Judgment :- 1. The petitioner herein was a member of the Police Force under Ex. French Government. He continued to be a constable, after the de jure transfer, under the Union territory of Pondicherry. He was promoted as Head Constable in 1963. While he was serving as a Head Constable in Reddiarpalayam in 1967, he applied for medical leave for six months from 5th August 1967, for taking treatment for leprosy. He again applied for leave for further six months and got the leave sanctioned. He again applied for the extension of leave for further period of six months. Before the expiry of the extended leave for six months, the petitioner got himself involved in a criminal case. He was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magisterial for an offence punishable under S. 147, I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two months. The matter was taken up in appeal, and ultimately in a revision to this court, this court upheld the conviction, but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone the result was that the petitioner has been in jail for six days. 2. After the petitioner was convicted by the Criminal Court, the second respondent passed an order on 2nd January 1969, dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 13th August, 1968. i.e., from the date of his conviction by the First Class Magistrate, pondicherry in Crime No. 17 of 1968. The petitioner took the matter in appeal to the Lt. Governor of Pondicherry praying that he might be compulsorily retired on the ground of physical incapacity or that disciplinary proceedings might be initiated against him on the basis of the Criminal Court Judgment. That appeal was partly allowed and it was ordered that the dismissal from service will operate only from the date of the order of the dismissal and not from the date of the judgment of the Criminal Court. The petitioner has been thereafter making representations to the respondents that the offence with which he has been convicted by the Criminal Court did not involve any moral turpitude, that as such he could only be retired compulsorily under S 59(1) of the Police Standing Orders, Volume 1, and that therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the second respondent cannot be sustained in law. All his representations having been turned down, the petitioner hat approached this court ultimately challenging the order, dated 14th July 1972, of the second respondent as confirmed by the first respondent in his order, dated 27th June 1974. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence, with which the petitioner in this case has been convicted, does not involve moral turpitude, that as such the case of the petitioner should be dealt with only under S. 59(1) of the Police Standing Orders, Volume I, and that if compulsory retirement is ordered as per S. 59(1) the petitioner will be entitled to pension. The petitioners case is that by dismissing the petitioner straightway on the basis of the judgment of the Criminal Court, without taking any disciplinary action he has been deprived of his pension, as he had put in the qualified years of service and this results in a double punishment. The petitioners alternative case is that even if compulsory retirement cannot be ordered straightway disciplinary proceedings under S. 73 of the order, could have been initiated by framing a charge basing on the conviction of the Criminal Court. 4. Since the Order impugned in the writ petition is the order of the second respondent holding that the petitioner is not entitled to pension, the validity of the order of dismissal from service does not arise. 5. The only question, the court has to consider now is, whether the petitioner is entitled to claim pension. According to the petitioner, since he has already been in the qualifying years of service, he is entitled to pension, notwithstanding the fact that his services have been terminated on the basis of the Criminal Court conviction. 6. In the counter affidavit, the respondents have stated that since the petitioner was a member of the ex-French Government, he was governed by ex-French Rules with regard to payment of pension conditions, that as a member of Police force, his service conditions were regulated by the provisions of Arrete of Public Force, d. 12th August 1943, as amended from time to time and that under the said Arrete the petitioner was not entitled to claim pension. It is said that though the petitioner is entitled to pension under Article If of the Arrete as amended on 28th February 1952, as he has put in 15 years of service, the said Arrete is subject to Art. 30 of the Arrete which is as follows— “S. 30: The Local P.Cs. of Public Forces in India can leave their service once and for all either (1) by submitting an application for retirement in the conditions laid down under S. 11 above; (2) by voluntary termination of their contract; (3) by compulsory retirement; (4) by compulsory termination of their contract”. The termination of service by the last two methods may be ordered either for physical unfitness certified by the Medical Board or on disciplinary grounds for habitual misconduct or serious fault in the service or offence against honour. Compulsory retirement and compulsory termination of the contract shall be ordered by the Governor on the proposal of the commandant of Public Forces and the date on which the individual should have his service shall also be fixed by him. When it is ordered for physical unfitness, compulsory termination can give right to pension if the following conditions are fulfilled, simultaneously— 1) physical unfitness due to the discharge of duty. (2) Recommendation of the Medical Board. (3) Like decision of the Governor. When compulsory termination of the contract is ordered on disciplinary grounds, the individual will not be entitled to any allowance. The P.C., struck off from the rolls on disciplinary grounds will not be eligible for re-enlistment later on either in the sepay company or in the Police force. The counter affidavit further proceeds on the basis that if a member has put in qualifying years of service, he will be entitled to passion even though his services were terminated, but that if a member is dismissed from service on disciplinary grounds, then he will not be entitled to pension. 7. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner who has put in qualifying years of service, has become disentitled to the pension as a result of Art. 30. In my view, where a Government servant is dismissed from service, or there is termination of service as a result of disciplinary proceedings based on misconduct, he will not be entitled to pension. Therefore, the next question is whether, in this case, the petitioner has been dismissed on disciplinary grounds. In my view, where a Government servant is dismissed from service, or there is termination of service as a result of disciplinary proceedings based on misconduct, he will not be entitled to pension. Therefore, the next question is whether, in this case, the petitioner has been dismissed on disciplinary grounds. Admittedly, no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioners grievance was that no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against him. There was no complaint or charge of any irregularity or misconduct on the part of the petitioner. No disciplinary proceedings were taken against the petitioner for any charge of misconduct and misdeameanour. The petitioners services have been terminated only on the basis of conviction by the Criminal Court. The conviction by the Criminal Court cannot be said to be a punishment on disciplinary grounds, so as to attract Art. 30. Where a member of police service is dismissed from service on the basis of a judgment of the Criminal Court without any further disciplinary proceedings, it cannot be said that he has been dismissed from service on disciplinary grounds. Normally, the word ‘disciplinary grounds’ will refer only to the disciplinary action taken by the authorities against the member of the police force with reference to the performance of his duties or his conduct while on duty. Termination of a contract based on Criminal Courts conviction for an offence not involving his conduct as a Policeman is not a termination of service on disciplinary grounds. Hence Art. 30 cannot have any application in this case. If Art. 30 does not stand in the way, as the petitioner has put in the qualifying years of service, namely 15 years, he will be entitled to claim pension. It is not disputed that the petitioner in this case has put in 15 years of service. In the counter affidavit except saying that Art. 20 prevents the petitioner from drawing the pension, no other statutory provision disabling the petitioner from claiming pension has been pointed out. The petitioners claim has, therefore, to be allowed. The writ petition is therefore, allowed. There will be an order as to costs.