S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was the Sarpanch of Mayurnagar Gram Panchayat in Surendranagar District. He was elected to than post in 1974. tn 1976 a special notice was served upon him in regard to the arrears of land revenue and education cess. It was dated 30th March 1976. On 7th May 1976 the petitioner paid up half the amount to the Secretary who had served special notice of demand upon him. It is the petitioners case that the Secretary thereafter withdrawn the notice. On 26th October 1976 the District Development Officer Surendranagar served upon the petitioners a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be disqualified from holding the post to which he was elected. The petitioner was heard. On 14th February 1977 the District Development Officer made an order holding that the petitioner was disqualified from holding the post of the Sarpanch because he was in arrears within the meaning of sec. 23 (1) (i) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 The petitioner challenged that order in appeal to the State Government. The Development Commissioner who heard the appeal dismissed it on 14th October 1977. It is that order which is challenged by the petitioner in this petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the special notice was withdrawn before the expiry of a period of three months within which the petitioner was required to pay up the arrears of land revenue if he wanted to avoid the disqualification. The period of three months for payment of arrears after the service of notice is prescribed by clause (i) of sub- sec. (1) of sec. 23 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 ( 3 ) NOW let us turn to the language of clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23. It provides as under: no person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue as such who. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 ( 3 ) NOW let us turn to the language of clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23. It provides as under: no person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue as such who. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fails to pay any arrears of any kind due by him to the panchayat or any panchayat subordinate thereto or any sum recoverable from him in accordance with Chapter VI of this Act within three months after a special notice in accordance with the rules made in this behalf has been served upon him. Explanation 2 has reference to the disqualification set out in clause (i ). It provides as follows:explanation 2. For the purpose of clause (i) - (i) a person shall not be deemed to be disqualified if he has paid the arrears or the sum referred to in clause (is of this sub-section prior to the day prescribed for the nomination of candidates; (II) failure to pay the arrears or the sum referred to in clause (i) of this sub-section to the panchayat by a member of an undivided Hindu family or by a person belonging to a group or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate or residence shall be deemed to disqualify all members of such undivided Hindu family or as the case may be all the members of such group or unit. EXPLANATION 2 has no application to the instant case. Relying upon the language used in clause (i) Mr. Raval has argued that what produces a disqualification is the arrears and not the special notice. According to him arrears constitute the core and substance of disqualification. It cannot be gainsaid that the arrears certainly constitute the core and substance of the disqualification set out in clause (i) but arrears alone do not produce the disqualification. There are three conditions precedent to the emergence of disqualification. Existence of arrears is one and the second is the service of a special notice demanding the payment of arrears and the third is non-payment of arrears within a period of three months after service of the special notice. When these three facts combine together they produce the disqualification set out in clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23. Existence of arrears is one and the second is the service of a special notice demanding the payment of arrears and the third is non-payment of arrears within a period of three months after service of the special notice. When these three facts combine together they produce the disqualification set out in clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23. In order to- test the contention which Mr. Raval advanced before me I asked him the following question: Would arrears in respect of which no special notice of demand has been served produce a disqualification for a member or an office-bearer of a panchayat under sec. 23 (1) (i) ? He replied to me in the negative though he did so with some hesitation. I have no doubt in my mind that though the arrears constitute the core and substance of the disqualification sect out in clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec 23 the disqualification actually emerges and attaches to a member or an office-bearer of a panchayat only when three conditions are satisfied. To repeat them they are as follows: (i) there must be arrears in existence (ii) a special notice of demand must have been served upon a member or an office-bearer of a panchayat who owes those arrears and (iii) he must have failed to pay them within a period of three months after the service of notice of demand ( 4 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Dave that the petitioner had paid half toe amount of arrears within a period of three months. That fact by itself would not be enough to prevent the birth of disqualification set out in clause (i) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 23. If arrears constitute the core and substance of a disqualification it is immaterial whether the arrears consist of the full amount due from such a person or whether they consist of a part of the amount due from him. Therefore. part payment of the arrears within a period of three months from the date of the service of special notice of demand does not prevent the birth of that disqualification and its attachment to the member or the office-bearer concerned. ( 5 ) IT has therefore been argued by Mr. Therefore. part payment of the arrears within a period of three months from the date of the service of special notice of demand does not prevent the birth of that disqualification and its attachment to the member or the office-bearer concerned. ( 5 ) IT has therefore been argued by Mr. Dave that in any case the Secretary had withdrawn the special notice of demand and that therefore after 7th of May 1976 there was no subsisting notice of demand which could produce the disqualification assuming that all other things were satisfied. He has in that behalf invited my attention to sec. 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 and contended that the Secretary had the power to undo what he had she power to do. Sec. 21 provides as follows:where by any Bombay Act. or Gujarat Act a power to issue notifications. orders rules or by-laws is conferred. then that power includes a power. exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like section and conditions (if any) to add to amend vary or rescind any notifications orders rules or by-laws so issued. It has been argued by Mr. Raval that sec. 21 applies to notifications orders rules and by-laws and that it does not apply to an individual notice served upon an individual defaulter. While a notification is general in character a notice is generally individual. It appears to me that an order is essentially different from a special notice of demand contemplated by sec. 23 (1) (i) because whereas an order has the finding force and can itself be enforced the special notice of demand has a capacity to produce a disqualification after a lapse of particular period of time. A special notice of demand contemplated be sec. 23 (1) (i) does not appear to me to be enforceable inasmuch as the Legislature does not lay down that the demand made in a notice issued under sec. 23 (1) (i) can be immediately implemented and appears can be recovered. The special notice of demand within the meaning of sec. 23 (1) (i) has only a limited capacity. It is incapable of producing any consequence within a period of three months. If it is complied with it produces no consequence whatsoever. If it is not complied with within a period of three months it processes a disqualification. The special notice of demand within the meaning of sec. 23 (1) (i) has only a limited capacity. It is incapable of producing any consequence within a period of three months. If it is complied with it produces no consequence whatsoever. If it is not complied with within a period of three months it processes a disqualification. The character of the order within the meaning of sec. 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 is therefore essentially different from a special notice of demand contemplated by sec. 23 (i ). Similarly a special notice of demand served upon an individual defaulter in respect of the arrears which he owes appears to me to be quite different- from the notification contemplated by sec. 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act inasmuch as where a special notice of demand pertains to an individual and relates to the default committed by an individual the notification by and large. is general in character and applies either to all the members of the public or to a section thereof. Therefore I am unable to uphold the argument raised by Mr. Dave that sec. 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 (Bombay Act No. 1 of 1904) conferred upon the Secretary power to withdraw or rescind the special notice of demand which had been served upon the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE next question which arises in that context is whether the Secretary who has the power to issue notice has an inherent power to withdraw it. Ordinarily a public officer who has the power to do a Particular thing has inherent power to undo it. What therefore he can do can be altered amended modified or undone by him. Can it therefore be said in the context of sec 23 (1) (i) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1961 that the Secretary who has the power to serve a special notice of demand in respect of arrears has inherent power to withdraw it? What therefore he can do can be altered amended modified or undone by him. Can it therefore be said in the context of sec 23 (1) (i) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1961 that the Secretary who has the power to serve a special notice of demand in respect of arrears has inherent power to withdraw it? I have no doubt in my mind that after the expiry of a period of three months the Secretary does not have the power to withdraw it because on the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the service of special notice of demand upon a defaulter the defaulter becomes dis- qualified in case he has not fully paid up the arrears demanded of him under a special notice of demand to continue to be a member or an office-bearer of the panchayat because withdrawal of the special notice of demand under the aforesaid circumstances will have the potentiality of removing the disqualification which is attached to a member or an office-bearer of a panchayat. The Secretary does not have the jurisdi- ction or the power to remove the disqualification which has already emerged and attached to such a defaulting member or an office-bearer. Therefore by withdrawing the notice after the expiry of a period of three months be cannot indirectly do what he cannot directly do. ( 7 ) THE next aspect of this controversy which arises therefore is whether the Secretary has the inherent power to withdraw the special notice of demand before the expiry of the period of three months contemplated by sec. 23 (1) (i ). It cannot be gainsaid that before the expiry of the period of three months the disqualification does not come into existence and does not attach to a defaulting member or an office-bearer. It is therefore necessary to examine the purpose and object underlying the issuance of a special notice of demand. ( 8 ) THERE is no doubt about the fact that the special notice of demand within the meaning of sec. 23 (1) (i) is a creature of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. It does not aim so much at the recovery of the arrears as at the creation and attachment of a disqualification. I say so because so far as the recovery of arrears is concerned sec. 23 (1) (i) is a creature of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. It does not aim so much at the recovery of the arrears as at the creation and attachment of a disqualification. I say so because so far as the recovery of arrears is concerned sec. 152 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 provides for issuance of a notice of demand to recover the arrears. Rule 118 of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules lays down that the notice of demand to be issued under sec. 152 shall be in Form S. Form S prescribes the form of notice to be issued to a defaulter. Therefore so far as the demand and recovery of the arrears are concerned the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the Rules made there- under make sufficient provisions. Therefore it is difficult to say that the special notice of demand contemplated by sec. 23 (1) (i) aims so much at recovery of the arrears as at disqualifying a person from holding an elected post in a Panchayat. Secondly. Gujarat Panchayats Act does not make any provision for recovery of arrears. It is a subject which is dealt with by the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Therefore the object of issuing a special notice of demand under sec 23 (1) (i) read with Rule 2 and the Form of special notice appended to it in Gujarat Panchayats (Service of Special Notice) Rules 1969 is to ensure that no defaulter is elected or continues to hold an elected post in a panchayat. Since. in my opinion. the purpose and object underlying the issuance of a special notice of demand under sec. 23 (1) (i) are those which I have stated above can the Secretary who has issued such special notice of demand withdraw it before the expiry of the period stipulated in sec. 23 (1) (i) ? Bearing in mind the object for which sec. 23 (1) (i) has been enacted I feel that in absence of any express provision authorizing the Secretary to withdraw it the Secretary has no power or authority to withdraw it. The statutory consequence which the special notice of demand produces can only be averted by payment of arrears in full within the period stipulated in section 23 (1) (i ). It cannot be averted in any other manner. The statutory consequence which the special notice of demand produces can only be averted by payment of arrears in full within the period stipulated in section 23 (1) (i ). It cannot be averted in any other manner. To take the view that what the Secretary can do can be undone by begin is to provide for one more mode of averting the statutory consequences flowing from the service of special notice of demand upon a defaulting member or an office-bearer in addition to one which has been provided by the section itself. To do so is to legislate. A Court of law cannot do so. If the intention of the Legislature was to enable the Secretary to withdraw the special notice of demand before the expiry of the period specified in sec. 23 (1) (i) it could as well have said so in the Gujarat Panchayats Act and laid down the conditions subject to which the Secretary would be able to do so. In my opinion therefore the Secretary has no inherent power to withdraw the special notice of demand issued by him upon a defaulting member or an office bearer of a panchayat. Therefore in the instant case the withdrawal by the Secretary of the special notice of demand upon the petitioner. was withhold authority and therefore of no consequence whatsoever. In law therefore the special notice served upon the petitioner continued to be in force. He could have avoided the statutory consequence flowing there- from by paying up the entire amount of arrears before the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the service of notice. It is not in dispute that he did not do so. He only paid up half the amount with- in that period. In that view of the matter the petitioner incurred. the disqualification under sec. 23 (1) (i) and forfeited his right to continue as the Sarpanch of Mayurnagar Gram Panchayat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) THE District Development Officer and the Development Commissioner were therefore justified in taking the view which they took. I therefore find no infirmity in the orders made by them. ( 10 ) IN the result the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is dis- charged with no order as to costs. .