S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This is a revision application by Indian Dairy Entrepreneurs Agricultural Company Ltd. (for short, the Company) having registered office at Bhawani Singh Road, Jaipur and factory at Raniwara, District Jalore which was non-applicant (opposite party) before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. IV of 1936) (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) and is directed against the order of the District Judge, Jodhpur dated April 6, 1978 by which he accepted the appeal of the respondent who was applicant before the Authority under the Act and set aside the order dated September 1, 1977 by which the claim under S. 15 of the Act was rejected. 2. The facts leading to this revision, briefly put, are these:— 3. The respondent Shri G.P. Udawat was employed on June 8, 1973 by the Company on a consolidated salary of Rs. 500/- per month and was posted at Raniwara. His work was to meet the local people and survey the area for the purpose of proposed establishment of a dairy industry at Raniwara as at the relevant time, there was neither any factory nor any establishment nor any office of the Company at Raniwara According to the Company, his appointment was in an administrative category and there were not fixed hours of working. Hi3 services were finally terminated by the Company on February 27, 1975. During the period of his working as stated by the petitioner, he took more than earned leave. On December 2, 1975, the respondent Shri Udawat (applicant before the Authority) submitted a claim under Sec. 15(2) of the Act before the Authority under the Act at Jodhpur for Rs. 3416 66 p. alleging that this amount was due from the Company on account of wages, leave dues and overtime wages for the period from June 8, 1973 to July, 1974 The details of the claim were mentioned in the Annexure appended to the application under Sec. 15(2) of the Act. The Company submitted its reply to the claim on March 18, 1976 The claim was resisted on various grounds Three preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the claim were also raised in the reply. The first preliminary objection was that the Act applied to the person employed on wages not exceeding Rs. 400/- per month and since the respondent was admittedly getting Rs. The first preliminary objection was that the Act applied to the person employed on wages not exceeding Rs. 400/- per month and since the respondent was admittedly getting Rs. 500/- per month, the amendment of the Act enlarging its application to a person drawing upto Rs. 1000/- having come into force in November, 1975, much after the respondent had ceased to be an employee of the Company and much later than the alleged cause of action for the claim arose, the Authority had no Jurisdiction to entertain it. The second preliminary objection was that the alleged claim of the respondent was time-barred, for, the cause of action for each months salary and other dues arose at the end of each month and a claim for the same could be filed within 12 months thereof. The third preliminary objection was that the claim of the respondent is not covered by the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act because it was not a claim for any deduction from wages not delay in payment of wages. According to the Company, the respondeat has made a claim for the work not done and for wages not due. The Authority dealt with the point of jurisdiction first and by its order dated September 1, 1977, held that it had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim application and rejected the same In view of the aforesaid finding on the point of jurisdiction, it did not consider proper to decide the other points. 4. Against the order dated September 1, 1977 passed by the Authority, the respondent preferred an appeal under Sec. 17 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, who by his order dated April 6, 1978 accepted the appeal of the respondent and set aside the order of the Authority holding that on the date, the claim application was presented by respondent, that is, December 2, 1975, sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 1 of the Act stood amended and so his claim application was maintainable. He, therefore, remitted the case back to the Authority for deciding it afresh in accordance with law. 5. Being aggrieved by this order of the learned District Judge, dated April 6, 1978, the Company has preferred this revision application. 6. Mr. (6) of Sec. 1 of the Act stood amended and so his claim application was maintainable. He, therefore, remitted the case back to the Authority for deciding it afresh in accordance with law. 5. Being aggrieved by this order of the learned District Judge, dated April 6, 1978, the Company has preferred this revision application. 6. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioner (Company) contended that the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the claim application of the respondent which was presented on December 2, 1975, under Sec. 15(2) of the Act pertaining to the wages for the period from June 8, 1973 to July 14, 1974, for, the amended provisions of Sec. 1(6) came into force from November 12, 1975. Mr. Parekh further contended that at the time of delayed payment, employee could not invoke the provisions of the Act. He referred to the provisions of Sec. 15(3) of the Act, regarding penal consequences, which have been provided in the Act. He also took aid of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, and according to him, applicability of Sec. 22(d) is to be judged by considering whether Sec. 15 could be invoked at the time when the wages had not been paid or any payment of wages had been delayed. In the facts of this case, he submitted that the applicability of Sec. 22 is excluded, for, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, the non-petitioner was not a person, who was entitled to claim the amount under Sec. 15(2) of the Act. At the time of the accrual of the cause of action, the non-petitioner could prefer his claim in respect of the recovery of wages or deductions from wages in a civil court. As such, he supported the order of the Authority and assailed the order under revision on the ground that the learned District Judge made a wrong approach to the matter as it is not a case of change of forum. On the other hand, Mr. As such, he supported the order of the Authority and assailed the order under revision on the ground that the learned District Judge made a wrong approach to the matter as it is not a case of change of forum. On the other hand, Mr. D.K. Parihar, learned counsel for the non petitioner argued that on the date when the claim application was filed, the amended Sec. 1(6) was in force and according to Sec. 22(d) of the Act, jurisdiction of the Court to entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so claimed could be recovered by an application under Sec. 15 of the Act was barred and, therefore, the Authority has/had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim application, According to him, the law which was in force on the date of the presentation of the claim application would govern the claim application of the respondent. In this connection, he placed reliance on the decisions reported in Rajah of Pittapor vs. Gani Venkata Subba Raw (1), M/s. V.C.K. Bus Service (P) Ltd., Coimbatore vs. H.B. Sethna (2), Miss Zarin Rustomji Munshi vs. Santubhai Manibhai Patel (3), M/s. Yadav Motor Transport Go. vs. Shri Jagdish Prasad (4), and Dr. G.H. Grant vs. The State of Bihar (5). To substantiate his argument, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the forum and cause of action are two different things and when Sec. 1(6), as amended, came into force, forum for enforcement of the right to recover the wages payable in respect of wage period which, over such wage period, average one thousand rupees a month or more was changed and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of the matters which could be decided by the Authority was barred under sec. 22 of the Act. The only course open to the respondent was to file a claim application before the Authority. Mr. Parihar argued that merely the remedy has been changed and to a matter regarding change in forum, the doctrine of retrospec-tivity has no application because the provisions are merely procedural. According to him, Secs. 15 and 22(d) of the Act are merely procedural. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on Fatehlal vs. Smt. Kalawati (6). Mr. Parihar argued that merely the remedy has been changed and to a matter regarding change in forum, the doctrine of retrospec-tivity has no application because the provisions are merely procedural. According to him, Secs. 15 and 22(d) of the Act are merely procedural. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on Fatehlal vs. Smt. Kalawati (6). My attention was drawn to A.R. Sarin vs. B. G. Patil (7), Bhagwat Rai vs. Union of India (8), Kewalram Ghan Shyamdas vs. Ram Manohardas Kalyandas (9) and Madan Kumar vs. Surendra Kumar (10) to show that the test for determining whether a suit can lie is not only whether on the date of the suit an application can be made to the Authority under Sec. 15, but also whether such an application could have been made before the institution of the suit. The jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit will not consequently depend upon the choice of the employee as to whether he should or should not apply to the Authority The civil courts jurisdiction will be ousted if the application could have been made to the Authority before the suit is filed. He also referred to Dhulabhai vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (11). 7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. There is no dispute between the parties that the claim of the respondent pertains to the period from June 8, 1973, to July 1974. Prior to amendment which came into force from November 12, 1975, Sec, 1(6) of the Act was as under,— "Nothing in this Act shall apply to wages payable in respect of a wage period which, over such wage period, average four hundred rupees a month or more." It may be mentioned here that the words "four hundred rupees" were substituted by Sec. 2 of the Payment of Wages (Amendment) Act, 1957 (No LXVIII of 1957) for "two hundred rupees" The Payment of Wages (Amendment) Ordinance 1975 further amended Sec. 1. Sec. 3 of this Ordinance provides that in sub sec. 6 of Sec 1 of Che principal Act for the words "four hundred rupees", the words "one thousand rupees" shall be substituted. It is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed on a consolidated salary of Rs. 500/-per month. Sec. 3 of this Ordinance provides that in sub sec. 6 of Sec 1 of Che principal Act for the words "four hundred rupees", the words "one thousand rupees" shall be substituted. It is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed on a consolidated salary of Rs. 500/-per month. It is, therefore, clear that the provisions of sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 1 of the Act, as they stood prior to the amendment, did not apply to him. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 provides for the appointment of the authority to hear and decide for a specified area all claims arising out of the deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area including all matters incidental to such claims. Sub-secs. (2) and (3) of Sec. 15 of the Act read as under:— "15. (2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub-sec. (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-sec. (3) : Provided that every such application shall be presented within twelve months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of twelve months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause far not making the application within such period. (3) When any application under sub sec. (3) When any application under sub sec. (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages and, after such further inquiry, if any, as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding twenty five rupees in the latter, and even if the amount deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the disposal of the application, direct the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding twenty-five rupees : Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to— (a) bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment." The Authority appointed under the Act is a tribunal with limited jurisdiction. Four important limitations have been placed upon the jurisdiction of the Authority which relate (1) to the class of persons entitled to make a claim that is as prescribed by sub secs. (4) and (5) of S. 1, (2) to the limits of" pecuniary jurisdiction prescribed by S. 1(6), (3) to the nature of the claim which may be made before the Authority, namely, claims arising out of deductions or delay in payment of wages or persons employed, and (4) to claims of persons employed in or paid in the areas specified in the notification of the State Government. The respondent had submitted an application under Sec. 15(2) of the Act and the important question that now arises in these circumstances is whether when the respondent was drawing more than Rs. The respondent had submitted an application under Sec. 15(2) of the Act and the important question that now arises in these circumstances is whether when the respondent was drawing more than Rs. 400/- during the period from June 8, 1973 to July 1974, he could be called an employed person so as to invoke the provisions of Sec. 15(2) of the Act. In other words, whether he was an employed person at the time of the accrual of the cause of action and if he was not an employed person, then his case could not fall under Sec 15(2). Sec. 4 of the Act provides for fixing of wage period and this section places the responsibility for fixing wage periods on the person responsible for making payment of wages and enjoins that the wage periods so fixed may be,daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly or so but in any event, such period should not exceed one month Section 5 lays down time of payment of wages and sub sec. (1) thereof runs as under:— "Time of payment of wages,—(1) The wages of every person employed upon or in— (a) any railway, factory or industrial establishment upon or in which less than one thousand persons are employed, shall be paid before the expiry of the seventh day, (b) any other railway, factory or industrial establishment, shall be paid before the expiry of the tenth day, after the last day of the wageperiod in respect of which the wages are payable: Provided that in the case of persons employed on a dock, wharf or jetty or in a mine, the balance of wages found due on completion of the final tonnage account of the ship or wagons loaded or unloaded as the case may be, shall be paid before the expiry of the seventh day from the day of such completion......" The provisions of sub sections (c), (d) and (e) of Sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act, 1897 relating to the consequences of a repealed law came to be considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh (12) wherein it was held that the provisions of sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act could be attracted only when an Act or regulation is repealed simpliciter but, not when as in the present, the repeal is followed by re-enactment. 6 of the General Glauses Act could be attracted only when an Act or regulation is repealed simpliciter but, not when as in the present, the repeal is followed by re-enactment. In the course of the judgment, their Lordships observed,— "...But when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them...." After considering the decisions reported in the cases of State of Punjab (12) and Deepchand vs. State of U.P. (13), their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jindas Oil Mill vs. Godhra Electricity Company Ltd. (14) observed as under,— "It is true that when an existing statute or Regulation is repealed and the same is repealed by fresh Statute or Regulation unless the new Statute or Regulation specifically or by necessary implication affects rights created under the old law those rights must be held to continue in force even after the new Statute or Regulation comes into force. But in the cases before us there is no question of affecting any vested right. There is no dispute that the charges fixed can be altered. The controversy does not touch any vested right. The procedure in question must necessarily be regulated by the law in force at the time of the alteration of the charges." (Italic is mine) Sec. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts and lays down,— "Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunals for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court." Sec. 110-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down— "Every application under seb-sec. (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed." The provisions of Sec. 110-A and 110-F came up for consideration before a Division Beech of this Court in Fatehlal vs. Smt. Kalawati (6). It was held therein that Secs. 110A to 110F do not affect any substantive rights. They only mean a change in forum and the doctrine of retrospectively has no application because the provisions are merely procedural. In para 20 of the report, the following observations have been made, which are of immense help for resolving the controversy before me,- "...All that the legislature has done, while substituting section 110 as also introducing Secs. 110A to 110F in the Act by the amending Act of 1956 is to provide a cheap and speedy remedy for the enforcement of the substantive right of an injured person to claim compensation which he could claim in the form of damages in tort in Civil Court. No rights are affected and it is only the remedy which has been changed for enforcing that right. A right of action is something different from the choice of the forum." In Birla Brothers Ltd. vs. Modak (15), it was pointed out that though the Industrial Disputes Act came into force in the year 1947, a reference of an industrial dispute based on the facts which arose before that Act came into force is a valid reference. The decision in that case was approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in its decision in the case between Jahiruddin vs. Model Mills, Ltd., Nagpur (16). In a case between Rustom & Hornsby (I) Ltd. vs. T.B. Kadam (17) an argument was raised before their Lordship? of the Supreme Court on behalf of the appellant that the incident took place in December 1S63 and the order of dismissal was made on January 7, 1964 and as Sec. 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act came into force on December 1, 1965, the reference of this dispute under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with sec. 2-A was bad, for, this will amount a retrospective effect to the provisions of sec 2-A While examining this argument, the question that arose for consideration was about the validity of the reference, and in that connection, their Lordships applied the reasoning given in Birla Brothers case (15), which was approved in Jahiruddins case (16). Relying upon these two authorities, the Supreme Court took the view that the test for the validity of a reference under sec. 10 is whether there is in existence a dispute on the day the reference was made and there was no question of giving retrospective effect to the Act. The matter regarding change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantial law came up for consideration in New India Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Smt. Shanti Mishra (18). This question arose in relation to sec. 110-A and 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. In that connection, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed,— "...It is a well established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to the causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective..." (Italic added) The important question which arose for determination in that case was in respect of the cases where accident occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. The remedy of action in Civil Court was alive but no suit had been filed. In such cases the vested right of action was not meant to be extinguished and it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal was constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal was the only remedy available to the claimant. In such cases the vested right of action was not meant to be extinguished and it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal was constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal was the only remedy available to the claimant. The view taken by the Madras High Court in the cases of M/s VCK Bus Service (2), M/s Yadav Motor (4) and Thomas vs. M/s Hotz Hotels Ltd. (19) was approved and the contrary view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Khatumal Ghanshamdas vs. Abdul Qadir Jemaluddin (20), Kumari Shushma Mehta vs. Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. (21) and the Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. vs. Rameshwar Raut (22) were overruled. Chhangani, J. also considered the provisions of sec. 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act in M/s, Yadav Motor Transport Companys case (4). He held that sec. 110-F bars jurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of all claims to be made after the constitution of the Tribunals even though the accidents may have occurred before the constitution of the Tribunal. 8. Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified in contending that the petitioner had a vested right of forum at the time when the wages became due or when the deduction in the wages was made, as this submission is based without noticing the distinction between what is substantial right and the procedural right. The litigant cannot say as a matter of right that his suit or application should be tried by this or that forum which existed on the date of accrual of cause of action. Forum belongs to the realm of pioce-dure and does not constitute substantive right of a party or litigant. The matter relating to forum relates to the law of procedure and should be governed by the law in force at the time of the institution of the claim or application as the case may be. It is beyond controversy that the presumption against the retrospective operation has no application to enactment which effect only the procedure and practice of the court. It is pertinent to refer what Salmond says that the substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seaks, the procedural law deals with the mean and instrument by which those ends are to be attained. It is pertinent to refer what Salmond says that the substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administration of justice seaks, the procedural law deals with the mean and instrument by which those ends are to be attained. He gives the illustration in this form,— "Whether I have a right to recover certain property in a question of law, for the determination and protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions." In Madan Kumars case (l0) the plaintiff served the defendants for eight months commencing from December 1958 to July 1959 and it was alleged that he was entitled to get Rs. 800/- on account of his salary. It was placed in the first instance that since the suit for the recovery of wages, it could have been recovered by an application under sec. 15 of the Act and the suit was barred under Sec. 22 of the Act. In that connection, the matter was examined and the learned Judge hold that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under Sec. 22 of the Act and the suit was also barred in as much as the remedy available to the plaintiff was to make an application under S. 15 of the Act. I may here mention that the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to draw support from the decision reported in Balkrishna vs. D.T.S., Western Rly., Abu Road (23). In that case, it was found by the learned Judge that dearness allowance is part of wages under the Payment of Wages Act, and as wages claimed in that application exceeded Rs. 200/-, the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. An application was moved that as the jurisdiction of the Authority had since been extended to claims in respect of the average wages at Rs. 400/- after the amendment of the Act in 1957, the application could be entertained. Jagatnarayan, J. as he then was, in Balkrishnas case (23) observed that the claims were filed before the Authority under the Act which it was not competent to entertain at the time when they were filed. 400/- after the amendment of the Act in 1957, the application could be entertained. Jagatnarayan, J. as he then was, in Balkrishnas case (23) observed that the claims were filed before the Authority under the Act which it was not competent to entertain at the time when they were filed. These claims could only be preferred before the Civil Court at that time. There was, thus, inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal before which the claims were preferred. The subsequent extension of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Authority could not be availed of by the applicant. This decision cannot be of any avail as when the respondent preferred the application under Sec. 15(2) of the Act, the Authority had jurisdiction to entertain it as the words one thousand rupees were substituted in place of the words four hundred rupees, in Sec. 1(6) of the Act. It may be stated, though at the risk of repetition that in Balkishans case (23), the claims were filed before the Authority under the Act, which it was not competent to entertain at the time when they were filed. In these circumstances, the learned District Judge was right in hold-ing that in view of the amended provisions of Sec. 1(6) of the Act, the Authority under the Act has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application of the respondent. I may here mention the two decisions reported in State of Kerala vs. N. Sami Iyer (24) and G. Ekambarappa vs. Excess Profits Tax Officer (25) on which stress was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the State of Keralas case (24), it was observed: — "if the Legislature had the intention to override the right attached to the liability under sec. 3 (5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, it would have used more clear and precise words." Sec. 6 (c) of the General Glauses Act was considered in G Ekambarappas case (25) The argument that was stressed in that case was that even if Sec. 6 (c) of the General Glauses Act was applicable, there was no liability incurred or accrued, as there was no assessment of escaped profits before November 1, 1956 when the adaptation was made. The argument was repelled and their Lordships held.— "...the liability to pay excess profits tax accrued immediately at the end of the chargeable accounting period and that liability was preserved under section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act even though the Act stood repealed so far as Bellary district was concerned with effect from November 1,1956." Their Lordships also observed,— "...the notice issued under sec. 15 of the Act was legally valid and the appellants representing the original partners of the firm continued to be liable to be proceeded against under that section for the profits which had escaped taxation...." These two decisions in my opinion, are not applicable to the case before me. 9. In these circumstances, there is no room for debate that the retpon-dent could file an application under Sec. 15 of the Act at the time when it was filed as jurisdiction of the civil courts was barred by virtue of Sec. 22 of the Act. For the reasons mentioned above, no case for interference with the order under revision is made out. 10. The result is that this revision application fails and it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances, I direct that the parties will bear their own costs of this revision application.