Short Note : This is a petition under sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of Peoples Act 1951 (hereinafter called 'The Act). The petitioner was one of the 10 contestants in the general election to the Legislative Assembly of State of Madhya Pradesh, held in May-June 1977 from Jabalpur East (Reserve) Constituency in Jabalpur district. The petitioner lost the election by a narrow margin of 391 votes against respondent No.1, Kailash Prasad Sonkar son of Shri Surajbali Sonkar, who was declared elected. Except the aforesaid respondent, all other respondents remained absent and were proceeded exparte. For the sake of convenience the aforesaid respondent No.1 Kailash Prasad Sonkar will be hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent'. Held: When we speak of an office of profit, it is pre-supposed that it is a position or place of substantive nature independent of the incumbent and which went on and was filled in succession time to time by successive holders. We must distinguish the term 'office' from any other engagement provided to a person for doing such work, which may be assigned to him. Such circumstances do not create an office because in such cases, the employment is to do certain things and in all merely comprises of activities of an individual for the time being. The respondent, in the present case, was doing his own business. He was not holding any office. The licence given to him to obtain fuel wood at the prescribed rates on credit was a facility given to encourage the unemployed educated person to do some thing for earning their bread and butter. It was neither a case of appointment on any post, nor of being' an agent of the State Government, After having purchased the fuel wood, the respondent became the owner of the same and was responsible for the profit and loss. However, he could not sell the same at a rate higher than the prescribed one and was bound to comply with the terms and conditions. There was nothing like an office in existence, independent of the recognition of the respondent as a vendor of fuel wood. However, he could not sell the same at a rate higher than the prescribed one and was bound to comply with the terms and conditions. There was nothing like an office in existence, independent of the recognition of the respondent as a vendor of fuel wood. It is true that he could earn a profit of about Rs.2 per quintal and was enjoying certain credit facilities by making payment of the cost of fuel wood supplied by the forest department in instalments and the rate prescribed was inclusive of transport charges but this much is not sufficient to create an office of profit so as to enable me to hold that the respondent was it's holder. He was nothing but a licence holder. He was given certain facilities. It was not disputed by either side that such fuel stall were allotted under the scheme of the Government for providing a chance to the educated unemployed persons to earn their livelihood by doing this business I, therefore. hold that the respondent did not hold any office of profit under the State Government and was not disqualified on that ground for being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly. The plea of disqualification, as specified under Article 191 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India, therefore, fails. Shri Baghel, thereafter, contended by placing reliance on the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Megraj patodia v. B.K. Birla. AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1295, that even when direct and positive evidence is not available the Court may infer the commission of any corrupt practice from the proved facts and circumstances. There is no quarrel with this proposition, but the fact still remains that the burden of proving the commission of corrupt practice as pleaded in the petition is on the petitioner and he has to discharge that burden satisfactorily. The observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Megraj's case (supra) make it specifically clear that the Court cannot rely on the preponderance or probabilities. Their Lordships have further observed in paragraph 16 of the judgment that to prove the corrupt practice of incurring expenditure beyond the prescribed limit. it is not sufficient for the petitioner to merely establish the probabilities that expenditure more than the limit prescribed must have been incurred in connection with the election. Their Lordships have further observed in paragraph 16 of the judgment that to prove the corrupt practice of incurring expenditure beyond the prescribed limit. it is not sufficient for the petitioner to merely establish the probabilities that expenditure more than the limit prescribed must have been incurred in connection with the election. What is further necessary is that the expenditure was incurred either by the returned candidate or with his consent or under his authority. The present case is governed by the amended provisions of section 77 of the Act which have made the burden heavier by adding explanation (1) which exempts all such expenditure incurred in connection with the election of a candidate by any individual other than the candidate or his election agent or by a political party or by an association of persons. In the present case, the testimony of a few witnesses examined by the petitioner for establishing the plea of expenses is in itself nothing but a bare general statement of certain allegations without any corroboration from other oral or documentary evidence or proved or undisputed circumstances. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Lakshami Raman v. Chandansingh, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 587, the allegations made in the petition must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. AIR 1964 SC 254 distinguished, AIR 1971 SC 1295 , referred to, AIR 1977 SC 587 , relied on. Petition dismissed.