JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, C. J.—All these writ petitions are preferred to challenge the vires of sections 104 and 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Act 8 of 1974), as amended by the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ordinance No. 2 of 1975), which is subsequently replaced by Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms (Amendments Act, 1976 (Act 15 of 1976), with retrospective effect. This bunch of petitions contains many common questions and, therefore, we shall first dispose of the common questions involved in these petitions and shall also dispose of separate questions raised in different petitions. 2. The Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 was enacted "to unify, amend and consolidate the laws relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to provide for certain measures of land reforms in Himachal Pradesh. "This Act received the assent of the President of India on 2nd February, 1972 and came into force at once. It was eventually amended by the Amendment Act of 1976 with retrospective effect. This Amendment Act received the assent of the president on 20th April, 1976 and is "deemed to have come into force from the date of the commencement" of the principal Act. This principal Act, as amended, is hereinafter referred to either as "the impugned Act" or "the Act". 3. Before this Act came into force different enactments of land reforms were in force in the old area of Himachal Pradesh as well as in the new area which was added to Himachal Pradesh a result of reorganisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab in the year 1966. 4. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to Bill No. 32 of 1977, by which the Act was brought into force, the Act was enacted for the following purposes : "Statment of objects and Reasons : As a result of the re-organisation of the erstwhile State of Punjab in November, Iv66, some areas were integrated in Himachal Pradesh under section 5 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966. There are different enactments regarding tenancy and agrarian reforms in force in new and old areas of the Pradesh. There are different enactments regarding tenancy and agrarian reforms in force in new and old areas of the Pradesh. In the areas as comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966, the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 is in force which is a progressive legislation about the security of tenures of tenants and their other rights. In the areas added to Himachal Pradesh under section 5 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, however, occupancy tenants have been vested with proprietary rights under two Acts on the subject namely, the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1953, and the Pepsu Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights; Act, 1954. In the old areas the occupancy tenants have to apply for ownership under section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates ad Land Reforms Act. It has, therefore, been considered necessary to unify the various laws relating to tenancies as in force in the Pradesh and to provide for measure of land reforms to remove disparities. Restrictions have been imposed to purchase land by the non-agriculturists to avoid concentration of wealth in the hands of non-agricultrists moneyed class. The Bill is to achieve the above objects." 5. The impugned Act is thus obviously enacted under the subject mentioned in Entry No. 18 of the State List of Schedule VII which speaks of "land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents ; transfer and alienation of agricultural land ; land improvement and agricultural loans ; colonization". This Act is put in Ninth Schedule of the Constitution at Entry No. 138 by the Constitution (40th Amendment) Act, 1976 on 27th May, 1976 in the following terms : "138. Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (Himachal Pradesh Act 8 of 1974)." Rules under the Act were framed in the year 1975 and they came into force on 4-10-1975. We shall refer to the relevant provisions of the rules at a suitable stage in this judgment. 6. The petitioners in all these petitions have challenged only two provisions of the Act, namely, section 104 and section lib. Some petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rules 24 to 27. We shall refer to the relevant provisions of the rules at a suitable stage in this judgment. 6. The petitioners in all these petitions have challenged only two provisions of the Act, namely, section 104 and section lib. Some petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rules 24 to 27. The common grounds of challenge can be stated as under : (1) Even though the Act is put in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, section 104, as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976, is not saved by the protection of Article 31-B of the Constitution, because Entry No. 138 (which is already quoted above) makes no reference to the said Amendment Act. (2) Even if it is held that the impugned Act is included in the Ninth Schedule along with the Amendment of 1976, the provisions of the amended section 104 are ultra vires of the Constitution as they fall outside the legislative competence of the State Legislature inasmuch as they provide for compensation which is illusory and nominal. (3) The impugned Act, and specially the provisions of section 104, are destructive of the basic structure of the Constitution inasmuch as they violate the role of law. (4) By putting the impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule the Parliament has closed the judicial review, and since judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, the constitutional amendment by which the impugned Act was put in the Ninth Schedule is illegal and liable to be struck down. (5) section 104 of the Act is even otherwise violative of Article 26 of the Constitution which contemplates freedom to manage religious affairs. (6) Provisions of section 104 of the Act are vague and unworkable as no forum is created by the Act to decide whether a particular piece of land is agricultural land. (7) The inclusion of impugned Act in the Ninth Schedule does not save section 118 of the Act which puts limitations on the transfer of land to non-agriculturists, because these provisions of the Act infringe Article 15 which constitutes a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Section 118 is also violative of Article 19, clauses (e), (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Section 118 is also violative of Article 19, clauses (e), (f) and (g) of the Constitution. (8) If the impugned Act cannot get the protection of Article 31-B, it cannot get the protection even of Article 31-A inasmuch as it cannot be construed as an enactment for agrarian reform, and the provisions of the Act which directly vest the land of the landlords in tenants do not amount to "acquisition by State." (9) Rules 24 to 27 framed under the Act are ultra vires the provisions of the Act as mutation in favour of tenants cannot be made before notification contemplated by section 104 (3) is issued. These are the points which have been raised by the learned Advocates of the petitioners during the course of the arguments. 7. Before taking these points for consideration it would be necessary to make a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. 8. The impugned Act, as already noted above, consolidates the previous enactments on the subject and exhaustively regulates the relationship between a land Owner and his occupancy as well as non-occupancy tenants. Chapter IX of the Act is with regard to acquisition of proprietary rights of a landlord by occupancy tenants, while Chapter X is with regard to the acquisition of the proprietary rights of a landowner by non-occupancy tenants. Section 104, which is placed in Chapter X, and which is the main target of attack in these petitions, makes exhaustive provisions for acquisition by non-occupancy tenants and the compensation to be paid to the landowner for the same. It is not necessary to quote section 104 as it appeared originally in the principal Act, because of the application of the amendment to this section with retrospective effect. However, it would be necessary to quote the whole of section 104, as amended. It is in the following terms : "104. It is not necessary to quote section 104 as it appeared originally in the principal Act, because of the application of the amendment to this section with retrospective effect. However, it would be necessary to quote the whole of section 104, as amended. It is in the following terms : "104. Right of tenant other than occupancy tenant to acquire interests of landowner.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, contract, custom or usage for the time being in force, on and from the commencement of this Act, if the whole of the land of the landowner is under non-occupancy tenants, and if such a landowner has not exercised the right of resumption of tenancy land at any time since January 26,1955, under any law as in force : (i) such a landowner shall be entitled to resume before the date to be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette and in the manner prescribed, either one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land under tenancy from one or more than one tenants for his personal cultivation and the right, title and interest (including contingent interest, if an>) of the tenant or tenants, as the case may be, therefrom shall stand extinguished free from all encumbrances created by the tenant or tenants to that extent: Provided that if the tenant has taken lean from the State Government, a co-operative society or a bank for the improvement of tenancy land which the landowner has resumed under clause (i) or (ii) and has used such loan for the improvement of such land, then the landowner shall be liable to repay the outstanding amount of such loan and to the extent actually used for the said purpose and interest thereon to the State Government or to the co-operative society or a bank, as the case may be, proportionate to the improved land resumed by him : Provided further that the landowner shall not be entitled to resume from a tenant more than one-half of the tenancy land ; (ii) in case the landowner holds less than one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land in his personal cultivation, he shall be entitled to resume tenancy land only to make up the land under his personal cultivation to the extent of one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land, as the case may be, subject to the other conditions laid down in this section ; (iii) the right, title and interest in the rest of the tenancy land of the landowner, who is entitled to resume land under clauses (i) and (ii), shall vest in the tenant free from all encumbrances with effect from the date to be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette ; (iv) in case the land under the tenancy is partly irrigated and partly unirrigated and the landowner intends to resume land of both these classes, he shall be entitled to do so in the ratio and manner to be prescribed ; (v) in the event of any dispute between the landowner and the tenant with regard to the selection of the land for resumption, the first right of selection of land shall be that of the tenant who may exercise this right in the prescribed, manner and before the date to be notified by the State Government in this respect in the Official Gazette ; (vi) in case the tenant fails to exercised his right of selection of land by the date notified under clause (v), the Land Reforms Officer shall determine his share after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. In such a case also, the tenant shall be given the first choice to select the land. (2) Where the landowner does not cultivate the land resumed under sub-section (1) personally within one year from taking possession thereof, then such land shall vest in the State Government on payment of an amount at the rate of ninety-six times the land revenue plus rates and cesses and such land shall be disposed of by the State Government in such manner as may be prescribed. In such an event the first right to get such land shall be that of the tenant from whom the land was resumed by the landowner. (3) All rights, title and interest (including a contingent interest, if any) of a landowner other than a landowner entitled to resume land under sub-section (1), shall be extinguished and all such rights, title and interest shall with effect from the date to be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette vest in the tenant free from all encumbrances : Provided that if a tenancy is created after the commencement of this Act, the provision of this sub-section shall apply immediately after the creation of such tenancy. (4) Whenever a dispute arises whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner, is a tenant or not, the burden of proving that such a person is not a tenant of the landowner shall be on the latter. (5) The landowner whose rights, title and interest are extinguished under this section, shall be entitled to. (4) Whenever a dispute arises whether a person cultivating the land of a landowner, is a tenant or not, the burden of proving that such a person is not a tenant of the landowner shall be on the latter. (5) The landowner whose rights, title and interest are extinguished under this section, shall be entitled to. receive an amount at the rate of ninety-six times the land revenue plus rates and cesses payable either in lump-sum or in such number of instalments not exceeding ten during a period not exceeding five years as may be prescribed : Provided that if the tenant makes a default in the payment of any instalment of the amount the same shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue: Provided further that if the land for which the amount is to be paid under this section is subject to a mortgage debt from a bank, the mortgage debt will be the first charge on the amount payable for such land: Provided also that the tenant shall not be liable to pay the amount to the landowner for the acquisition of ownership rights in the tenancy land which is equal in area to that of his tenancy land resumed by the landowner under clauses (i) and (ii) of subsection (1) and the extinguishment of rights, title and interest of the tenant in the land resumed by the landowner shall be deemed to be the amount therefor. (6) Save as otherwise provided in section 114, every decision of the Land Reforms Officer, under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in a holding notwithstanding the fact that any such person-has not appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Land Reforms Officer or any other revenue authority. (7) The provisions of the foregoing sub-section shall apply to evacuee land as defined in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to composite property as defined in the Evacuee Interest v Separation) Act, 1951, or the property vested in the Central Government under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, with effect from such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. (8) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (9) nothing contained in sub-section (1) to (6) shall apply to a tenancy of a landowner during the period mentioned for each category of such landowners in sub-section (9) who,— (a) is a minor or unmarried woman, or if married, divorced or separated from husband or widow ; or (b) is permanently incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or mental infirmity ; or (c) is a serving member of the Armed Forces ; or (d) is the father of the person who is serving in the Armed Forces, upto the extent of inheritable share of such a member of the Armed Forces on the date of his joining the Armed Forces, to be declared by his father in the prescribed manner. (9) In the case of landowners mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of subsection (8), the provisions of sub-sections (1) to (6) shall not apply,— (a) in case of a minor during his minority and in case of other persons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (8) during their life time ; (b) in case of persons mentioned in clauses (c) and (d) of sub section (8), during the pedod of their service in the Armed Forces subject to resumption of land by such persons to the extent mentioned in first proviso to clauses (d; and (dd) of sub- section (1) of section 34." The section is long enough but its provisions can be stated in a summary form as under : 9. Sub-section (1) of this section read with clause (i) thereof contemplates resumption of land from non-occupancy tenant by the landowner and enables the landowner who has not exercised right of resumption of the tenancy land at any time since January, 26, 1955 to resume land from his tenants to the extent of one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land, from tenants. Clause (ii) provides for the cases wherein holding with a landowner is less than one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land, and says that he shall be entitled to resume tenancy land to make up one and half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land. Clause (ii) provides for the cases wherein holding with a landowner is less than one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land, and says that he shall be entitled to resume tenancy land to make up one and half acres of irrigated land or three acres of un-irrigated land. Clause (iii) of this sub-section provides the vesting of the balance of land in the tenant free from all encumbrances with effect from the date to be notified by the State Government in the Official Gazette. Thus, these three clauses of sub-section (1) enable a landowner to have in his personal cultivation the minimum of one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of unirngated land. Clause (iv) of this sub section provides for the cases when the landowner wants to resume partly irrigated land and partly un-irrigated land. Clause (v) provides for the cases wherein dispute arises as regards the selection of land by the landowner and clause (vi) provides for the cases wherein tenants fail to exercise their option. 10. Sub section (2) of this section provides for the cases where in a landowner does not personally cultivate the land resumed as above, and says that if he fails in doing so for one year from the date of taking possession thereof, the land would vest in the Government on payment of an amount as compensation. 11. Subsection (4) provides for the cases wherein disputes arise as regards the question whether a person is a tenant or not. 12. Sub-section (5) provides for compensation to be paid to the land owner for the extinguishment of his rights and vesting of the rights in tenants at the rate of ninety-six times the land revenue. 13. Sub-section (6) provides that the decision of the Land Reforms Officer appointed under the Act shall be binding on dl the persons claiming interest in the holding. 14. Sub-section (7) is with regard to evacuee land. 15. Sub-sections (8) and (9) provide for exceptions in the case of certain categories of persons such as minors, unmarried woman, members of Armed Forces and physically incapable persons. 16. Another target of attack is section 118 of the Act. This section is placed in Chapter XI which speaks of control on transfer of land. 15. Sub-sections (8) and (9) provide for exceptions in the case of certain categories of persons such as minors, unmarried woman, members of Armed Forces and physically incapable persons. 16. Another target of attack is section 118 of the Act. This section is placed in Chapter XI which speaks of control on transfer of land. Originally, this section put a total bar on the transfer of land by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession to one who is not an agriculturist. But subsection (2) made exceptions in favour of landless labourers, landless persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, village artisans, landless persons carrying on an allied pursuit, State Government, Co operative Societies and new Banks constituted under the Banking Companies Act, 1970. By virtue of the Amendment Act even this section was amended with retrospective effect. By this amendment, the Legislature has relaxed the rule as regards ban on transfer in favour of non-agriculturists, by adding clauses (g) and (h) to sub-section (2) which provide for the cases which are not governed by the bar. These clauses (g) and (h) are in the following terms: "(g) a non agriculturist within the limits of municipal corporations, municipal committees, notified area committees for any one of the purposes, i.e. for construction of a dwelling house, a shop or commercial establishment or office or industrial unit subject to the condition that transter of land for such purposes shall not exceed,— (i) in case of a dwelling house-500 square metres ; (ii) in case of a shop, commercial establishment or office 300 square metres ; (iii) in case of an industrial unit such area as may be certified by the Department of Industries of the State Government; (h) a non-agriculturist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes to be prescribed." It is thus apparent that by virtue of the addition of clauses (g) and (h) to subsection (}.) of section 118 of the principal Act, the land could be transferred even to non-agriculturists under certain circumstances and with some limitations. 17. Originally, when the rules were framed, Rule 36 provided for the procedure regarding transfer of land by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession. 17. Originally, when the rules were framed, Rule 36 provided for the procedure regarding transfer of land by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession. But as a result of the above referred addition, of clauses (g) and (h) in subsection (2) of section 118, the rule making authority added a new rule 38-A. This added rule No. 38-A is in the following terms: "38-A. Purpose for which land is transferable under section 118 (2) (h)- (1) In case a non-agriculturist intends to acquire land in his name by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage with possession, he shall apply in Form LR-XIV to the Collector in whose jurisdiction the land is situated, duly supported with copies of Jamabandis and the Tatima Shajra of the land which he intends to acquire. The Collector shall verify the claim of the applicant and thereafter submit the application with his remarks to the State Government for permission under clause (h) of sub section (2) of section 118, through the Divisional Commissioner who shall also record his opinion about the transfer of land in favour of the applicant. (2) The State Government, on receipt of the recommendations of the Divisional Commissioner, shall consider the same and may grant or refuse the permission. (3) The permission under sub-rule 2 of this Rule shall for any one or more of the following purposes in the following scale :— (a) for agriculture or horticulture purpose or for both An area not exceeding 4 acres. (b) for building a residential house 500 square metres. (c) for construction of a shop 300 square metres. (d) for industrial unit Such area as may be certified by the Department of Industries of State Government." (e) for charitable, religious or Dublic utilitv service Such area as certified by the Collector of the District." The amended rule also provides for proforma for the application for permission required under sub-rule (1) of the above quoted rule 38-A. As already noted above, some petitioners have also challenged rules nos. 24 to 27 of the Rules. These rules are placed in Part V of the Rules with relate to acquisition of proprietary rights by non-occupancy tenants. Rule 21, which is the first rule of this part, provides for application for resumption of land by landowner under sub-section (1) of section 1U4. 24 to 27 of the Rules. These rules are placed in Part V of the Rules with relate to acquisition of proprietary rights by non-occupancy tenants. Rule 21, which is the first rule of this part, provides for application for resumption of land by landowner under sub-section (1) of section 1U4. Rule 22 provides for the manner of selection of land for the purpose of resumption by the landowner. Rule 23 provides for conversion ratio for the purpose of clause (4) of sub-section (1) of section 104. Rule 24 provides for the procedure for dealing with applications for resumption. Rule 25 provides for mutations Rule 26 provides for disposal of land vested in the State Government under subsection (2) of section 104, and Rule 27 provides for the procedure for conferment of proprietary rights on tenants covered by sub section (3) of section 104. These rules 24 to 27 are in the following terms : "24 (1) On the receipt of the application under rule 21, the Land Reforms Officer shall issue a 10 days notice in Form LR-V1I to the parties asking them to be present before him on the date and place (within patwar circle) to be mentioned in the notice. On the date so fixed the Land Reforms Officer will hear the parties and if the selection of the land made by the landowner under rule 22 is mutually agreed upon by the parties, the Land Reforms Officer shall pass an order about the extinguishment of the rights of the tenant in such land. He shall further order that the possession of the land be given to the landowner from the date to be specified irv the order. At the same time regarding the remaining land of such tenant or tenants the Land Reforms Officer shall confer proprietary rights on such tenant or tenants, as the case may be. (2) Where the selection of land made by the landowner under rule 22 is not mutually agreed upon between the parties, the Land Reforms Officer, shall ask the tenant to exercise the right of selection of land, in writing within one month from the date of issue of notice under sub-rule (1). (2) Where the selection of land made by the landowner under rule 22 is not mutually agreed upon between the parties, the Land Reforms Officer, shall ask the tenant to exercise the right of selection of land, in writing within one month from the date of issue of notice under sub-rule (1). On receipt of the choice of the tenant within the said period of one month the Land Reforms Officer shall hear the parties, and after having satisfied himself that the landowner is entitled to resume land under the provision of section 104 of the Act, shall pass orders regarding the land chosen to be retained by the tenant and also in respect of the land to be resumed by the landowner for personal cultivation, within two months from the date of receipt of Form LR-V under sub-rule ( ) of rule 21. He shall further order the extinguishment of right of tenancy on the land resumed by the landowner and for handing over the possession of land to the landowner by the tenant or tenants, as the case may be after the crop is harvested. Regarding the remaining land of the tenant or tenants, the Land Reforms Officer shall confer proprietary rights of such land upon the tenant or tenants, and determine the amount payable by the tenant to the landowner in respect of that land. (3) Where part of the fields are involved in selection of land for resumption and to be left with the tenant, the tatima sbajras will be prepared by the Patwari and checked by the Field Kanungo. The Revenue Officer will also check 25% of the tatima shajras. (4) While determining the amount payable by the tenant or tenants, as the case may be, to the landowner for extinguishment of his rights in land mentioned in sub-rule (2), the Land Reforms Officer shall follow the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 104. 25. The order of the Land Reforms Officer passed under rule 24 shall be given effect to by way of mutation on the expiry 01 the period of limitation prescribed for appeal and revision in section 114. There will be two mutations in each case, one for extinguishment of tenancy rights and the other for extinguishment of ownership rights of land in question. There will be two mutations in each case, one for extinguishment of tenancy rights and the other for extinguishment of ownership rights of land in question. The mutation fee chargeable on these mutations will be the same as that for giving effect to a decree of a Civil Court. 26 (1). In case the landowner fails to bring under personal cultivation the land reserved by him under clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of section 104 within one year from taking over the possession of the land, the Patwari shall make a report to the Land Reforms Officer of such failure. On receipt of such a report, the Land Reforms Officer shall issue a notice to the landowner to show cause within fourteen days from the receipt of the notice as to why the land shall not vest in the State Government. On hearing the landowner, if the Land Reforms Officer comes to the conclusion that the landowner has failed to cultivate the land without sufficient cause then he shall pass an order in writing under sub-section (2) of section 104 that such land vest in the State Government. The Land Reforms Officer may also order payment of amount to the landowner at rates prescribed in subsection (2) of section 104. He shall also take possession of the land on behalf of the State Government and shall cause to make entry in the revenue records to this effect. (2) On vestment of the land in the State Government under sub-rule (1), the Land Reforms Officer shall summon the tenant from whom the landowner resumed the land for personal cultivation and shall give him an option and the first choice to acquire the proprietary rights of the land on payment of the amount at the rate prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 104. (3) In case the tenant agrees to acquire ownership rights of the land under sub-rule (2) he shall be asked to pay the amount in lump sum or in such number of six monthly instalments not exceeding ten during the period not exceeding five years from the date of order of the Land Reforms Officer. The Land Reforms Officer shall at the same time pass an order for the delivery of possession of the land to such a person on payment of 1st instalment of the amount who acquires the proprietary rights under this sub-rule. The Land Reforms Officer shall at the same time pass an order for the delivery of possession of the land to such a person on payment of 1st instalment of the amount who acquires the proprietary rights under this sub-rule. (4) In case the tenant does not exercise option under sub-rule (2) then the land will be allotted in the following order of preference on payment of 96 times the annual land revenue plus rates and cesses chargeable thereon : (a) to landless agricultural labourers ; (b) to village artisans ; and (c) to members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 27. All rights, title and interests in the tenancy land of landowners who have already under their personal cultivation 3 acres unirrigated or 1½ acres irrigated land shall vest in the non-occupancy tenants with effect from the commencement of these rules. Similarly, the proprietary rights of tenancy land of the non-occupancy tenants on Government land shall also vest in the tenants from the commencement of these rules." 18. Now, taking the first ground of challenge, the contention of the petitioners is that since Entry No. 138 of Ninth Schedule makes a reference only to the impugned Act and not to the Amendment Act of 1976, section 104, as it stands amended with retrospective effect, is not entitled to any protection under Article 31-B of the Constitution. This contention is not acceptable for the simple reason that the Amendment Act of 1976 is acting retrospectively and therefore the amendments carried out by that Act should be read in the principal Act as if they were incorporated on the day on which the principal Act came into force. But, apart from it, it is clear that when Entry No. 138 was added to the Ninth Schedule by 40th Amendment Act on 27th May, 1976, the amendment in question was already carried out by the Legislature. Therefore, the Parliament at the time of amending Ninth Schedule by putting Entry No. 138 was knowing about the existence of the amendment and it was with this knowledge that the amendment of the Ninth Schedule was carried out. Therefore, the Parliament at the time of amending Ninth Schedule by putting Entry No. 138 was knowing about the existence of the amendment and it was with this knowledge that the amendment of the Ninth Schedule was carried out. The matter is completely covered by the decision given by the Supreme Court in The Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd, v. S. B. Kamble, AIR 1975 SC 1193, wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the protection and immunity afforded by Article 31-B is restricted to the provisions of the Act or Regulation as they exist on the date the Act or Regulation is included in the Ninth Schedule. The inclusion of the Act and Regulation would protect not only the principal Act or Regulation which is included in the Ninth Schedule but also the amendments which have been made therein till the date of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, even though the constitutional amendment by which the Act or Regulation is included in the Ninth Schedule refers only to the principal Act and Regulation and not to the amendments thereof. The Supreme Court has clarified w this decision that the protection or immunity would not, however, extend to the amendments made in the Act or Regulation after the date of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. This decision, therefore, clearly protects the amendment carried out in the year 1976, because when Entry No. 138 was put in the Ninth Schedule, this amendment did exist. Therefore, we see no point in the first contention mentioned above. 19. So far as the second ground of challenge is concerned, it is with regard to the legal competency of the Legislature in framing section 104 in the amended form. The contention was that Schedule Nine would protect challenge under Part III of the Constitution but would not protect any Act from the challenge on the ground of legislative in competency. It may be noticed here that this contention is not based on any legislative list given in Schedule VII nor is it based on any interpretation of any of the Entries contained therein. The contention as regards legislative in competency is, however, based on the question of illusory character of compensation which is provided to the landowner. It may be noticed here that this contention is not based on any legislative list given in Schedule VII nor is it based on any interpretation of any of the Entries contained therein. The contention as regards legislative in competency is, however, based on the question of illusory character of compensation which is provided to the landowner. It was pointed out in this connection that taking into account the market value of the land which is to be acquired the compensation of 96 times the land revenue is sheerly ridiculous, illusory and nominal, amounting to a fraud on the Constitution and, therefore, it amounts to no compensation at all. The argument regarding legislative incompetency was that if no acquisition can be made under Article 31 without providing for any compensation, any legislation which fails in providing real compensation is incompetent. According to the petitioners, such a challenge of incompetency does not amount to challenge under Part III of the Constitution and hence there is no bar under Article 31-B, 20. In our opinion, this argument has no merits, because it amounts to nothing but an attack based on the fundamental right contemplated by Article 31. What the petitioners cannot do overtly in view of Article 31-B, they seek to do covertly through backdoor by invoking the concept of legislative competency. It is, however, apparent that legislative competency, if any, comes into picture only in presence of Article 31. The argument, there fore, in essence is a challenge under Article 31. Apart from the fact that such a challenge is not likely to succeed even under Article 31, as it stands at present, we find that the same is completely barred under Article 31-B which is very wide in its sweep. 21. The argument, there fore, in essence is a challenge under Article 31. Apart from the fact that such a challenge is not likely to succeed even under Article 31, as it stands at present, we find that the same is completely barred under Article 31-B which is very wide in its sweep. 21. Since the wide sweep of Article 31-B is sought to be contained on various grounds in these petitions, it would be necessary at this stage to consider some legal implications which flow from the proper analysis of this Article which is in the following terms : "31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.—Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall b- deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or Tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force." A proper analysis of this Article reveals the following : (1) It does not seek to cut down the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A and thus saves the protection given by Article 31-A against an attack under Articles 14, 19 and 31. (2) It extends its protective shield not only to the Acts and Regulations mentioned in the Ninth Schedule, when taken as a whole, but also to different individual provisions thereof. It does protect the whole of the Act as well as every separate part thereof. (3) It creates a deeming fiction and operates retrospectively to save the concerned Act or Regulation from any attack in any form based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. (4) Its protective impact is not retarded even if such an Act, Regulation or any provision thereof is "inconsistent" with or "takes away", or "abrogates" any of the rights contemplated by Part III of the Constitution. (4) Its protective impact is not retarded even if such an Act, Regulation or any provision thereof is "inconsistent" with or "takes away", or "abrogates" any of the rights contemplated by Part III of the Constitution. (5) It operates on its own force, and that too quite independently of Articles 31 and 31-A, and this operation is not limited only to Acts and Regulations involving agrarian or land reforms. It, in other words, takes within its sweep all the provisions of law, irrespective of their nature, which are placed in the Ninth Schedule. 22. The comprehensive effect of this Article, as found from the above analysis, is so wide and effective that in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. "No master of English legal diction could have used, so tersely, such protean words which in their potent totality bang, bar and bolt the door against every possible invalidatory sally based on Part III". And, hence, in the words of the same learned Judge, "No matter what the grounds (of attack) are, if they are traceable to Part III in whatever form, they fail in the presence of Article 31-B" (Vide Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977)2 SCC 548). 23. In the above referred case of Dattatraya Govind Mahajan an argument was advanced that the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31-A does not confer any foundamental right but merely imposes a limitation on legislative competence of legislature and, therefore, Article 31-B does not exonerate the Act from its obligation to conform with the requirements of second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31-A. This argument was quite similar to the one which is advanced before us on the question of legislative incompetency. But this contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in view of the wide and comprehensive provisions found in Article 31-B. After considering the background under which Article 31-B was enacted, the court rejected this contention and observed in the following words : "It must be remembered that the aim and objective of Article 31-B is to make the most comprehensive provision for saving agrarian reform legislation from invalidation on the ground of infraction of any provision in Part 111 and it must, therefore, be so interpreted as to have the necessary sweep and coverage. It is an elementary rule of construction that a statutory provision must always be interpreted in a manner which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and carry out the object and purpose of the legislation. Moreover, we must not forget, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Marshall, that it is the Constitution that we are expounding. Our Constitution has a social purpose and an econonic mission and every article of the Constitution must, therefore, be construed so as to advance the social purpose and fulfil the enconomic mission it seeks to accomplish. The Court must place an expansive interpretation on the language of Article 31-B so as to carry out the object and purpose of enacting that article. We must, in the circumstances, hold that Article 31-B is sufficiently wide to protect legislation not only where it takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III, but also where it is inconsistent with any such provisions. It must follow a fortiori that even if the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31-A is construed as not conferring any fundamental right but merely imposing a restriction on legislative competence, the Act, in so far as it contravenes or is inconsistent with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31-A would still be saved from invalidation by Article 31-B". 24. In the recent case of State of Maharashtra v. Man Singh Suraj Singh Padvi, (1978) 1 SC Cases 615, the Supreme Court has held that even if an enactment is void initially the defect is cured after its inclusion is Schedule Nine. 25. In view of above, this challenge on the ground of legislative incompetency, apart from the fact that the challenge in substance in under Article 31 of the Constitution, cannot succeed in view of the provision of Article 31-B. 26. Even apart from what is stated above, we are of the opinion that there is no scope for the contention that the compensation which is provided under the Act is illusory. It is obvious that the impugned Act is enacted with a view to fulfil the obligations which the State carried under clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 which contain some of the Directive principles of State Policy. It is obvious that the impugned Act is enacted with a view to fulfil the obligations which the State carried under clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 which contain some of the Directive principles of State Policy. Under clause (b), the State is expected to direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, and under clause (c) the State is to direct its policy so that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. With a view to achieve this policy, the State has resorted to the different provisions and especially to the provisions contained in section 104 of the Act. Now, at the time of compulsory acquisition of a particular property, the only obligation which the State carries under Article 31 (2) is that the law of acquisition should provide for "an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law". Here, the law provides for the manner in which the compensation is to be fixed and it also states the principles on which the same should be fixed. As already noted above the compensation is to be provided on the basis of 96 times the land revenue. This compensation may be found inadequate by the petitioners, but it cannot be said that it is nominal or illusory. Several decisions, including the decision given by the Supreme Court in Bank Nationalisation case, were cited, but these decisions have obviously become obsolete not only by the subsequent development of the case law on the subject, but also by the various amendments carried out in the Constitution with regard to the amount of compensation. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shri Rangonatha Reddy, (1977) 4 SC Cases 471, the provision excluding the courts power to investigate either the adequacy of the amount or the propriety of the principles to determine the amount has been upheld in Keshwanand Bharatis case, and therefore the result is that the quantum of the amount or the reasonableness of the principles are out of bounds for the court. Keshwanand Bharatis case has also upheld the validity of Article 31-C, First Part. In view of this, it cannot be said that the compensation provided by the Act is either illusory or nominal. We, therefore, hold tliat the contentions raised by the petitioners with regard to point No. 2 must fail. 27. Coming to the third point, the question is whether by enacting section 104 the Legislature has violated rule of law and has, therefor, destroyed any part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The argument advanced in this connection by Shri Nag, who represented several petitioners, was that provisions of section 104 are so drastic that they are destructive of rule of law, and hence offend the basic structure of the Constitution. It was contended that the State Legislature has acted arbitrarily by enacting such drastic provisions which, according to the petitioners, would result not in any agrarian reform but only in the distribution of poverty. It was pointed out that there was enough legislation on the subject when the impugned Act was brought in the statute book, and even the holdings permissible under the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act 1953 were not sufficient to maintain the families of landowners and, therefore, further inroads made by the impugned Act through section 104 would result in uneconomic holdings, would retard agricultural production, and would make already poor agriculturists of this State still poorer. 28. We find that if a Legislature acts within the limits of its legislative powers it is difficult to comprehend how it can be said to be destroying the rule of law. The doctrine of rule of law applies to those who have to administer the law and not to those who have to formulate the law. Formulation of law cannot be characterised as arbitrary if the same is within the bounds of legislative competency. 29. We do not find it necessary to go into the contentions raised about the likely result of the provisions contained in the impugned section 104, as any such considerations fall beyond the purview of judicial review. It is not for the courts to formulate the socio-economic policies which should guide and inform the legislatures in this country. 29. We do not find it necessary to go into the contentions raised about the likely result of the provisions contained in the impugned section 104, as any such considerations fall beyond the purview of judicial review. It is not for the courts to formulate the socio-economic policies which should guide and inform the legislatures in this country. Formulation of policies, by which the destiny of nation should be shaped is entirely the function of the elected representatives of the people, and the Constitution of our country does not call upon the Judiciary to sit in judgment over the correctness, desirability and wisdom of these policies. As observed by the Supreme Court in the above referred case of Dattatraya Govind Mahajan, (supra) : "Court cannot assume the role of an economic adviser or censor competent to pronounce upon the wisdom of such policy". If, therefore, a Legislature functions within its own legislative competency and other constitutional limitations, it has plenary powers to choose its own policy which in its opinion is likely to achieve socio-economic goals prescribed in the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in part IV of the Constitution. Once a choice is made by the Legislature in the manner stated above, it is not for the courts in or country to point out that the choice of some other policy would be more conducive to the result, nor is it open to the court to strike down a particular legislation on the ground that in the long run the legislation instead of turning out a boon, turns out to be a curse (Per Palekar, J. in State of Kerala v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1973 SC 2734). 30. We, therefore, fail to understand how by choosing a particular policy, however harshly it may operate on a particular section of society, and by laying down a binding code of conduct in a statute pursuant to that policy, it can be contended that, the Legislature has destroyed rule of law. It would, of course, have been another matter if the procedure prescribed by the legislation was destructive of rule of law. But that was not the argument advanced here. We, therefore, see no substance even in this contention. 31. It would, of course, have been another matter if the procedure prescribed by the legislation was destructive of rule of law. But that was not the argument advanced here. We, therefore, see no substance even in this contention. 31. Proceeding now to the fourth contention it was argued that judicial review is a part of the basic structure of our system and since the inclusion of the impugned enactment in Schedule Nine bars the judicial review as regards the validity of the enactment on the touchstone of Part III of the Constitution, a very important part of the basic structure is destroyed and hence inclusion of the impugned Act in Schedule Nine is invalid and void. 32. Here, even presuming, without admitting, that judicial review in every case, and to the fullest extent possible without any modification, is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we find that putting the impugned Act in the list of schedule Nine does not bar completely the judicial review. It may, however, be noted that in the two decisions of the Supreme Court given in Kesavananda Bharat’s case, (1973) 4 SC Cases 225, and Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi, AIR 1975 SC 2299, the court as such has not given any decision on the question whether judicial review forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, the question whether judicial review is always apart of the basic structure of the Constitution is a question which is res integra in absence of any binding decision of the Supreme Court. But, as already stated above, this question does not arise to be determined here in view of the fact that in our opinion Article 31-B dose not bar the judicial review. We shall presently discuss how it is so. 33. If again a reference is made to Article 31-B, it will be found that it merely saves the validity of certain Acts and Regulations which are placed in Schedule Nine. In other words, what it bars is a challenge to these Acts and Regulations under Part III of the Constitution. Part III of the Constitution contains fundamental rights. Therefore, what Article 31-B states is that no litigant would be able to challenge the validity of a particular Act or Regulation on the ground of the breach of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III. Part III of the Constitution contains fundamental rights. Therefore, what Article 31-B states is that no litigant would be able to challenge the validity of a particular Act or Regulation on the ground of the breach of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III. This is obviously a limitation on a litigants right to challenge the validity of the enactments found in Schedule Nine on certain grounds. Article 31-B, therefore, does not speak about the limitations on High Courts right to undertake judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Inspite of Article 31-B it is still open to the court to see whether the legislation in question was passed by a competent legislature. The court can also still resort to a judicial review to find out whether the impugned enactment is in fact included in Schedule Nine, and the court can also enquire into the question whether the impugned enactment is liable to be struck down on a challenge emanating from any Article of the Constitution other than those found in Part III thereof. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court to scrutinise the validity of a particular enactment on other grounds as mentioned above under its power under Article 226 still remains, and its power to test a particular legislation on the touchstone of the Part III of the Constitution would always be available to it once an enactment is taken out of the purview of Schedule Nine. Therefore, what Article 31-B does, is not to touch the courts jurisdiction, as such, though it undoubtedly limits the right of a litigant to challenge the enactments placed in Schedule Nine on the ground of infringement of any of the Articles placed in Part III so long as that enactment continues in Ninth Schedule. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioners cannot succeed even on point No. 4. 34. Point No. 5 is with regard to the challenge under Article 26 of the Constitution. This challenge is obviously not open in view of the provisions of Article 31-B. But even apart from that, even a religious institution who has got rights under Article 26 would be entitled to-resume one and a half acres of irrigated or three acres of un-irrigated land under the provisions of section 1(4, and would further get compensation as prescribed by the Act for the remaining land. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the freedom of such a religious institution to manage its religious affairs is abrogated by section 104. The petitioners, therefore, should fail even oh this point. 35. So far as point No. 6 is concerned, it was contended that provisions of section 104 of the Act are vague and unworkable, because no forum is created by the Act to decide whether a particular piece of land is agricultural land. We see no substance in this contention because every land is noted in the revenue record which carries a presumption of correctness, and the provisions of the Act as well as the rules make sufficient provisions with regard to the objections which could be raised by a person on the ground that the Act is not applicable to a particular piece of land. 36. This disposes of point No. 6. 37. Coming to point No. 7, it raises two types of contentions with regard to section 118 of the Act, the amendments to which we have quoted in extenso in the foregoing portion of this judgment. The first contention with regard to this section was that it infringes Article 15 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes discrimination on the ground of place of birth, and in support of this contention it was urged that a non-agriculturist, who belongs to a State other than Himachal Pradesh in India, would not be able to acquire any agricultural land by transfer. Another fact of the contention relating to this point was that section 118 infringes the fundamental right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India contemplated by clause (e) of Article 19 (1), as also the right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property con templated by clause (f) thereof, and the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business contemplated by clause (g) of the said Article. 38. So far as the contentions arising from Article 19 are concerned, the same can be disposed of in one line by statin4 that challenge under Article 19 is not available to the petitioners in view of Articles 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution. 38. So far as the contentions arising from Article 19 are concerned, the same can be disposed of in one line by statin4 that challenge under Article 19 is not available to the petitioners in view of Articles 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution. But apart from that, the fundamental rights conferred by Article 19 are not absolute, because the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India conferred by clause (e), can be reasonably restricted in the interest of general public. Similarly, right to acquire, hold and dispose of property contemplated by clause (f) can also be reasonably restricted in the interest of general public. Right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business contemplated by clause (g) also can be similarly restricted. Therefore, if Articles 31-B and 31-C were absent from the Constitution, the question which would have arisen would be whether the restrictions contemplated by section 118 are reasonable or not. 39. As we shall discuss/subsequently, we are of the opinion that the impugned Act is nothing but an agrarian reform. Its principal object is to regulate the relationship between tenant and his landlord with regard to agricultural lands, and to abolish absentee landlordism. The Act wants to establish direct contact between the person who actually, cultivates the land and the ultimate owner of the land, namely, the State. By abolition of absentee landlordism the Act obviously wants to give incentive to those who sweat for the improvement of land and thus another object which it seeks to achieve is to increase agricultural production. 40. The statement of objects and reasons quoted above makes a further reference to restrictions imposed on purchase of land by non-agriculturists with a view to avoid concentration of wealth in the hands of non-agriculturists moneyed class. It is obvious that the agricultural land in the State like Himachal Pradesh would be very much limited in view of its mountanious terrain. If this land is allowed to go indiscriminately in the hands of those who can over bid an usual customer, it is very obvious that ultimately the very object for which the Act was enacted would be lost. If this land is allowed to go indiscriminately in the hands of those who can over bid an usual customer, it is very obvious that ultimately the very object for which the Act was enacted would be lost. Non- agriculturists, who have not evinced any interest in the agriculture upto now, would, by the sheer strength of their money power be able to over bid the agriculturists, and a class of society would emerge which would be interested not so much in the improvement of agriculture but in the investment of un-used, and in some cases, undisclosed, finances. Such an incentive would be more to them in view of the fact that income from agriculture is exempt from income-tax. Therefore, if one of the objects of the legislature was to prevent the limited land resources of the State from going in the hands of financial sharks, it cannot be said that that objective was purposeless. Under the circumstances, the restrictions which are placed on the fundamental rights contemplated by clauses (e), (f) and (g) must be held to be quite reasonable. Therefore, in our view, even in absence of Articles 31-B and 31-C challenge to section 118 of the Act would not have succeeded on the ground of the infringement of the fundamental rights contemplated by clauses (e), (0 and (g) of Article 19. 41. This brings us to the challenge on the ground of Article 15 of the Constitution. 42. As already noted above, the rigour of section U8 against the transfers in favour of the non-agriculturists has been substantially reduced by the Amendment Act of 1976, because under the provisions of that Amendment Act even the transfers in favour of non-agriculturists are allowed to a certain extent and for specified purposes. The contention of Shri Sood, who argued this point, was that the above referred provisions of the amended section 118 read with Rule 38-A discriminate against the citizens of India who are not agriculturists and who want to settle in Himachal Pradesh from outside the State by taking up the agriculture as their profession. The contention of Shri Sood, who argued this point, was that the above referred provisions of the amended section 118 read with Rule 38-A discriminate against the citizens of India who are not agriculturists and who want to settle in Himachal Pradesh from outside the State by taking up the agriculture as their profession. He, in this connection, pointed out to the definition of the word "agriculturist" given in clause (2) of section 2 of the Act as under : "(2) agriculturists means a person who cultivates land personally in an estate situated in Himachal Pradesh." It was contended, therefore, that if a person belonging to some other State wants to purchase land in Himachal Pradesh, he can get it only subject to limitations specified in section 118, because he would ordinarily not be a person who cultivates land in Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, in his contention such persons are discriminated against substantially on the ground of the place of their birth and, therefore, Article 15 would be violated. Shri Sood, however, contended that Article 15, being based on the principle of equality and rule of law, is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution and there-tore even if the impugned Act finds its place in Schedule Nine of the Constitution, the same can De challenged because it has been brought in Schedule Nine by a constitutional amendment. 43. The question whether the legislation, which is included in Schedule Nine of the Constitution, can change the basic structure of the Constitution if it violates some of the fundamental rights given in Part III, has remained a controvercial question because the same is not resolved by a majority judgment either in Kesavananda Bharat’s case or Shrimati Indira Nehrus case (supra). In the former case six Judges, namely, Sikri, C. J., Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hegde and Mathew, JJ. and Reddy, J. have held that such a legislation can change the basic structure under given circumstances. Other six Judges have not agreed with this view because they have not subscribed to the doctrine of basic structure. The remaining Judge, namely, Khanna, J. has not expressed any opinion on this point. Under the circumstances, this question is open for decision by this court. We, however, do not consider it necessary to decide the same because we find that Article 15 is not infringed by the provisions of section 118 as amended. The remaining Judge, namely, Khanna, J. has not expressed any opinion on this point. Under the circumstances, this question is open for decision by this court. We, however, do not consider it necessary to decide the same because we find that Article 15 is not infringed by the provisions of section 118 as amended. For the same reasons, we also do not find it necessary to decide whether Article 15 is part of basic structure of the Constitution. We shall, therefore, presently proceed to consider how the provisions in section 118 do not infringe Article 15. 44. Article 15 provides that State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The remaining portions of this Article are not relevant for our purpose. Form a bare perusal of the above referred provisions of Article 15 it becomes apparent that discrimination cannot be made on the solitary ground of religion, caste, sex or place of birth. Therefore the first question which arises to be considered is whether discrimination, if any, contemplated by section 118 can be said to be existing "only" on the ground of place of birth. Our answer to this question is clearly in the negative. If again definition of the word "agriculturist" is taken into account it is obvious that it applies to all persons who are not personally cultivating land in Himachal Pradesh irrespective of the fact whether they are Himachal is or non-Himachalis. Therefore, the section operates irrespective of the place of birth. It cannot be said to be operative only on those who are born outside the State of Himachal Pradesh, because the added qualification which is required to be an agriculturist is that the person concerned should be found cultivating land personally in Himachal Pradesh. 45. Another aspect of the matter is that either under Article 14 or under Article 15 it is always permissible to the legislature to resort to reason able classification provided the said classification has some sort of nexus with the object which the Act wants to achieve. Here, the Legislature has made classification in favour of agriculturists as distinguished from non-agriculturists. Another aspect of the matter is that either under Article 14 or under Article 15 it is always permissible to the legislature to resort to reason able classification provided the said classification has some sort of nexus with the object which the Act wants to achieve. Here, the Legislature has made classification in favour of agriculturists as distinguished from non-agriculturists. Such a classification has an obvious nexus with the object of the Act which, as stated above, is to introduce a land reform with wide ramifications covering landlord tenant relationship, improvement of agriculture and abolition of absentee landlordism. 46. The third aspect of the matter is that, according to the amended section, the rigour of the ban which was found in the old section has been substantially reduced, and now even a non-agriculturist can acquire agricultural land from an agriculturist subject to certain reasonable limitations. 47. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that Article 15 is not infringed in any manner by section 118 of the Act. 48. In this connection it was contended that section 118 read with Rule 38-A gives unfettered and unguided power to the State Government to determine whether a particular piece of land should be allowed to be transfer red or not. In other words, the argument was that exercise of power without proper guidelines in the statute is likely to be arbitrary and in the result the exercise of such power would destroy the principle of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. This contention is not acceptable because, if again a reference is made to clauses (g) and (h) of the amended section read with rule 38-A, it becomes quite evident that these provisions contain sufficient guidelines for the exercise of discretion vested in the State Government. Clause (g) points out the guidelines for allowing the transfer to a non-agriculturist within municipal limits. It is evident from clause (g) that these transfers can be allowed only for the conscruction of a dwelling house, shop, commercial establishment, office or industrial unit. The extent to which the transfer can be allowed is also given in the section. Clause (g) points out the guidelines for allowing the transfer to a non-agriculturist within municipal limits. It is evident from clause (g) that these transfers can be allowed only for the conscruction of a dwelling house, shop, commercial establishment, office or industrial unit. The extent to which the transfer can be allowed is also given in the section. So far as clause (h) is concerned, it generally provides for a transfer with the permission of the State Government for the purposes to be prescribed and these purposes are prescribed by the above quoted rule ?8-A, reference to which shows that the transfer can be only for the specified purposes and to the specified extent. Therefore, when the State Government allows a transfer in favour of a non-agriculturist it is bound to keep in mind that these transfers cannot be allowed at the sweet will of the authority concerned. The said authority is bound to be guided by the provisions contained in clauses (g) and (h) of sub-section (2) of section 118 and rule 38 A. 49. Another guideline is provided by the Act itself because, as already stated above, the intention of the Legislature, as evidenced from various provisions of the Act, is not to allow any other powerful class of absentee landlords, and to preserve the limited land resources to the ever increasing asrarian population of the State. It is now well established that guidelines in such discretionary matters need not always be provided in specific terms hut can be read even through the preamble, long title, and other related provisions of the Act. In Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465, the validity of clause (3) of Cotton Textiles (Control of Mevement) order, 1948, which delegated power to Textile Commissioner, was considered and it was held that the policy underlying the order was to be taken into account with a view to regulate the transport of cotton textile in a manner that would ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the country. The Supreme Court observed in that case that the grant or refusal of a permit was thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile Commissioner was to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate the policy. The Supreme Court observed in that case that the grant or refusal of a permit was thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile Commissioner was to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate the policy. The Supreme Court finally held that conferment of such a discretion to the Textile Commissioner under clause (3) of the order cannot therefore be called unregulated or arbitrary and it would not be invalid on that ground. The Supreme Court also observed in that case that if there was any abuse of power the courts had ample power to undo the mischief. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459, the broad principles of legislation, the preamble to the Act and other provisions of the Act were taken to be sufficient guidelines (Vide para. 47 of the reported judgment). In P. J. Irani v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1731, power vested in the Government to exempt a particular building or buildings from the operation of Madras Buildings, Lease and Rent Control Act was considered for determining whether it offended Article 14 of the Constitution. It was observed that enough guidance was afforded by the preamble and operative provisions of the Act for the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Government under section 13 of the Act to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act, so as to render the impugned section not open to attack as a denial of the equal protection of laws. It was also further observed in that case that an individual order of exemption passed by the Government would be subject to judicial review by courts to find out whether it was discriminatory or whether the order was made on the grounds which were germane or relevant for the purpose or policy of the Act. 50. It was contended that the power which the State Government was expected to exercise under section 11s of the Act is likely to be exercised arbitrarily. This contention also is not acceptable because the provisions referred to above with regard to section 118 are that the Government is to act upon the report of the Divisional Commissioner concerned. 50. It was contended that the power which the State Government was expected to exercise under section 11s of the Act is likely to be exercised arbitrarily. This contention also is not acceptable because the provisions referred to above with regard to section 118 are that the Government is to act upon the report of the Divisional Commissioner concerned. Moreover, when the power is vested either in a high ranking officer or in the highest body, such as the State Government the court cannot work with the presumption that it would be utilised in an arbitrary manner. The legal position on this point is quite settled and, therefore, a reference to a few decisions on the question would suffice. 51. In Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44, the provisions of section 197 of the Cr. P. C. were attacked on the ground that they offended Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that though the provision vested discretion with the State Government, discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power, and abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in A. T. Kunju Musaliar v, M. Venkatachalam, AIR 1956 SC 246, with regard to the provisions of section 5 (1) Of Travancore Taxation on Income (Investigation Com mission Ace. The Supreme Court observed in that case that the possibility ot the Government discriminating between persons and persons tailing within the group or category of substantial evaders of Income-tax would not render section :> (1) discriminatory and void. It was further observed in that case that it is to be presumed, unless contrary were shown, that the administration of a particular law would be done "not with an evil eye and unequal hand" and the selection made by the Government of the cases of persons to be referred for investigation by the Commission would not be discriminatory. In yet another case of Messrs Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397, the question arose whether the power to transfer the case of a particular income-tax assessee from one area to another was unfettered and unguided or not. In yet another case of Messrs Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397, the question arose whether the power to transfer the case of a particular income-tax assessee from one area to another was unfettered and unguided or not. While dealing with this question the Supreme Court observed that merely because the case of a particular assessee is transfer red from the Income-tax Officer of an area within which he resides or carries on business to another Income-tax Officer whether within or without the State will not by itself be sufficient to characterize the exercise of the discretion as discriminatory, and even if there is a possibility of discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the same group or category, such possibility cannot necessarily invalidate the piece of legislation. The Supreme Court further observed in this case as under : "It may "also be remembered that this power is vested not in minor officials but in top-ranking authorities like the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Central Board of Revenue who act on the information supplied to them by the Income-tax Officers concerned. This power is discretionary and not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed1 where the discretion is vested in such high officials." (Vide Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 at page 48). There is moreover a presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the rules of law. In view of these decisions it is apparent that presumption of dishonesty cannot be made and the court cannot proceed on the assumption that the State Government will act arbitrarily at the time of granting permission for transfer under section 118 of the Act. 52. Shri Sud, learned Advocate of some of the petitioners who argued this point, drew our attention to some other decisions. We shall presently consider these decisions and show how they are not helpful to the petitioners. He drew our attention to the Assam case of Miss. Sitimon Sawian v. District Council, United K.&.J. Hills, Shillong, AIR 1968 Assam 43, where the question involved was whether section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953 offended Article 14 of the Constitution. He drew our attention to the Assam case of Miss. Sitimon Sawian v. District Council, United K.&.J. Hills, Shillong, AIR 1968 Assam 43, where the question involved was whether section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Transfer of Land) Act, 1953 offended Article 14 of the Constitution. The impugned section 3 of that Act put prohibition on land to be sold, mortgaged, leased, bartered, gifted or otherwise transferred by tribal to a non-tribal or by a non-tribal to another non tribal except with the previous sanction of the District Council. The court found that the impugned provision provided no principles on which the policy of the Act was to be implemented. According to the learned Judges who decided that case, the Regulation contained no principle or criterion on which the Executive Committee could grant or refuse to grant a licence or its renewal. Therefore, the court relied upon the Supreme Court decision given in Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council, AIR 1967 SC 829, which held that a provision which leaves an unbridled power to an authority could not in any sense be characterised as reasonable. We are of the opinion that this decision has no application to the facts of the present case, because, unlike the learned Judges who decided the Assam case, we are net unable to find the guidelines for the exercise of the powers. It may, however, be noted that an appeal against this decision of the Assam High Court was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal on the ground of legislative incompetency, but kept the question of infringement of Article 14 open. We were also referred to the decisions given in Rulia Ram v. Sadh Ram (F. B), AIR 1952 Pepsu 190, and Jaidayal x.Umrao Harchand Ahir, AIR 1958 Rajasthan 199. We have referred to these decisions, but we find that apart from the fact that they are decided on their own facts, they also missed to take into consideration the fact that it is the fundamental duty of the State to inform itself of the Directive Principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution and therefore even the Judiciary, being an organ of the State, is bound to be informed by the Directive Principles. Under the circumstances, when the reasonableness of a particular restriction or classification is to be considered by the court sitting to exercise its powers under Article 226, the court should not fail to take into consideration these Directive Principles. We find that these decisions have not taken proper account of these Directive Principles and therefore we do not went to go into an elaborate discussion to show how these decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 53. In this connection we may end by making reference to the decision given by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Khan Chand, AIR 1974 SC 543, which was relied on by the petitioners. We have perused the decision, and we find that the impugned Act in that case conferred uncontrolled power on the State Government or the officers authorised by it to requisition any movable property, and no guidelines were laid down regarding the object or the purpose for which it became necessary or expedient to requisition a movable property. The present case, as already noted by us above, does contain sufficient guidelines and, therefore, the decision has no application to the facts of this case. 54. Coming to point No. 8, arguments were advanced that the impugn ed provisions of section 104 of the Act cannot get protection of Article 31-A of the Constitution in view of the fact that this enactment cannot be considered to be an Act for agrarian reform. We have already adverted to this aspect of the matter and after considering various provisions of the Act as well as the statement of objects and reasons quoted above, we are covinced that the Act is nothing but an enactment on agrarian reform. It does not cease to be an enactment for agrarian reform simply because its provisions are not approved of by the petitioners or because these provisions operate harshly on the petitioners. It may be noted that this Act replaces, inter alia, the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 and various other provisions relating to land reforms. The provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 were considered by the Supreme Court in Jadab Singh v. Himachal Pradesh Administration, AIR 1960 SC 1008, wherein it has been held that it was an agrarian reform Act. The provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 were considered by the Supreme Court in Jadab Singh v. Himachal Pradesh Administration, AIR 1960 SC 1008, wherein it has been held that it was an agrarian reform Act. Since the impugned Act is nothing but the consolidation of various enactments on the agrarian reform, even without considering the other aspects of the matter, we can safely come to the conclusion that it is an Act of agrarian reform and would therefore be covered by the provisions contained in Article 31-A of the Constitution. Arguments were advanced to show that the scheme contemplated by section 104 cannot be considered as the real programme for agrarian reforms. But as held in State of Kerala v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co, AIR 1973 SC 2734, "what programme of agrarian reform should be initiated to satisfy the requirement of rural uplift in a particular community under the prevailing circumstances is a matter for legislative judgment". It could not be over emphasised that the concept of agrarian reform is not a static one and much depends upon what particular line of action and policy is adopted by the legislature in this connection. 55. Shri Ramesh Chand, the learned Advocate of some of the petitioners, contended that since in this case it is found that land in excess of what is resumed by a landowner vests directly in the tenants, such vesting does not amount to acquisition by State and therefore Article 31-A of the Constitution has no application. It was contended by him that clause (a) of Article 31-A sub-Article (1), refers only to acquisition by State of any estate or of any rights therein. This contention is not acceptable because clause (a) of sub-Article (1) of Article 31-A contemplates four categories of cases, namely :— (1) acquisition by State of any estate ; (2) acquisition by State of any rights in an estate ; (3) extinguishment of such rights ; and (4) modification of such rights. The last two categories are independent of the acquisition by State and therefore whenever it is found that the rights in an estate are either extinguished or modified in favour of some other person or persons except the State, Article 31-A would have full application. The last two categories are independent of the acquisition by State and therefore whenever it is found that the rights in an estate are either extinguished or modified in favour of some other person or persons except the State, Article 31-A would have full application. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 856, wherein Sikri, J., Speaking for the Court, has observed as under in this connection :— "It seems to us that there is this essential difference between "acquisition by the State" on the one hand and "modification or extinguishment of rights" on the other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of the modificiation or the extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of that property, and law provides for the extinguishment of leases held in estate. In one sense it would be an extinguishment of the rights of a leasee, but it would properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State because the beneficiary of the extinguishment could be the State." These observation make it clear that the expression "extinguishment or modification" found in clause (a) of Article 31-A (1) has a distinct and different connotation from acquisition by State. The result, therefore, is that even if. with regard to a particular estate, rights are extinguished or modified in favour of a person other than the State, Article 31-A applies. In Laxminctrayan Dipchand Maheshwari v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, AIR 197-i SC 1036, the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act under which there was direct vesting in favour of the tenants without the land being first acquired by the State. This was done by section 46 thereof. An argument was advanced before the Court that this section 46 was violative of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and was not saved by Article 31-A which was not applicable because under section 46 there was no acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein, in order to come within the saving provision of Article 31-A (1) (a). This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court by observing that the fact that section 46 in terms transfers the land from landlord to tenant and vests the ownership in the latter does not mean that there is no extinguishment of the estate for the sole reason that there is no express mention of such acquisition by the State in terms. The Supreme Court further observed that the provisions of section 46 of the Bombay Act had achieved the twin purpose of extinguishment of the right of the landlord in the estate and conferment of the same right upon the tenant. The Supreme Court says that once that happened there was in one breath extinguishment of the right in favour of the State and the conferment of the said right in favour of the tenant. This was so because the State was the paramount owner of the lands in question. 56. In view of what is stated above, we see no force in the contention raised by ShiiRamesh Chand with regard to the applicability of Article 31-A. This disposes of point No. 8. 57. Point No. 9 is with regard to the validity of Rules 24 to 27 which are all quoted above. It was contended that these rules are ultra vires the provisions of the Act because the mutation in favour of the tenants cannot be made before the notifications contemplated by section 104 (3) were issued. This contention requires a reference to the relevant provisions of section 104. It should be noticed from the scheme of section 104 that it makes distinction between the landowners who are entitled to resume land from the tenants under subsection (1) and the land-owners who are not so entitled in view of the fact that they are already holding irrigated land measuring more than one and a half acres or unirrigated land measuring more than three acres. So far as the first category of landlords is concerned, clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of this section provides that right, title and interest of the tenancy land which is more than the land resumed under sub-section (1) shall vest in the tenant free from all encumbrances "with effect form the date to be notified by the State Government in the official Gazette". So, according to this clause (iii) the surplus land vests in the tenants only from the date which is notified by the State Government in the official Gazette. 58. Sub-section (3) of section 104 makes similar provision, though in different language, with regard to that category of landowners who are not entitled to any resumption under sub-section (1). For this category of landowners sub-section (3) provides that their right, title and interest "shall be extinguished" and all such rights, title and interest shall vest in the tenant free from all encumbrances from the date to be notified by the State Government in the official Gazette. 59. The difference which is notable between the two provision is that while sub-section (3) or section 104 makes a specific reference to the extinguishment of the rights of a landowner and to the vestment of these rights in the tenant at a date which may be subsequent to the date of such, extinguishment, clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 104 makes no specific reference to "extinguishment". 60. We thus find that while according to sub-section (3) the rights of a landowner covered by that sub-section are subject to immediate extinguishment, there is no such stipulation of immediate extinguishment of the rights of a landowner who is covered by sub-section (1). We shall advert to petitioners contention with regard to this interpretation at a subsequent stage. But at this stage, we note the above difference between the two provisions with a view to appreciate whether Rules 24 to 27 are, in any manner, contradictory to these provisions. 61. In our opinion, the legislature has contemplated this distinction between the provisions of sub-section (3) and clause (iii) of sub section (1) for the apparent reason that in case of the landowners who are entitled to resumption of tenancy some enquiry is invariably necessary before ultimate mutations in favour of the tenants are recorded in the revenue register. It is apparent that in case of the landowners who are entitled to resumption, questions as regards from what tenant he would resume and to what extent, are likely to arise. If the lands in the possession of the tenants are both irrigated and unirrigated, then question would also arise as to in what pro portion and from what tenant this resumption can be made. If the lands in the possession of the tenants are both irrigated and unirrigated, then question would also arise as to in what pro portion and from what tenant this resumption can be made. Therefore, unless all these enquiries are completed it would be difficult to know how much land would vest in favour of a particular tenant, in case the tenants are more than one. 62. So far as the landlords who are not covered by sub-section (1) of section 104 are concerned, no such questions are likely to arise because these landowners are those who already possess at least the minimum of one and a half acres of irrigated land or three acres of unirrigated land. Therefore, for such landlords sub-section (3) of section 104 provides for immediate extinguish ment of rights and vesting of rights in favour of the tenants at a subsequent stage when notification is issued by the Government. 63. Now. if we look to the provisions of Rules 24 to 27 from this angle it would be clear that these provisions are not, in any manner, inconsistent with the scheme or the provisions contained in section 104. 64. As noted above, Rule 24 is with regard to the procedure dealing with the application for resumption. It contemplates an application under Rule 21 to be made by the landowner for resumption and a notice thereof to the concerned authorities. Then it prescribes detailed procedure to be followed by the Land Reforms Officer with regard to the land which could be resumed by the landowner. Under the circumstances, Rule 24 is found to be completely in harmony with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 104. 65.Rule 25 merely follows the procedure which is adopted ic Rule 24 and prescribes for the mutations as a result of the resumption of land. In fact, nothing was said about Rules 25 and 26 as to how they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. We find that they are in complete harmony with the provisions of the Act. Arguments were, however, advanced to show that Rule 27 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. This Rule 27 seems to have relevance to sub-section (3) of section 104. We find that they are in complete harmony with the provisions of the Act. Arguments were, however, advanced to show that Rule 27 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. This Rule 27 seems to have relevance to sub-section (3) of section 104. Marginal note attached to this Rule 27 is in the following terms :— "Procedure for conferment of proprietary rights on tenants covered by sub-section (3) of section 104." Rule 27 itself makes the following provision : — "27. All rights, title and interest in the tenancy land of landowners who have already undsr their personal cultivation 3 acres unirrigated or 1% acres irrigated land shall vest in the non-occupancy tenants with effect from the commencement of these rules. Similarly, the proprietary rights of tenancy land of the non-occupancy tenants on Government land shall also vest in the tenants from the commencement of these rules." Obviously this rule speaks of only that category of landowners who possess 3 or more acres of unirrigated land or 1½ or more acres of irrigated land. Therefore, as stated in the marginal note, this would apply only to the cases covered by sub-section (3) of section 104. 66. The argument of the petitioners was that while sub-section (3) of section 104 contemplates the vesting of rights in fayour of the tenants only on the date of Gazetted notification, Rule 27 contemplates vesting of these rights in the tenants from the date of the commencement of the rules. This apparent dichotomy as regards the date of the vesting of the rights in favour of the tenants venishes the moment it is borne in mind that the rules in which Rule 27 finds its place are also notified by Gazette. It would, therefore, follow that vesting of the rights of the landowners covered by sub-section (3j of section 104 would be from the date on which the rules were notified because this date would be the date contemplated even by sub-section (3) of section 104. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Rule 27 cannot be declared void on the ground that it militates against the main provision of the statute, namely sub-section (3) of section 104. We, thus, find that none of the Rules 24 to 27 can be declared void. 67. This finishes the common points raised in these writ petitions. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Rule 27 cannot be declared void on the ground that it militates against the main provision of the statute, namely sub-section (3) of section 104. We, thus, find that none of the Rules 24 to 27 can be declared void. 67. This finishes the common points raised in these writ petitions. We, therefore, go to the specific points raised in some writ petitions. 68. In writ petitions Nos. 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 152 of 1976, the petitioners are minors. In writ petition No. 47 of 1976, the petitioner is a widow. In writ petition No. 6z of 1976, the petitioner is a blind man and therefore physically incapable of cultivating the land. It was contended on behalf of these petitioners that their cases fall within sub-section (8) of section 104. But the Land Reforms Officer has refused to exempt them from the operation of the Act on the ground that some of them have acquired the land by transfer after the Act came into force. 69. Reference to sub sections (8) and (9) of section 104 shows that minors, widows and persons permanently incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or mental infirmity are exempted for the period mentioned under the respective heads in sub-section (9). But the main dispute appears to be arising out of the fact that some of these minors are alleged to have taken the land on transfer after the Act came into force. The Land Reforms Officer has, therefore, held that these transfers were mala fide made with a view to defeat the provisions ot the Act. In answer to this contention of the Land Reforms officer, it is contended by the learned Advocates of the petitioners that since the rights of the landowners concerned vest in the tenants only from the date on which notification is issued in the official Gazette, it was open to the original landowners to transfer the land in favour of anybody either by way of gift or any other conveyance. It was pointed out that unlike other agrarian reform enactments, there is no specific provision in the Act to prohibit such transfers before the vesting in favour of tenants takes place. 70. It was pointed out that unlike other agrarian reform enactments, there is no specific provision in the Act to prohibit such transfers before the vesting in favour of tenants takes place. 70. On principle we find that the resolution of the conflicting views stated above lies in the proper interpretations which could be put to subsection (3) of section 104 and clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 104. We have already noted the difference between these two provisions and we have also noted that while sub-section (3) contemplates the cases of only that category of landowners who are not entitled to resume tenancy, clause (iii) of sub-section (1) contemplates the category of those landowner who are entitled to resume. While in case of former, the provisions of sub-section (3) specifically refer to extinguishment of the rights, in case of the latter the provisions of clause (in) of sub-section (1) do not make any specific reference to extinguishment. We find that on true interpretation the effect of sub section (3) is that the rights, title and incerest of the landowners covered by that subsection stand immediately extinguished on _the application or the Act. On such extinguishment, the extinguished rights, title and interest immediately vest in the State Government which is the superior owner of all agricultural lands situated in the State. Then subsequently when the Gazetted notification follows, the rights, title and interest would vest in the tenants. 71. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that this is not the correct interpretation of sub-section p). In their view, extinguishment of the rights, title and interest of the landowner and vesting of these rights, title and interest in favour of the tenants must be construed as happening simultaneously under sub-section (3) of section 104. We dont find the slightest justification for taking such a view because that would be going against the plain words of sub-section (?). If it was the intention of the legislature that in the cases covered by subsection (3) extinguishment and fresh vestment of rights should take place simultaneously, there was nothing to prevent the legislature from employing the same language as it has employed in clause tin) of sub-section (1) of section 104. If it was the intention of the legislature that in the cases covered by subsection (3) extinguishment and fresh vestment of rights should take place simultaneously, there was nothing to prevent the legislature from employing the same language as it has employed in clause tin) of sub-section (1) of section 104. But instead of employing the language of clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 104, the legislature has expressly said that all rights, title and interest of the landowner other than the landowner who is entitled to resume the land under sub section (1) shall be extinguished. The intention which is expressed by the legislature in enactment of sub-section (3) of section 104 is similar to the one expressed by it in section 94 which is with regard to occupancy tenants. As already noted above, the scheme of the impugned Act is to make distinction between occupancy tenants and non-occupancy tenants. Chapter IX deals with occupancy tenants and section 94 which is found in that Chapter says that on or from the appointed day all rights, title and interest of land owner in the land under him by an occupancy tenants shall be extinguished, and such rights, title and interest shall be deemed to be vesting in the occupancy tenant free from all encumbrances. We find that sub-section (3) of section 104 is also practically on the same lines. It contemplates immediate extinguishment of the rights of the landowners covered by that sub-section. The result, therefore, would be that if the landowner who falls within the category of the landowners contemplated by sub-section (3) of section 104 has made any transfer after the commencement of the Act, that transfer would be void because his rights having been extinguished he possessed nothing which could be transferred. 72. The position with regard to the landowners falling within the category contemplated by clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 104 would be different because this clause does not stipulate immediate extinguishment of landowners rights. Therefore till the vestment in favour of the tenant takes place by a Gazetted notification, it would be open to him to deal with the property in the manner he likes. Therefore, if such a landowner is found to have transferred his right, title and interest before the vestment contemplated by clause (iii) in favour of the tenant takes place, then that transaction must be treated as valid. Therefore, if such a landowner is found to have transferred his right, title and interest before the vestment contemplated by clause (iii) in favour of the tenant takes place, then that transaction must be treated as valid. 73. It should, however, be noted that transfer in favour of minors, in cases which are covered by clause (iii) of subsection (1) of section 104, would also attract the consideration of section 118 which puts limitations on transfer of agricultural land in favour of non agriculturists. Therefore, if the minor or any other alienee is found to be a non-agriculturist, then transfer in his favour after the commencement of the Act would be governed by the principles of section 118 and would be recognized only to the extent to which the provisions of that section are complied with. 74. It is, therefore, decided that the cases of the minors above referred to shall be scrutinised by the concerned Land Reforms Officer in accordance with the principle stated above and final mutation orders shall be passed accordingly. 75. So far as C. W. P. No. 47 of 1976 is concerned, the petitioner is a widow, and so far as petitioner of C W. P. No. 62 of 1976 is concerned he is a blind man and as such physically incapable of cultivating the land. If they are not the transferees after the commencement of the Act, their cases would fall clearly under sub-sections (8) and (9) of section 104. The Land Reforms Officer shall, therefore, consider their cases on merits and give his decision accordingly. 76. In C. W. P. No. 64 of 1976 the facts are that the original owner was one Babu Ram who has died after the Act came into force. His heirs, therefore, claim that each one of them, who has inherited his property, is entitled to the minimum of 1½ acres of irrigated land or 3 acres of uneirrigated land. On the principles already stated above, if it is found that on the date of the commencement of the Act Babu Ram fell within the category of. His heirs, therefore, claim that each one of them, who has inherited his property, is entitled to the minimum of 1½ acres of irrigated land or 3 acres of uneirrigated land. On the principles already stated above, if it is found that on the date of the commencement of the Act Babu Ram fell within the category of. landowners covered by sub-section (3) of section 104, then the petitioners who are the heirs of Babu Ram would not be entitled to separate allocation of minimum lands contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 104 and the decision with regard to the holding will be taken on the basis that it belongs to Babu Ram. If, however the case of this petitioner falls within the category of landowners contemplated by clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 104, then, in case the inheritance has opened on account of the death of Babu Ram before the date was notified in the Gazette as regards the vesting of rights of the landowner in the tenants, each of the heirs of Babu Ram would be entitled to the minimum land contemplated by sub section (1) of section 104. 77. In view of above, all these writ petition fail in obtaining a declaration that either section 104 or section 118, or any of the Rules 24 to 27 is in any manner void and inoperative. It is stated at the Bar that in many matters, applications for resumption under Rule 21 have been made by land owners. These applications shall be decided by the Land Reforms Officer on merits. The rule granted in this writ petition is discharged without any order as to costs. The ad interim orders passed in all these writ petitions also stand discharged. Petitions dismissed.