Short Note : The distinction between clause 2 of section 299 and clause 3 of section 300 IPC depends upon the degree of probability of death from the act of the accused. If the probability of death resulting from the injury is high, the finding has to be that the accused intended to cause death or injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; but if on the other hand there was lesser degree of probability of death the finding has to that the accused intended to cause injury likely to cause death. It is not correct to say that an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is inevitably an injury which must in all circumstances cause death. It the probability of death is very high, it is murder and if it is less, it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Thus It is clear that the accused has not committed are crime punishable under section 302 IPC, but has only committed one punishable under section 304 (former clause) of IPC. Thus the appellant is acquitted of crime punishable under section 302 IPC, but is convicted under section 304 former clause IPC Baba Naya v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Ragoon 64, Naga Pu Ke and others v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang. 338 relied on Willie William Slaney Vs. State of M.P. AIR 1951 SC 116, Chamru Budhwa v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 652 , distinguished. Appeal partly allowed.