Judgment :- 1. Respondents (1) and (2)-a brother and a sister-applied for resuming 50 cents of land comprised in the holding of the revision petitioner-tenant. The Land Tribunal allowed resumption of 20 cents, and the Appellate Authority concurred. The tenant has come up in revision. 2. The application for resumption was filed under S.15 of Act 1 of 1964. The section reads; "Resumption for construction of residential buildings. A landlord (other than a sthani or the trustee or owner of a place of public religious worship) who is not in possession of any land other than nilam, or is in possession of less than two acres in extent of such land and who needs the holding for the purpose of constructing a building bona fide for his own residence or for that of any member of his family may resume from his tenant: (i) an extent of land not exceeding 20 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of one person; and (ii) an extent of land not exceeding 50 cents, where resumption is sought on behalf of two or more persons: Provided that, by such resumption, the total extent of land other than nilam in the possession of the landlord shall not be reduced below fifty cents. Explanation. For the purposes of this section and S.16, "member of his family" shall mean, (i) in the case of a landlord who has granted a lease on behalf of a joint family, member of such family; and (ii) in any other case, wife or husband, as the case may be, or a lineal descendant of the landlord." 3. The applicants had averred that they had no residential buildings of their own, that they had no other land, that the 1st petitioner was doing some business in Bangalore, but he had no place to live in on return, that the 2nd petitioner was residing in the family house of her husband who was away at Singapore, that this was embarrassing and inconvenient, and that therefore resumption of 50 cents was needed bona fide for constructing two buildings. In the objections filed by the tenant, the existence of bona fide need was questioned. It was stated that the applicants had other lands and houses. In the objections filed by the tenant, the existence of bona fide need was questioned. It was stated that the applicants had other lands and houses. In regard to the 2nd petitioner, a specific plea was also raised that she was living in a house belonging to her husband, that she was pot in need.of another house, and that her husband had large extents of other lands where a house could be constructed for her, if at all such separate abode was necessary. 4. The Land Tribunal found that the 1st applicant (brother) had his own house, and that he was not in need of another house-site. But the need of the 2nd applicant (sister) was found to be genuine, and resumption of 20 cents was permitted. The Tribunal said: "The second petitioner is residing in the tarwad house of her husband. It has been alleged that it is inconvenient for her to reside in the tarwad house of her husband, and that she is not having possession of any land for the purpose of constructing a residential building. Ext. B2 and B4 produced by the third respondent only show that the husband of the second petitioner is in possession of some land. These documents do not show that the second petitioner has got any right over the land possessed by her husband under Exts. B2 and B4. In so far as the second petitioner is not having any house of her own nor Saying any land suitable for the construction of a residential house it cannot be said, when she alleges that she requires a portion of the holding to be resumed for the purpose of constructing a residential building, that her claim is without any bonafides. Therefore, I hold that there is bonafide need for the second petitioner to construct a building for her own residence." According to the Appellate Authority, the only contention advanced before it in appeal was that the 2nd petitioner's husband was possessed of other properties and a residential building, and that there could therefore be no bonafide need at all for her to have a separate residential building. As already noticed, this contention did not succeed. 5. Before this Court also, the point raised is practically the same. The second petitioner, a married woman, has admittedly been living in the husband's house. As already noticed, this contention did not succeed. 5. Before this Court also, the point raised is practically the same. The second petitioner, a married woman, has admittedly been living in the husband's house. Quite a normal thing for any one in her position to do, says counsel. The husband has other lands of his own to build, if a separate or larger building is required for the wife. Why then should the tenant be compelled to part with a portion of his small holding? Is it not really an indirect attempt to drive him out of that portion? Is it not a pretence, rather than a bona fide need to construct, asks counsel. Reference is also made to the many decisions of this Court, touching the question of "bona fide requirement" in shifting proceedings under S.75 (2), to contend that something more than a mere desire or whim or fancy should be established by an applicant under S.15. Counsel even advanced a general proposition that a married woman, living in the house of her husband and having other suitable house-sites though belonging to the husband, can never be held to be in bona fide need, within the meaning of S.15. 6. Though there are certain similarities in the language used in S.15 and S.75 (2), I am not prepared to say that all the considerations relevant for determining the question of bona fides in the latter case, should invariably apply to the former. Under S.75 (2), what is to be established is that the land occupied by the kudikidappu is required. That means that if the applicant has other lands suitable for putting up a house, he should show why he prefers the land occupied by the kudikidappukaran. In proceedings under S.15, no such question arises. The section permits only resumption of a portion of the land comprised in the holding; and it is for the tenant to decide, under S.22(4), which portion he is to give up. Again, the social impact of permitting resumption of a small extent of land under the stringent conditions laid down in S.15, may not be so serious as the one arising under S.75(2), where a kudikidappukaran, practically a landless person, is uprooted, and transplanted. Again, the social impact of permitting resumption of a small extent of land under the stringent conditions laid down in S.15, may not be so serious as the one arising under S.75(2), where a kudikidappukaran, practically a landless person, is uprooted, and transplanted. Nor could I accept counsel's plea that general principles applicable for determination of the question of bona fides, whether it arises under one section or another, could or should be laid down by this Court. 7. Let us therefore examine the proposition advanced, without the aid of precedents. S.15 permits the landlord to resume land from the tenant, not only for putting up a house for himself, but also for any member of his family, i. e., for his wife or for any of his lineal descendants. A husband, wife and their children normally live together under the same roof; but still, the legislature thought, as is clear from the "Explanation", that a husband should be permitted to resume a small bit of land f or constructing a residential house either for the wife or for a child. That is one indication that the mere fact that one of the spouses has buildings or lands of his or her own, shall not by itself be a circumstance to hold that an application by the other under S 15 is without bona fides. Again, a landlord having other lands less than two acres in extent, can apply under S.15; mere possession of some other small extent of land is not by itself a disqualification, or a circumstance to establish mala fides. The Section itself contains adequate safeguards against mala fide assertion of the right by the landlord, in a manner calculated to defeat the tenant. For example, the maximum extent that could be resumed is 50 cents, irrespective of the number of members in the landlord's family, and even this is subject to the restrictions in the proviso. S.23 provides for restoration also, where resumption is obtained on pretence. If these safeguards are not sufficient, that is no reason why this Court could be called upon to rewrite the section by holding that a person like the 2nd petitioner herein can under no circumstances bona fide invoke it. 8. I am not laying down a general proposition that an application under S.15 by a person like the second petitioner can never be rejected for want of bona fides. 8. I am not laying down a general proposition that an application under S.15 by a person like the second petitioner can never be rejected for want of bona fides. On the contrary, I am only refraining from laying down a rule that such applications, without anything more, should be presumed to be mala fide. Generalisations apart, the real question is whether the two tribunals have committed an illegality in assessing the facts and circumstances of the case and drawing inferences therefrom; and my answer is that the inference drawn by them is at least a possible one, outside the pale of review by this court under S.103. 9. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Dismissed.