JUDGMENT 1. - This is a revisional application under Section 115, C.P.C. by the three judgment-debtors directed against the order of the Munsif City, Jodhpur dated January 1, 1978 by which he dismissed their objections dated October 14, 1977 praying that execution cannot proceed against them and that the execution may be dismissed. 2. The short facts relevant for the disposal of this revision are these : The plaintiff-decree-holder instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant Shantilal (now deceased) in respect of the shop No. 2 situate in Ramnath Mehra Bhawan, Jalorigate, Jodhpur. An ex parte decree was passed by the learned Munsif, Jodhpur on March 28, 1973 for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation @ Rs. 75/- per mensem. Execution was levied by the decree-holder against Shantilal judgment-debtor on October 16, 1973. During the pendency of the execution application, since Shantilal, original judgment-debtor died on April 14, 1976, notices were issued to the legal representatives of Shantilal under Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. Shantilal judgment-debtor is survived by his widow, Indra Dixit (petitioner No. 1); his son Ajay Dixit (petitioner No. 2) and daughter Kumari Abha, (petitioner No. 3). Besides these, there are two minor daughter Kumari Vibha and Kumari Nidhi who are pro form a non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 whose Court guardian is Smt. Indu B. Rathi, Advocate, High Court, Jodhpur. In response to the notice Under Order 21, Rule 22 C.P.C., the objections were filed stating that an agreement was arrived at between the decree-holder-non-petitioner No. 1 and deceased Shantilal (original judgment-debtor) during his life time according to which, the decree-holder had agreed that he will not disposes the judgment-debtor from the shop in dispute and will relinquish his right to execute the decree if the judgment-debtor pays to the decree-holder rent in time and further pays the entire dues after adding interest and costs. It has also been stated that Shantilal agreed to the offer made by the decree- holder and he paid the entire rent, costs and interest to the decree-holder in time. The case of the judgment-debtors further is that rent was paid to the decree-holder upto August, 1977 and that the decree-holder did not dispossess the judgment-debtors from the shop in dispute in pursuance of the agreement. The case of the judgment-debtors further is that rent was paid to the decree-holder upto August, 1977 and that the decree-holder did not dispossess the judgment-debtors from the shop in dispute in pursuance of the agreement. It has been mentioned in the objections that after the death of Shantilal, rent has been accepted by the decree-holders from his son and he has also accepted him as his tenant. Thereafter on July 27, 1976, Rs. 225/- was sent by money-order which were accepted on behalf of the decree-holder. Subsequent to that, on November 2, 1976, a further sum of Rs. 225/- was sent to the decree-holder which was received by him on November 4, 1976. In the premises aforesaid, it was contented by the judgment-debtors in their objections that the decree-holder has relinquished his right, and so the execution cannot proceed further. In para 5 of the objection-petition, it was pleaded that a new tenancy had come into existence between the decree-holder and the judgment debtor and, therefore, on account of novation of contract, the execution is not maintainable. Certain other objections were taken but I do not consider them necessary to mention for the present purpose. The decree-holder resisted the objections by filing a reply dated November 4, 1977. The decree-holder denied the agreement between him and the original judgment-debtor Shantilal. The various payments alleged to have been made were admitted by the decree-holder. His principal pleas are that there was neither agreement for novation of contract and that the objections of the judgment-debtor are not barred by time as the pleas taken by the judgments-debtors amount to adjustment of the decree and since the judgment-debtors did not get it certified within thirty days as required by Article 125 of the Limitation Act, 1963, no effect can be given to these pleas. He also contended that the objections taken by the judgment-debtors are barred by the principle of res judicata. The facts stated by the petitioners were not investigated by the execution Court. It held that since the adjustment was not got certified under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C., it cannot be recognised. According to it, the adjustment should have been got certified within thirty days from the date of adjustment according to Article 125 of the Limitation Act. It held that since the adjustment was not got certified under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C., it cannot be recognised. According to it, the adjustment should have been got certified within thirty days from the date of adjustment according to Article 125 of the Limitation Act. Since this was not done within the prescribed time, it dismissed the objection of the judgment-debtor so far as to relates to the "adjustment of the decree". Being aggrieved by the order dated January 10, 1978, the judgment-debtors-petitioners have come up in revision before this Court. 3. On August 14, 1978, I ordered that show cause notices be issued to the non-petitioners as to why the revision petition be not admitted. On September 11, 1978, Mr. S.S. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner, stated that non-petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the minor daughters of the judgment-debtor Shantilal and so, for the purpose of admission of the revision application, it is not necessary to get them served. On that day, Mr. G.R. Singhvi put in appearance for non-petitioners No. 1. On September 14, 1978, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted the copies of the objections as well as of the reply submitted by the decree-holder. Learned counsel for the decree-holder did not dispute the correctness of these copies. Learned counsel for the parties also do not dispute the facts stated herein-above. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the decree-holder (non-petitioner No. 1) at great length. At the request of both the learned counsel, I am finally disposing of this revision. 5. It was contended before me by Mr. S.S.Purohit learned council for the judgment-debtor that the judgment-debtor should have been afforded an opportunity to lead evidence to prove the agreement pleaded in the objections filed by the judgment-debtors as it does amount to "adjustment of the decree". He submitted that the executing Court wrongly took `the view that this agreement was in the nature of "adjustment of the decree' and could not, unless certified by the Court under Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. be permitted to be set up. He submitted that the executing Court wrongly took `the view that this agreement was in the nature of "adjustment of the decree' and could not, unless certified by the Court under Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. be permitted to be set up. In this connection, he placed reliance upon Oudh Commercial Bank Ltd. Fyzabad v. Thakurain Bind Banci Kaur and others, AIR 1939 PC 80 ; Girish Chandra Santra and others v. Purna Chandra Bhattachariya and others, AIR 1944 Calcutta 53; Bhagwati Maharaj v. Shambhu Nath, AIR 1960 Allahabad 562; Messers Sehgal Brothers and others v. Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1961 Punjab 439; M/s. Chitra Talkies v. Durga Dass Mehta, AIR 1973 Allahabad 40. He also referred to me Nathuram v. Shambhu Dayal and others, 1977 Rent Control Reporter 489; wherein it was held that the issue of satisfaction of the decree should first be decided. Mr. G.R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the decree-holder, on the other hand, urged that the agreement pleaded by the judgment-debtor could not be given effect to in the execution proceedings as the agreement amounts to an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree and since it was not certified within thirty days from the date when the adjustment is alleged to have been made and as such, it was rightly not taken note of by the executing Court. He supported the order under revision by referring to the decisions reported in Nalam Subramanyam v. Devara Ramaswami and others, AIR 1932 Madras 372. K.C. Pillappa v. M. Munireddy, AIR 1959 Myrs. 155; Suresh Chandra Datta v. Ashutosh Dutta and others AIR 1960 Assasm 24; Pullareddigari Venkatasubha Reddy and others v. Pullareddigari Peddasubaredde and another, AIR 1974 Andhra Pradesh 458. and Phoolchand Babulal and others v. Narish Chander, 1969 WIN 69. 6. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, I am of opinion that the order of the executing Court cannot stand. 7. For the better appreciation of the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to consider the scope of Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. These provisions were considered by their lordships of the Supreme Court in M.P.Shreevastava v. Mrs. Veena, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1193. 7. For the better appreciation of the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to consider the scope of Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. These provisions were considered by their lordships of the Supreme Court in M.P.Shreevastava v. Mrs. Veena, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1193. In para 13 of the report, their lordships made the following weighty observations:- "...There is, in our judgment, no antithesis between Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 2: the former deals with the power of the Court and the latter with the procedure to be followed in respect of a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of decree." (emphasis added)Para 6 for the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "Order 21 Rule 2 preceding a special procedure for recording adjustment of a decree, or for recording payment of money paid out of Court under any decree. However the plenary power conferred by Section 47 C.P. Code upon the Court executing the decree to determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, is not thereby affected. Whereas Order 21 Rule 2, deals with the procedure to be followed in a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of decrees, where there has been payment of money or adjustment or satisfaction of the decree by consensual arrangement, Section 47 C.P. Code deals with the power of the Court executing the decree." As regards adjustment, their lordships observed, para 5,- "...Adjustment contemplates mutual agreement........Order 21 Rule 2. contemplates adjustment of the decree by consent - express or implied-of the parties : where there is no such consent, Order 21 Rule 2" does not apply. 8. It is, therefore, clear that the plenary power conferred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the Court executing the decree is not thereby affected. 9. contemplates adjustment of the decree by consent - express or implied-of the parties : where there is no such consent, Order 21 Rule 2" does not apply. 8. It is, therefore, clear that the plenary power conferred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the Court executing the decree is not thereby affected. 9. The important question that arises for consideration in this revision in these circumstances is, whether the facts stated by the petitioners in their objections amount to an "adjustment of the decree" an the adjustment having not been certified or recorded within limitation, cannot be recognised in view of sub-rule 3 of Rule 2ORDER21, C.P.C. In S.S. Nirmalchand v. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi, AIR 1958 MPP 333, it was held by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that Order 21, Rule 2. only applies to adjustment of a decree and not to any other contract which affects its terms. It was observed,- "the Code of Civil Procedure puts no restriction on the parties' liberty of contract with reference to their rights and obligations under the decree. Even if, therefore, agreement may not involve an adjustment of a decree but if or affects the question of execution, discharge or satisfaction thereof, it will be required to be investigated and the adjudged in proceedings under Section 47..........." (emphasis supplied)The provisions of Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. again came to be considered in Mohd. Ali v. Bahadur Singh, 1976 MLJ 636. In that case, the respondent obtained a decree for ejectment of the appellant from a plot occupied by him as a tenant in Civil Suit No. 122A of 1952. He started execution proceedings against the appellant. The case of the appellant was that on February 9, 1961, the parties came to terms and a fresh tenancy was created and thereafter the respondent got the execution dismissed on September 22, 1961. The respondent realised rent @ Rs. 71/- per month from the appellant after February, 9, 1961 till 1963 and passed receipts for the same. The case of the appellant further was that he had spent huge amounts for the construction of pucca structures for rice and Poha mills after the new tenancy was created on February 9, 1961. The respondent again filed execution application fro ejectment of the appellant. The appellant preferred an objection contending that he could not be ejected. The case of the appellant further was that he had spent huge amounts for the construction of pucca structures for rice and Poha mills after the new tenancy was created on February 9, 1961. The respondent again filed execution application fro ejectment of the appellant. The appellant preferred an objection contending that he could not be ejected. The execution Court, however, dismissed the objection on September 19, 1973 on the ground that the alleged compromise or settlement was not certified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 2ORDER21 of the C.P.C. and, therefore, it could not be given any effect to in execution proceedings. This judgment was upheld in appeal. The appellant filed a second appeal. The learned Judge held that such an agreement does not amount tot adjustment of the decree because it was open to the decree-holder to let out the accommodation afresh even after executing the decree under an independent contract. He further concluded that, that was not the case of adjustment of decree but a new contract between the parties subsequent to the decree on account of which the decree-holder could not execute the decree against the appellant. He therefore, held that such a question can be investigated under Section 47, C.P.C. and that sub-rule 3 of Rule 2 Order 21, C.P.C. is not a bar to such a case. Post decree arrangement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor was considered by the Allahabad High Court in Bhagwati Maharaj's case. The question that arose in that case was whether the agreement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder under which the decree-holder foregoes his right to execute the decree in consideration of the judgment-debtor foregoing his right to an appeal against the decree, is a matter of investigation by the executing Court under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure . The learned Judge held that the agreement set up by the judgment-debtor in the case did not have the effect of satisfying or discharging the decree which was left unsatisfied but the decree-holder surrendered his right to execute it in consideration of the judgment-debtor giving up his right of appeal. After examining the agreement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder and the circumstances of the case, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the executing Court had the power in view of the wide provisions of Section 47 to decide the question. After examining the agreement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder and the circumstances of the case, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the executing Court had the power in view of the wide provisions of Section 47 to decide the question. Again in M/s Chitra Talkies's case, the provisions of Section 47 and Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. came to be considered. In that case, after obtaining a decree for possession by eviction of the tenant from the demised premises, the decree-holder created a fresh tenancy in favour of the judgment-debtor and the question arose whether the creation of fresh tenancy in favour of the judgment debtor was an adjustment of the decree. It was held that the decree cannot be said to have been adjusted within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. so as to require certification and the judgment-debtor could raise an objection under Section 47, C.P.C. that the fresh tenancy created in his favour rendered the decree inexecutable. It was observed, the enough Commercial Bank's case:- "...It may or may not be that any and every bargain which could interfere with the right of the decree-holder to have execution according to the tenor of the decree comes under the term "adjustment" : on that their lordships do not pronounce. Nor will they here consider what consequences would flow from a finding that, a particular bargain for time was not an adjustment. In the absence of express statutory authority it is not possible in their lordships' view to regard Order 20, Rule 10, as excluding any possibility of the parties coming to valid agreement for time to which the Court under Section 47 will have regard....... The purpose of providing a limitation of six months for such applications to the Court which passed the decree is no altogether plain and the objects may be more than one : but this provision, like the rule itself, affords no sufficient ground for holding that the Code makes parties wholly incomponent to come to an arrangement for time enforceable in execution proceedings. Such bargains may take different forms and it is not possible to pre-judge the individual case........" 10. Such bargains may take different forms and it is not possible to pre-judge the individual case........" 10. It has been pleaded in the objections preferred by the judgment-debtors that, bl izdkj fMdhnkj }kjk viuk gd rdZ dj fn;s tkus ds dkj.k orZeku btjk; pyus ;ksX; ugha gS fd fMdhnkj ,oa en;qr 'kkfrUryky ds chp fMdh ds i'pkr ubZ fdjk;nkjh dk;e gks xbZ blfy;s novation contract gks tkus lsn Hkh orZeku btjk; pyus dkfcy ugha gS On the basis of the decisions reported in the cases of S.S. Nirmalchand; Bhagwati Maharaj, M/s. Chitra Talkies and Mohd. Ali, with which I respectfully agree, I hold that the agreement pleaded by the judgment debtors does not amount to adjustment of the degree so as to require certification under Order 30, Rule 2, C.P.C. I further hold that Sub-rule 3 of Rule 21, C.P.C. cannot operate as a bar.12. So far as the case of Nal Subramanyam is concerned, it may be mentioned that the principles laid down by the full Bench of the Madras High Court are that the judgment-debtor cannot plead uncertified adjustment while opposing transfer under Rule 16 and that the uncertified adjustment cannot be recognised by the Court executing the decree. Here, the question which I have been called upon to determine is whether the agreement pleaded by the judgment-debtors amounts to adjustment of the decree or it is a new contract between the parties subsequent to the decree on account of which the decree holder cannot execute the decree against the judgment-debtors. The decision in K.C. Pillappa case also does not help the decree-holder. In that case, the respondent claimed that he has paid the decree amount in full and filed application for entering up satisfaction of the decree. That application was opposed as having been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefore under Article 174 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908. In view of this opposition, the respondent did not press that application. Subsequently, another application was filed purporting to be under Sections 47 and 151, C.P.C. praying for entering up full satisfaction of the decree in original suit No. 150/52-53 and to convert the application in to a suit. In view of this opposition, the respondent did not press that application. Subsequently, another application was filed purporting to be under Sections 47 and 151, C.P.C. praying for entering up full satisfaction of the decree in original suit No. 150/52-53 and to convert the application in to a suit. In those circumstance the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2, and Section 47 CPC were considered and his Lordship of the Mysor High Court observed that an application by a judgment-debtor under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2ORDER21, C.P.C. undoubtly raised the question of satisfaction of the decree which has got to be determined as between the judgment-debtor and the decree holder. Coming to Suresh Chandra Datta's v. Ashuttosh Datta and others case, AIR 1960 Assam 24, i may state at once that it is distinguishable on facts. In that case, after the passing of the decree for ejects there was a compromise under which the decree-holder undertook not to eject the judgment-debtor for five years. Before the expiry of five years, the decree-holder lived execution of the decree and the compromise was set up as a defence. In those facts and circumstances, it held by the Division Bench of the Assam the High Court that the compromise could not be given effect to in the execution proceedings as it was not certified. In that connection, the following observations from para 1 of the report may usefully be quoted, - "It is not an adjustment of the decree, it was an agreement between the parties not to execute the decree itself and if there was any breach on the part of the decree-holder of this agreement, the judgment-debtor may have his remedy, if any by means of a suit; but if he intends to put it as a defence to the execution of the decree it can only be done on the basis that there is a temporary suspension of the execution of the decree for fives years, and the decree stood satisfied for five years. This was only an adjustment of the decree and unless it was certified, it could not be taken notice of by the executing Court." The decision in Pullarddigari Venkatasubba Reddi's case is also of no avail to the decree-holder in which it was observed - "Under Order 21, Rule 2, a promise to do something in future or an executory contract could operate as an adjustment of the decree." In Phool Chand Babu Lal's case, the question that arose for the consideration of this Court was whether the assurance given by the decree-holder can extend the period prescribed under Article 125 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Judge was of the opinion that even if any such assurance was given, it could not extend the period under Article 125 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the executing Court cannot hold an enquiry about the alleged adjustment of September, 1955 on the application of the judgment-debtor moved beyond the period of limitation.13. None of the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the decree-holder has taken a view contrary to the one which has been taken in the case of S.S. Nirmal Chand, Bhagwati Maharaj, M/s Chitra Talkies and Mohd. Ali.14. At the risk of repetition, it may be stated that it has been clearly ruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.P. Shreevastava's case that Order 21, Rule 2, C.P.C. deals with the procedure to be followed in respect of a limited class of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of the decrees. As held by me above, the agreement pleaded by the judgment-debtors does not involve the question of adjustment but it effects the question of execution of the decree and this will be investigated and adjudged in proceedings under Section 47, C.P.C.15. In this case, illegality or at any rate, material irregularity has been committed by the executing Court in the manner in which it exercised its jurisdiction while disposing of the objections of the judgment-debtors. It may be mentioned here that learned counsel for the decree-holder did not address me on the question that the case of the judgment-debtors-petitioners is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 115(1), C.P.C. Be that as it may, a case for interference has been made out in this revision. 16. It may be mentioned here that learned counsel for the decree-holder did not address me on the question that the case of the judgment-debtors-petitioners is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 115(1), C.P.C. Be that as it may, a case for interference has been made out in this revision. 16. Since the decree-holder has denied the agreement pleaded by the judgment-debtors, this question shall have be to investigated and adjudged by the executing Court.17. The revision petition is accordingly allowed and the order of executing Court dated January 10, 1978 is set aside. The case shall now go back to the executing Court for investigating the agreement pleaded by the judgment-debtors on merits in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this revision application.Petition allowed. *******