JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent involves a short question as to who is the appointing authority empowered as such to direct compulsory retirement of the appellant under Rule 75 (aa) of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part i (hereinafter referred to as the said rules). The facts are more or less not in dispute. The appellant was an amusement Tax Inspector of the Calcutta Collectorate. He was served with a notice of compulsory retirement under Rule 75 (aa) of the said Rules by the first respondent, the Commissioner of Presidency Division, the material part whereof recited : "i, A. K. Mazumdar, Commissioner, Presidency Division and appointing authority of Amusement Tax Inspectors of the Calcutta collectorate, am of the opinion that it is in public interest to retire Shri Mitra from Government service; it is accordingly decided to serve a notice on him directing that he should retire from Government service with effect from the 11th November 1974. " 2. SUCH a notice was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition principally on two grounds, namely, (i) that the respondent No. 1 not being the appointing authority in respect of the petitioner had not the authority to direct his compulsory retirement, (ii) that in any event the said respondent did not do so on any independent opinion of his own but did it mechanically acting on the recommendation of a review committee. The writ petition was contested by the respondents and a learned single judge of this court dismissed the writ petition on such contest overruling both the points so raised before him. So far as the first point is concerned, the learned judge in the trial court found on the affidavit evidence that the respondent No. 1 had actually appointed the appellant as the Amusement Tax inspector, and as such, must be held to be his appointing authority. Appellant's contention to the effect that irrespective of whether respondent No. 1 had appointed him or not, when under the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, the Collector and not respondent No. 1 is the appointing authority in respect of holders of posts held by the appellant, the Collector and not respondent no, 1 could have exercised powers under Rule 75 (aa) of the said Rules and directed appellant's compulsory retirement was overruled by the learned judge. It was so overruled firstly because according to the learned judge Rule 6 (2) of the West, bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules which conferred the power of appointment on Collector is not retrospective and as such can hare no application to the present case when the appellant was appointed long ago in 1942 and secondly because when the definition of the term "appointing authority" as given by West Bengal services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, 1971, covers the authority who had actually made the appointment along with the authority authorised to make the appointment, respondent No. 1 would as well be the appointing authority in respect of the appellant. So far as the second point raised by the appellant is concerned it was found by the learned judge that though in directing compulsory retirement of the appellant the respondent no. 1 accepted the majority opinion of the review committee recommending such retirement he did so upon his own decision, and as such, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 did not apply his mind or that he did not satisfy himself about the necessity of so retiring the appellant in public interest. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the learned judge in the trial court the present appeal has been preferred. In this appeal Mr. Maitra appearing on behalf of the appellant has very strongly contended that the learned judge in the trial court went wrong in holding that the respondent no. 1 was the appointing authority authorised as such by Rule 75 (aa) of the said Rules to direct appellant's compulsory retirement. According to mr. Maitra. the term 'appointing authority' in Rule 75 (aa) must necessarily mean the authority who for the time being is competent to make an appointment to the post held by the appellant. Since under the provisions of Rule 6 (2) read with entry 10 in column 2 of the First Schedule to the west Bengal Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, it was the Collector who alone is authorised to appoint an Amusement Tax Inspector he alone should be taken to be the appointing authority competent to take action under Rule 75 (aa) and not the Commissioner, an authority higher in rank to the Collector even if the Commissioner might have appointed the appellant years ago. The learned jude in The trial court over-ruled thus contention when raised before him for reasons referred to hereinbefore. Rule 6 (2) of the West Bengal services (Classification. Control and appeal) Rules, 1971, provides: " (2) Appointments to Class III and Class IV Services-All appointments to West rental State Services, Class III and class IV specified in the entries in column 1 of Schedule I shall be made by the authorities mentioned in the corresponding entries in column 2 of that Schedule. " 3. THE relevant entry is entry no. 10 which specifies the authorities as "head of office belonging to West Bengal State Service Class I (in respect of their own establishment) or where there are no such officers, the officers just above the heads of offices. " There is no dispute that head of office in respect of the Calcutta Collectorate is the Collector, and as such, under the west Bengal Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, he is empowered under Rule 6 (2) read with the Schedule to make all appointments in class III and Class IV Services at the Collectorate including amusement Tax Inspectors which is a class III post. No doubt these Rules came into effect in the year 1971 and the authority to appoint vested in the collector only therefore but if the term 'appointing authority' in Rule 75 (aa) of the said Rules which also came into effect in the year 1971 means and includes only the authority competent to make appointment to the post for the time being then It is inconsequential whether Rule 6 (2) is prospective or retrospective because on the date the power under Rule 75 (aa) is being exercised that authority alone would be competent being authorised as such. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned judge in the trial court could not have overruled this objection of the appellant merely on the ground that Rule 6 (2) is prospective and not retrospective. 4. THE real issue in our view is to find out what is meant by the term 'appointing authority' in Rule 75 (aa). Therefore, in our opinion, the learned judge in the trial court could not have overruled this objection of the appellant merely on the ground that Rule 6 (2) is prospective and not retrospective. 4. THE real issue in our view is to find out what is meant by the term 'appointing authority' in Rule 75 (aa). If that authority means only the authority for the time being competent to make the appointment to the post held by the appellant then the Commissioner would not be the appointing authority at the time when the impugned notice was being issued because at that point of time the Collector alone was competent to make the appointment to the post held by the appellant. The term 'appointing authority' has not been defined by the said Rules, namely, the west Bengal Service Rules, Part I. The term 'appointing authority', however, has been defined by Rule 3 of the West bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The relevant provision reads as follows: "3. Definitions-In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,-II) "appointing authority" in relation to a Government servant means- (i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the services of which the Government servant is for the time being a member or to the grade of the service in which the Government servant is for the time being included, or (ii) the authority empowered to make appointments to the post which the Government servant for the time being holds, or (iii) the authority which appointed the Government servant to such service, grade or post as the case may be, or (iv) where the Government servant having been a permanent member of any other service or having substantively held any other permanent post, has been in continuous employment of the Government the authority which appointed him to that service or to any grade in that service or to that post. Whichever authority is the highest authority," The learned judge in the trial court has relied on this definition in holding that when under this definition the term "appointing authority" includes under clause (iii) the authority who had appointed the Government servant, certainly the Commissioner would constitute the appointing authority since on facts it is well established that the Commissioner had appointed the appellant as an Amusement Tax inspector. Mr. Mr. Maitra appearing on behalf of the appellant has, however, drawn our attention to the fact that this definition applies only in the matter of interpretation of the term 'appointing authority' as used in the west Bengal Services (Classification, control, and Appeal) Rules, 1971. and not of the term so used in the said rules, namely, the West Bengal service Rules, Part I. In our view, however, when the said Rules, namely, west Bengal Service Rules, Pan I has not defined the term 'appointing authority', if we are so invoke the meaning of the said term 'appointing authority' from the West Bengal services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, such meaning must necessarily be with reference to the definition given in the said Rules and to that extent in our view the learned judge in the trial court could rightly refer to the definition of the term 'appointing authority' in the West bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, l971, to find out whether the Commissioner could be considered to be the appointing authority. 5. WE are, however, in agreement with Mr. Maitra that such definition of the term 'appointing authority' as set out in the West Bengal Services (Classification. Control and Appeal), rules, 1971, cannot normally be invoked to interpret Rule 75 (aa) of the west Bengal Service Rules Part I if that Rule is to be interpreted independent of the West Bengal services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules. Admittedly, however, the term 'appointing authority' has not been defined in the said Rules, namely, west Bengal Service Rules, Part I. It has not been so defined in our opinion it would be for us to determine what is really meant by the term 'appointing authority'. When in rule 75 (aa) the term 'appointing authority' has been used in relation to the Government servant who can be made to go on compulsory retirement in exercise of the powers so vested by rule 75 (aa) and not in relation to the post held by him, it would not be unreasonable to think that the terra means the authority who having appointed the Government servant concerned is his appointing authority. Viewed from this aspect there is no reason why the term would not include the authority who had actually appointed the Government servant concerned. Viewed from this aspect there is no reason why the term would not include the authority who had actually appointed the Government servant concerned. Whether the said term would also include the authority for the time being competent to make an appointment to the post held by the government servant concerned or need not be decided in the present case but in our opinion even if the term includes such an authority we find nothing on the terms of the Rule to exclude the authority who and actually appointed the Government servant concerned. Rule 6 (2) of the West bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 1971 in specifying the authorities competent to make appointments, is not exhaustive and there may be cases not covered by these rules to whom Rule 75 (aa) need nonetheless apply. Therefore, it cannot be taken that by the term "appointing authority" used in Rule 75 (aa), the framers of the Rule merely meant those who were authorised to make the appointment in Rule 6 (2) and not those who having appointed the particular Government servant was the appointing authority in respect of him. Under Rule 6 (2) of the West Bengal services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, the Collector alone may for the time being be the authority competent to make appointment to the post held by he appellant as specified by Part III of those Rules but when rule 75 (aa) on its terms do not limit the exercise of powers in the hands of only the authority specified in Rule 6 (2) of the West Bengal Services (Classification. Control and Appeal)Rules, 1971, we are of the opinion that the term 'appointing authority' in Rule 75 (aa) should be given its ordinary and wide meaning to include an authority who having made the appointment certainly becomes the appointing authority in respect of the Government servant concerned. 6. MR. Maitra relies on two decisions-one of the Punjab and haryana High Court and the other of the Allahabad High Court in the rases of Gurdayal Singh Baba-V-Diretor of industries, 1871 (1) S. L. R 161 and nanak Saran Srivastava-V-State of u. P. 1971 (1) S. L. R 168. 6. MR. Maitra relies on two decisions-one of the Punjab and haryana High Court and the other of the Allahabad High Court in the rases of Gurdayal Singh Baba-V-Diretor of industries, 1871 (1) S. L. R 161 and nanak Saran Srivastava-V-State of u. P. 1971 (1) S. L. R 168. So far as the allahabad decision is concerned, the same is clearly distinguishable, in as much as the power there exercised was neither by one who had the authority to appoint nor by one who had actually appointed the Government servant but was so exercised by a higher authority, and as such, it was held that such authority had not been exercised by the competent authority. The single Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana high Court, however, well supports the contention put forward by Mr. Maitra. But from the judgment it does not appear whether the Act or the Rules thereunder consideration excluded the authority who had actually appointed the Government servant directed to be retired. But if in that case, the decision rests on view that when under the rules later enforced an authority other than the authority who had made the appointment had been conferred the exclusive authority to appoint to the post to which the Government servant was so appointed, the authority who had appointed the Government, servant would cease to be the appointing authority competent to direct compulsory retirement under a provision like Rule 75 (aa), then with respect we are unable 10 agree to that view In our view, therefore. Rule 75 (aa) of the said Rules while authorising the appointing authority to exercise powers vested thereby did not exclude the authority who had actually appointed the Government servant concerned. Though incidentally a dispute was sought to be raised as to whether the respondent No. I had actually appointed the appellant as an amusement Tax Inspector or not we feel no hesitation in accepting the finding of the learned judge that on the affidavits its of the parties is is not really disputed even by the appellant that he respondent No. I had appointed him as the Amusement Tax inspector. Such being the position, in our view respondent No. I was competent enough to exercise the powers under Rule 75 (aa) of the said rules, and as such, it cannot be said that, when he issued the notice he did so without any authority. Such being the position, in our view respondent No. I was competent enough to exercise the powers under Rule 75 (aa) of the said rules, and as such, it cannot be said that, when he issued the notice he did so without any authority. 7. THE second point raised by mr. Maitra is that the respondent No. 1 did not issue the notice on any independent decision of his own but that he proceeded to do so merely on the majority opinion of the review committee. Strong reliance is placed by mr. Maitra on the statement made in paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Collector on behalf of the respndents. In thin paragraph what was stated is as follows : "before the issuing of the said notice of) compulsory retirement dated 6. 8. 74 his case was considered by the review committee and as per the majority opinion of the members of the review committee the Commissioner, presidency Division, decided to issue the aforesaid notice in the public interest. " This statement, however, does not establish the claim of Mr. Maitra that the respondent No. I in directing compulsory retirement of the appellant did so merely in view of the recommendation of the review committee and without applying his own mind and without forming any independent opinion of his own. We agree with the learned judge in the trial court that the respondent No. I in issuing the impugned notice did so on an independent opinion of his own which was formed on consideration of the recommendation of the majority members of the review committee. Such being the position, we find no merit in the second contention raised by Mr. Maitra. 8. INCIDENTALLY, it was pointed out by mr. Maitra that the impugned notice, recites that whereas the appellant had attained the age of 55 years and whereas he had entered the government service before attaining the age of 35 years so he is being retired compulsorily in exercise of powers under Rule 75 (aa). According to Mr. Maitra when the appellant was a Class III staff he would never come under clause (i) of Rule 75 (aa) and whether he had entered the government service before attaining the age of 35 years or not is inconsequential. According to Mr. Maitra when the appellant was a Class III staff he would never come under clause (i) of Rule 75 (aa) and whether he had entered the government service before attaining the age of 35 years or not is inconsequential. Therefore, it is suggested that such a recital in the notice clearly indicates that the same was being used in a mechanical manner without, any application of mind. We are, however, unable to accept this contention since on the materials disclosed and on the records it being otherwise well established that such power had been exercised in a bonafide manner on proper application of mind an inappropriate recital incorporated in the notice would not render it illegal nor would it furnish any basis for holding that, the power had been so exercised in a mechanical way. In this view, we find no substance in such a contention raised by Mr. Maitra. As all the points raised by Mr. Maitra fail, the appeal fails and is dismissed. We make no order to costs. The money deposited by the respondents with the Registrar, appellate Side of this Court be permitted to be withdrawn by the respondents since the appeal fails. B. C. Chakrabaiti, J. : appeal dismissed.