ORDER U.C. Srivastava, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 11th July, 1977 passed by the court of the Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur, dismissing the revision application against the order passed by the court of Judge Small Causes decreeing this suit filed by opposite party No. 3, the owner landlord of the premises in dispute for ejectment and arrears of rent. The opposite party No 3 filed a suit for ejectment of opposite party No. 4 on the ground that the opposite party No. 4 has illegally sub-let the premises in dispute to the petitioner and has further not paid the rent with effect from 1st September, 1973. The opposite party No. 4 admitted the plaint allegations but the petitioner contested the suit alleging that some ten years ago the opposite party No. 4 who was the tenant of the premises in dispute discontinued his business and with the permission of opposite party No. 3 he was put into possession and since then he is in occupation of the shop of the landlord who has been realising rent from him. It was further pleaded that the landlord started proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in which case it was pleaded that he was the tenant of the landlord and the said plea operated as res judicata. The trial court holding the petitioner to be the sub-tenant and the defendant No. 4 to be in arrears to rent decreed the suit against which the petitioner filed a revision application which too was dismissed. It will not be out of place to mention that the petitioner offered to pay the rent before the trial court. Against the revisional order the petitioner has filed the present writ petition and against the appellate order dated 10-10-75 passed by the court of 1st Additional District Judge, Shahjahanpur, admittedly no writ petition or revision application was filed. The petitioner was impleaded as a patty to the proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and those proceedings were in fact contested by the petitioner and the opposite party No. 4 sided with the landlord. The petitioner was impleaded as a patty to the proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and those proceedings were in fact contested by the petitioner and the opposite party No. 4 sided with the landlord. The appellate court held that the petitioner entered into possession of the said shop as sub-tenant of the tenant-in-chief to which landlord consented and recorded the following finding ; It is admitted case of the landlord that Damodar Swarup had entirely given up his claim in respect of the shop in question and so Ram Lal clearly became the tenant-in-chief of the shop in question with the consent of Raja Ram landlord. This finding was based on appraisal of evidence. 2. Sri Grover, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the said decision operated as res-judicata between the parties and in any case it was not open to the opposite party No. 3 to raise any contention against the same and it was also contended that before the revision was filed the money was tendered, but was not accepted by the landlord where after the petitioner deposited the entire amount in cash and as such he was entitled to protection under section 39 of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and no decree for ejectment could be pissed against him. The proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are governed by the Civil Procedure Code to a certain extent only as is provided under section 34 of the said Act. The petitioner was impleaded as party to these proceedings and in fact it is he who contested the same and as such for the purpose of the said case it was necessary to find out as to whether the petitioner in fact has become the tenant or still continued to be the Sub-Tenant, a fact which was asserted by the landlord himself. The appellate court in the said case recorded a finding that the petitioner has become a tenant-in-chief in his own right with the consent of the landlord. 3. The principles of res judicata are applicable in respect of the judgments of the court of exclusive jurisdiction like revenue courts and Land Acquisition courts etc. The appellate court in the said case recorded a finding that the petitioner has become a tenant-in-chief in his own right with the consent of the landlord. 3. The principles of res judicata are applicable in respect of the judgments of the court of exclusive jurisdiction like revenue courts and Land Acquisition courts etc. The legislation pertaining to the Rent Control matters has also conferred exclusive jurisdiction on rent control courts and in respect of such matters the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and certain other Acts do apply. The courts under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act are courts of exclusive jurisdiction and finality has been attached to their decisions. Section 37 of the said Act makes it clear that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court. 4. In Raj Laxmi Dasi v. Banamali, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 83, the Supreme Court laid down that the principles underlying res judicata are applicable in respect of questions which ate raised and decided after full contest, even though the first tribunal which has decided the matter may have no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit and even though the subject matter of the dispute was not exactly the same in the two proceedings. 5. The principles of res judicata thus are also applicable even in respect of findings given under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 up the courts under the said Act even though said court may not be competent to entertain the subsequent dispute. As to the question which has been decided by the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority in this case was within their jurisdiction the finding which has been recorded by the appellate court in proceedings under section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 holding that the petitioner became a tenant of the premises in dispute and the landlord was a consenting party to it operated as res judicator and it was no longer open to record a contrary finding. 6. Sri Dubey, learned counsel for the opposite party, contended that because another remedy by way of revision was available to the petitioner and the petitioner not having availed of the remedy by filing the revision, the writ petition was not maintainable. 6. Sri Dubey, learned counsel for the opposite party, contended that because another remedy by way of revision was available to the petitioner and the petitioner not having availed of the remedy by filing the revision, the writ petition was not maintainable. The present writ petition was filed in the year 1977 and it could not be said that the remedy by way of revision under section 115 C P.C. in which the question of jurisdiction or some procedural error could be seen was an efficious remedy. In the present case I do not find any force in the contention raised by the learned counsel. Sri Dubey further contended that the appellate court in the earlier suit has wrongly held that the petitioner has become a tenant-in-chief instead of a tenant and as such the decision cannot operate as res judicata. The said contention has no force. Merely because the appellate court instead of using the word 'Tenant' (has wrongly used the word 'tenant' in chief, that will not change the legal and factual position. The decision of the appellate court was not even challenged by means of the writ petition and the same attained finality and it was no longer open to the opposite party No. 3 who was a party to the proceedings to contend that the petitioner was stilt a sub-tenant. Thus both the courts have committed an error in holding that the said finding did not operate as res judicata or was. not binding between the parties and the matter could be opened. In this view the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 25-4-1977 (Annexure-IV) and the Additional District Judge dated 11th July, 1977 (Annexure VI thus suffer from manifest error of law. 7. In view of this the writ petition is allowed with costs and the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge are quashed.