JUDGMENT M.M. Gupta, J. - This writ petition has been filed by Om Prakash and Satyabir for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on the 4th December, 1975 and the order passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital dated 18th June, 1976 (Annexure I and II respectively to the writ petition) releasing the shop in question in favour of opposite party No. 3, Sri Shanti Prasad. 2. It appears that a shop in Mohalla Najkari Bazar, Kashipur, district Nainital was in the tenancy of the petitioner for about 50 years. The shop was purchased by opposite party No. 3 in 1966. After purchasing the disputed shop, opposite party No. 3 moved an application under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to sue for eviction of the petitioners. This application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. That order was confirmed in revision by the Commissioner as well as by the State Government. 3. On 19.11.1971 a fresh application was moved before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer seeking the permission to sue the petitioners for their eviction from the shop in question. During the pendency of that application the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1912 (hereafter to be referred to as the Act) came into force. The application for permission moved under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 (hereafter to be referred as the Old Act was converted into one under section 21 of the Act. The application was duly amended by adding an additional ground that opposite party No. 3 required the shop after demolition. It was also mentioned in that application that a portion of the shop after construction shall be made available to the petitioners for carrying on their business. Another ground taken in that application was that the petitioners had built a shop in Durga Mandi after purchasing a plot. One of the objections that was taken against the maintainability of the application under section 21(l)(a) for the release of the shop in dispute was that the premises were not bona fide required by opposite party No. 3. Another ground taken in that application was that the petitioners had built a shop in Durga Mandi after purchasing a plot. One of the objections that was taken against the maintainability of the application under section 21(l)(a) for the release of the shop in dispute was that the premises were not bona fide required by opposite party No. 3. It was also claimed that the application was not maintainable and was barred by res judicata on account of the previous application moved on similar ground having been rejected. This objection relates to the provision of Rule 18 framed under the Act. It was also claimed that in the shop in question the good will was acquired and a very great hardship would be suffered by the petitioners. It was further asserted that in the shop in Durga Mandi one could carry on only the whole-sale business while in the shop in question the petitioners were carrying on the business of tobacco and vegetable ghee and under the Excise Rules that shop could not be shifted. The shop also carried on retail business. Both the Prescribed Authority as the learned Addl. District Judge did not accept the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and consequently ordered the release of the shop in favour of opposite party No. 3. 4. The grounds on which the quashing of the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge has been sought are that the application for release was not maintainable under Rule 18. It was further claimed that the likely hardship and the need of the petitioners were not considered. It was further asserted that during the pendency of the petition opposite party No. 3 had got another tenant evicted from another shop and as that accommodation could be used by him, the application was not maintainable. On this ground also, it was asserted, that the impugned orders should be quashed. It was further claimed that the learned Additional District Judge or the Prescribed Authority did not provide any alternative accommodation to the petitioners despite the fact that opposite party No. 3 himself extended that facility in his pleadings and further the appellate authority did not award two year's tent as compensation to the Petitioners, as provided under the statute. 5. It was further claimed that the learned Additional District Judge or the Prescribed Authority did not provide any alternative accommodation to the petitioners despite the fact that opposite party No. 3 himself extended that facility in his pleadings and further the appellate authority did not award two year's tent as compensation to the Petitioners, as provided under the statute. 5. I shall first discuss whether the application dated 19.11.1971 moved under Section 3 of the old Act and amended after the enforcement of the Act was maintainable or barred under Rule 18. This Rule does not prohibit a landlord from making an application within six months of the relevant date. It, however, makes a provision that if such an application is made the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings on merits shall be accepted as conclusive in the newly instituted proceedings. That means that the findings recorded under Section 3 of the Old Act had to be accepted in the proceedings when fresh application is moved and is converted into an application under Section 21(l) of the Act. This view was taken by brother Ojha J. in Dr. Rameshwar Prasad v. The IInd Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1977 A.R.C. 37. The first application for permission to site was finally decided by the State Government rejecting it on 26th May, 1971. The present application was moved on 19th November, 1971. Thus, that application was moved within six months and, as such, the conclusions in respect of the grounds taken in the earlier application are to be treated as conclusive if the same grounds are taken in the second application. The learned Additional District Judge has failed to notice that the first application was rejected on 26th May, 1971 by the State Government. He had, perhaps, before him only the order of the Commissioner which was passed much before the period of six months from 19th November, 1971. It is conceded on behalf of the opposite parties that since the application dated 19.11.1971 was converted into one under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act after its enforcement, the case shall be governed by the provisions of Rule 11. Now, it has to be examined how far the grounds taken in the first application, in which the decision was taken, were the same as taken in the second application. Now, it has to be examined how far the grounds taken in the first application, in which the decision was taken, were the same as taken in the second application. So far as the ground of personal requirement is concerned, it cannot be disputed that they are practically mentioned verbatim in the subsequent application dated 19.11.1971, as were stated earlier. It is clear from the order of the State Government dated 26th May, 1971. 6. It has further been contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 3 that the application after amendment under the provisions of Section 21(1) of the Act containing altogether a fresh grounds of the need of the building by him for reconstruction after demolition. Section 21(l)(a) runs as below : "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant : (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely- (a) That the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and now construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust." 7. The requirement of this provision is that before the building can be released the landlord has to prove his bona fide requirement irrespective of the fact whether he wants the building in its existing form or after demolition. He has, therefore, to establish in either case his bona fide requirement. So far as the requirement is concerned, the requirement is the same in the second application as it was in the former application. The order on the requirement rejecting the former application under section 3 of the Old Act passed by the State Government is, therefore, conclusive so far as the present application for release is concerned. The relief on this application, therefore, could not he given as Rule 18 bars it on account of the fact that the application was moved within six months of the date of the decision by the State Government. 8. The relief on this application, therefore, could not he given as Rule 18 bars it on account of the fact that the application was moved within six months of the date of the decision by the State Government. 8. There is another ground. The order passed by the Additional District Judge also suffers from the infirmity that he did not consider the likely hardship that will be caused to the petitioners from their eviction, although he has considered the hardship that would be caused to the landlord. 9. Another point raised was that during the pendency of the writ petition opposite party No. 3 had obtained a decree for eviction against another tenant in respect of a shop which is at a very short distance from the shop in question. It was contended on behalf of opposite party No. 3 that this point could not be raised for the first time in the writ petition. However, there is a direct authority on this point of our own High Court in C.M. Writ petition No. 5603 of 1974 - decided on 21.5.1976. Raj Narain Jain v. The IVth Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1976 A.W.C. 542, where it was held by brother K.N. Singh, J. : "The principle that subsequent events should be taken into account to do justice between the parties, is fully applicable to a writ petition. The primary purpose of a writ petition under Article 226 is to do justice between the parties and to ensure that the authorities constituted under the Act, are in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and no injustice is caused to the parties. If during the pendency of the writ petition the landlords occupied additional accommodation which was sufficient to meet their need in that case it would be unjust to evict the petitioner - tenant, who has been carrying on business in the shop for his livelihood. If during the pendency of the writ petition the landlords occupied additional accommodation which was sufficient to meet their need in that case it would be unjust to evict the petitioner - tenant, who has been carrying on business in the shop for his livelihood. It would not be proper or desirable to ignore the subsequent events, which took place in the instant case, as they have material bearing on the question of bona fide need and requirement of the landlord." (Extracted from the Head Note.) However, it is not necessary to consider this aspect of the case as I have held that the order for release on the present application cannot be passed as the earlier order passed by the State Government on 25th May, 1971 was conclusive against the opposite party No. 3 and the order of release could not be passed in his favour of the present application. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Annexure I to the writ petition) and the order passed by the prescribed authority (Annexure Ito the writ petition) are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.