Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioners are the respondents in E. P. No. 108 of 1974 in O.S. 26 of 1973 of the Sub-Court, Kasaragod. E. P. No. 108 of 1974 was filed by the decree-holder against the legal representatives of the judgment debtor for realisation of Rs. 10, 284 towards the decree debt. The legal representatives contended inter alia that the debt stood discharged under S.3 of the Kerala Debt Relief Act, 1977 (Act 17 of 1977), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. The executing court held that being legal representatives they are not entitled to relief and also that since the quantum of the debt was more than Rs. 3,000/- they do not fall under the definition of 'debtor'. The further objections based on the correctness of the amount and the fixation of the upset price were also over-ruled. 2. Under S.3 of the Act every debt and interest thereon payable by a debtor to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged with effect on and from the commencement of the Act. The main question involved is whether the petitioners come under the definition of 'debtor' and whether the liability is a debt under the Act. The relevant portion of the definition of 'debt' under S.2 (3) reads: 'debt' means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from or incurred by a debtor on or before the date of commencement of this Act, whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court, or otherwise, and subsisting on that date, but does not include xx x x The concerned portion of the definition of 'debtor' is S.2 (4) is as follows: "debtor" means any person whose annual income does not exceed three thousand rupees, from whom any debt is due, but does not include (i) any person from whom debt or debts exceeding three thousand rupees (excluding interest) is or are due; (ii) a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or a company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956, or a corporation formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any special Indian Law." 3. The executing court placed reliance on the decision in Hariffa Beevi v. Madhavan (1977 KLT.158). The executing court placed reliance on the decision in Hariffa Beevi v. Madhavan (1977 KLT.158). In that case, while the suit was pending, the respondent-plaintiff attached an item of property belonging to the defendant. Pending attachment the property was assigned to the respondent. When execution was sought the appellant applied for stay of proceedings under Kerala Debtors Temporary Relief Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1975). S.3 of Act 30 of 1975 directed stay of execution of all decrees in respects of debts. The definition of debt was on all fours with the definition in the present Act. But there was a difference in the definition of debtor. A. debtor under Act 30 of 1975 barring the excluded category, meant any person, who had any interest, other than a simple mortgage, in any agricultural land in the State of Kerala. The application for stay was dismissed holding that an assignee of a property pending attachment was not a debtor. The decision was confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court. Sri. Rama Shenoi appearing on behalf of the revision petitioner would contend that the decision is against the ratio of the various rulings of this Court and of the Supreme Court and therefore it requires-reconsideration. The argument, as I understood him, is that a person who purchases property pending attachment has an interest in the land other than as a simple mortgagee and as such he should have been considered to be a debtor. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Nageswaraswami v. Viswasundara (AIR. 1953 SC. 370) which arose under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act 4 of 1938). The Supreme Court observed: "It is not necessary that the applicant for relief himself should be liable for the debt on the date that the Act came into force. The right to claim relief as is well settled by decisions (vide 'Perianna Goundan v. Sellappa Goundan', AIR 1939 Mad. 186(D) of the Madras High Court) is not confined to the person who originally contracted the debt, but is available to his legal representatives and assigns as well; nor is it necessary that the applicant should be personally liable for the debt. 186(D) of the Madras High Court) is not confined to the person who originally contracted the debt, but is available to his legal representatives and assigns as well; nor is it necessary that the applicant should be personally liable for the debt. The liability of a purchaser of the equity of redemption to pay the mortgage debt undoubtedly arises on the date of his purchase; but the debt itself which has its origin in the mortgage bond did exist from before his purchase, and if it was payable by an agriculturist at the relevant date, the purchaser could certainly claim the privileges of the Act if he himself was an agriculturist at the date of his application." 4. I do not think that I need comment upon the correctness, or otherwise of the decision in Hariffa Beevi v. Madhavan (1977 KLT 158) for the purpose of this case. Suffice to say the decision of the Division Bench in the Hariffa Beevi's case is based on the view that the legislature could not have intended to confer benefit under S.3 of the Act on a person, who, as a speculative venture, purchased a property remaining in custodia legis in violation of the clear provisions of S.64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A different view was taken in Mohammadkutty v. Kunju Musaliar (1972 KLT. 543). The learned judge who decided the case observed that the assignment even if made after attachment under S.64 CPC. carried with it the liability to pay the debt. In any case the reasoning in Hariffa Beevi's case has no application to the case in hand. 5. The claim of the legal representatives in the present case for benefits under the Act is opposed on two grounds: (I) the liability of the legal representatives is not personal but is incidental to their coming into possession of properties of the original decree holder; (2) whereas there is specific mention is S.2(2) of the Act that a creditor shall include the heirs, legal representatives and assigns of the creditor, no such qualification is made in the case of a debtor and therefore a debtor should be taken as not including legal representatives etc. of the original debtor. 6. The argument based on personal liability was considered in Narasaraju v. Satyavatamma (AIR. 1939 Mad. of the original debtor. 6. The argument based on personal liability was considered in Narasaraju v. Satyavatamma (AIR. 1939 Mad. 187), a case which has been referred to by the Supreme Court in the decision already referred to and also by the Division Bench of this Court in Hariffa Beevi's case. The plaintiff in that suit sued for recovery of money due under a mortgage impleading the 9th defendant who was the purchaser of the equity of redemption in respect of a portion of the property. The 9th defendant claimed relief under the Madras Agriculturist Relief Act (Act 4 of 1938). The plaintiff contended that the definition of debt should be understood as limited to cases where there is personal liability attached to the claimant. The High Court did not accept the contention and held that the definition clause spoke only of 'any liability' and the word 'due' did not necessarily imply that it must be recoverable by imprisonment of the debtor. 7. A similar reasoning was adopted by the Cochin High Court in Padmanabha Vadhyar v. Rev. Fr. Jacob Kannangiri and Others (VII Cochin Law Journal 437), wherein a previous mortgagor claimed relief under the Cochin Agriculturists Act, Act 18 of 1114 in a suit filed by the first mortgagee. Reliance was placed by the Court on Asharam Sowkar v. Venkata-swami Naidu (ILR. 44 Mad. 544). It was held in that case that a purchaser of the equity of redemption is a person liable to pay the mortgage debt within S.20 of the Limitation Act of 1908. In both the above rulings reference has been made to the observation of Lord West bury in Balding v. Lane (46 E. R.47), interpreting the word 'the person by whom the same was payable'. The relevant portion reads: "These words do not denote merely the persons who are legally bound by contract to pay the interest, but all the persons against whom the payment of such arrears may be enforced by any action or suit, and by whom therefore, as they have a right to pay such interest in redemption of their land, interest may be properly said to be payable. If a legacy is by will charged upon land, which is then specifically devised, the devisee is not liable by any contract to pay the legacy or the interest thereon, but he is, nevertheless, a person by whom such legacy and interest are payable, for he is entitled to redeem the lands devised to him. In truth, these words of the statute, far from having the limited construction of the Vice Chancellor, appear to have been selected as a description capable of including not only every person liable to be sued at law, but every person who, having an interest in the land sought to be charged, might be properly sued as a defendant in a suit in equity, brought to enforce payment of the principal and interest out of such land." 8. In Beevi Kunhi v. Subramania Iver (IX Cochin Law Journal 214), another case under the Cochin Agriculturists Act, the expression judgment debtor was construed as including legal representatives or assignee of a judgment debtor in cases where the original judgment debtors died after the decree or he assigned to a third party over which the decree had been passed. 9. The decisions in Rahina Beevi v. Liquidator (1957 KLT. 809), Varghese v. Palai Central Bank Ltd. (1959 KLT. 955), Raghavan Nair v. Daniel (1959 KLT. 1232) and Kunhappa Kurup v. Madhavi Amma (1965 KLT. 789) all arising under the Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, (31 of 1958) adopt the same reasoning. "The general principle is and S.146 of the Civil Procedure Code embodies this principle-that a statute or other law conferring rights and imposing liabilities must be deemed to apply to representatives also unless the rights and liabilities are personal." (Per Raman Nayar J. in Krishnan Nair v. Abdu (1964 KLT. 94) (FB.). There is nothing in S.3 of the Act which may suggest benefit conferred therein is confined to the persons who originally incurred the debt. On the other hand the more reasonable interpretation is that it is also available to the actual person who was liable to pay the debt on the date of commencement of the Act either by virtue of personal liability incurred or by virtue of interest in property. It is pertinent to note that S.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a decree holder to execute a decree against the legal representatives of the deceased. It is pertinent to note that S.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a decree holder to execute a decree against the legal representatives of the deceased. If the legal representative fails to pay and disposed of the property he received from the original debtor, he would be personally liable to the extent of the unaccounted property. There is no reason why the personal liability so incurred should be treated on a different footing. 10. The second limb of the argument has bearing on the definition of 'creditor' in S.2 (2). A creditor is defined to include his heirs, legal representatives and assigns of the creditor. The contention is that in the absence of similar words in the definition of 'debtor', the expression should be confined to the person who incurred the debt. The reasoning is fallacious because a person becomes a debtor only if there is a liability cast on him to pay the debt either on account of a personal undertaking or by virtue of ownership of property. The question of benefits under the Act would arise only if there is liability to pay debt and once there is liability to pay the person concerned becomes a debtor also. Hence there is no necessity to specifically mention that a debtor includes the assignees and legal representatives of the person who in the first instance incurred the liability. 11. The revision petitioners do not become disentitled to the benefits under the Act on the ground that they are only the legal representatives of the original debtor. They should however satisfy that they were themselves debtors on the date of commencement of the Act and their liability is a debt. 12. But so far as the present case is concerned, the revision petitioners have to cross another hurdle. Admittedly the liability under the decree is more than Rs. 3,000/-and therefore the original debtor, if alive, would not have come under the definition of a debtor. The revision petitioners would however rely on Explanation.) (ii) of S.2 (3) of the Act. 12. But so far as the present case is concerned, the revision petitioners have to cross another hurdle. Admittedly the liability under the decree is more than Rs. 3,000/-and therefore the original debtor, if alive, would not have come under the definition of a debtor. The revision petitioners would however rely on Explanation.) (ii) of S.2 (3) of the Act. The explanation reads: "Where a debt has been split up in any manner whatsoever, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and fresh documents have been executed in respect of different portions of the debt, each such different portion shall be a debt." The argument is that after the passing of the Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, each of the petitioners became owner of a specific portion of the property involved in the case and therefore their liability to pay the debt also got split up in proportion to their right in the property. In other words, the stand taken is that since the liability of each of the legal representatives is proportionate to his share in the property such liability in each case would be less than Rs. 3,000/- and therefore Explanation I (ii) to S.2 (3) would apply. But it is a well known fact that when a property is mortgaged, each and every portion of it will be liable for the whole debt. Therefore in the instant case assuming that the petitioners got severed in status and became entitled to specific shares in the property, each of such shares is liable for the whole debt. If there are more than one item it is open to the decree holder to proceed against any particular item and realise the whole debt. For the application of Explanation I (ii) it is not enough that the liability is split up. It is also necessary that fresh documents should be executed in respect of the different portions of the debt. There is no case for the revision petitioners that fresh documents have been executed in respect of different portions of the debt. Therefore Explanation I (ii) has no application and the petitioners are not debtors coming under the purview of the Act. The revision petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. Dismissed.