Judgment :- 1. The respondent in this revision petition filed R. C. O. P. No. 214/72 for eviction of the petitioner from a building that he had taken on rent. The claim was contested. On 4-3-1974 the petition was dismissed for default. On 18-3-74 the respondent filed IA. No. 919/74 for restoration of the petition to file. He also filed IA. No. 918/74 to get himself examined on commission. On 28-6-74 the respondent and his counsel were absent. There was default in depositing the commission bata as directed. IA. No. 918/ 74 and IA. No. 919/74 were therefore dismissed. The respondent filed IA. No. 1713/74 for restoring IA. 919/74. The Rent Control Court held that the petitioner did not explain his absence on 28-6-74 and dismissed the petition. In appeal, the Appellate Authority observed that the absence of the respondent stood explained in view of the fact that the application for issue of commission itself was filed on the ground of illness. The court having allowed that application was not justified in observing that the appellant was absent without sufficient reasons. Taking the above view the Appellate Authority restored to file RCOP. 214/ 72, without adverting to the fact that IA. 1713 of 1974 was filed to restore only IA. 919/74. The matter was taken up In revision before the District Judge, Kozhikode. The District Judge, Kozhikode set right the irregularity and directed that the order of restoration would be confined to IA. 919/74. The legality of this order is challenged in this revision. 2. There is no specific provision in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (for short the Act) for restoring a petition dismissed for default. S.23 of the Act confers on the Rent Control Court, and the Appellate Authority the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure only in matters mentioned in that section. Under the said provision the Rent Control Court and the Appellate authority have the powers to set aside the ex parte orders and also to review their own orders. The section does not say that the provision of either Order IX R.8 or Order IX R.9 would apply in the case of petitions filed under the Act. 3. The respondent has a case that the order passed should be treated as one setting aside an ex parte order. But the general scheme of S.23 does not warrant such a course. 3. The respondent has a case that the order passed should be treated as one setting aside an ex parte order. But the general scheme of S.23 does not warrant such a course. The Code of Civil Procedure provides for the procedure to be followed when defendant only appears, in Order IX R.8 and 9 and for setting aside exparte decree against defendant in Order IX R.19. The expression'exparte orders' is used in the Code of Civil Procedure only to denote orders passed in the absence of the party against whom a particular motion is made viz., defendant in the case of a suit and respondent in the case of other proceedings. The expression does not stand for orders passed in the absence of the plaintiff or the appellant or of a party who initiates particular proceedings. The expression should be presumed to be used in the same sense in S.23 of the Act which deals with powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore S.23 (1) (h) which deals with the power to set aside exparte orders has no application to a case where a petition is dismissed for default of appearance by the petitioner. 4. The Rent Control Court being a creature of a statute, its powers are circumscribed by the provisions of the Statute. Therefore in the absence of specific mention in S.23, the provisions contained in Order IX R.8 and 9 have no application in proceedings under the Act. The ratio of the decisions in Kuttappan v. Thressia (1973 KLT 521) and Mariyumma Mathai v Pothan (1973 KLT. 32) which are cases under the Kerala Land Reforms Act applies in the instant case. 5. The further question is whether this Court should in revision interfere with the order of the District judge restoring I.A. 919/74. It is true that the provisions of Order IX R.8 and 9 as such do not apply to the proceedings under the Act and viewed as one under Order IX R.9, the order of the Appellate authority with the modification made by the District Judge was without jurisdiction. But it is noted that under S.23 (1) (k) the Rent Control Court and the Appellate authority are provided with the power of review which is available in the case of Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. But it is noted that under S.23 (1) (k) the Rent Control Court and the Appellate authority are provided with the power of review which is available in the case of Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that a wrong provision of law was quoted need not deter the court or a tribunal from exercising the powers which are otherwise available to it in cases where the conditions for the exercise of such powers are present. There is no reason why IA. 919/ 74 and IA. 1713 of 1974 should not be treated as applications for review, in case it is found that they satisfy the concerned provisions of law. The powers of revision vested in this Court are discretionary. It is not made out that there was total want of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. Since the effect of the order of the District Court is only that an opportunity is afforded to the respondent to proceed with I.A. 919/74, I do not think that this court should interfere with the order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The revision is therefore dismissed. Dismissed.