Shiv Narain v. Bal Kishan — 1978 DIGILAW 290 (RAJ)

JUDGMENT : 1. This is a defendant-tenant's appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated March 18, 1978 by which, he allowed the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent (Landlord) and set aside the decree of dismissal of the suit for ejectment dated March 20, 1976 passed by the Munsif City, Jodhpur in Civil Original Case No. 375 of 1975. 2. A few facts deserve recall here. The plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for ejectment of the defendant from the premises mentioned in para 2 of the plaint situate in a building described in para 1 of the plaint. The building is situate in Beldaron-ka-bas, Jodhpur. The ejectment was sought on.the.ground that the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff when Suit No. 425 of 1972, Plaintiff: Balkishan v. Defendant : Shivnarain which is pending trial at present in the Court of Additional Munsif No. 1, Jodhpur. The Suit No. 425/72 is for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 146.95 p and possession. Para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement which was filed in that suit reads as under:- 2 ;g gS fd oknh us fdjk;k fpB~Bh is'k ugha gS fd blfy, dkSu DkSu ekfyd gS A ;g iw.kZr;k ekywe ugha gS A oknh us fdjk;k fpB~Bh ds vuqlkj vko';d Qjksd eqdnek Jh ukFk nkl ds dk;e eqdke dks o nhxj ekfydks dks ikVhZ ugha cuk;k gS vr ;g nkok ugha py ldrk gS A The case of the plaintiff is that the contents of the aforesaid para 2 amount to the denial of (landlords') title inasmuch as the defendant has set up title in his father Seth Raghunath Dass and his legal representatives. According to him, this is covered by Section 13(1)(f) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XVII of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). The ejectment from the premises in suit was sought on this ground. The defendant resisted the suit. He, inter alia, out pleaded that the plaintiff did not produce the rent note in that suit and with seeing the rent note, he could not know the correct names of the owners of the demised premises, and, therefore he took the objection in para 2 mentioned above when he filed the written statement in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of 1972. He contended that he has not challenged the title of the plaintiff but he merely raised an objection about the maintainability of the suit in the absence of all the owners of the demised premises. He further pleaded that he did not set up any title in the third persons but the objection was raised as the rent note was not produced. He subsequently amended his written statement to which a rejoinder was filed by the plaintiff. The trial Court framed five issues in the first instance and subsequently additional issue No. 1 was also framed. In this appeal, I am only concerned with issue No. 2 which when translated into English, reads as under:- "Whether the defendant challenged the title of the plaintiff in respect of the property in dispute ? If it is so, what is the effect ?" The burden of his issue was pleaded upon the plaintiff. 3. After trial, the learned Munsif, by his judgment dated March 20, 1972 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs. Being dissatisfied with the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court, the plaintiff went in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, by his judgment dated March 18, 1978 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment with costs. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the defendant-appellant has preferred this appeal as aforesaid. 5. The arguments in the appeal were heard on September 13, 1978 and the learned counsel for the parties submitted that as the appeal has been heard at length, it may be finally disposed of. The appeal was ordered to be listed for dictation of judgment on September 14, 1978. On that date, the judgment could not be dictated. When the appeal came up for dictation of judgment on September 15, 1978, Mr. D.L. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the dictation of the judgment may be deferred until September 18, 1978 as the respondent wants to make an attempt for compromise with the appellant. The request of the learned counsel for the respondent was considered reasonable and the appeal was ordered to be put up for dictation of judgment on September 18, 1978. On September 18, 1978, Mr. The request of the learned counsel for the respondent was considered reasonable and the appeal was ordered to be put up for dictation of judgment on September 18, 1978. On September 18, 1978, Mr. D.L. Metha learned counsel for the respondent informed the Court that no settlement has been arrived at between the parties. On that day, the respondent Balkishan moved an application under Order 61 Rule 27, C.P.C. supported by affidavit. Mr. M.M. Vyas, also put in appearance on behalf of the respondent and prayed that he wants time to submit additional arguments besides those which have already been made by Mr. D.L. Metha. Time was sought on the ground that he has been engaged by the respondent only on September 18, 1978. It may be mentioned here that Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant opposed the prayer of Mr. Vyas. However, in the interest of justice, I granted an opportunity to Mr. Vyas to make additional arguments on September 19, 1978. On September 19, 1978, I heard the additional arguments of Mr. Vyas and reply thereto of Mr. N.P. Gupta. Arguments were also heard on the application dated September 18,1978.which was submitted by the respondent under Order 61. Rule 27, C.P.C. 6. I propose to dispose of the application of the respondent under Order 61, Rule 27, C.P.C. first. Along with the application under Order 61. Rule 27, C.P.C. the following documents were submitted by the respondent:-1. Certified copy of the application dated May 11, 1972 under Section 19A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 submitted by the appellant in case No. 38A of 1972.2. Certified copy or receipt No. 285 dated June 8, 1970 for Rs. 11/- passed by the appellant in favour of the respondent and submitted in case No. 38A of 1972.3. Certified copy of the application under Order 6, Rule 17 and Section 151, C.P.C. dated February 26, 1976 submitted by the defendant in Civil Original Case No. 425 of 1972.4. Certified copy of the order dated May 24, 1975 passed by the learned Munsif rejecting the defendant's application under Order 6, Rule 17, and Section 151, C.P.C.In para 8 of the application, it was stated that the plaintiff-respondent was not advised properly earlier to produce the above-mentioned documents and that these documents would be helpful in arriving at a correct decision of the case. It was, therefore, prayed in that application that the aforesaid four documents may be accepted in evidence by taking them on record, while arguing this application. Mr. Vyas submitted that Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27ORDER41, C.P.C. may be invoked and the additional evidence which has been produced along the application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. may be taken on record. This application was opposed by the appellant. The plaintiff has brought the suit on the ground that the contents of additional pleas' para 2 of the written statement filed by the defendant in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of 1972. In para 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff has mentioned "......... mlesa mtj fd;k gS fd oknh us Jh ukFk nkl ds dk;e eqdke dks o nhxj ekfydksa dks eqdnesa eas ikVhZ ugha cuk;k gS blfy, nkok ugha py ldrk In para 8, it has been mentioned that because of the facts mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the plaint, the defendant was well-aware that the owner of the demised premises is the plaintiff only in whose favour he has executed the original rent note, still he denied the title of the plaintiff and has set up the title in the deceased father Seth Raghunath Dass and his legal representative. In the trial Court, the certified copies of the plaint and the written statement filed in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of.1972 were produced and they have been marked as Ex. A.I. and Ex. 7 (Ex.2 marked on 10-1-74) respectively. Mr. Vyas. learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the documents produced with the application under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. will be helpful in arriving at a just and correct decision. Learned counsel of the respondent tried to persuade me that these documents should be admitted as additional evidence. It has been held in Arjan Singh v. Kartar Sing, AIR 1951 SC 193 , that the legitimate occasion for the application of Order 41, Rule 27 is, when, on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, where a discovery is made, outside the Court, of fresh evidence & the application is made to import it. "The true test, therefore, is whether the appellant Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be produced. "The true test, therefore, is whether the appellant Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be produced. Therefore, the first question that arises is, whether this Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment. Here, the observations made in Parsotim Thakur and others v Lal Mohar Thakur, AIR 1931 PC 141, may usefully be quoted. "The provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by Order 41, Rule 27, are clearly not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the Court of appeal. Under Rule 27, Clause (1)(b) it is only where the appellant Court "requires" it (i.e. finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but "when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent." The provisions of Order 61, Rule 27(1) Civil Procedure Code came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. Venkataramiah v. Seetharamma Reddy and others, AIR 1963 SC 1526 . It was observed therein that requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna of defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. In doing so, reliance was placed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on Parsotim Thakur and others v. Lal Mohar Thakur (supra). What are the powers of an appellate Court and the limitations thereon in respect of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27(1) Clause (b), were again examined in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham and others, AIR 1965 SC 1008 : - ".....But the requirement of the High Court may not be limited to those case where if found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce the judgment. This provision does not entitle the High Court to allow any fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence, it can pronounce the judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to allow any fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. That the power under Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) Rule 27 cannot be exercised for adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the grounds specified in the provisions." It is, therefore, clear from the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court that the previsions of Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) do not apply where, on the evidence on record, the appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment and that it is only a lacuna in the evidence that will empower the Court to admit additional evidence. One of the factors which the Court should, in such cases take into consideration is the bearing which the evidence which is sought to be produced, is likely to have on the matters in controversy in the appeal. As stated above by me, the ground for ejectment in this case is contained in paras 7 and 8 of the plaint. In the written-statement exhibit 7, filed in Civil Original Case No. 425 of 1972, the defendant took an objection in para 2 of the additional pleas that the plaintiff has not produced the rent note and, therefore, it cannot be definitely said who are the owners of the premises in suit and it has further been stated in this para that according to the rent note of the plaintiff, the heirs of Raghunath Dass and other owners of the demised premises, who are necessary parties, have not been impleaded and, therefore, the suit is not maintainable. The question that arose for determination before the lower Courts was whether the defendant has challenged the title of the plaintiff whereby denying his title and if so, what is its effect ? This question has to be determined on the basis of the averments contained in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement Exhibit 7. The question that arose for determination before the lower Courts was whether the defendant has challenged the title of the plaintiff whereby denying his title and if so, what is its effect ? This question has to be determined on the basis of the averments contained in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement Exhibit 7. The documents for which the application has been made are for showing that the defendant has admitted the plaintiff as his landlord. It may be mentioned here that the application dated May 11, 1972 under Section 19A of the Act was filed by the defendant against the plaintiff alone and in para 1 thereof, it is written that the defendant has been residing in the premises, the description of which is given in para 1, as tenant, on monthly rent of Rs. 5.50 (Rs. 4.50 as rent + Rs. 1.00 as meter charges. The second document is the receipt which was issued to the defendant by the plaintiff and the title of the receipt is Balkishan landlords and estate owners. This receipt evidences that rent amounting to Rs. 11/- from April 1, 1970 to May 31, 1970 was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The third document is the application under Order 6. Rule 17 and Section 151, Civil Procedure Code submitted by the defendant in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of 1972 by which it was prayed that the written statement in that suit may by permitted to be amended by deleting para 2 of the additional pleas. The fourth document is the certified copy of the order dated May 24, 1975 by which the application for the amendment of the written-statement was rejected by the trial Court. So far as the determination of the question of denial of title of the landlord is concerned, these documents are not needed by this Court to pronounce judgment. On examining the record as it stands, I do not find any inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence. This Court is able to pronounce judgment. On examining the record as it stands, I do not find any inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence. This Court is able to pronounce judgment on the material already on record without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. This Court is able to pronounce judgment. On examining the record as it stands, I do not find any inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence. This Court is able to pronounce judgment on the material already on record without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. As there is no requirement of the Court in order to enable it to pronounce judgment, the additional evidence consisting of four document referred to above cannot be admitted. In these circumstances, the application under Order 9l, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, filed by the respondent on September 18, 1978, is rejected. 7. Appearing for the appellant in support of the appeal, Mr. N.P. Gupta raised only one point, namely, that the learned Additional District Judge has committed a serious error of law in holding that the contents of para 2 of the additional please of the written-statement Exhibit 7 filed in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of 1972 amount to denial of title of the plaintiff-landlord and that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant-tenant as provided under Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. He submitted that the contents of para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement were to the effect that the plaintiff has not impleaded all the necessary parties according to the rent note and in these circumstances, the plea of the defendant-appellant was the plea qua the tenant and not de-hors the tenant and thus from this, it cannot be inferred that the defendant-appellant has denied the title of the landlord. In this connection, he also referred to issue No. 2 framed by the trial Court and submitted that this issue does not comprehend a ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. In these circumstances, it was contended that the decree of ejectment passed by the lower appellate Court should be set aside. He referred to the decision in Smt. Bela Das and others v. Samarendra Nath Bose, AIR 1975 SC 398 and Ratanlal Manikchand Shah v. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi and others, AIR 1978 Bom. 216. 8. Mr. D.L. Mehta who argued on September 9, 1978 on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent urged that the defendant-tenant would be said to deny the title of the plaintiff when he denied that he, though lessee of the demised premises, is not tenant of the person who let it out to him. 216. 8. Mr. D.L. Mehta who argued on September 9, 1978 on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent urged that the defendant-tenant would be said to deny the title of the plaintiff when he denied that he, though lessee of the demised premises, is not tenant of the person who let it out to him. He contended that where the tenant alleges in his written statement that the person from whom he has taken the premises on rent is only a co-sharer in the demised premises and certain other persons are also co-sharer therein, he states, in effect, that the person is not his landlord and this amounts to a denial of the title of the landlord within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. In support of his submission, reliance was placed upon Hasmat Husain v. Saghir Ahmed and others, AIR 1958 All. 847 ; Ram Bux v. Sohan Lal and others, ILR 1962 XII Raj. 171; Bishwanath Gosain v. Dulhin Lalmuni and another, AIR 1968 Patna 481; Bhura and another v. Bahadur Singh and another, AIR 1976 Raj. 249 and Michawaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada and another, 1978 (1) R.C.J. 368. He also argued that denial of title of the landlord by tenant is a question of fact and since the lower appellate Court has found that the defendant has denied that title of the landlord-plaintiff, this being a question of fact, is not open to challenge in second appeal. The decisions in Bhura and another v. Hahadur Singh and another (supra); Jaghir v. Mahabir Parasad Gupta, AIR 1977 SC 27 and R. Thathdesika Thalhachariar and another V. K.V. Alagia Manavala Jeer Swamy (died) and others, AIR 1978 Mad. 21 0 , were cited for showing that the above finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate Court is not open to attack in this second appeal. While making the additional arguments, Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, invited my attention to Section 116 of the Evidence Act and argued-that under this Section, no tenant can deny his landlord's title and that if the tenant has executed a rent note in favour of a particular landlord and he has been put in possession by him, he (tenant) cannot dispute the landlord's title. According to Mr. According to Mr. Vyas, when the defendant-tenant has executed a rent note in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, he is estopped from denying the landlord's exclusive title to the property. The proposition that he put for my consideration was that where a person executes a lease in favour of a person who is merely a co-sharer in the property, he is estopped from denying the exclusive title of the co-sharer in the property. In support of his submission, he referred to Maung Shwe Cyaw v. Ma Shwe Thet, 34 Indian Cases 71; Basant Kumar Das v. Kusum Kumari Dasi, 38 Indian Cases 584; Jahangira v. Karrar Hussain, 44 Indian Case 584; Jamsedji Sorabji v. Lakshmiram Rajaram, ILR XIII Bom. 323; Mt. Laxmibai v. Devi and another, AIR 1924 Nagpur 62 and R. Thathadesika Thalhachariar and another v. Alagia Manavala Jeer Swamy (died) and others (supra). He vehemently argued that when a defendant has stated in the written statement that besides the plaintiff, there are other owners of the demised premises, thereby he has prejudiced the title of the plaintiff-landlord and as such the provisions of Section 13 (1)(f) of the Act are attracted. He drew my attention to para 1391 of Vol. 23 of the Halsbury's Laws of England, IIIrd Edition, wherein it is written - "1391. Impugning landlord's title as ground of forfeiture. There is implied in every lease a condition that the tenant shall not do anything that may prejudice the title of the landlord; and that if this is done the landlord may re-enter for breach of this implied condition. Thus, it is a cause of forfeiture if the tenant denied the title of the landlord by alleging in writing, or, in the case of a tenancy from year to year, either in writing or verbally, that the title to the land is in himself or another, or if he assists a stranger to set up an adverse title, as where he acknowledges the freehold title to be in him, or delivers the premises to him in order to enable him to set up a title. In the case of a tenancy from year to year, the effect of such denial of title is that the tenancy may be forthwith determined by the landlord without notice to quit. In the case of a tenancy from year to year, the effect of such denial of title is that the tenancy may be forthwith determined by the landlord without notice to quit. It is a question of fact, however, what intention underlies the words or the actions of a tenant, whether in fact he is definitely asserting a title adverse to the landlord, or, as the case may be, intending to enable somebody else to set up such a title. Thus, it is not sufficient that the tenant pays rent to a stranger, or does not at once acknowledge the title of the landlord, or refuses to give up possession at time when the landlord has no right to claim it. Where, in proceedings between landlord and tenant, the tenant, either as plaintiff or defendant, sets upon adverse title in himself, a cause of forfeiture arises, and even an inadvertent denial of the landlord's title in pleadings may give rise to forfeiture A tenant is not entitled to relief against forfeiture caused by denial of the landlord's title because in such a case the forfeiture arises by operation of law and not under any proviso or stipulation in the lease."By making reference to the word `deeger' used in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written-statement Ex. 7, he tried to impress upon so that by doing, so, he has set up title in the strangers and this is sufficient for evicting the defendant as the case clearly falls within Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. 9. Next point, which is to be considered by me, is whether the finding arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge that the defendant appellant has denied the title of the landlord is a question of fact and it should not be interfered with in second appeal. Strong reliance was placed on Bhura and another (supra) by Mr. D.L. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. A perusal of para 7 of the report shows that in that case, there was no dispute between the parties the report shows that in that case, there was no dispute between the parties on the point whether the tenants have renounced their character as such or denied the title of the landlords is a question of fact. A perusal of para 7 of the report shows that in that case, there was no dispute between the parties the report shows that in that case, there was no dispute between the parties on the point whether the tenants have renounced their character as such or denied the title of the landlords is a question of fact. The only question which remained to be determined regarding the point was whether the finding regarding forfeiture of tenancy recorded by the trial Court and the first appellate Court was not supported by any evidence or it wan based on inadmissible evidence i.e. whether it was a case of no evidence Act 11. The learned Judge, after taking into consideration the relevant evidence, reached the conclusion that it cannot be said that it is a case of no evidence and, therefore, he declined to interfere in second appeal and set aside the finding of fact. Whether a particular question is substantial or no depends upon the circumstances of each case and the reported decision are mostly of illustrative value. In order that a point may be substantial question of law or not it should be such as to impress the High Court that it is debatable. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju and others, AIR 1951 Mad. 969 , considered the question as to what is a substantial question of law. It did so with reference to Article 133 of the Constitution of India and Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed then. In that case, the following question was referred to the Full Bench - "Whether the words `Substantial question of law' occurring in Article 133 of the Constitution of India mean an important or difficult question of law or any question of law affecting the rights of parties ?" 10. The answer to the question, that was returned, was that any question of law affecting the rights of the parties would not by itself be a substantial question of law and an important and difficult question would of course be substantial question; but even if a question is not important or difficult if their is room for reasonable doubt or difference of opinion on the question, then it would be a substantial question of law within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution of India. The matter was also considered by the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulab Chand Gambhir mal v. Kudilal Govindram and another, AIR 1952 M. Pradesh 149. While considering Article 133 of the Constitution, it was observed that a question of law in respect of which there may be difference of opinion, is a substantial question of law. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and sons Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 , agreed with the view taken by the Madras High Court in Rimmalpudi Subba v. Noony Veeraju and others (supra) and made the following observations:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court of the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 11. In that case, the question involved was with regard to the construction of the Managing Agency Agreement and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the construction of the Managing Agency Agreement was not only one of law but also it was neither simple not free from doubt, and, therefore, the High Court was in error in refusing to grant the appellant a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) that the appeal involved a substantial question of law. A question of law is substantial as between the parties if the decision turns one way or another on the particular view taken of the law. I may add here that the phrase `substantial question of law' used in Section 100 C.P.C. should be given wider construction than what was attributed to it under Section 110 (old) of the C.P.C. The expression `substantial question of law' has been used in proviso to Section 30(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. I may add here that the phrase `substantial question of law' used in Section 100 C.P.C. should be given wider construction than what was attributed to it under Section 110 (old) of the C.P.C. The expression `substantial question of law' has been used in proviso to Section 30(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The Allahabad High Court in Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd, AIR 1956 All. 491 , took the view that the phrase `substantial question of law, in Section 7(10(a) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 must not be given the same meaning as in Section 110 (old) C.P.C. In Jwali and other v. Babu Lal and another, AIR 1958 All. 564 , while interpreting the phrase `substantial question of law' as used in the first proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it was held that the phrase must be given a wider construction than what is attributed to it under Section 110(old) C.P.C., namely that it would not cover cases of applicability of well-settled principles of law to a particular set of facts. The Orissa High Court in Central Engineering Corporation v. Darai Raj, AIR 1960 Ori. 39 , held that for the purpose of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 should be construed to cover even a case in which the commissioner has clearly misdirected himself on question of law. In my opinion, whether the averments made in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written-statement amount to a denial of the title of the landlord within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act is debatable and is not free from difficulty. In view of the authorities cited at the Bar, the question arising in this appeal, appears to me to be substantial question of law. The construction of the averments made in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement Ex. 7 undoubtedly raises a substantial question of law and for the aforesaid reasons, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the appellant has denied the title of the landlord is a pure question of fact is devoid of force. Bhura's case (supra) is of no avail to the respondent. 12. Bhura's case (supra) is of no avail to the respondent. 12. I, therefore, hold that the present appeal involves a substantial question of law. The following substantial question of law arises in this appeal, - "Whether the averments made in para 2 of the additional pleas in the written statement Ex. 7 filed in Civil Original Suit No. 425 of 1972 constitute denial of the title of the plaintiff under Section 13(1)(f) of the Act, so as to entitle the plaintiff to evict the defendant-tenant from the demised premises ?" It may be pertinent here to read Section 13(1(f) of the Art, and Section 111(g)(2) of the transfer of Property Act, 1882 - "13. "Eviction of tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything ............ (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant." "111. A lease of immovable property determines ..(g) by forfeiture : that is to say, ............ (2) in the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or ........... 13. It will, therefore, be seen that in Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, the words "has defined the title of the landlord" have not been used but the words used are "renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself". The term `denial of the title of the landlord' means renouncing the character of another as a landlord, whereas renouncing the character as tenant means that he is not a tenant of the plaintiff at all. It thus follows that it (denial of the title of the landlord) either results from the denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties to suit or by setting up the same relationship with the third persons. In such circumstances, the position of the person denying the title remains as a tenant. 14. Here, it may be useful to examine "disclaimer." A disclaimer is a renunciation by the party of his character as a tenant either by setting up a title in another or by claiming in himself. What amounts to a disclaimer has been dilated upon in Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant 25th Edition, para 2583. The learned author has said. 14. Here, it may be useful to examine "disclaimer." A disclaimer is a renunciation by the party of his character as a tenant either by setting up a title in another or by claiming in himself. What amounts to a disclaimer has been dilated upon in Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant 25th Edition, para 2583. The learned author has said. "It is sometimes a nice question whether what has taken place does or does not amount to a disclaimer of the tenancy. It is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile all the cases on this point. In order to make either a verbal or written disclaimer sufficient, it must amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant, or to a distinct claim to hold possession of the estate upon a ground wholly inconsistent with the relation which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it ..........." "The qualification that the denial must be in clear unmistakable terms has not unfrequently been applied by the Courts in India, which have held that where a tenants admits that he does hold as a tenant of the person who claims to be his landlord but disputes the terms of the tenancy, and sets up terms more favorable to himself; he does not, though he fails in establishing a more favorable tenancy, so far deny the landlord's title as to work as to forfeiture." Shadilal, C.J., in Kewal Ram and another v. Abdul Bai and others (supra) observed, "Denial therefore must not only be of a clear and unambiguous nature but must be antecedent to the suit for possession." Bhargava, J. in Ram Bux v. Sohan Lal and others (supra) has held that it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule for determining the question of disclaimer as it depends on the language used by the tenant to see whether he has transgressed the limits of honest inquiry. 15. Section 11(g) came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, AIR 1965 SC 23. Their Lordships observed - "the disclaimer of the repudiation of the landlord's title must however be clear and unequivocal and made to the knowledge of the landlord is also beyond dispute." 16. Their Lordships observed - "the disclaimer of the repudiation of the landlord's title must however be clear and unequivocal and made to the knowledge of the landlord is also beyond dispute." 16. In these circumstances, the question that crops up for consideration is whether the averments made in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement (Ex. 7) amount to denial of the title of the landlord. The certified copy of the plaint. (Ex. Al), filed in Civil Suit No 425 of 1972 shows that in para 1, the plaintiff has inter alia stated as under : -------izfroknh us oknh ls 5-50:- ekgkokj ij fdjk;s ys j[kk gSA In reply to para 1 of the plaint (Ex. Al) in para 1 of written-statement (Ex. 7) the defendant has stated - fQdjk u- vthZnkok lgh gS ijUrq bl tk;nkn ds dkSu dkSu ekfyd gS cSxsj fQ- fdjk;k fpVBh nkyku ugha fy[ks tk ldrs gSA It is therefore, clear that the defendant has not denied his position as a tenant of the plaintiff-landlord. From para 2 of the additional pleas of the written-statement (Ex. 7), it is also clear that as that as the rent note was not produced by the plaintiff before the filing of the written statement, an objection was taken that in the absence of that, it is not definitely known who are the owners of the demised premises and as such the defendant stated that the plaintiff has not impleaded the necessary parties in the suit according to the rent note, namely, the heirs of Regunath Das and other owners and therefore, the suit cannot proceed. In these circumstances, I regret, I cannot infer that there is direct repudiation of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Such a plea cannot amount to repudiation of the plaintiff's title as this cannot construed as a denial of the landlord's title in clear and unequivocal terms. The defendant, as is clear from the reply to para 1 of the plaint (Ex. 1), has admitted that he is a tenant of the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs. 5.50/- per mensem and that he is not in a position to state as to who are the owners of the property in the absence of the rent note. My conclusion, therefore, is that the words used in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement (Ex. 5.50/- per mensem and that he is not in a position to state as to who are the owners of the property in the absence of the rent note. My conclusion, therefore, is that the words used in para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement (Ex. 7) do not constitute denial of the title of the plaintiff-landlord. This view of mine stands supported by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Bela Deas and others v. Samarendra Nath Bose (supra). In that case the plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction against the defendant-respondent. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant has been inducted as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 135/- per mensem and subsequently on account of a decree in a partition suit between the plaintiffs and their co-sharers, the property was allotted to the plaintiffs and they became the absolute owners thereof. Plaintiffs wanted to evict the defendant on the ground of non-payment of rent, breach of the conditions of the tenancy and on account of their personal bonafide requirements of the premises. The defendant in his defense inter alia took the plea that the plaintiffs were not the absolute owners of the suit premises as the decree for partition had been set aside in a first appeal filed in the Patna High Court, and there were others who were also the landlords. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 6 observed as under : "The defendant had admitted that he was the tenant under the plaintiffs but was hereby asserting that there were some more landlords of the premises in question. It was not a case of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In the case of Mahabir Ram AIR 1968 Patna 425' the tenant had denied the title of the plaintiffs and set up a title in himself. In the instant case the plea of the defendant has been that the plaintiffs being landlords of the suit premises for a moviety of share could not alone claim a decree for eviction against him. Such a plea set up by the defendant to resist the suit for eviction was a plea qua-tenant and not de-hors it ....... In the instant case the plea of the defendant has been that the plaintiffs being landlords of the suit premises for a moviety of share could not alone claim a decree for eviction against him. Such a plea set up by the defendant to resist the suit for eviction was a plea qua-tenant and not de-hors it ....... It may also be added that the learned Munsif in his order dated 8.7.1964 striking out the defense, which order was confirmed by a Bench of the High Court in Civil. Revn. No. 824 of 1964, decided on 21.4.1964 (Pat), had pointed out on the basis of the defendant's statement in his written statement as also in his rejoinder to the plaintiffs petition under Section 11-A of the Act that the defendant had admitted that he was paying rent to the plaintiffs and had recognised them to be their landlords. In that view of the matter also the plaintiffs were the landlords of the suit premises occupied by the defendant within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act. In either view of the matter there is no escape for the defendant in this case that his entire defense in the suit was in his capacity as a tenant and on its striking out it was struck out as a whole." The decision given in Abbakka Shethi and others v. Sheshamma and others, AIR 1915 Mad. 85; Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, AIR 1918 PC 1 ; Kewal Ram v. Adbul Bai and another, AIR 1923 Lahore 409, and Raia Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan v. Municipal Board. of Sitapur and another, AIR 1965 SC 23, also lead to the same conclusion as the denial in the case before me is not in clear and unequivocal words. 17. Now, I deal with the cases cited by Mr. D.L. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. of Sitapur and another, AIR 1965 SC 23, also lead to the same conclusion as the denial in the case before me is not in clear and unequivocal words. 17. Now, I deal with the cases cited by Mr. D.L. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. So far as Hasmat Hussain v. Saghir Ahmed and other (supra) is concerned, the question raised by the appellant in that case was that the allegation in the written statement to the effect that plaintiff was not the sole owner of the property in suit but had only a share in it, the other share being owned by F amounted to a denial by the tenant of the landlord's title by setting up the title in another and it entitled the plaintiff to eject the defendants from the property in suit. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court held that the lease in favour of the defendants was determined by forfeiture on account of the renunciationed their character as lessees of the plaintiff by setting up a title in F a third person. In the case in hand the defendant-tenant in reply to para 1 of this plaint (Ex A1) has not denied his position as a tenant. This decision distinguishable and is, therefore, not applicable. I may, however, mention that Hasmat Hussain's case (supra) takes note of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which does not speak of forfeiture of a lease on a tenant's disclaiming the title of his landlord but speaks of the determining of the lease by forfeiture when a tenant sets up a title in a third person. Here I may refer to the observation made in Mallika Dassi's case (supra) at page 931:- "As we have already pointed out, in order to make a disclaimer sufficient, it must amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant, a renunciation by the party of his character as tenant. Here I may refer to the observation made in Mallika Dassi's case (supra) at page 931:- "As we have already pointed out, in order to make a disclaimer sufficient, it must amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant, a renunciation by the party of his character as tenant. It is difficult to see upon what principle it can be contended that a tenant disclaims the title of his landlord when he admits his title as such, but only questions the extent of his interest in a case of this description, the tenant does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, repudiate the tenancy or advice a claim to hold possession of the estate upon a ground inconsistent with the existence of the relations of landlord and tenant ........ To constitute a disclaimer, there must be a distinct and unequivocal renunciation of the tenancy, and we are not prepared to extend the application of the doctrine to a case in which the tenant does not set up a title to the whole in himself or a title to the whole in others, but, merely questions to the extent of the interest of the plaintiff and his title to receive the entire rent." For determining whether particular averments constitute denial of the title of the landlord or not, the surrounding circumstances in which the averments are made should also be taken into consideration and thereafter it is to be judged whether it (Denial) is in clear and unmistakable terms, so as to conclude denial of the title of the landlord. 18. In Rambux's case (supra), the tenant, in the notice Ex. 2 clearly renounced his character as such, when he stated that he had purchased the equity of redemption from the real heirs of the mortgagor and thus claimed to be the owner of he property in dispute. He further denied the plaintiffs title as landlord of the disputed property when he said in the notice that "you are not the heirs of the mortgagor and you had no right to redeem the property from the mortgagee. He further stated in the notice (referring to the plaintiffs)" you are not the owners of the property in dispute. "Because of these words used in the notice Ex. He further stated in the notice (referring to the plaintiffs)" you are not the owners of the property in dispute. "Because of these words used in the notice Ex. 2 the learned Judge opined that there can, therefore, be no doubt left after reading it that the appellant both renounced his character as such and also denied the title of the landlord. While doing so, the learned Judge held that it depends on the language used by the tenant to see whether he has transgressed the limits of honest inquiry. Chellommal and another v. Valliammal, AIR 1978 Mad. 21 , on which reliance was placed has no application. In that case, defendants had denied the plaintiff's title and under the circumstances the learned Judge was of the opinion that such denial was willful. Within five months of the execution of the lease-deed in favour of the plaintiff, the second defendant obtained a gift-deed from the first defendant in respect of all the properties inclusive of the properties which he took on lease and the very taking of the gift from the first defendant showed that he set up title in the first defendant and himself. The second defendant in the written statement stated that he neither denies not affirms the plaintiff's title. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the self serving statement by the second defendant made in his pleading that he neither denied nor affirmed the plaintiff's title is of no avail and undoubtedly he is setting up a hostile title and, therefore, the finding that he has forfeited lease, was right. 19. Ratanlal Manikchand's case (supra) is also distinguishable. The learned Judge, in the circumstances of that case and the state of pleadings between the parties, found that the virtual admission of the disclaimer by the defendants 3 and 4 unmistakably reflected in non-payment of any rent to the plaintiff and claim of payment of rent to defendants I and 2 establish the varaciy of the plaintiff's claim. In that case, the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in their written-statement not merely denied allegations in the plaint but claimed to be the tenants of defendants 1 and 2. It was also not controverted that defendants 3 and 4 did not pay any rent to the plaintiff. 20. In that case, the defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in their written-statement not merely denied allegations in the plaint but claimed to be the tenants of defendants 1 and 2. It was also not controverted that defendants 3 and 4 did not pay any rent to the plaintiff. 20. The facts, in Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada and another (supra) were that the eviction petition was filed against the tenant petitioner on two grounds namely : willful default on the part of the petitioner in payment of rent and that the building is bonafide required by the respondent landlady for her personal occupation. After the counter was filed before the Rent Controller, a petition for amendment by incorporating a paragraph as No. 8(c) in the counter already filed by him in the eviction petition was filed. It was contended, in paragraph 8(c), which was sought to be added, that the respondent had no real title to the suit building and much-less exclusive title as claimed by her in the eviction petition. On the ground that this amounted to a denial of title and the denial of title is not bonafide one, the Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition as one of the grounds mentioned in Section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 for evicting a tenant is denial of title of the landlord and that such denial is not bonafide.. It was contended before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner that what was stated by the petitioner in the application for amendment of the counter did not amount to a denial of title and that denial of title to afford a ground for eviction should be anterior to the proceedings taken for eviction. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the learned Judge did not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner Judge did not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner on both these contentions. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the petitioner became a tenant under the respondent and that the denial is not bonafide. This decision does not help the respondent. 21. Now I proceed to deal with the additional arguments of Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the petitioner became a tenant under the respondent and that the denial is not bonafide. This decision does not help the respondent. 21. Now I proceed to deal with the additional arguments of Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent. Section 116 of the Evidence Act reads as under : "116 No tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such persons had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given." 22. Estoppel contemplated by Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the landlord had no title before the tenancy commenced or the title of the landlord has since come to an end. From the averments contained in paras 1 and 2 of the additional pleas of the written-statement Ex. 7, it cannot be inferred that the defendant-appellant denied the title of the landlord as envisaged by Section 13(1)(f) of the Act. What was stated in para 1 is that he is a tenant of the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs. 5.50 but in the absence of rent note, it cannot be said that who are the owners of the property and, therefore, correct state of affairs cannot the written. The above reply has further been elucidated in para 2 of the additional pleas and it was stated that according to the rent note, necessary parties to the suit, heirs of Raghunath Das and other owners, have not been impleaded as parties. In the words of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan's case (supra), such averments, as held by me above, being not clear and unequivocal do not amount to denying the title. Now, I proceed to examine the cases cited by Mr. M.M. Vyas. In the words of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmed Khan's case (supra), such averments, as held by me above, being not clear and unequivocal do not amount to denying the title. Now, I proceed to examine the cases cited by Mr. M.M. Vyas. In Jamsed Sorabji v. Lakshmiram Rajaram (supra), a suit for ejectment against the defendant for failure to pay rent, on the ground that such failure operated as a forfeiture under the lease was instituted. The defendant pleaded that he had paid rent to the plaintiff's co-sharer, and the plaintiff alone could not sue without joining his co-sharer. The subordinate judge disallowed both the pleas and passed a decree declaring the plaintiff to be entitled to eject the defendant. Unless the latter paid up all arrears of rent up-to-date of decree together with interest and costs of suit within three months. On appeal, the District Judge, however, awarded possession of the land to the plaintiff, on the ground that the defendant having in his written statement denied the plaintiff's exclusive title. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court opined that this decree is wrong because the plaintiff's alleged clause of action was not any disclaimer of his title by the defendant, but merely the non-payment of rent; and forfeiture for such a breach of the covenants in a lease can be relied against a Court of Equity. The learned Judges observed.:- "the question whether there had been such a disclaimer and denial of the plaintiff's title as would entitle him to a decree for possession, was not dealt with at all by the subordinate Judge. Indeed such a cause of action could not well have been considered, as it was not alleged in the plaint." 23. In these circumstances, learned Judges amended the District Judge's decree by restoring that of the Subordinate Judge. 24. Maung shwe's case (supra) relates to a suit for the recovery of certain baskets of paddy or their value, Rs. 128.8 alleged to be due for rent of a piece of paddy land. The plaintiff, in that case, alleged that he let out the suit land to the 1st defendant, and that the 2nd defendant was added, as the first said that he ha paid the rent to him. 128.8 alleged to be due for rent of a piece of paddy land. The plaintiff, in that case, alleged that he let out the suit land to the 1st defendant, and that the 2nd defendant was added, as the first said that he ha paid the rent to him. The 2nd defendant alleged that he let out the land to the 1st defendant, claimed the right to receive the rent, and admitted the receipt of it from the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant denied hiring the land from the plaintiff, said that he did so from the 2nd defendant and pleaded that he had paid him and was, therefore, not further liable. The Additional Judge of the District Court on appeal held that the first defendant hired the land from the plaintiff, and would have to pay the rent and could not dispute her right to receive it. This was so held by the Additional Judge of the District Court on the basis of the authority of Jamsedji Sorabji (supra). The Additional Judge of the District Court passed a decree against both the defendants. The 2nd defendant alone preferred an appeal. It was observed by the learned Judge that the Additional Judge of the District Curt was quite right in holding on the Bombay authority (supra) that the 1st defendant hired the land from the plaintiff and that to her, he was bound to pay rent due. 25. So far as Alimaddin's case (supra) is concerned a suit was brought by the plaintiff for ejectment of defendant, the plaintiff claiming that he was a raiyat and the defendant was on under-raiyat, who held the property on a lease for seven years, the terms of which had expired. It was found by the lower appellate Court in reversing the judgment of the Munsif that the defendant was a raiyat and that his term had expired, and, therefore, he was liable to ejectment. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court held that having regard to the fact that the lease in favour of the defendant has been executed by the plaintiff alone and that the defendant had been inducted on the land by the plaintiff. It was not open to the defendant, having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act to say that the plaintiff was not in fact the landlord of the defendant. It was not open to the defendant, having regard to the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act to say that the plaintiff was not in fact the landlord of the defendant. With that view, the learned Fletcher, J., agreed with whom learned Richardson, J., concurred. 26. Next reference may be made to Jahangira's case (supra). In it, was held that the defendant having admitted the plaintiff to have held the premised lands in severally and having covenanted to occupy them as his defendant and to pay him rent therefore, it was not open to him to object that the other co-sharers should have joined in the suit. This finding was based on the point, which was canvassed before the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue at all, because the right to collect the rents of these lands is not vested in the plaintiff alone but in the entire body of co-sharers in the Mahal to which the lands in suit appertain. In that connection, it was observed:- "in our opinion the defendant is estopped from raising this plea. He entered into a rent agreement with the plaintiff in respect to these particular lands. If the plaintiff in enforcing his rights under that agreement is trenching on the right of the other proprietors in the Mahal, the latter have their remedy, either by way of a suit for settlement of accounts or by way of an application for partition. At any rate this defendant has admitted this plaintiff to have held these particular lands in severally and has covenanted to occupy them as his tenant and to pay him rent therefor. The defense that other co-sharers should have joined in this suit is not open to him." 27. In Mt. Laxmibai v. Devi and another (supra), it has been observed:- "though under Section 115 of the Evidence Act, no tenant can deny his landlord's title existing at the commencement of the lease, the rule only applied were the tenant has been let into possession by such landlord."In that case, it was not denied that though the defendants executed the rent-notes in favour of the plaintiff, yet they had been in possession of the sites previously. Reference was made to Jamsedji Sorabji's case (supra). Reference was made to Jamsedji Sorabji's case (supra). In that connection the learned Prideaux, A.J.C., observed:- "But this also, I think, is bound by the rule of the landlord's giving possession under the tenancy. If through ignorance or mistake a tenant has executed a rent-note and has not been put in possession by the lessor it seems to me he can dispute the lessor's title." 28. The decision of this Court in Smt. Barkat Bai v. Bhanwarlal, 1975 WLN 217, on which reliance was also placed, was rendered in different circumstances. Two points were canvassed before the learned Judge. The first was that the plaintiff's donor Smi. Rajmata had not acquired ownership to the Kothar Building' and consequently the plaintiff also got no right by the gift-deed in his favour from Smt. Rajmata with respect to the building in question and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The second point was that the plaintiff had failed to prove bonafide and reasonable necessity for the premises in question with respect to the first point, the learned Judge after referring to paras 745, 746 and 747 from Foa's General Law of Landlord & Tenant, 8th/9th Edition and after making a reference to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in V. Satyanarayanaraju v. Hanumayamma observed : "Judging by all these tests there is no escape from the conclusion that, having paid rent for a considerable period to the Rajmata and then to the plaintiff after he had been initiated the fact of gift by Rajmata to the plaintiff, the defendant cannot contend that Ex. 2 did not constitute a valid gift by the Ruler in favour of the Rajmata or for the matter of that, the plaintiff did not derive a valid title on the basis of the gift by the Rajmata. As already stated above, the defendant has miserably failed to show a better title in some other persons." 29. 2 did not constitute a valid gift by the Ruler in favour of the Rajmata or for the matter of that, the plaintiff did not derive a valid title on the basis of the gift by the Rajmata. As already stated above, the defendant has miserably failed to show a better title in some other persons." 29. In para 11, the learned Judge took note of the fact that the defendant has denied the title of the landlord and in passing, he mentioned that this fact also arise to the right of the plaintiff to ask for ejectment, but he did not consider it necessary to go into this question as, in his view, the Courts below had rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff's reasonable and bonafide requirement for the premises in question for the use of himself and his family was proved. The decision in Jamsedji Sorabji v. Lakshmiram Rajaram (supra), Moung Shwe Gyaw v. Ma Shwe that (supra), Jahangira v. Karrar Husain (supra), Basant Kumar Das v. Kusum Kumari Dasi (supra), Mt. Laxmibai v. Devi and another (supra) and Smt. Barkat Bai v. Bhanwarlal (supra) are not of any aid to the learned counsel for the plaintiff. None of the aforesaid cases in my opinion, apply to the facts of the case in hand and are distinguishable. Each case must be taken by itself and one decision in one context does not offer much guidance in a different context.33. Section 116 of the Evidence Act is only a rule of evidence and precludes a tenant from denying the title of his landlord at the commencement of the tenancy and not in subsequent point of time, whereas Section 13(1)(f) of the Act provides that unless the Court is satisfied that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant, a decree evicting the tenant cannot be passed. I have already held that para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement does not amount to the denial of the title of the landlord within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act.31. No other points was argued by either of the parties before me.32. I have already held that para 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement does not amount to the denial of the title of the landlord within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act.31. No other points was argued by either of the parties before me.32. In these circumstances, I am constrained to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated March 10, 1978 in Civil Appeal (decree) No. 23 of 1976 and restore that of the learned Munsif City, Jodhpur dated March 20, 1976 by which the plaintiff's suit for ejectment against the defendant was dismissed.33. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that the parties will bear their own costs through out.Appeal allowed.