JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of Basak, J., whereby the learned Judge discharged the rule nisi obtained by the appellants on their application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. THE appellants are the partners of the firm K. M. P. Products. They are also the partners of the firm kalooram Mahadeo Prasad. That firm manufactures edible oil. It is alleged by the appellants that they have entered into an agreement with the firm Kalooram Mahadeo prasad to this effect that the appellants would pack up oil belonging to the said firm in tin containers in lieu of remuneration. Respondent 1, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, west Bengal, by his letter, dated 25 May 1970, directed the appellants to comply with the provisions of the Employees provident Funds Act, 1952, and the Employees' provident Funds Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act and the scheme)on the ground that the appellant's establishment was a scheduled industry as it had been manufacturing edible oil within the meaning of S. 2 (i-a) of the Act, Thereafter a correspondence ensued between the appellants and respondent I. The appellants denied that their establishment was a scheduled industry or that the Act and the scheme applied to their establishment. Ultimately, respondent 1 by his letter, dated 17 November 1971, informed the appellants that their case was carefully examined and the establishment of the appellants was found to be a scheduled industry as it was engaged in the manufacture of "edible oil" within the meaning of S. 2 (i-a)of the Act. By another letter, dated 29 December 1971, respondent 1 demanded from the appellants a sum of Rs. 9000 as the employer's contribution from June 1970 to November 1971, and also administrative charges amounting to Rs. 325 for the said period. The appellants moved a writ petition on the original side of this Court challenging the said orders of respondent I and obtained a rule nisi being Matter No. 82 of 1972. On 13 November 1973, when the rule came up for hearing before Masud, J, none appeared on behalf of the appellants. The rule was, however, disposed of by Masud, J., on that day. On 13 November 1973, when the rule came up for hearing before Masud, J, none appeared on behalf of the appellants. The rule was, however, disposed of by Masud, J., on that day. The appellants were directed to have their grievances redressed and to make their submissions before respondent i with regard to the determination of the amount due from them after proper enquiry as provided under S. ?a of the Act. The said order was made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. Thereafter, respondent I issued a notice, dated 10 January 1974, under S. 7 A of the Act for the purpose of determination of the amount due from the appellants. The appellants were also directed to produce certain books and registers as specified in the said Notice. It appears that appellant 2 appeared before respondent 1 and submitted that their establishment did not come within the meaning of scheduled industries and so they were not liable under the provisions of the Act and the scheme. Respondent 1, however, came to the finding that the appellants' establishment was a scheduled industry and the provisions of the Act and the scheme were applicable to them. The said decision of respondent 1 was verbally communicated to appellant 2, which will appear from the order of respondent 1, dated 4 February 1974. Further it appears from the said order that as appellant 2 did not produce the books and registers that were called for, the amount due from the establishment of the appellants could not be calculated. Appellant 2, however, assured respondent 1 that he would intimate respondent 1 about the amount due from the establishment within thirty days from that date. Instead of doing that the appellants moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained the rule nisi out of which this appeal arises. 3. IT was contended on behalf of the appellants that as they were only packing oil in tin containers, they did not manufacture oil within the meaning of the definition of the word "manufacture" as contained in S. 2 (i-a)of the Act, and accordingly their establishment was not a scheduled industry. The said contention was overruled by Basak, J., and the rule was discharged. Hence this appeal. 4. SECTION. The said contention was overruled by Basak, J., and the rule was discharged. Hence this appeal. 4. SECTION. 1 (i-a) provides as follows: " 2 (i-a), 'manufacture' or 'manufacturing process* means any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. " Under Such I to the Act, any industry engaged in the manufacture of "edible oils and fats" would be a scheduled industry. It has been already stated that the appellants only pack up oil in tin containers belonging to the firm kalooram Mahadeo Prasad. Sri Ginwalla, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture" should be applied to the definition of the word. According to him, the ordinary or the normal meaning of the word "manufacture" is transformation of one article into another. It is submitted by him that packing of any article cannot be said to be transformation of one article into another and, as the appellants have been carrying on the business of packing oil, they are not manufacturers of oil. Therefore, their establishment is not a scheduled industry as they do not manufacture edible oil in the ordinary sense of the term. In support of this contention much reliance has been placed by the learned advocate on the case of Hjriprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divelkar [A.I.R. 195/ S. C. 12]. In that case the Supreme Court observed as follows : " It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. " According to Concise Oxford Dictionary the word 'manufacture' means to making of articles by physical labour or machinery, especially on a large scale. Packing of an article does not come within the meaning of the word "manufacture" as understood in common parlance. Packing may be said to be a stage in the process of manufacture. In spite of that, the Legislature has placed the meaning of the word "manufacture" on a par with that of the words "manufacturing process. Packing of an article does not come within the meaning of the word "manufacture" as understood in common parlance. Packing may be said to be a stage in the process of manufacture. In spite of that, the Legislature has placed the meaning of the word "manufacture" on a par with that of the words "manufacturing process. " The definition includes various stages of manufacturing process including packing. The definition of "manufacture" or ''manufacturing process" as contained in S. 2 (i-a) is different from the ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture. " the fact that the word "manufacture" has been placed on a par with that of the word "manufacturing process" strongly indicates that a meaning different from the ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture" has been intended by the Legislature. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that the ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture" should be applied in construing the definition The Legislature hiving adopted an artificial meaning, which is different from that of the ordinary meaning, the ordinary meaning cannot, in our opinion, be applied as contended on behalf of the appellants. This contention of the appellants, therefore, fails. It is urged by the learned advocate for the appellants that in order to bring within the scope of the Act, all categories of employees of a scheduled industry engaged at different stages of the "manufacturing process" under the same employer, the definition of the word "manufacture" has been placed on a par with that of the words "manufacturing process. " It is said that an employer who does not produce any article but packs up the same, cannot be said to manufacture the article within the meaning of S 2 (i-a) of the Act. In the definition, there is no indication that the meaning of the word "manufacture" or the words "manufacturing process" should be applied only when an establishment under the same employer manufactures an article and for that purpose carries on the entire manufacturing process. The Act and the schema are for the Benefit of industrial workers and in our view, Courts should not interpret the provisions of the Act or the scheme in such a manner as to deprive the workers of the benefit of the same. The Act and the schema are for the Benefit of industrial workers and in our view, Courts should not interpret the provisions of the Act or the scheme in such a manner as to deprive the workers of the benefit of the same. In the absence of any specific provision, it is difficult to accept the contention of the appellants that the definition of the said terms in s. 2 (i-a) should be applied only when the various operations mentioned therein are carried on by the employees of an establishment under the same employer and not under different employers. If such a restricted meaning is given, a considerable number of workers would be deprived of the benefit of the Act and the scheme. We do not think that the Legislature intended to give such a restricted and narrow meaning to the terms as defined under S. 2 (i-a). In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants. In our view, as the appellants have been carrying on the business of packing edible oil in tin containers, they have been manufacturing oil within the definition under S. 2 (i-a). 5. APART from what has been stated above even if it is assumed that unless the manufacturing operations are carried on under the same employer, the definition under S. 2 (i-a)would not apply as contended on behalf of the appellants, still, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the said contention is not available to the appellants for the reasons stated hereafter. It has been already noticed that the appellants are also the partners of the firm Kalooram mahadeo Prasad. Besides the appellants, there is no other partner in either of the firms. Under the Indian Partnership Act, a firm is not a legal entity. There is no provision in the Act or in the scheme which confers any legal status on a firm or recognizes a firm as a legal entity. The appellants being the partners of both the firms, it is apparent that the appellants have been carrying on the business of manufacturing oil under two firm names. The employees working in K. m. P. Products are the employees of the appellants and those working in the other firm, viz., Kalooram Madadeo prasad are also the employees of the appellants. It is curious that the appellants entered into a contract with themselves. The employees working in K. m. P. Products are the employees of the appellants and those working in the other firm, viz., Kalooram Madadeo prasad are also the employees of the appellants. It is curious that the appellants entered into a contract with themselves. As the firm is not a legal entity, in our view, the manufacture of edible oil and the entire manufacturing process are carried on by the appellants. In these circumstances, the said operations are carried on by the same employers. So even if we assume that the definition should have a restricted application as suggested by the learned advocate for the appellants, still the appellants would be manufacturers of edible oil by packing the same in tin containers. 6. IT is next contended that as the appellants are not packing oil with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, they cannot be held to be manufacturing oil within the meaning of S. 2 (i-a) of the Act. There is no merit in this contention. There can be no doubt that oil is required to be packed in containers for the purpose of its being used, sold, transported, delivered or disposed. Whether the appellants are doing the work of packing oil with that view or not, is quite immaterial. This contention is, therefore, rejected. Lastly, it is contended that in view of the definition of the word " employee" under s. 2 (f) of the Act, the employees of the appellants who are alleged to be contractors, should be considered as employees of the firm kalooram Mahadeo Prasad. This argument is without any substance. For the same reasons as indicated above, namely, that as the appellants have been carrying on the business of manufacturing edible oil under two firm names, the manufacturing works are being carried on under the same employers; the definition of the term " employee " as mentioned in S 2 (f) has no manner of application in context it has been sought to be applied. 7. NO other point has bean argued on behalf of the appellants. All the contentions the appellants having failed, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 8. DHIRESH Chandra Chakravorti, J. :i agree.