B. K. MEHTA, R. C. MANKAD, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the State is directed against the order passed by the learned City Sessions Judge Ahmedabad acquitting the respondent accused of offence punishable under sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) read with sec. 7 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this appeal are as follows. J. C. Patel who is a Food Inspector attached to the Municipal Corporation for the city of Ahmedabad purchased from the accused who is running a shop in Javahar Chowk in Maninagar area in the city of Ahmedabad 40 grams of chilly powder. It appears that chilly powder was purchased in the presence of Kantilal who is working as a peon and one Shantilal. After following the necessary formalities laid down under the Act sample of chilly powder has sent for analysis to the Public Analyst for the City of Ahmedabad. The Public Analyst in his report gave an opinion that chilly powder was adulterated. J. C. Patel thereupon filed a complaint before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Eighth Court Ahmedabad alleging that the accused had committed offence punishable under sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) read with sec. 7 (1) of the Act. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The learned Magistrate after recording evidence convicted the accused for the offence punishable under sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) read with sec. 7 (1) of the Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 in default to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence the accused went in appeal before the City Sessions Court at Ahmedabad. It was contended before the learned City Sessions Judge who heard the appeal that J. C. Patel that is the complainant who had filed the complaint before the learned Magistrate was not a Food Inspector on the date on which he took the sample of chilly powder and therefore prosecution of the accused was bad in law. It was contended before the learned City Sessions Judge who heard the appeal that J. C. Patel that is the complainant who had filed the complaint before the learned Magistrate was not a Food Inspector on the date on which he took the sample of chilly powder and therefore prosecution of the accused was bad in law. The learned Judge proceeded to decide this contention raised on behalf of the accused on the basis that there was no dispute that complainant Patel did not possess any of the qualifications referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. On appreciation of evidence on record the learned Judge found that the complainant took charge and commenced to work as Food Inspector three months prior to the dale on which P. W. 2 Kantilal gave his evidence before the learned Magistrate. In the view of the learned Judge though the complainant was appointed as Food Inspector in 1966 he was not working as such and he therefore held that the complainant was not a Food Inspector within the meaning of proviso to the said Rule 8. The learned Judge therefore came to the conclusion that the complainant was not competent to take sample of chilly powder for analysis and he was also not competent to set the law into motion by launching prosecution against the accused. In this view of the matter the learned Judge held that the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate was wrong. He therefore allowed the appeal filed by the accused and acquitted him. In the view which he took the learned Judge did not consider it necessary to decide other contentions which were raised by the accused before him. It is this order of acquittal which is challenged by the State before us in this appeal. ( 4 ) MR. J. U. Mehta learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the state submitted that the learned Judge was not right in proceeding on the assumption that there was no dispute that complainant Patel did not possess the prescribed qualifications to work as Food Inspector. Patel was Food Inspector and he was validly appointed as such on October 6 1966 Mr. J. U. Mehta learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the state submitted that the learned Judge was not right in proceeding on the assumption that there was no dispute that complainant Patel did not possess the prescribed qualifications to work as Food Inspector. Patel was Food Inspector and he was validly appointed as such on October 6 1966 Mr. Mehta submitted that in his desposition recorded by the learned Magistrate Patel had deposed that he was appointed as Food Inspector and his appointment was gazetted on October 6 1966 Mr. Mehta pointed out that nothing has been brought out in the cross examination of Patel which would indicate that his appointment was not valid. Under these circumstances submitted Mr. Mehta the learned Magistrate was right in taking aid of sec. 114 (e) of the Indian Evidence Act and holding that Patel was validly appointed as Food Inspector. Mr. Mehta submitted that the finding of the learned Judge that Patel did not possess necessary qualifications for being appointed as Food Inspector and that his appointment as Food Inspector was not valid is not supported by any evidence on record. Mr. B. C. Patel learned Advocate appearing for respondent accused on the other hands submitted that though Patel had stated that he was appointed as Food Inspector on October 6 1966 he did not take charge as Food Inspector till July 1974. In this connection he invited our attention to the deposition of P. W. 2 Kantilal who had stated to the effect that he was working as peon under the complainant Patel for the last three months since the date he took charge. Mr. Patel further submitted that the complainant had admitted that on October 6 1966 he was working as Sanitary Inspector and was looking after the work of issuing licence under the Act. This admission submitted Mr. Patel clearly showed that the complainant was not working as Food Inspector but he was only looking after the work of issuing licences under the Act. This admission submitted Mr. Patel clearly showed that the complainant was not working as Food Inspector but he was only looking after the work of issuing licences under the Act. Complainant Patel has deposed that he was appointed as Food Inspector and his appointment was notified in the Government Gazette published on October 6 1966 In his cross examination also he stated that he was Food Inspector since October 6 1966 In reply to a question put in his cross examination he stated that on October 6 1966 the date on which he was appointed as Food Inspector he was working as Sanitary Inspector and he was also given the work of issuing licences under the Act. It was on this last statement made by Patel that strong reliance was placed on behalf of the accused and it was submitted that this indicated that in spite of his appointment as Food Inspector Patel did not take charge as Food Inspector. We fail to see how the statement goes to show that Patel had not taken charge of his post as Food Inspector. It only shows that on the date he was appointed as Food Inspector he was working as Sanitary Inspector and also looking after the work of issuing licences under the Act. There is no reason to disbelieve Patels statement that he is Food Inspector since October 6 1966 No question has been put to him that he did not take charge of his office as Food Inspector. We also do not understand as to how P. W. 2 Kantilals statement to the effect that he was working under Patel for the last three months since the time he took charge of his post goes to show that though Patel was appointed as Food Inspector on October 6 1966 he took charge of his office only three months prior to the date on which deposition of P. W. 2 Kantilal was recorded which was on October 17 1974 As pointed out above no question has been put to Patel as to when he took charge of his appointment as Food Inspector. We therefore fail to see how with reference to the above statement made by P. W. 2 Kantilal who is a peon working under Patel it can be held that Patel did not take charge as Food Inspector till July 1974. We therefore fail to see how with reference to the above statement made by P. W. 2 Kantilal who is a peon working under Patel it can be held that Patel did not take charge as Food Inspector till July 1974. We were told that city of Ahmedabad is divided into different zones and each zone is put under a Food Inspector. It is likely that Patel was posted as Food Inspector in the zone in which P. W. 2 Kantilal was working three months prior to the date on which he gave deposition. However the mere fact that Kantilal was working under Patel for the last three months since the date he took charge cannot lead us to the conclusion that Patel did not take charge of his appointment as Food Inspector till July 1974. As observed above we see no reason to reject Patels statement that he has been working as Food Inspector since October 6 1966 Nothing has been brought out in his cross examination nor is there anything on record which would indicate that Patel does not possess necessary qualifications to act as Food Inspector. The learned Judges observation to the effect that there was no dispute that Patel did not possess qualifications referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 8 does not seem to be correct. Official acts must be deemed to have been done according to law. Therefore it must be deemed unless contrary is proved that Patel possessed necessary qualifications for being appointed as Food Inspecter. As pointed out above he was appointed as Food Inspector on October 6 1966 and he worked as such from that date. We do not agree with the learned Judge that in spite of his appointment as Food Inspector in October 6 1966 he did not take charge of his office until July 1974. We therefore do not find any infirmity in the appointment of Patel as Food Inspector. He was validly appointed as Food Inspector and he worked as such from October 6 1966 ( 5 ) WE further find that in view of the admitted position that Patel was appointed as Food Inspector on October 6 1966 his appointment as Food Inspector is valid under the proviso to Rule 8 which prescribes qualifications of Food Inspector. He was validly appointed as Food Inspector and he worked as such from October 6 1966 ( 5 ) WE further find that in view of the admitted position that Patel was appointed as Food Inspector on October 6 1966 his appointment as Food Inspector is valid under the proviso to Rule 8 which prescribes qualifications of Food Inspector. Rule 8 which has been reproduced in the judgment of the learned Judge reads as under :a person shall not be qualified for appointment as Food Inspector unless he (i) is a medical officer in charge of the health administration of a local area; or (ii) is a Graduate or a Licentiate in Medicine and has received at least one months training in Food inspection and sampling work approved for the purpose by the Central or the State Government; (iii) is a qualified Sanitary Inspector having an experience as such for a minimum period of one year and has received at least three months training in food inspection and sampling work in any of the laboratories referred to in clause; (1) of rule 6; or (iv) is a Graduate in Science with Chemistry as one of the subjects or a graduate in Agriculture Food Technology or Dairy Technology and has received at least three months training in food inspection and sampling work in any of the laboratories referred to in clause (i) of Rule 6;provided that a person who is a Food Inspector on the date of the commence of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules 1968 and to hold office as such subject to the terms and conditions of service to him even though he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down in (i) to (iv ). IT will be seen that under the proviso a person who is a food inspector on the date of the commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules 1968 continuous to hold the office as such subject to the terms and conditions of service applicable to him even though he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down in clauses (i) to (iv) of the said rule. Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules 1968 came into force on July 8 1968 As pointed out above Patel was appointed as Food Inspector in October 1966. He was Food Inspector on the date on which the said Rules came into force. Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules 1968 came into force on July 8 1968 As pointed out above Patel was appointed as Food Inspector in October 1966. He was Food Inspector on the date on which the said Rules came into force. It further appears that he continued to hold the office as Food Inspector after coming into force of the said Rules. Therefore there cannot be any doubt that Patel whose initial appointment as Food Inspector was valid continued to hold the office as Food Inspector after the said Rules came into force. It therefore cannot be urged that Patel was not Food Inspector within the meaning of said Rule 8. The learned Judge was therefore wrong in holding that Patel was not Food Inspector on the date he took sample of chilly powder from the accused. ( 6 ) IN the view which we are taking the prosecution launched by Patel cannot be held to be bad in law. It is not disputed that if Patel is held to be a Food Inspector he had authority to launch prosecution under the Act. The only dispute which was raised was that as he was not Food Inspector within the meaning of Rule 8 the proceedings taken by him were vitiated. In other words the contention which was raised was that as Patel could not act as Food Inspector he could not validly initiate prosecution against the accused and consequently the accused cannot be convicted of the offence under sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) read with sec. 7 (1) of the Act. However since we are holding that Patel was Food Inspector at the time when he took sample of chilly powder from the accused and also when he launched prosecution against the accused the above ground urged on behalf of the accused fails. ( 7 ) ONCE having found that complainant Patel was a Food Inspector both at the time when he took sample of chilly powder as also when he launched prosecution ordinarily we would not have considered it necessary to deal with and decide the question whether any defect or irregularity in the appointment of Patel as Food Inspector would necessarily render the prosecution launched by him bad in law. The learned Judge as pointed out above has held that proceedings initiated by Patel are vitiated inasmuch as his appointment as Food Inspector was defective or invalid. The learned Judge as pointed out above has held that proceedings initiated by Patel are vitiated inasmuch as his appointment as Food Inspector was defective or invalid. In view of our finding that Patel was Food Inspector at the relevant time the decision of the learned Judge cannot be upheld. We are however of the opinion that having regard to the importance of the question whether prosecution launched by a Food Inspector whose appointment is defective or invalid is bad in law we do not consider it proper to leave this question open or undecided. If the view taken by the learned Judge which in our opinion is patently wrong is allowed to stand many proceedings initiated by a Food Inspector whose appointment is defective or invalid are likely to be held to be bad in law. Therefore in order to set at rest the controversy we proceed to decide the question whether the prosecution launched by Patel was bad in law on the assumption that his appointment as Food Inspector was defective or invalid. In order to decide this question it is necessary to read some of the provisions of the Act. Sec. 2 (viii) defines the expression local authority and this definition so far as is relevant reads as under :local authority means in the case of (1) a local area which is (a) a municipality the municipal board or municipal corporation. x x x x x x x sec. 9 of the Act empowers the Central Government or the State Government to appoint such persons as it thinks fit having the prescribed qualifications to be Food Inspector for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be. Proviso to sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 9 are not relevant for our purpose. Sec. 10 deals with the powers of the Food Inspectors. Proviso to sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 9 are not relevant for our purpose. Sec. 10 deals with the powers of the Food Inspectors. The relevant provisions of the said section read as under :-10 A food inspector shall have power (a) to take samples of any article of food from (i) any person selling such article; (ii) any person who is in the course of conveying delivering or preparing to deliver such article to a purchaser or consigner; (iii) a consignee after delivery of any such article to him; and (b) to send such sample for analysis to the public analyst for the local area within which such sample has been taken; (c) with the previous approval of the health officer having jurisdiction in the local area concerned or with the previous approval of the Food (Health) Authority to prohibit the sale of any article of food in the interest of public health. (2) Any food inspector may enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured stored or exposed for sale and take samples of such articles of food for analysis. (3) Where any sample is taken under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) its cost calculated at the rate at which the article is usually sold to the public shall be paid to the person from whom it is taken. (4) If any article intended for food appears to any food inspector to be adulterated or misbranded he may seize and carry away or keep in the safe custody of the vendor such article in order that it may be dealt with as hereinafter providedprovided that where the food inspector keeps such article in the safe custody of the vendor he may require the vendor to execute a bond for a sum of money equal to the value of such article with one or more sureties as the food inspector deems fit and the vendor shall execute the bond accordingly. SEC. 11 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Food Inspector. SEC. 11 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Food Inspector. Sec. 12 amongst other things lays down that nothing contained in the Act shall be held to prevent a purchaser of any article of food other than a food inspector from having such article analysed by the public analyst on payment of such fees as may be prescribed and from receiving from the public analyst a report of his analysis. Provisos to sec. 12 are not relevant for our purpose. Sec. 20 of the Act which is an important section so far as the question raised before us is concerned reads as under : 20 No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority;provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in sec. 12 if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. (2) No court inferior to that of a Presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act. ( 8 ) IT will be seen that sec. 20 provides that no prosecution for the offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority. Municipal Corporation is a local authority as specified under sec. 2 (viii) which can institute prosecution under the Act or authorise a person to launch prosecution or prosecution may be instituted with the written consent of the Corporation by the person authorised by it. It is not in dispute before us that the complainant Patel is duly authorised by the Municipal Corporation for the city of Ahmedabad to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act. It is not in dispute before us that the complainant Patel is duly authorised by the Municipal Corporation for the city of Ahmedabad to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court has in K. C. Agarwal v. Delhi Administration in Criminal Appeal No. 100 of 1966 decided on March 27 1969 held that a complaint filed by one of the officers of a local authority at the instance of that authority is in law a complaint instituted by that local authority. Therefore as the complaint in the present case has been filed by complainant Patel on the authority of the Municipal Corporation the complaint must be held to have been instituted by the Municipal Corporation itself. (vide Dhian Singh v. Municipal Board Saharanpur and Another A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 318 ). ( 9 ) THE validity or otherwise of the complainants appointment as Food Inspector is not at all relevant for the purpose of deciding the question whether the prosecution under sec. 20 is validly launched. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Patels appointment as Food Inspector is invalid or defective the prosecution launched by him would not necessarily be illegal. Valid appointment as Food Inspector is not a prerequisite for valid institution of prosecution under sec. 20. What we have to see is whether the conditions laid down by sec. 20 are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied the prosecution launched must be held to be valid irrespective of the fact whether or not appointment of Patel as Food Inspector was valid. Prosecution would not be bad ex facie as sought to be urged on behalf of the accused even if appointment of Patel as Food Inspector is not valid. In the present case it is not disputed that Patel was duly authorised to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act on behalf of the Municipal Corporation for the City of Ahmedabad. Therefore in our opinion validity of the prosecution launched by him cannot be challenged. ( 10 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the accused that Food Inspector is appointed for taking samples of any article of food and to send such samples for analysis to the Public Analyst and in case the sample was found to be adulterated to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act. ( 10 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the accused that Food Inspector is appointed for taking samples of any article of food and to send such samples for analysis to the Public Analyst and in case the sample was found to be adulterated to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act. It was contended that the power which the Food Inspector derives for launching prosecution is on account of the fact that he is a Food Inspector. Therefore once it is shown that the person who launches prosecution is not validly appointed as Food Inspector all the steps taken by him as Food Inspector must be held to be illegal and invalid. We do not agree with this proposition. The Food Inspector as is seen from reading sec. 10 is not merely appointed for taking samples sending them to Public Analyst and launching prosecution as sought to be urged on behalf of the accused. Power to take samples and to send them for analysis to the Public Analyst is one of the powers conferred on the Food Inspector and not the only power. Under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 10 Food Inspector has also power to seize any food article if he finds the said article to be adulterated or misbranded. Further it is not correct to say that it is the Food Inspector who is conferred with the power of launching prosecution under the provisions of the Act. As pointed out above any person authorised by the Municipal Corporation or the Central Government or the State Government under sec. 20 con launch prosecution for the offences under the Act. The power to launch prosecution is not confined to Food Inspector as urged on behalf of the accused. Food Inspector can launch prosecution under sec. 20 only if he is authorised to do so under sec. 20. As a matter of fact a person who is authorised to launch prosecution under sec. 20 need not be a Food Inspector. It is by virtue of the authority conferred under section 20 by the local authority Central Government or the State Government that Food Inspector or any other person gets authority to launch prosecution for the offences under the Act. Therefore whether a person who is duly authorised to launch prosecution under sec. 20 need not be a Food Inspector. It is by virtue of the authority conferred under section 20 by the local authority Central Government or the State Government that Food Inspector or any other person gets authority to launch prosecution for the offences under the Act. Therefore whether a person who is duly authorised to launch prosecution under sec. 20 of the Act is or is not validly appointed as Food Inspector is an entirely irrelevant factor. In our opinion prosecution will not fail even if appointment of complainant Patel as Food Inspector is invalid. ( 11 ) THE view which we have taken above finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality (supra ). In that case it was urged on behalf of the accused that a permission under sec. 20 of the Act to file a complaint is a condition precedent for validly instituting a complaint under the provisions of the Act. The fulfilment of that condition must be satisfactorily proved by the complainant before a Court can entertain the complaint. It was urged that without such a proof the Court will have no jurisdiction to try the case. In support of the above contention the learned Counsel for the accused sought to take assistance from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King A. I. R. 1948 P. C. 82 and Madan Mohan Singh v. The State of U. P. A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 637. Boththese decisions deal with the question of the validity of sanction given for the institution of certain criminal proceedings. The provisions under which sanction was sought in those cases required the sanctioning authority to apply its mind and find out whether there was any justification for instituting the prosecution. The Judicial Committee as well as the Supreme Court have laid down that in such cases the Court must be satisfied either from the order of sanction or from the other evidence that all the relevant facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority and that authority had granted the sanction after applying its mind to those facts. The Supreme Court observed that the ratio of these decisions had no bearing on the facts of the case before it. Under sec. The Supreme Court observed that the ratio of these decisions had no bearing on the facts of the case before it. Under sec. 20 of the Act no question of applying ones mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as the authority to be conferred under that provision can be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designated in that section are alone competent to file complaint under the statute. Therefore as observed by the Supreme Court the Municipal Corporation city of Ahmedabad or the person authorised by it was competent to file complaint under the Act. As already pointed out above complainant Patel was duly authorised to file complaint under the Act. That being so the prosecution launched by him cannot be held to be bad in law even if his appointment as Food Inspector is defective or invalid. ( 12 ) IN Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others v. Darshan Lal Sharma 1973 F. A. C. 356 the High Court of Delhi made the following observations which are relevant for our purpose. AFTER Shri Jamna Pershad ceased to have any financial interest in the manufacture or sale of articles of food there was no legal bar to his acting as Food Inspector. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not appear to be correct but even if there was any defect in the appointment of the Food Inspector the purchase of sweets made by him for purposes of analysis could be regarded to be purchase by a person other than a Food Inspector in terms of sec. 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There was no legal bar to prosecution being instituted by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or by the Person authorised in this behalf by a general or special order of that authority. THE proviso to sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only enables such a purchaser to institute prosecution so that he may not be without remedy if prosecution is not instituted by the authorities mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of that section. THE proviso to sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act only enables such a purchaser to institute prosecution so that he may not be without remedy if prosecution is not instituted by the authorities mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of that section. IN a later decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another v. Chandu Lal 1974 F. A. C. 507 Delhi High Court referred to the above observa- tions made in the case of Darshan Lal Sharma (supra) and held that even assuming that there was any irregularity in the appointment of Sethi as a Food Inspector the purchase made by him was covered by the provisions of sec. 12 of the Act and there was no illegality in the prosecution instituted on the complaint of the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor. It was further observed that the purchase made by the Food Inspector in that case was covered by the provisions of sec. 12 of the Act. ( 13 ) WE fully agree with the view taken by the High Court of Delhi. As held by the High Court of Delhi in the present case even if appointment of Patel as Food Inspector was defective or invalid there was no legal bar to the prosecution being instituted by the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad or by any person authorised in that behalf by a general or special order of that authority. It is not urged in the present case that there was any legal defect in taking of the sample or the institution of prosecution against the accused which could vitiate the proceedings or which may have caused prejudice to the accused. ( 14 ) MR. B. C. Patel learned Advocate for the accused placed strong reliance on a decision of Allahabad High Court in Shabbir Abdul Rehman v. State A. I. R. 1969 Allahabad 478. It may be mentioned here that the learned Judge in the instant case in arriving at the conclusion which he did had placed reliance on this decision of the Allahabad High Court in preference to the decision of the Delhi High Court referred to above Relying on this decision of the Allahabad High Court Mr. Patel urged that the prosecution on the basis of analysis of sample obtained by the person who was not validly appointed as Food Inspector is mis-conceived and not sustainable in law. Patel urged that the prosecution on the basis of analysis of sample obtained by the person who was not validly appointed as Food Inspector is mis-conceived and not sustainable in law. In the case before the Allahabad High Court one I. P. Apan Food Inspector of Municipal Board Chandausi purchased 3 seer of buffalo milk from the accused in that case on August 8 1263 and after undergoing the necessary formalities sent a sample of the same for examination of the Public Analyst. The Public Analyst analysed the sample and found it deficient in fat contents by about 10 per cent and in non fatty solids by about 16 per cent Consequently the accused was prosecuted on a complaint launched by the Medical Officer of the Municipal Board and convicted and sentenced for offence under sec. 16 read with sec. 7 of the Act. The learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court found that Apan did not possess any diploma recognised by the U. P. Government for being appointed as Sanitary Inspector. The Government had however issued G. O. on 1-11-1962 in which it permitted unqualified Sanitary Inspectors to continue to work as Sanitary Inspector subject to their being successful in the special Examination arranged by the Government in that behalf. Apan therefore continued to act as Sanitary Inspector but he passed the qualifying examination in the month of November 1963 He had taken the sample on 8th August 1963 and although he was acting as a Sanitary Inspector he admittedly did not possess the qualification prescribed by the State Government for appointment of Sanitary Inspectors. That qualification came to be possessed by him when he passed the examination in November 1963. The learned Single Judge therefore held that it was obvious that he was not a Food Inspector within the meaning of sec. 9 of the Act and the G. O. dated 1-11-1962 which permitted him to act as Sanitary Inspector could not confer on him the powers of a Food Inspector as required under the Act. The learned Single Judge was therefore of the opinion that Apan had no authority as Food Inspector to take a sample of the milk from the accused and his prosecution on the basis of the analysis of that sample was misconceived and not sustainable in law. The learned Single Judge was therefore of the opinion that Apan had no authority as Food Inspector to take a sample of the milk from the accused and his prosecution on the basis of the analysis of that sample was misconceived and not sustainable in law. In this view of the matter he set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused. With respect we do not agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. As observed above even assuming that the person who launched the prosecution does not possess the qualifications as Food Inspector or that he is not validly appointed as Food Inspector the prosecution launched by him cannot be held to be misconceived and sustainable in law. In order to find out whether the prosecution launched under the Act is valid or not all that we have to see is whether the conditions laid done in sec. 20 of the Act are satisfied. If these conditions are satisfied the prosecution would be valid. It may be pointed out that it was brought to ear notice that in a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Yadram v. State (1968) All. W. R. (H. C.) 675 (677) (D. B.) it was held that where sample sold to the Food Inspector is legally proved to be adulterated mere fact that the Food Inspector had no proper official status because of some defect in the order of his appointment is immaterial. However unfortunately (1968) All. W. R. was not made available to us and therefore we have not been able to properly appreciate the ratio of that decision. We however agree with the view that where the sample sold to the Food Inspector is legally proved to be adulterated mere fact that Food Inspector had no proper official status because of some defect in the order of his appointment is immaterial. We therefore hold that even if complainant Patels appointment as Food Inspector was not valid or that he had not taken the charge as Food Inspector or that there was some defect in his appointment or functioning as Food Inspector prosecution launched by him under sec. 20 cannot be held to be invalid. As already observed above he was duly authorised to launch prosecution and therefore prosecution launched by him under sec. 20 cannot be held to be invalid. As already observed above he was duly authorised to launch prosecution and therefore prosecution launched by him under sec. 20 of the Act cannot be held to be bad in law. ( 15 ) WE also do not agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that once the complainant Patel purported to act as Food Inspector the purchase made by him from the accused would not be covered by sec. 12 of the Act. It is not disputed that Patel had purchased 450 grams of chilly powder from the accused which was found to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. Therefore in our opinion as purchaser Patel had authority to launch prosecution against the accused. In our opinion therefore even as purchaser under sec. 12 of the Act complainant Patel had authority to launch prosecution against the accused. ( 16 ) IN our view therefore the learned Sessions Judge has misdirected himself both on question of law and in appreciating evidence before him and as a result arrived at conclusions which are wholly unreasonable and unsupportable. It is therefore the duty of this Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by him. ( 17 ) IN the result we allow this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge. We however find that the learned Judge has not dealt with other points raised before him by the accused. It is therefore necessary to remand the case to him for deciding other points raised before him. ( 18 ) WE therefore remand the case to him to decide the same in accordance with law in light of the observations made above. Bailable warrant in a sum of Rs. 1000 (one thousand) to be issued against the accused to appear before the learned City Sessions Judge Ahmedabad. Order accordingly. .