JUDGMENT Subramonian Poti, J. 1. Ext. P-8 order of the appellate authority under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960 is challenged in this petition by the petitioners who are officials of the Corporation Bank Ltd. which has its head office at Mangalore. They were the respondents in Shop Appeal No. 22 of 1972 before the appellate authority who passed Ext. P-8 order. The appeal before the appellate authority was filed by the 1st respondent who was a probationer appointed by the Corporation Bank. He was selected earlier for apprenticeship to learn work in the Bank. This was by an order dated 21st August 1971. Ext. P-1 is a copy of that order. He was to be an apprentice for three months at the end of which his case was to be considered for appointment as a clerk and that, initially on probation. Later, by order dated 19th November 1971, copy of which is Ext. P-2 the 1st respondent was appointed as a probationary clerk subject to the Service Regulations of the Bank. According to the petitioners here his service during probation was not satisfactory and further he failed to secure a pass in the test which he was obliged to pass. It is said that since he failed to pass the test during the period of probation and since his work was not satisfactory, he was relieved from the service of the Bank by order dated 13th May 1972. Ext. P-3 is the copy of that order. Pursuant to Ext. P-3 he was relieved on 15th May 1972. It is against that order Ext. P-3 that the 1st respondent filed the appeal before the appellate authority. Ext. P-4 is the copy of the application filed before the appellate authority. To that the petitioners herein objected by Ext. P-5 written statement. It was contended by the petitioners herein as respondents in the appeal that the service of the appellant was dispensed with for reasonable cause, that his service was not satisfactory and that he had not passed the test. Ext. P-7 is produced by the petitioners herein as the relevant extract of the Service Regulations and it is so produced to show that passing of the test was one of the requirements for satisfactory completion of probation. In Ext. Ext. P-7 is produced by the petitioners herein as the relevant extract of the Service Regulations and it is so produced to show that passing of the test was one of the requirements for satisfactory completion of probation. In Ext. P-8 order passed by the appellate authority it was found that no domestic enquiry was held before finding that the 1st respondent's service was unsatisfactory and no attempt was made to prove that fact before the appellate authority. For that reason it was found that the termination order had to be vacated and the 1st respondent reinstated with the benefit of back wages. In regard to the relief of reinstatement taking into account the fact that the 1st respondent had been employed only for about 8 months prior to termination, option was given to pay three months salary in lieu of reinstatement. 2. This case has come up before the Division Bench since one of us referred the case as one raising an important question concerning the application of S.18(1) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960. S.18(1) enables termination of services of an employee employed continuously for a period of not less than six months for reasonable cause on giving notice of at least a month or wages in lieu of such notice. But such notice shall not be necessary where the termination is on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose. Sub-s.(2) of S.18 is relevant for the purpose of this case and therefore we quote it here: "18(2) Any employee whose services are dispensed with may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer." That sub-section indicates that one of the grounds of appeal which could be validly urged by an appellant is that there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services. That would necessarily mean that if the appellate authority is called upon to adjudicate on that ground, it has to find whether there was reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of the appellant. That would necessarily mean that if the appellate authority is called upon to adjudicate on that ground, it has to find whether there was reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of the appellant. It is also open to the appellant to plead and prove that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer. But that plea would be available only in case where the termination is on account of misconduct. Where the termination is for a reasonable cause other than misconduct of the employee, it is only the former ground mentioned in sub-s.(2) that would be available namely, there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his service and in that event there would be no question of going into any charge of misconduct on the part of the employee. 3. In a case where a probationer whose service is liable to be terminated if it is found unsatisfactory is discharged from service on the basis that it is so found it is not a termination on account of any misconduct on the part of the employee. Therefore, in such a case there is no need to hold an enquiry. A probationer holds his office on trial, and it is one of the conditions of his probation that his confirmation depends on his completing satisfactory service during the period of probation. His work and conduct are liable to be watched during the period and it is the assessment of such work and conduct that ultimately determines the question of confirmation. Therefore, if a decision is taken to terminate his service because his service is not satisfactory to the appointing authority, there need be no enquiry to prove that fact. This position is well established to call for any discussion. Reference need be made only to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. T. C. Pillai v. Indian Institute of Technology, Guindy ( 1971 (1) LLJ 530 ) and B. L. Gupta v. State, of Haryana ( 1978 (1) LLJ 316 ). 4. The appellate authority which passed Ext. P-8 order after narrating the evidence of the witness in the case, observes: "In the written statement the respondent has no case that the conduct of the appellant was not good or unsatisfactory." This is clearly erroneous. 4. The appellate authority which passed Ext. P-8 order after narrating the evidence of the witness in the case, observes: "In the written statement the respondent has no case that the conduct of the appellant was not good or unsatisfactory." This is clearly erroneous. The contention taken in the written statement in very specific and categoric terms was that the conduct of the appellant was not satisfactory and that he failed to come out successful in the departmental test held by the Bank. In Para.12 of the same written statement this was reiterated and it was mentioned that this would be a reasonable cause within the meaning of S.18 of the Act. Hence it was wrong to say that the employer had no case that the conduct of the appellant was not satisfactory. The Tribunal further observes: "I am of the view that not only the misconduct of the appellant but the nature of his unsatisfactory work also should have been proved in a domestic enquiry or before this appellate authority. This the Respondent has not done." This is the basis for the ultimate directions made in the appellate order. 5. The view expressed by the appellate authority that the fact of the unsatisfactory nature of the work should have been found in a domestic enquiry is palpably erroneous. As indicated it goes against the well settled rule. As regards the observation, of the appellate authority that the unsatisfactory nature of the work must be proved before such authority, it is not evident what exactly is meant by the authority concerned. Whether it should be shown that what is pleaded is a reasonable cause or whether it should be established by the evidence independently before the appellate authority that there is a reasonable cause or whether the appellate authority must have materials before it to show that the employer had materials to reach the decision that there was a reasonable cause is not a matter which is clear from the order of the appellate authority. In tact there was material. As reasonable cause it was pleaded specifically in the written statement that the 1st respondent who had to pass a test under the Service Regulations did not pass such test and the failure to pass such test was a reasonable cause for terminating probation. In tact there was material. As reasonable cause it was pleaded specifically in the written statement that the 1st respondent who had to pass a test under the Service Regulations did not pass such test and the failure to pass such test was a reasonable cause for terminating probation. In support of the plea the fact that the 1st respondent failed in the test was also sought to be proved. The answer papers were produced as Exts. R-1 and R-2 before the appellate authority. It is one thing to say that this material was insufficient but another not to advert to it at all. There is no reference in the appellate order to the plea that the 1st respondent was bound to pass the test and inasmuch as he has failed to do so there was reasonable cause for terminating the service. It cannot be said that this is not a fact which was not attempted to be proved. It was. Neither the pleading nor the evidence is adverted to in the appellate order. Therefore, it cannot be said that question of reasonable cause has been considered by the appellate authority in the manner it should have been. 6. Normally, this Court would not interfere with an order of an appellate authority, merely because the order could have been framed in a better manner or more lucid reasons could have been given. We do realise that it is not always men well trained in law that man Tribunals like the appellate authority. But where the authority has failed to get to grips with the problem which it has to handle and has failed to pose to itself the question which calls for decision interference is necessarily called for. In this context we may also observe that there is an indication in the appeal memorandum filed by the 1st respondent that the termination was prior to the expiry of the term of probation. It has been well settled that termination prior to the period of probation would not be proper. Evidently that is because it is an assessment made at the end of the term or period of probation that would justify the decision either to confirm or to terminate. Of course parties can provide otherwise in the agreement. It has been well settled that termination prior to the period of probation would not be proper. Evidently that is because it is an assessment made at the end of the term or period of probation that would justify the decision either to confirm or to terminate. Of course parties can provide otherwise in the agreement. The Supreme Court said in Express Newspapers v. Labour Court, Madras ( 1964 (1) LLJ 9 ), at 11 thus: "It appears clear to us that without anything more an appointment on probation for six months gives the employer no right to terminate the service of an employee before six months had expired except on the ground of misconduct or other sufficient reasons in which case even the services of a permanent employee could be terminated." The words "without anything more" certainly advances the argument that the parties can contract for an assessment to be made even before the expiry of the period and to terminate on the basis of such assessment. But, we need not consider that here for, though the question of propriety of termination before the expiry of the term is indicated in the appeal memorandum that is not dealt with in the appellate order. We are indicating this only to show that if this is properly urged before the appellate authority when the matter goes back that also is a matter which could be considered. The result is that Ext. P-8 order is vacated. The appellate authority is directed to go into the matter afresh and decide whether there was reasonable cause for terminating the probation of the 1st respondent. In doing so, the appellate authority will be well advised to notice what has been said in this judgment in regard to this matter. The parties will suffer their costs.