Bhanwarlal v. Champalal — 1978 DIGILAW 280 (RAJ)

S.K. MAL LODHA., J.—This is a defendants revision against the order of the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, dated March 31, 1978 by which he confirmed the order of the Munsif City, Jodhpur, dated March 2, 1977. 2. The plaintiff-landlerd (non-petitioner) instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant-petitioner in the court of Munsif City, Jodhpur, on August 30, 1972. Ejectment was sought on the ground of default and sub-letting. The case of the plaintiff as disclosed in the plaint is that the defendant had taken on lease shop No 5 situate in his building located in Moti Chowk, Jodhpur and the rent payable by the defendant was Rs. 32/- per mensem inclusive of electricity charges and house tax about which there is no dispute between the parties and the defendant has paid rent up to Chait Sudi 15, Samvat 2028. It has been further mentioned in para 5 that a written notice wast sent to the defendant on December 27, 1971 stating that his tenancy would sand terminated on Magh Sudi 15, Samvat 2028 which is the date on which the month of the tenancy expires and that rent from Chait Sudi 15 to Magh Sudi 15 amounting to Rs. 320/- are due from him. In para 7 of the plaint, it is mentioned that a sum of Rs. 225/- on account of damages for use and occupation for the period from Falgun Badi 1 to Srawan Sudi 15, inclusive of Adhik Mas is due. Cause of action is stated to have arisen on Srawan Badi 1, Samvat 2035 when the defendant took the shop on rent and agreed to pay Rs. 32/- per men-sem as rent. The defendant contested the suit on various grounds. His defence inter alia, is that rent up to Baisakh Sudi 15 has already been paid. He also preferred a counter-claim for the payment of Rs. 64.80 p. alleging that the plaintiff has realised from the defendant house-tax from Samvat 2025 to the current Samvat illegally. 3. On October 27, 1972, an application under S. 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XVII of 1950) (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) as it existed then, was filed by the defendant. 3. On October 27, 1972, an application under S. 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XVII of 1950) (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) as it existed then, was filed by the defendant. In that application, in para 2, it was mentioned that the defendant had already paid rent upto Baisakh Sudi 15 and that the plaintiff has wrongly mentioned in para 2 of the plaint that rent has only been paid upto Chait Sudi 15. He prayed that the arrears may be determined and time may be allowed for depositing the same. A reply was filed to this application on February 1, 1973 and the plaintiff reiterated in para 2 of the reply that the defendant has paid rent up to Chait Sudi 15 only. As the defendant raised the dispute regarding 1o amount of rent payable by him, the trial court held an enquiry. The trial court vide its order dated April 26, 1973 determined the amount of rent etc. upto Jeth Badi 1, Samvat 2030 and directed the defendant to deposit the rent so determined within fifteen days from the date of the order. A further direction was made that the defendant should continue to deposit the rent month by month in accordance with S. 13(4)(old) of the Act. In that order dated April 26, 1973, the learned Munsif has clearly recorded a finding that the defendant has failed to prove that he has paid rent upto Baisakh Sudi 15. The defendant deposited the amount so determined within the time fixed by the court. He, however, failed to deposit the rent month by month as envisaged by S. 13(4)(old) of the Act. On February 16, 1974, an application (dated February 14,1974) was moved by the plaintiff under S. 13(6)(old) of the Act stating that the defendant has neither deposited in court nor paid to the plaintiff arrears of rent by 15th of each succeeding month, It was prayed by the plaintiff that the defence against eviction be struck out. On February 16, 1974, an application (dated February 14,1974) was moved by the plaintiff under S. 13(6)(old) of the Act stating that the defendant has neither deposited in court nor paid to the plaintiff arrears of rent by 15th of each succeeding month, It was prayed by the plaintiff that the defence against eviction be struck out. The defendant submitted his reply on October 19, 1974 and stated that the tenancy of the defendant commences from the first of the month according to British calendar about which there was an oral agreement between the parties and that the defendant has been depositing rent, month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month Along with the reply, he submitted a schedule mentioning details of the deposit of the rent made by him from month to month. Learned Munsif, by bis order dated December 10, 1974, dismissed the plaintiffs application. It was not disputed before the learned Munsif, as is apparent from the order dated December 10, 1974, that the defendant had deposited each months rent after the order dated April 26, 1973 by the 15th of each succeeding month according to the British calendar and as such, he has not become a defaulter. The next question that came to be considered by the learned Munsif was whether the tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month or the British calendar month. He examined this question and observed that the plaintiff has not specified the details of the delayed payments according to the Hindu calendar month. 4. Being dissatisfied with the order dated December 10, 1974, the plaintiff preferred an appeal and it is not in dispute before me that appeal was withdrawn on November 20, 1975 The second application was moved under S. 13(5) of the Act on April 7, 1976 in which it was stated that the defendant has deposited the rent of the months April and November, 1974, May 1975 and January 1976 beyond time and since the defendant has not deposited the rent of the aforesaid months in time, he is a defaulter. In this application, it was specifically mentioned that the plaintiff has previously moved an application tinder S. 1 (6) of the Act, on the ground of default which was dismissed. In this application, it was prayed that the defence against eviction be struck out. In this application, it was specifically mentioned that the plaintiff has previously moved an application tinder S. 1 (6) of the Act, on the ground of default which was dismissed. In this application, it was prayed that the defence against eviction be struck out. The defendant contested this application stating that he has not committed any default in payment of the rent as stated by the plaintiff. It appears from the order sheet dated Jan. 10, 1977 that the learned counsel for the plaintiff stated before the court that he wants to move a fresh application under S. 13(5) of the Act, to which the learned counsel had no objection. This second application of the plaintiff has not been disposed of by the trial court so far and the third application was submitted on January 20, 1977 under S. 13(5) of the Act. It was stated in this application that the defendant did not deposit the rent by the fifteenth of each succeeding month. It was also mentioned that the tenancy of the defendant is from Badi Ekam and the month of tenancy is from Badi Ekam to Sudi Poonam. A mention was made in the application that the previous application under S. 13(6) of the Act was dismissed because it did not contain specific details of defaults of the monthly rent by the defendant. In this application, details of the monthly defaults according to the Hindu calendar were given. It was specifically stated that the defendant has not deposited rent month by month in time as required by Section 13(4) of the Act and, therefore, the defendant is a defaulter. Because of the defaults committed by the defendant-petitioner, it was pleaded that the defence against eviction under S. 13(5) of the Act be struck out. The defendant opposed this application by filing a reply on February 17, 1977. The principal objection taken in the reply was that it was not open to the plaintiff to allege that the month of the tenancy commences from Badi Ekam of each month and that this will be deemed to have been abandoned when he did not press the appeal which was preferred by him against the order of the trial court dated December 10, 1974. It was pleaded that he has been depositing the rent according to the British calendar months by fifteenth of each month and that this deposit has been made in accordance with S. 13(4) of the Act. The learned Munsif, by his order dated March 2, 1977, ordered the defence of the defendant against eviction to be struck out on the ground that the defendant has failed to deposit the rent by fifteenth of each of the month of the tenancy according to Hindu calendar month. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Munsif on March 2, 1977, the defendant-petitioner went in appeal and the learned District Judge dismissed it on March 31, 1978 holding that the defendant-tenant has committed default in the payments of the monthly rent in pursuance of the order passed on April 26, 1977. 5 Being dissatisfied with this order, the defendant-petitioner has come up in revision. 6. I have heard Mr. P.C. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the non petitioner, and have also gone through the record of the case. 7. It has vehemently been argued by Mr. Mathur that the order dated December 10, 1974 passed on the first application (which was presented on November 16, 1974) operates as res judicata. His submission in this behalf is that the plaintiff himself in that application had mentioned that the defendant did not deposit the rent of each month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month nor did he pay the same to the plaintiff He invited my attention to the following words used in the application,— ^^iUnzg rkjh[k ds igys us rks U;k;ky; esa tek djk;k gS vkSj u gh oknh dks vnk fd;k x;k gSA** 8. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that in the first application the plaintiff has clearly mentioned "BEFORE DATE OF 15TH" and before the trial court it was admitted by the learned counsel lor the plaintiff that according to the British calendar month, rent of each month was deposited before fifteenth of each succeeding month and, therefore, the defendant has not committed any default. 9. On the basis of this, the learned Munsif observed in the order that, ^^oknh dk vk/kkj izkFkZuk i= bl rjg ls lekIr gks tkrk gSA** 10. 9. On the basis of this, the learned Munsif observed in the order that, ^^oknh dk vk/kkj izkFkZuk i= bl rjg ls lekIr gks tkrk gSA** 10. Apart from this, it was submitted that it is clear that the application of the plaintiff landlord was dismissed under S. 13(6) (old) of the Act. It is this order, according to the learned counsel, which operates as res judicata on more than one count. He elaborated his submission by saying that in that application, the plaintiff landlord should have averred that the rent was payable according to the Hindu calendar month and since he failed, to raise this plea in that application, it was not open to him to aver this in the third applica-tion which was presented on January 20, 1977. He invokes principle of constructive res judicata. In this connection, he placed reliance on Bundu vs. Smt. Hashmat (1), State of U.P. vs. Nawab Hussain (2), Braj Bhusan Singh vs. Nagendra Singh (3), Arjunsingh vs. Mohindra Kumar (4) and Satyadhyan Ghosal vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi (5). 11. On the other hand, Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the non-petitioner argued that the first application which was presented on February 16, 1974 was dismissed as details of the defaults according to the Hindu calendar months were not mentioned and there was no finding of the trial court that defaults have not been committed in payment of monthly rent according to the Hindu calendar months. According to the learned counsel date (Tarikh) means the statement of time He further submitted that when the matter was not in issue and when no finding has been given in respect thereof, it does not operate as res judicata. He urged that it is the order dated April 26, 1973 which operates as res judicata in so far as commencement of the month of tenancy according to the Hindu calendar month is concerned. He argued that the principle of constructive res judicata is not applicable to rent control matters as S. 13(4),(5) and (6) are mandatory. In this connection, he placed reliance on the decision of this court reported in Jodhraj vs. Suleman (6). 12. It is no doubt true that a previous order in a proceeding finally adjudicating a matter cannot be canvassed by the parties thereto in any subsequent stages of the same proceeding. In this connection, he placed reliance on the decision of this court reported in Jodhraj vs. Suleman (6). 12. It is no doubt true that a previous order in a proceeding finally adjudicating a matter cannot be canvassed by the parties thereto in any subsequent stages of the same proceeding. This has been so held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosals case (5) and Arjunsinghs case (41). This is also well settled that it is matter in issue either actually or constructively and not the subject matter that forms the test of res judicata. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined and decided but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with, the subject matter of litigation and every such matter that comes within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of matters of claim or defence. The first application that was submitted on February 16, 1974 on behalf of the plaintiff merely mentioned that the defendant-tenant had neither deposited in court nor did he pay to the plaintiff rent by the fifteenth of each month. The learned Munsif, while disposing of the application, in his order dated December 10, 1974, has stated that the plaintiff has nowhere mentioned the month of the tenancy whether it is according to the British calendar month or according to the Hindu calendar month. There are two significant findings in this regard given by the learned Munsif in his order dated December 10, 1974: One is that since the rent of each month has been deposited before the fifteenth of British calendar month as conceded by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the defendant tenant has not committed any default in payment of rent and two, so far as the question whether the rent was payable according to the Hindu calendar month or not the learned Munsif has merely stated that it was the duty of the plaintiff to have specifically mentioned the dates of delayed payment of rent of each month Since the details in respect thereof were not specified, he dismissed the application. In these circumstances, two important questions crop up for consideration: (1) whether on the application submitted by the plaintiff landlord on February 16, 1974, the court was required to adjudicate on the question whether the month of tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month or British calendar month and (2) whether while disposing of the application, the learned Munsif has given any finding in this regard. On a careful examination of the order dated December 10, 1974, it is clear that the question «hat the tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month was not at all gone into by the learned Munsif, for, it was conceded before him by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant has not committed any default in payment of rent in accordance with the British calendar months. It is clear from the order dated December 10, 1974 that the learned Munsif did not give any finding on the question, for, in his view, in the absence of the details of defaults according to the Hindu calendar month, no finding in this regard was possible. It inevitably follows that so far as the order dated December 10, 1974 is concerned, there is no finding of the learned Munsif on the question that the tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month. The matter, however, does not stand at that as according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the plaintiff should have taken the plea specifically in the first application that the rent was payable according to the Hindu calendar month but since that was not done, it is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. The scope of enquiry at that stage when the application dated Feb. 16, 1974 was moved, was whether the defendant has deposited rent by the fifteenth of each month. In Section 13(4) (old), the words used are, "shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate". The Hindi word "TARIKH" when translated into English is date which means a statement of time, point of time for beginning etc. So, it cannot be said that in this application, there was a positive assertion about the fifteenth of the British calendar month. The Hindi word "TARIKH" when translated into English is date which means a statement of time, point of time for beginning etc. So, it cannot be said that in this application, there was a positive assertion about the fifteenth of the British calendar month. As the scope of that application was merely whether there was any default in payment of monthly rent according to Sec. 13(4)(old) of the Act, it was not necessary at that stage to specifically adjudicate as to whether the tenancy was according to the British calendar month or Hindu calendar mouth. The order dated December 10, 1974 cannot be said to bar the subsequent applications of the plaintiff-landlord on the ground of constructive res judicata. 13. It may be stated here that in the plaint, the plaintiff landlord has clearly stated that rent has been paid up to Chait Sudi 15. Not only this, the amount claimed as arrears of rent has also been mentioned from Chait Sudi 15, to Magh Sudi 15 and the damages far use and occupation have been claimed from Falgun Badi 1 to Srawan Sudi 15 for seven months inclusive of the Adhik Mas. The defendant in his written statement in para 2 has stated that the rent was paid up to Baisakh Sudi 15. In para 12 relating to the counterclaim, it was mentioned that the plaintiff has illegally realised from the defendant house-tax amounting to Rs. 64.80 p. for the period intervening Samvat 2025 to Samvat prevailing at the time of the filing of the written statement. In the application under Sec. l3(5)(old) of the Act submitted on October 27, 1972 in para 2 the defendant has stated that he has paid rent upto Baisakh Sudi 15 and not upto Chait Sudi 15 as mentioned by the plaintiff in para 2 of the plaint. The learned Munsif determined the amount payable upto Jeth Badi 1, Samvat 2030 and this amount was deposited by the defendant within the time fixed by the court. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the plaintiff as well as the defendant were quite aware that the month of tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month commencing from Badi 1, to Sudi 15. In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the plaintiff as well as the defendant were quite aware that the month of tenancy is according to the Hindu calendar month commencing from Badi 1, to Sudi 15. As such, according to me, even when the application under Sec. 13(6) (old) of the Act dated February 16, 1974 was moved, this question was not in dispute and when it was not in dispute, the question of raising it as an alternative ground does not arise. From this point of view also, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted that the order on the first application dated February 16, 1974 will operate as res judicata. The conditions for the applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata do not exist in this case. As stated above, the second application which was moved on April 7, 1976 mentions that the rent for the month of April 74, November 74, May 75 and January 76 have not been deposited as envisaged by Sec. 13(4)(old). This application was not decided since the plaintiff, with the permission of the trial court, submitted a third application on January 20, 1977. In the third application, the particulars of the defaults in payments of monthly rent were mentioned and it was stated that the monthly rent has not been deposited each month before the fifteenth of the succeeding month. 14 I may add that the defendant in the first instance moved an appli-cation under Sec. 13(5)(old) on October 27, 1972. That application was decided by the Munsif on April 26, 1973 and it was not disputed at that time that the tenancy of the defendant-petitioner did not commence according to the Hindu calendar month. As required by Sec- 13(4)(old), the learned Munsif determined the arrears of rent and further gave a direction to the defendant to deposit rent month by month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month. Since the rent was determined and paid according to the Hindu calendar month, it was clear that deposit of rent month by month was also to be made according to the Hindu calendar month. Thus, there was an adjudication to that effect at that time and that question was not open to challenge or attack at any subsequent stage. Since the rent was determined and paid according to the Hindu calendar month, it was clear that deposit of rent month by month was also to be made according to the Hindu calendar month. Thus, there was an adjudication to that effect at that time and that question was not open to challenge or attack at any subsequent stage. Therefore, according to the plaintiff as well as the defendant, as is borne oat from the pleadings of the parties an 1 the order passed by the trial court on April 26, 1973, the payment of each months rent was to be made according the Hindu calendar month and since there was default in payment of the rent, the court rightly ordered the defence of the defendant against eviction to be struck out under Sec. 13(5) of the Act. In any view of the matter the court below did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity in ordering that the defendant has committed default in payments of monthly rent in time in pursuance of the order of the trial court dated April 26, 1973. 15. It was next argued by Mr. Mathur after obtaining leave from the court that sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 13(old) which was in vogue at the relevant time din not envisage payment of rent month by month and as such, the direction of the trial court that the defendant should "continue to deposit the rent every month as prescribed by Sec. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act" was without jurisdiction. It was urged that this direction is non est in the eye of law and as such, if the defendant has not deposited monthly rent in pursuance of this direction, which could not have been given and which was without jurisdiction, the defence of the defendant against eviction could not be struck out. According to him, as soon as a dispute was raised by the tenant as to the amount of rent payable, then the matter went out of the purview of Sec. 13(4)(old) and Sec. 13(5)(old) did not provide for deposit of rent month by month. According to him, as soon as a dispute was raised by the tenant as to the amount of rent payable, then the matter went out of the purview of Sec. 13(4)(old) and Sec. 13(5)(old) did not provide for deposit of rent month by month. I may state at once that this argument is wholly devoid of force though I propose to dilate on it a little liter In order to test the correctness of this argument, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Sec. 13(4), 13(5), 13(6) and 13(7) of the old Act. Sub sec. (4) of Sec 13 (old) applies where a suit for eviction of a tenant from the premises is pending before the court and one of the grounds for eviction is default in payment of rent as contemplated by Sec. 13(l)(a). Sub-sec. (4) of S. 13 allowed a further opportunity to the tenant to prevent eviction if he was ready and willing to comply with the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 13. Sub sec. (4) of Sec. 13 therefore afford* d an additional protection to a tenant. Then, sub-sec. (5) of Sec, 13 provided that where the dispute arises as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the dispute shall be solved by the court by determining the amount of arrears of rent due and by making a direction for the payment thereof in accordance with the provisions of sub sec. (4) of Sec. 13. It, therefore, follows that even when a determination is made under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 13, the amount so determined is to be paid within fifteen days from the date of such order. But while passing any order, the court has to pass it in accordance with the provisions of sub sec. (4). This is what the court did when it passed the order dated April 26, 1973. Last para of the order dated April 26, 1973 clearly mentions that the amount so determined is to be deposited within fifteen days from the date of the order and a further direction was given that rent of every month is to be deposited as prescribed by Sec. 13(4) (old) of the Act. Last para of the order dated April 26, 1973 clearly mentions that the amount so determined is to be deposited within fifteen days from the date of the order and a further direction was given that rent of every month is to be deposited as prescribed by Sec. 13(4) (old) of the Act. Sub-S. (16) of S. 13 further provided that if the tenant fails to deposit or pay the amount payable in accordance with sub-S. (4) or sub-S.(5) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court has been empowered to strike out the defence against eviction and to proceed with the hearing of the suit. Sub-S. (7) of S. 13 is also very significant, for, it provided as to what is to be done by the court if deposit or payment as required by sub S.(4) or sub-S.(5) is made by the tenant. According to sub-S.(7) if the tenant makes deposit or payment in accordance with the provisions of sub-S. (4) or sub-S.(5), decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in S.l3(l)(a) (old) could not be passed and the court had been given discretion to allow such costs which it deemed proper. It will be noticed that sub-S. (4) has been mentioned in sub-S.(5),(6), and (7) of S. 13 and consequences for failure to comply either with sub S. (4) or sub-S. (5) are provided in sub-S.(6) and if the amount is paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of that sub-section, then the decree for eviction cannot be passed against the tenant. When the defendant-petitioner submitted an application under S. 13(5) of (he Act, he invited the court to determine the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant. While deciding that application, the court determined the amount and made a direction as envisaged by sub-S. (4) of S. 13. 16. The provisions of S. 13(4) and 13(5) came to be considered in Martin & Harris (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Prem Chand (7) by the Full Bench of this Court. While deciding that application, the court determined the amount and made a direction as envisaged by sub-S. (4) of S. 13. 16. The provisions of S. 13(4) and 13(5) came to be considered in Martin & Harris (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Prem Chand (7) by the Full Bench of this Court. After quoting sub-sections (4) and (5) of S. 13, it was observed,— "A close reading of these provisions indicates that put together, they cover a situation in a case of eviction claimed on the ground of default in payment or tender of rent In such a suit the tenant on the first day of hearing may deposit in court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default, including the period subsequent thereto, upto the end of the month previous to that in which the default or the payment is made, together with interest on such amount calculated at rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of the deposit. The tenant shall thereafter "continue to deposit or pay month by month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate" and provides that the court shall determine it in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (4), When should such a dispute be raised? Obviously, sub-secs. (4) and (5) constitute an integrated provision to adjust the conflicting contentions between the landlord who says that rent has not been paid or tendered and the tenant who has an answer to make. If the tenant is ready and willing to pay the rent, the landlord is not entitled to eviction subject to the provisions of the Act. If the tenant is in default, but he deposits the rent on the first day of hearing or within such time as may be extended, envisaged by sec. 13(4) of the Act, then too the tenant shall not be liable to eviction, and, if there is any dispute in regard to the rent payable by the tenant, that dispute must be raised on the first day of hearing because if it is raised at the end of the trial then sub sec. 13(4) of the Act, then too the tenant shall not be liable to eviction, and, if there is any dispute in regard to the rent payable by the tenant, that dispute must be raised on the first day of hearing because if it is raised at the end of the trial then sub sec. (4) would not be workable as it insists on a deposit of rent for each succeeding month, by the fifteenth of the month. There is also an underlying purpose in insisting that the dispute should be raised on the first day of hearing. The tenant is given a locus poenitentise as it were, for miking amends for the default made by him in paying the rent. Such a latitude if enlarged, would work hardship Obvi- on the landlord and would be encouraging dilatoriness on the part of the tenant. Sub-sec. (5) is closely co-related to the situation envisaged by sec. 13(4)." In the Full Bench case Saligram vs. Narottam Lal (8) was considered and while answering the second question framed by the Full Bench, it was observed that Saligrams case (8) has been correctly decided. Here, I may refer to para 7 of the decision in Mingalram vs. Smt. Chandravati Devi (9), which reads as under,— "The other contention put forward by the defendants in the trial court was that there was no specific order of the trial court directing the defendants to deposit rent month by month. No such order is required to be passed specifically by the trial court as there is a statutory provision requiring its payment ex-deposit in sec. 13(4). It is not laid down in this sub-section that the court should pass an order directing the defendants to deposit or pay rent month by month." Learned counsel for the petitioner endeavoured to support his argument by making reference to the provisions of S. 13A and argued that as soon as the amount is determined for being deposited or paid, a further direction for deposit of rent month by month is not contemplated. According to Sec. 13A (b), when the amount of rent and arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit are determined, then the court is required to make a direction to the tenant to pay the amount so determined within the time to be fixed by the court not exceeding 90 days and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceedings are required to be disposed of as if the tenant has not committed any default. On this basis, Mr. Mathur contended that in the circumstances of this case, as soon as the amount was determined according to the provisions of S. 13(4) or for that matter if S. 13A(b) is applicable, the proceedings would come to an end. In this connection, he referred to the decision in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 216/76. (Mangibai vs. Jeewan decided on October 4, 1976). One of the con-ten ions which was raised in that case before the learned Judge was that since the tenant had deposited the amount which was determined by the first appellate court by its order which included arrears of rent upto the date but as the tenant had failed to deposit rent thereafter month by month the provisions of S. 13(4) should have been invoked. The learned Judge repelled this contention and observed that Sec. 13A starts with a non obstante clause. In that case, the tenant had deposited the amount determined under S. 13A(b) within the time allowed by the court and as such, the mandate of the law as contained in S. 13A(b) came into play and the court could not have passed a decree for ejectment in the proceedings. I am afraid this decision does not help the learned counsel. In the case in hand, the suit could not have been disposed of in view of the provisions of S. 13(5) of the Act for failure to comply with the direction to deposit rent month by month. For the reasons mentioned above, I am unable to hold that direction to deposit rent month by month could not have been given when dispute was raised by the tenant under S. 13(5) (old) of the Act. As such, the aforesaid direction is not nonest in the eye of law. For the reasons mentioned above, I am unable to hold that direction to deposit rent month by month could not have been given when dispute was raised by the tenant under S. 13(5) (old) of the Act. As such, the aforesaid direction is not nonest in the eye of law. In the aforesaid pre-mises, it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. For failure to deposit the rent month by month as ordered on April 26, 1973, the consequences contemplated by S. 13(5) would inevitably follow. The learned District Judge has, therefore, rightly affirmed the order of the trial court striking out the defence against eviction. It is not necessary to examine the other authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the parties as they are not applicable. 17. The result is that this revision application has no force and it is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.