ORDER Tankha, J. – 1. This revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure is directed by petitioner-plaintiff Municipal Council, Raigarh, through the Chief Municipal Officer against an order dated 23-6-1976 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Raigarh in Civil Suit No 10-A of 1973. 2. Facts, in brief, leading to the present revision are that the plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of the respondent defendant Laxmandas from the suit accommodation on certain grounds mentioned under section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. 1961. In reply the defendant stated that not he but two other namely Sawalmal and Heeramal were the ienants of the suit accommodation and he being the son of Sawalmal is in possession of the premises. He also raised number of other pleas for the dismissal of the suit. After respective parties adduced their evidence then on 21-6-1976 an application under Order 6 rule 17 or the Code of Civil procedure was moved by the plaintiff seeking a prayer to amend the plaint so as to incorporate an alternative claim for a decree for possession on the basis of his title. Advalorum Court fee on the alternative claim was sought to be paid. The application was opposed by the defendant. The trial Court rejected the application on the ground that it was filed with inordinate delay and also for the reason that the amendment sought to be made in the plaint being of no substance. It further held that if the amendment sought is allowed it will entail irrepairable injury to the defendant which cannot be compensated by costs. Therefore, the plaintiff has now come up before this Court in the present revision against that order. 3. Having heard the learned counsel of the parties, I am of opinion that the revision has merit and deserves to be allowed The only point that arises for consideration in the present petition is whether the trial Court committed error in the exercise of its jurisdiction or to say acted with illegality in rejecting the application of the plaintiff seeking amendment of his plaint to incorporate an alternative claim on the basis of his title. 4. So far as the rule for granting permission to amend plaint is concerned, it is now well settled. 4. So far as the rule for granting permission to amend plaint is concerned, it is now well settled. An amendment cannot be refused merely on the ground that it was being sought at the belated stage if the administration of justice requires that. It can also not be refused because of some mistake or negligence on the part of the party seeking the amendment provided the relief sought to be claimed through the amendment is just. The amendment can be refused by the Court only when it finds that the party seeking the same was acting malafide or that if the amendment is allowed it would entail an, irreparable injury to the other side which cannot be compensated by an order of courts that is to say otherwise should ordinarily be allowed if it can be without injustice to the otherside. I am supported in my view by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon AIR 1969 SC 2169, in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that:- The order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. Rules of procedure are intended to be hand-maid to the administration of justice, A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, in-advertance or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and. however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. In the present case there is no finding of the trial Court that the amendment sought by the plaintiff is malafide. So far as the finding of that Court that if the amendment is allowed it will cause irrepairable injury to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs is difficult to understand as what will be that injury has not been described by the Court. So far as the finding of that Court that if the amendment is allowed it will cause irrepairable injury to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs is difficult to understand as what will be that injury has not been described by the Court. Even to say that the amendment being of no substance without any reasoning, in my opinion was not correct approach in the matter on the part of the trial Court. Adverting to the controversy whether in a suit between landlord and tenant, can a landlord claim in the alternative a decree for possession on the basis of his title. I am of opinion that there can be no bar for seeking such a relief. By amendment alternative or inconsistent claims can be laid provided they are based on facts which are not inconsistant. I am supported in my view by a decision of this Court in the case of Girdharilal v. Rajkishore Civil Revision No. 178 of 1964 decided on 26-10-1964=1966 MPLJ Short Note 28. That was the case where a suit was filed for eviction and arrears of rent by the landlord against the tenant and subsequently the landlord sought amendment of the plaint to claim eviction on the basis of his title as well. The amendment was allowed. It was held in that case that if such an amendment could be allowed it would a void multiplicity of suit. 5. In the case of Harishchandra Behra and others v. Garbhoo Singh and another 1961 JLJ 780 =1961 RN 231= 1961 MPLJ 501 , a Division Bench of this Court held that although originally the claim was based on right as gaontia in a suit for possession but subsequently the plaint was amended making an alternative claim on the basis of right as Raiyat. Such an amendment was proper on the ground because the right accruing as Raiyat was on the happening of subsequent events since after the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1951, came into force, office of gaontia had come to an end. 6. Then the Madras High Court in the case of Subbiah Nadar Thankaaswamy v. Nadar Champaka Pillai Meenakshi ammal and another AIR 1961 Madras 413. held as under:- “……..the question therefore will be whether the cause of action has been changed by a proposed amendment and whether the subject matter of the suit has been changed. 6. Then the Madras High Court in the case of Subbiah Nadar Thankaaswamy v. Nadar Champaka Pillai Meenakshi ammal and another AIR 1961 Madras 413. held as under:- “……..the question therefore will be whether the cause of action has been changed by a proposed amendment and whether the subject matter of the suit has been changed. In such a case what one should see is not whether the suit of one character has been changed into one of another character, but whether the cause of action and subject matter of the suit would be changed by the amendment if allowed. Taking the instant case it cannot be denied that the cause of action, namely, the plaintiff's purchase, is the same both for the prayer for ejectment as well as for that for redemption." In the present case the subject matter remains the same and the plaintiff has not even changed the cause of action. Besides that it also cannot be overlooked that if amendment is allowed it will save multiplicity of the proceedings because if the plaintiff happens to fail in the present suit, his right to file a second suit for possession on the basis of title in view of the challenge to his title by the defendant cannot be taken away. I may also mention here that even if the amendment is allowed the relief of possession which the plaintiff is claiming as a landlord or that now he intends to claim by amending the plaint remains the same for possession for the same property. In fact the plaintiff as an abundant caution desires a decree for possession by alternatively claiming it on the basis of his title. In such circumstances, if the amendment would have been allowed in my opinion, it would not have occasioned any such injury to the defendant which could not be compensated by costs. Even it cannot be said as tried to be contended, that the amendment sought is of no substance. In this connection the learned counsel appearing for the defendant tried to contend that certain necessary parties have not been joined in the present suit and an objection has also been raised in that regard. Therefore, in the absence of those parties even the alternative claim for possession on the basis of title cannot be laid and as such the amendment would be of no substance. Therefore, in the absence of those parties even the alternative claim for possession on the basis of title cannot be laid and as such the amendment would be of no substance. In my opinion, it would be premature to adjudicate this point at this stage. The defendant would be at liberty to raise all such objections available to him if he would like to raise by amending his written statement. 7. The learned counsel for the defendant further contended that there is no error in the exercise of jurisdiction committed by the trial Court, therefore this 'Court cannot interfere in the revisional jurisdiction but what I have stated above from that it is clear that the trial Court exercised its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity while considering the application for amendment of the plaint. I, therefore, hold that the order of the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 8. For the reason stated above, this revision is allowed. The impugned order of the trial Court is set aside and instead it is ordered that the application of the plaintiff seeking amendment of his plaint is allowed subject to the payment of Rs.200 as costs to the defendant. It is further ordered that the trial Court shall get the necessary amendments incorporated in the plaint and would give opportunity to the defendant, if he so likes, to amend his written statement correspondingly. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this Court.