JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It has arisen under the following circumstances. 2. Shop No. 7-B Asltey Hall, Dehradun, was allotted to one Ram Saran on 5 6.1959. On 30.4.1971 opposite party No. 3 purchased it from the previous owner. On 16.6.1971 he moved an application under Section 7 of the U. P. Act III of 1947 alleging that Smt. Surnitra Malhotra was in illegal possession and the same be released in his favour. On 8.12.1971 notice under section 7-A was issued to her to show cause why she should not be evicted. She filed objections contending that she was not an illegal occupant. 3. According to her, Ved Prakash had become tenant of the shop after Ram Saran and on 19.11.1961 she entered into partnership with Ved Prakash. She also gave out that she was in possession of the shop with the consent of the landlord and was regularly paying rent. She claimed benefit of proviso second to Section 7-A. The case was heard by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun and 3.6.1972 was fixed for orders. 4. No orders were passed on that date or till the new Act XIII of 1972 came into force. Written arguments were disposed of by another Officer on 6.1.1973. On 1.2.1973 this order was communicated to the counsel for Smt. Malhotra. She was held to be a trespasser and liable to eviction. 5. On 6.2.1973 she moved an application for review under Section 16 (5) of the new Act. This application was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. She filed a revision under Section 18 and it was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Dehradun on 10.5.1977. Hence this writ petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed three points before me. In the first place it is argued that the proceedings had started under U.P. Act III of 1947. No judgment was delivered by the Officer before whom the case was till the new Act came into force on 15.7.1972. Thereafter it was transferred to another Officer, who disposed it of without affording her any opportunity for fresh arguments. The contention does not carry much force because before the previous officer she had filed even written arguments as is evident from the material on the record. Thereafter it was transferred to another Officer, who disposed it of without affording her any opportunity for fresh arguments. The contention does not carry much force because before the previous officer she had filed even written arguments as is evident from the material on the record. There is no doubt that the new officer should have given fresh opportunity for arguments, but in the circumstances of this case it cannot be said to have prejudiced the petitioner. Her written arguments were already on the record. 'thereafter she moved an application for review, under Section 16 (5) and had full opportunity to advance her arguments. When she remained unsuccessful a revision was filed before the learned District Judge and there also all the points were canvassed at length. No. prejudice which may have been caused to her had been pointed out to me and in its absence the order passed by the new Officer cannot be said to suffer from any error of law. 7. The second contention is that the proceedings against the petitioner were under section 7-A and they could not stand transferred to another officer and could not be decided by him. It is based on the ground that Section 43 (2) (b) of the new Act does not apply to the proceedings under Section 7-A. There is no other provision under which it could be heard by him. It has also no force because the proceedings were initiated on an application under Section 7 of the old Act read with rule 6 framed thereunder. It was on this application that the petitioner was treated as unauthorised occupant of the disputed premises and notice under Section 7-A of that Act was issued. Therefore, these proceedings were part and parcel of the proceedings under Section 7 of the Act. Section 43 (2) (b) lays down : "Any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under Section 7 of the old Act or under rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949, made under Section 17 of the old Act shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of sections 16 and 17 of this Act." 8. In Rameshwar Prasad Agrawal v. The First Addl. In Rameshwar Prasad Agrawal v. The First Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and others, AIR 1976 Allahabad 323, it has been held that the word "proceedings" in section 43 of the new Act denotes not only specific orders passed under Section 7 of the old Act but also applications and other miscellaneous proceedings connected with final orders thereunder. The same view was reiterated in Niren Kumar Das v. District Judge, Pilibhit, 1977 A.L.J. 46. Therefore, the authority who disposed of the matter was competent to do so. 9. Lastly, it is urged that the order of the lower court suffers from manifest error of law in as much as release order was passed without determining vacancy as contemplated by rule 8 and without deciding whether the landlord had any need for the premises. Even this contention is not tenable for a number of reasons. In the first place, it was not pressed before the learned District Judge and cannot be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction Secondly, notice under Section 7-A was given on 8.12.1971 obviously on the ground that the present petitioner was an unauthorised occupant and the premises will be deemed to have fallen vacant, Rule 8 was not in existence at that time and the vacancy was not to be determined in its light. It appears to have been done according to the provisions then existing. It is true that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer decided this matter on 1.2 1973 but at that time rule 13 (4) provided that every application under rule 16 (1) (b) shall be a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord and the out-going tenant or the prospective allottee, if any, shall have no right to file any objection against it. As stated above, the proceedings under section 17 of the old Act pending on the date of commencement of the new Act had to be disposed of under sections 16 and 17 of the new Act. Therefore, at that time the petitioner had no right to raise any objection because she was an unauthorised occupant. Rule 4 appears to have been deleted on 25.5.1977, i.e., even after the judgment delivered by the District Judge in this case. Therefore, at that time the petitioner had no right to raise any objection because she was an unauthorised occupant. Rule 4 appears to have been deleted on 25.5.1977, i.e., even after the judgment delivered by the District Judge in this case. So far as finding on need is concerned, the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is absolutely clear on this point that the landlord has need for business purposes. Therefore, there is no ground for interference at this stage. 10. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs on parties. The petitioner is granted three months' time to vacate the premises.