Judgment :- 1. The judgment of the learned judge has got to be affirmed, although for different reasons. The writ petition which was allowed by the learned judge was to quash an order of surcharge passed against the writ petitioner, the ex-President of the Birikolam Multipurpose Cooperative Society, a Society governed, at the relevant time, by the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. For having allowed 32 loans to become time-barred certain enquiries were" instituted and proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by notice dated 28-3-1969 under S.49 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 2 51969. The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 came into force on 15 5 1969. Thereafter by Ext, P1 order dated 2511972 the petitioner was informed that he was solely responsible for allowing the loans to become time-barred; that the loans are benami in some cases, and, in others, the petitioners had appropriated the amounts for his own use by not giving receipt and bringing the amount of the loans into accounts of the Society. The Deputy Registrar recorded his conclusion that the total amount of the time-barred loans was Rs. 2729/-which had to be made good by the petitioner. In exercise of the powers under S.68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act he ordered that the sum of Rs. 2058/-(after adjustment of the share capital of Rs. 671/-) be surcharged against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal (Ext. P3) which was dismissed as not maintainable by Ext. P4 order. The writ petition was to quash Exts. P1 and P4 and for other appropriate reliefs. 2. The learned judge quashed the orders on the short ground that the basis of the charge, namely, that the petitioner had allowed the loans to become time-barred, was not sustainable, as the bar of limitation would not be applicable to Tribunals as ruled by this Court in Thilakan v. M. C. V. Co-operative Society (1974 KLT. 657), following the decision of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court Hubli (AIR. 1969 SC. 335). If the bar of limitation was not applicable, the basis of the charge that the petitioner had allowed the loans to become time-barred, could not, it was argued, be sustained. 657), following the decision of the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court Hubli (AIR. 1969 SC. 335). If the bar of limitation was not applicable, the basis of the charge that the petitioner had allowed the loans to become time-barred, could not, it was argued, be sustained. This argument was accepted by the learned judge who held that in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and of this Court, the basis of the charge was unsustainable. Ext. P1 order was accordingly quashed. 3. Writ Appeal No. 12 of 1976 is filed by the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the State of Kerala against the learned judge's judgment; and W. A. No. 19 of 1976 has been filed by the Co-operative society itself. The contention urged in these Writ Appeals is that the learned judge's reasoning and conclusion to hold that the basis of the charge is unsustainable is fallacious. It was argued that the proceedings were initiated under the Madras Act and would be governed by the provisions of the said Statute, and that R.15 of the Rules framed under the said Act is specific on the question of limitation. The said Rule enacts: "XV. (1) The reference to the Registrar of any dispute under S.51 of the Act shall be in writing. (1-A) The period of limitation for referring a dispute touching the business of a registered society to the Registrar under sub-section (1) of S.51 of the Act shall be regulated by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court: Provided that a dispute between (i) the society or its committee, and (ii) any past committee, any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, (shall, where the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of the society or its committee, or any any past committee, any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, be referred to the Registrar) within two years from the date on which the act or omission with reference to which the dispute arose, took place. Provided further that a dispute relating to the election of a member or an officer of the committee of a registered society shall be referred to the Registrar within two months from the date on which the election with reference to which the dispute arose, was held. In view of this express provision under the statutory Rule, it was rightly admitted by Counsel for the writ petitioner that he cannot sustain the ground on which the learned judge had rested his judgment. There is yet another ground why the reasoning of the learned judge cannot be sustained. The learned judge proceeded on the assumption that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is not a Court, but a Tribunal which is unaffected by the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act. But, it has been ruled in Madhaya Rao v. Surya Rao (AIR 1954 Madras 103) and by the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank (AIR. 1967 SC. 1494) that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a Court. And R.15, which we have quoted deems it to be a court. Therefore again, the Limitation Act would be applicable and the reasoning of the learned judge must fail. 4. However, the actual conclusion allowing the writ petition, was, we think, correct. As noticed already, the proceedings were initiated under the Madras Act, and it was only pending the proceedings that the Kerala Act came into force on 15-5-1969. S.110 clause (2) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act reads: "110. Repeal and savings. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932 and the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act, 1951 and without prejudice to the provisions of S.4 and 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (VII of 1125), (i) all appointments, rules and orders made, notifications and notices issued, and suits and other proceedings instituted, under any of the Acts hereby repealed shall, so far as may be, be deemed to have been respectively made, issued and instituted under this Act; The continuance of the proceedings initiated under the earlier Act, under the Kerala Act is directed only subject to the provisions of S.4 and 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act; and also only to the extent to which (so far as may be) they can be deemed to have been made or instituted under the provisions of the new Act. S.4 and 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act give certain vested rights to persons in respect of proceedings instituted under the earlier Act, and provide that they are liable to be continued under the earlier Act. That is one reason why in this case the proceedings are liable to be continued under the Madras Act and cannot be dealt with under the Kerala Act. Further, S.68 of the Kerala Act is the provision for taking surcharge proceedings, (corresponding to S.49 of the Madras Act). But the scope and the content of the Section under the Kerala Act is quite different from that of the Madras Act. Under S.49 of the Madras Act, surcharge proceedings can be taken if any one of three acts of misconduct are found against the persons sought to be surcharged, namely: (1) misappropriation (2) fraudulent retention of money and (3) breach of trust. Under S.68 of the Kerala Act, the range of action appears to be wider. Liability is attracted for payment made contrary to the Act. Rules or bye laws, or causing any deficiency in the assets of the Society by breach of trust or wilful negligence, or for misappropriation or fraudulent retention of money or property belonging to the Society. Wilful negligence and other matters are new grounds of liability under the Kerala Act not known to or at least specifically-recognised by the Madras Act. Therefore, in so far as wilful negligence can be attributed to, or found against the petitioner, the continuance of the proceedings under the Kerala Act would not be consistent with, or warranted by, the provisions of S.110 of the Kerala Act. Especially would it be so, when, as in this case, the charge, or show cause notice did not attribute negligence or wilful negligence, but the order of surcharge proceeded, somewhat indefinitely, on the ground of negligence. We therefore sustain the conclusion of the learned judge quashing Ext. P1, and dismiss this appeal, but in the circumstances without costs.