetting the offences of wrongful confinement and abduction alleged to have been committed by his wife. The grounds, which were urged by counsel for the applicant before me are as follows,— (1) The Government of Rajasthan did not record its reasons in support of the order of dismissal: (2) The applicant has been dismissed for abetting the offences of wrongful confinement and abduction alleged to have been committed by his wife. No charge of abetment was framed against him. (3) There is no evidence at all on the record to prove that the applicant has committed any misconduct or abetted the commission of any offence by his wife. The findings, to the contrary, by the Government in its order of dismissal is perverse. 12. I may now take up these grounds in their order. Ground No. 1: 13. In order to find out whether the impugned order is a speaking order or not, one has to go through the order itself. We may, therefore, reproduce the order in material parts as under:— "Government of Rajasthan Home (Group-I) Department. No. F. 3(186) Home (Gr.-I)/74 Jaipur April 30, 1976. ORDER Shri Ramesh Kumar Johari, Head Constable No. 38, has been dismissed from service by the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, vide his order dated December 18, 1973, on the following charges : 1................ 2................ 3................ 4. .............. (Note : For perusing the charges, please refer to pages 3-4 of this judgment where they are reproduced verbatim). The appellant (Ramesh Kumar Johari) challenge the order of dismissal by way of appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur. By his order dated May 9, 1973, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, partly allowed the appeal by quashing the order of dismissal and substituting it by his own order inflicting on the applicant a minor penalty by reducing his pay to the minimum of the time-scale of the pay of a Head Constable for a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement in service, with a further penalty that the period of suspension shall be treated as period of leave without pay. The appellant has preferred this second appeal from the order of the Deputy Inspector General, Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, mentioned above. Thereupon, the Government consulted the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in the matter. Having regard to the gravity of the charges against the appellant, the Commission has advised that the penalty be enhanced to dismissal from service. The appellant has preferred this second appeal from the order of the Deputy Inspector General, Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, mentioned above. Thereupon, the Government consulted the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in the matter. Having regard to the gravity of the charges against the appellant, the Commission has advised that the penalty be enhanced to dismissal from service. Therefore, in accordance with the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India and sub-rule (2) of rule 30 of the Service Rules, a notice was served on the appellant to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. On receipt of written representation from the appellant in reply to the aforesaid notice, the Government duly considered it and forwarded it along with the relevant records to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. The Commission has reiterated its earlier opinion that having regard to the serious charges against the appellant, he deserves to be dismissed from service. The Government of Rajasthan, after giving its careful consideration to this case and in agreement with the opinion of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, hereby dismisses the appeal of Shri Ramesh Kumar Johari, and consequently directs his removal from service. The order dated December 18, 1973, passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, and the order dated May 9, 1973, passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur shall stand altered accordingly. By order, (Sd) Satyendra Nath, Deputy Secretary, Administration." 13. The applicant has admitted the receipt of a copy of this order by him. 14. It it obvious, on a bare perusal of this order, that it does not contain the findings of the State Government, let alone its reasons for such findings. Learned counsel for the State submitted, somewhat half-heartedly, that the State Government might have passed a speaking order prior to the passing of the impugned order reproduced above, giving its findings and the reasons for those findings in respect of the charges framed against the applicant. Had any such earlier order been passed by the Government, as is sought to be suggested now, the same would have been brought on the record or, at least, some mention thereof must have been made in the impugned order. Had any such earlier order been passed by the Government, as is sought to be suggested now, the same would have been brought on the record or, at least, some mention thereof must have been made in the impugned order. It will be seen that the impugned order is a fairly lengthy document containing a description of all the steps which the Government took preparatory to the passing of the order of dismissal against the applicant. The impugned order gives a clear indication that no order whatever, in respect of the applicant, had been passed by the Government prior to this order. 15. A perusal of the return, filed by the State Government in answer to the rule nisi would also show that the Government did not consider it necessary to record its own findings on the charges against the applicant, on the erroneous assumption that both, the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, had recorded concurrent findings that the applicant is guilty of all the four charges framed against him, and that the only question on which there is disagreement between the said two officers, and which, therefore, requires decision by the State Government is the question of penalty which should be awarded to the applicant in the facts of this case. For example, in paragraph 8 of the return, the State Government averred, in so many words, that the Dy. I.G., Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, also "found the petitioner to be guilty and it was only on humanitarian grounds that the Dy. I.G. of Police inflicted upon" the applicant the minor penalty instead of the major penalty of dismissal. Again, in paragraph ll(iii), the State Government repeated that "the Dy. I.G. of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, as well as the State Government have found him guilty of the charges proved (sic) against him". The State Government added in this context in the same paragraph that it was only on the point of punishment that the State Government and the Dy. I.G. bad differred. 16. If the functionary concerned, at the level of the State Government, who examined the record, had read the findings of the Dy. I.G. of Police. The State Government added in this context in the same paragraph that it was only on the point of punishment that the State Government and the Dy. I.G. bad differred. 16. If the functionary concerned, at the level of the State Government, who examined the record, had read the findings of the Dy. I.G. of Police. Ajmer Range, Jaipur, with a little more care, he would have discovered that the said officer had expressed disagreement in his report, not merely on the Question of penalty to be imposed on the applicant, but also on the findings arrived at by the S.P., Ajmer. The Dy. I.G. of Police, had, in fact, reversed the findings of the S.P Ajmer, and had restored those of the Inquiring Officer, there by exone-rating the applicant of all the charges framed against him It is true that not-withstanding such exoneration, the Dy. I.G. of Police chose to impose a minor penalty on the applicant, obviously on extraneous considerations not mentioned in his order that, being a police official, the applicant was expected to set a better example of discipline by sending Premlat back to her parents house without any delay or at least, by informing her parents that she was in his house. If the State Government was not in agreement with the findings of the Dy. I.G. of Ponce, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, it was incumbent on it, consistent with the requirements of law and principles of natural justice, to pass a speaking order, giving reasons for its disagreement. The ipsi dixit of the State Government that the charges against the applicant are serious, cannot possibly be accepted as a substitute for statement of its finding together with brief reasons for disagreement as required by rules 16(9). 16(10), 16(12) and sub-rule (2) of rule 30 of the Service Rules. Now that it is evident that the State Government has not recorded its own findings and reasons on the charges framed against the applicant there is no escape from the conclusion that the only findings with reasons, which hold the field, are the findings arrived at by the Dy I.G. of Police As already stated, the said officer has clearly stated in his order that the charges framed against the applicant are not proved. The assertion of the State Government that the said charges are proved and that they are of serious nature is therefore, wholly without foundation. 17. The conclusions, which emerge from the discussion above may be re-stated as follows:— (i) The State of Rajasthan did not pass any order, much less a speaking order, in respect of the applicant, prior to the passing of the impugned order, dated April 30, 1976. (ii) The impugned order does not contain a statement of the findings of the State Government on the charges framed against the applicant. (iii) The State Government has not given its findings on the charges and the reasons for those findings, for it proceeded on the erroneous assumption that there was no disagreement between it and the Deputy Inspector General of Police as to the findings on the various charges. (iv) The report containing a statement of findings together with reasons therefor, which holds the field, is the report prepared by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur, who exonerated the applicant of all the charges against him. 18. Having dealt with the nature of the order passed by the Government of Rajasthan against the applicant, I may now address myself to the legal position as to these aspects of the case. 19. Article 311(2) of the Constitution enjoins that no civil servant shall be dismissed "except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges". In order to effectuate this requirement of the Consti-tution, the competent authority has promulgated the Service Rules especially Part V containing rules 14 to 31, which deal with "discipline" in the civil services of Rajasthan. Rule 14 lays down that some of the penalties specified therein, which also include the penalty of dismissal, may be imposed on a Government Servant "for good and sufficient reasons which shall be recorded" The State Government has not, in the instant case, recorded any reason for dismissing the applicant from service. It would, therefore be idle to speculate as to whether the undisclosed reasons were "good and sufficient reasons" or not. It can be safely concluded that the applicant has been dismissed from service without recording any reason and that the impugned order contravenes the provisions of rule 14. 20. It would, therefore be idle to speculate as to whether the undisclosed reasons were "good and sufficient reasons" or not. It can be safely concluded that the applicant has been dismissed from service without recording any reason and that the impugned order contravenes the provisions of rule 14. 20. Moreover, by its failure to state the findings together with reasons therefor, the State Government has contravened the mandatory provisions of rule 16 of the Service Rules. The relevant sub-rules of Rule 16 of the Service Rules may be reproduced here,— "Rule 16. Procedure for imposing major penalties.—(1)..................... (9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge; (10) (i). If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its finding on the charges is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 should be imposed, it shall— (a) furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a statement of its finding together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Authority; (12) Orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall be communicated to the Government servant who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and, where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a statement of its findings together with brief reason for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, unless they have already been supplied to him....................................... The relevant sub-rules, extracted above, clearly and repeatedly charge the Disciplinary Authority with the duty to give a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for its disagreement with the findings of the Inquiring Officer. The State Government, in the instant case, is also included in the definition of the expression "Disciplinary Authority" as given in rule 2(c) of the Service Rules. As per the definition, "Disciplinary Authority", in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a government servant, means "the authority competent under these rules to impose on him that penalty". The State Government, in the instant case, is also included in the definition of the expression "Disciplinary Authority" as given in rule 2(c) of the Service Rules. As per the definition, "Disciplinary Authority", in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a government servant, means "the authority competent under these rules to impose on him that penalty". Both the parties agree that the State Government, in the instant case, is also competent, under the Service Rules, to impose on the applicant the penalty of dismissal from service and, in fact, the said penalty in the instant case has been imposed by none else than the State Government. In that sence therefore, the State Government is also one of the Disciplinary Authorities under the Service Rules. Since, the State Government found itself in disagreement with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it was incumbent on it to give a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for its disagreement with the findings of the Inquiring Authority. Such findings and reasons, as were given by the Superintendent of Police, could not possibly relieve the State Government from such duty, for, the said report had already been reversed by the higher disciplinary authority i.e., the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range, Jaipur. 22. A reference to rule 30 of the Service Rules, which deals with "consideration of appeal", would also lead to the same conclusion that, in order to sustain its order of dismissal under law, the State Government was required to give distinct findings together with its reasons on the various charges framed against the applicant. Rule 30, no doubt, provides for the enhancement of penalty by the appellate authority. It, however, enjoins that "no order imposimposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty". Rule 30, no doubt, provides for the enhancement of penalty by the appellate authority. It, however, enjoins that "no order imposimposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty". It further lays down that if the enhanced penalty, which the appellate authority proposes to impose to impose is the penalty of dismissal andif an inquiry under rule 16 has not already been held in the case, "the appellate authority shall subject to the provisions of rule 19 itself hold such inquiry ordirect that such inquiry be held and there after on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and after giving the appellant an opportunity of making any representation, which he may wish to make against such penalty, pass such order, as it may deem fit. Now, it will be seen that, in the instant case, the inquiry under rule 16 of the Service Rules had already been held and it had been found, as a result thereof that the charges against the applicant were not proved. It was of course, open to the State Government, as the appellate authority, to reverse those findings by giving its own reasons. In other words, the inquiry already held under rule 16, could be accepted by the State Government as a valid inqruiry in all stages of the proceedings, except the proceedings dealing with "a report setting out the findings on each change and the reasons therefor." In the absence of such report the action taken by it cannot be justified as action taken under law 23. Even other wise, the impugned order is bad, being violative of the rinciples of natural justice. The rule of natural justice requires that the State Government shall give reasons for the action taken by it. In a recent decision, Siemens Engineering & Manufactruing Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India (1), the Supreme Court observed that it is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order, it makes. In a recent decision, Siemens Engineering & Manufactruing Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India (1), the Supreme Court observed that it is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order, it makes. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of a quasi-judicial ordre, is, in the opinion of their Lordship, "like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basis principle of natural justice, which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requriement of law." 24. For the foregoing reasons, this ground prevails and the impugned order must, accordingly, be set aside. Ground No. 2: 25. It has already been mentioned that there is nothing in the impugned order indicating as to which charge or charges, if any, had been proved against he applicant. A perusal of the return filed by the State Government in answer to rule nisi gives some inkling as to what was at the back of the mind of The State Government when it stated in the impugned order that the charges against the applicant were of a serious nature. The said paragraph reads; "The petitioner was a police officer and a duty of high order was expected from him. But he failed to observe this and has indulged hmlself into the activities for committing or abetting the commission of the crime. It is evident from the deposit of Smt. Prem Lata that the petitione was an abettor of crime. His silence at that time depicts that he has done something which a police officer should not have done." (para 11(Xiv) of the reply filed by the State). It would therefore, be reasonable to believe that the State Government has dis-missed the applicant from service on the basis of an un-stated charge that the applicant was guilty of the misconduct by reason of the abatement by him of the offences of abduction and wrongful confinement of Premlata by his wife. It would therefore, be reasonable to believe that the State Government has dis-missed the applicant from service on the basis of an un-stated charge that the applicant was guilty of the misconduct by reason of the abatement by him of the offences of abduction and wrongful confinement of Premlata by his wife. Rule 16(7) of the serv,ce Rules, inter alia, lays down that if in the opinion of the inquiring Authority, the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed, it may record findings on such charge, "provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the Government servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them." (Emphasis supplied). It has never been the case of the Department that the applicant had admitted the facts constituting the charge of abetment by him of the offences of abduction and wrongful confinement alleged to have been committed by his wife. On the other hand, the record reveals that the applicant had categorically denied the charges of abduction and wrongful confinement framed against him. There was, thus, no occasion or opportunity for him to admit the facts constituting the charge of abetment of the offence of abduction and wrongful confinement alleged to have been committed by his wife. Since the applicant denied that he had committed any offence whatever, it is not possible to attribute to him the admission of guilt regarding the offence of alleged abetment. He was not given any opportunity of defending himself against the charge of abetment. That being so, this ground also prevails and the impugned order has to be set aside on its basis. Ground No. 3: 26. There is absolutely no evidence on the record to prove that the applicant had committed any misconduct or abetted the commission of any offence by his wife. Even Premlata did not accuse the applicant of any objectionable conduct towards her throughout the period she stayed in his house. She made it clear that the applicant was throughout ill and therefore there was no question of his being a party to the alleged acts of omission and commission by his wife. The opinion of the Disciplinary Authority, to the contrary, is not supported by any evidence on the record. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside on this ground as well. 27. The opinion of the Disciplinary Authority, to the contrary, is not supported by any evidence on the record. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside on this ground as well. 27. In conclusion, therefore, I make the rule nisi absolute and consequently, quash the order of dismissal made by the State Government against the applicant. 28. In the circumstances, as brought out on the record, I am further of opinion that the applicant is entitled to his costs in this case from the State Government. I would order accordingly.