JUDGMENT Amitav Banerji, J. - This civil revision is directed against an order of the District Judge, Banda, dated 8th October, 1974 passed in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. 2. The plaintiff-applicants filed a suit on 22.12.1970 in the court of Munsif, Banda praying for the ejectment of the defendants from the accommodation in dispute along with a decree for rent and damages alleging that the accommodation was built after 1950. The defendants in their written statement took a plea that the accommodation in dispute was a pre-1950 construction. Subsequently, the defendants moved an application 20 A 2 for the amendment of the written statement on 7.8.1972 i.e. after coming in force of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and (Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1972 Act). It was stated in that application that the provisions of the 1972 Act applied as the building was undoubtedly constructed before 15th July, 1972 and, as such, the defendants were entitled to avail of the provisions of section 39 of the said Act. Objections were filed to this application for amendment and, subsequently the plaintiffs also moved an application 23AI on the 15th January, 1973 in which they sought the amendment of para 3 of the plaint. They now wanted to say that the accommodation in dispute was constructed in 1925. The trial court by its order dated 30th March, 1974 allowed both the applications for amendment. Since the trial court was also Judge of Small Cause Court a Small Cause Court Revision was filed before the District Judge by the defendant. The learned District Judge allowed the revision and set aside the order of the trial court in respect of the amendment of the plaint sought by the plaintiffs. The learned District Judge held that the application was mala tide and that the plaintiffs had not come to the court with clean hands. The present revision has been filed against the above order. 3. The learned District Judge held that the application was mala tide and that the plaintiffs had not come to the court with clean hands. The present revision has been filed against the above order. 3. Learned counsel for the applicants contended firstly, that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to sit as a court of appeal and disallow the application for amendment to the plaint, secondly, that the power of amendment is discretionary and unless it could be shown that the exercise of discretion was manifestly erroneous and contrary to well settled principles, it could not he interfered with, thirdly, that when the defendants were being permitted to change their case, the plaintiffs were also entitled to amend their pleadings fourthly, that the learned District Judge had not taken into consideration the material on the record which showed that the Construction was of the year 1925 and lastly it was contended that there was a mistake of fact in the pleadings and the plaintiffs were entitled to correct it. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that this court exercised power of a revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code (here in after referred to as the code), and unless it could be shown that there was an error in exercise of jurisdiction, the order passed by the District Judge could not be interfered with. It was further contended that the District Judge had given cogent reasons for disallowing the amendment of the pleadings by the plaintiffs. This Court would not exercise its discretionary power in setting aside that order. It was also contended that the ambit of the power in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court act is very wide and, as such the District Judge could interfere with the order of the trial court, for he found the order not to be in accordance with law. 4. It is apparent from the material on the record that the plaintiffs sought the amendment in their pleadings in order to introduce a case which they had not taken earlier. Their specific case was that the suit property was a post 1950 construction. By the amendment, they wanted to give up this position and take a specific plea that the construction was of the year 1925. Their specific case was that the suit property was a post 1950 construction. By the amendment, they wanted to give up this position and take a specific plea that the construction was of the year 1925. This application was made more than two years after the suit was tiled and after the defendants had made an application for the amendment to their written statement saying that in view of the provisions of the 1972 Act, they were entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the latter Act. There is no doubt that the plaintiffs by this amendment sought to bring their case under the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act). Section 43 (2) (s) of the 1972 Act provides that a pending suit under the provisions of the 1947 Act shall be continued as if the new Act has not come in force. The plaintiffs must have realised that if the 1972 Act applied then either the defendants would get the benefit of section 39 of section 20 (4) of the 1972 Act to avoid ejectment from the suit premises. It is, therefore apparent that the amendment was sought to avoid this situation. The District Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the application was not bona fide and that the plaintiffs had not come with clean hands. When the plaintiffs originally filed the plaint, they had very clearly stated there that the construction was a post 1910 construction. The idea was to avoid the trial of the suit under the provisions of the 1947 Act. The 1947 Act also stipulated that a construction erected after the 1st January, 1950 would not come under the purview of the 1941 Act. Until the coming in force of the 1972 Act, the position was that a suit for the ejectment of a tenant from a building built after 1950 could be instituted after serving only a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiffs, it appeared, desired to take advantage of this and, therefore, they had asserted that the construction was post-1950 and verified this assertion on personal knowledge. When they found that the provision of section 39 of the 1972 Act would defeat their object they had made the application for amendment. The plaintiffs, it appeared, desired to take advantage of this and, therefore, they had asserted that the construction was post-1950 and verified this assertion on personal knowledge. When they found that the provision of section 39 of the 1972 Act would defeat their object they had made the application for amendment. I, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the District Judge in this regard. 5. The contention that if the defendants were to be allowed an amendment of the written statement, the plaintiffs also ought to be allowed to do so has no merits. The defendants in the present case by their application had conceded to the position that the building as one which was constructed after 1950 and, as such, they claimed the benefit of section 39 of the 1972 Act. The defendants could plead an alternative case. The plaintiffs could not be permitted to plead a case contrary to the one taken by them in the plaint, as it would amount to their setting up a new case. They could have taken an alternative case that even if the building was constructed prior to 1950, they were entitled to a decree for ejectment, as there was a 'default' within the meaning of section 3 (I) (a) of the 1947 Act. But this has not been their case and, as such, the plaintiffs could not be permitted an amendment as of right. 6. The contention that the District Judges had no jurisdiction to allow the revision is again misconceived. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act makes it clear that the revisional Court may call for the case for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree of order made in any case decided by a court of small cause was according to law. The District Judge in this case was the revisional court. In the revision filed before him he had to satisfy himself that the order passed by the trial court was in accordance with law. The powers under section 25 of the Act are wide and permit the District Judge to examine the order passed by the small Cause court to see if it is in accordance with law. The District Judge has given adequate and cogent reasons which show that the order passed by the trial court was not in accordance with law. The powers under section 25 of the Act are wide and permit the District Judge to examine the order passed by the small Cause court to see if it is in accordance with law. The District Judge has given adequate and cogent reasons which show that the order passed by the trial court was not in accordance with law. Once the Revisional Court finds that the application was mala fide and the party had not approached the court with clean hands but the trial court had allowed the application contrary to law, the revisional court would be perfectly with in its jurisdiction to set aside such an order. I am, therefore, satisfied that the District Judge had jurisdiction to set aside the order of the trial court on this point. 7. It was contended that there was a mistake of fact and the plaintiffs were entitled to correct it when they came to know of it. Was it a mistake of fact ? The district Judge has held that the application was mala fide. Thus, the plea of mistake of fact was impliedly rejected. 8. The contention that the district Judge as a court of revision could not interfere in the exercise of discretion by the trial 'court allowing amendment is also without merits. The power under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act is wide enough and empowers the revisional court to interfere where the order is not in accordance with law. 9. It was urged that the District Judge had not considered the material on the record regarding the building being constructed in the year 1925. The District Judge had to consider first if the amendment sought was to be allowed. Since he disallowed the amendment prayed, the non-reference to the papers regarding the building was not an illegality. 10. Suffice it to say that I do not find any error in the exercise of jurisdiction in the order of the District Judge in refusing the amendment sought by the plaintiffs. Lastly, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case for interference. The learned District Judge has given adequate reasons for setting aside the order and refusing the amendment. 11. For the reasons given above, this revision fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Lastly, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case for interference. The learned District Judge has given adequate reasons for setting aside the order and refusing the amendment. 11. For the reasons given above, this revision fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. The stay order is vacated, and the record of the case, which is here, shall be sent back to the court below with in a fortnight so that further proceedings before the trial court are not held up.