M. K. SHAH, P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE deceased was a medical practitioner holding B. A. M. S. and L. M. P. degrees. Since September 1968 he had established private practice at Pethapur. At the time of his death he was aged about 32. The first respondent widow of the deceased was at the material time about 27 years of age. The second respondent daughter of the deceased was at the material time aged about 3 years. The third respondent father of the deceased was at that material time aged about 63 years. ( 3 ) IT might be stated that the claim petition was originally filed only; by the first and second respondents. The third respondent was originally joined as the fourth opponent. Subsequently however the Tribunal permitted the transposition of the third respondent as applicant No. 3 at the request of the said respondent. So far as the claim put forward by the first and second respondents in their claim petition is concerned the total amount claimed as and by way of compensation was Rs. 3 0 C00. 00. The said claim was split up under different heads as per the particulars mentioned hereinbelow:rs. 1,32,000 Pecuniary loss caused to the first respondent. 25,000 Pecuniary loss caused to the second respondent. 10,000 Mental shock and suffering caused to the first respondent. 5,000 Mental shock and suffering caused to the second respondent. 10,000 Marriage expenses of the second respondent. 30,000 Pecuniary loss caused to the child in the womb of the first respondent at the time of the accident. 5,000 Mental shock and pain and suffering caused to the deceased. 1,000 Medical expenses90,000 Lost to the estate1,500 Damage to the Motor-bike3,09,500although on the aforesaid basis the first and second respondents were entitled to claim the sum of Rs. 39,500 as compensation they restricted their claim to Rs. 300 ( 4 ) THE third respondent who as earlier stated was originally cited as opponent No. 4 fixed his written Statement which is at Ex. 35 In the written Statement it was his case that the deceased was paying him Rs. 300. 00 per month towards his maintenance. On that basis the third respondent claimed onethird share in the sum of Rs. 35 In the written Statement it was his case that the deceased was paying him Rs. 300. 00 per month towards his maintenance. On that basis the third respondent claimed onethird share in the sum of Rs. 1320 claimed by the first respondent as pecuniary loss caused to her by the death of the deceased The third respondent further claimed one half share in the sum of Rs. 100 claimed by the first respondent on account of mental shock and pain caused to her as a result of the death of the deceased. The third respondent similarly claimed one third share in the claim made by the first and second respondents under the head of loss to the estate. On the aforesaid basis the third respondent claimed to be entitled to a sum of Rs. 800 out of the total claim of Rs. 300 made by the first and second respondents. ( 5 ) AN analysis of the award made as aforesaid in a tabular form yields the following result: First and second Third Respondents respondent Rs. Rs. 1,26,000/- Dependency benefit 5,000/- Mental shock and suffering 5,000/- mental shock & suffering caused to the first respondent. 10,000/- Loss to estate. 5,000/- Pain and suffering to the deceased. 15,000/- Medical expenses 800/- Damage to the Motor-bike. 20,000/- Loss to the estate. 1,57,300/- out of the amount of Rs. 1,57,300 awarded as above the sum of Rs. 5000 was exclusively awarded to the first respondent and therefore the amount jointly awarded to the first and second respondents came to Rs. 1 52 300 The Tribunal apportioned the said amount between the first and second respondents in the proportion of two units for the first respondent and one unit for the second respondent. Accordingly. it awarded out of the sum of Rs. 1,52,300 he amount of Rs. 1,6,534 to the first respondent and Rs 50,766 to the second respondent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) THAT takes us to the question of compensation. As earlier stated different amounts have been awarded to the first and second respondents on the one hand and to the third respondent on the other. We will first take up for consideration the appeal in so far as it is directed against the amount awarded to the third respondent. As earlier stated different amounts have been awarded to the first and second respondents on the one hand and to the third respondent on the other. We will first take up for consideration the appeal in so far as it is directed against the amount awarded to the third respondent. ( 7 ) THE first part of the award in favour of the third respondent consists of the amount of Rs. 10 0 which is awarded to the said respondent out of Rs. 30 0 which the Tribunal found to be the estimated loss to the estate on account of the premature death of the deceased. So far as the amount awarded as aforesaid is concerned for the reasons which follow we are of the view that the award is wholly unsustainable. ( 8 ) AS would be apparent from the narration of facts given above the Tribunal was in error in separately computing the sum of Rs. 30 0 as loss to the estate. The Tribunal found that though the actual income of the deceased at the time of his death amounted to about Rs. 9000. 00 per annum taking into consideration the possibility of increase in the income in future as also the possibility of some reverses which a professional man might encounter during his professional career the average income of the deceased was required to be computed at Rs. 1000. 00 per month. Out of the income of Rs. 12 0 per annum arrived at as afore said the Tribunal deducted a sum of Rs. 3600. 00 as the sum which the deceased would have spent on himself. The Tribunal on the basis of this reasoning computed the average annual economic utility of the deceased to the respondents. 8400/- per annum and 15 years multiplier was applied to the said datum figure in order to arrive at the just and fair compensation awardable to the respondents. 00 as the sum which the deceased would have spent on himself. The Tribunal on the basis of this reasoning computed the average annual economic utility of the deceased to the respondents. 8400/- per annum and 15 years multiplier was applied to the said datum figure in order to arrive at the just and fair compensation awardable to the respondents. It would thus appear that the Tribunal took the entire balance of the estimated income of the deceased (minus that which he would have spent on himself) as the datum figure for the purpose of arriving at just compensation on application of the proper multiplier It is difficult to appreciate under these circumstances as to how the Tribunal held that the deceased could still have laid aside something out of his income and that something was the loss to the estate on account of his premature death. The possibility of the deceased having laid aside something by way of Saving could have been contemplated only if it was found by the Tribunal that even after spending for himself and for the maintenance of his dependents there was left some surplus out of the income of the deceased which would have gone into his savings. On the reasoning of the Tribunal however the entire estimated balance income of the deceased (minus that which he spent on himself) was taken to have been spent on the family and it is on that basis that after application of 15 years multiplier compensation was determined as payable to the first and second respondents. In such a case in our opinion there is no scope for awarding any amount by way of compensation for loss to the estate under the head of savings. In the next place any compensation on account of loss to the estate which is awardable under section 2 of the Fatal Accident Act 1855 is in respect of the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the accident. Damages for the loss caused to the estate are to he claimed on behalf of the estate and when recovered form part of the assets of the estate. The claim for such compensation could only be made by those who would succeed to the estate or on their behalf. It could not be made by someone who has no legal right to succeed to the estate. The claim for such compensation could only be made by those who would succeed to the estate or on their behalf. It could not be made by someone who has no legal right to succeed to the estate. In the present case the deceased left behind him his wife and a minor daughter. At the time of his death his wife also carried a child in the womb. It is nobodys case that the deceased had left behind him any will. The parties are Hindus and they are governed by the Hindu Succession Act 1956 Under sec. 8 of the said Act the property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves according to the provisions made in Chapter II and accordingly the property devolves firstly upon the heirs being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule. When one turns to the Schedule one finds that daughter and widow are amongst the heirs of Class. I where is father is an heir of Class II. Under the scheme of sec. 8 an heir belonging to Class II would succeed only if there are no heirs in Class I. Therefore the third respondent could not have laid any claim to the estate of the deceased so long as the first had second respondents are there. It appears to us clear therefore that in any compensation awarded may the Tribunal on account of the loss to the estate of the deceased the third respondent could not possibly have laid any claim and no amount out of such compensation even in awardable could have been directed to be paid over to the third respondent. On both these grounds therefore we are of the view that the Tribunal erred in awarding the sum of Rs. 10 0 to the third respondent as and by way of compensation for the loss to the estate. The appeal must therefore succeed to this extent. ( 9 ) THEN comes the award in the sum of Rs. 5000. 00 made in favour of the third respondent under the head of mental shock and suffering on account of the accidental death of the deceased. This award also in our opinion is wholly unsustainable. There is no dispute that compensation under this head is claimed de hors sec. 1-A and sec. 5000. 00 made in favour of the third respondent under the head of mental shock and suffering on account of the accidental death of the deceased. This award also in our opinion is wholly unsustainable. There is no dispute that compensation under this head is claimed de hors sec. 1-A and sec. 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1855 and that the liability if any to pay this compensation is based on the principles of common law regarding the tort of negligence. The law in regard to damages for mental shock and suffering shows beyond doubt however that the claim herein advanced on behalf of the third respondent under this head cannot possibly be sustained. ( 10 ) THE law at one time was that there could not be damages for nervous shock. However this view has been abandoned since long. For the last several years it is well settled that damages can be given for nervous shock caused by the sight of an accident at any rate to a close relative. (See Hinz v. Berry (1970) All England Law Reports 1074 at p. 1075 The fundamental principles underlying the award of damages in respect of the tort of negligence must however govern an action for compensation for mental or nervous shock. The first of such principles is that such damage must be attributable to the breach by the defendant of some duty owing to the plaintiff; damnum sine injuria (See Hay (or Bour hill) v. Young 1943 Appeal Cases 92 at Page 106 per Lord Wright ). In case of negligence the duty is to take reasonable care against harm which a reasonable man would foresee as likely. Therefore there is no liability for damage which was not of a foreseeable type within the scope of the duty of care. Foreseeability is now the sole test of whether damages are recoverable in negligence (See Halsburys Laws of England Fourth Edition Vol. XII Para 1138 ). It is obvious therefore that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock (see observations of Denning L J. in King v. Phillips (1953) I. Q. B. 429 at page 441 cited with approval by Viscount Simonds in Overseas Tankship (U. K.) v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. (1961) A. C 388 at 425-426 ). It is obvious therefore that the test of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock (see observations of Denning L J. in King v. Phillips (1953) I. Q. B. 429 at page 441 cited with approval by Viscount Simonds in Overseas Tankship (U. K.) v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. (1961) A. C 388 at 425-426 ). The second principle is that no damages are awardable for grief or sorrow caused by death of a close relative because in any even such death would have caused much sorrow and mourning. The Court must draw a line between mental anguish and suffering for which damages are not recoverable and nervous shock that is to say any recognizable psychiatric illness which manifests itself on account of one having witnessed the accident for which damages are recoverable. In other words to claim damages on account of mental shock and suffering there must be positive evidence showing that there is something more than mere sorrow or grief or mourning and that that additional or extra element has taken the form of any recognizable psychiatric illness which is attributable and really wholly attributable to the misfortune of having actually witnessed the accident (See Hing v. Berry (supra) ). ( 11 ) LET us now proceed to examine in the light of the aforesaid principles whether the claim for damages advanced on behalf of the third respondent on the ground of his having suffered mental shock and suffering on account of the death of his son is well founded. Taking up first the question whether there was breach of duty if any on the part of the driver it is well to remember that the duty consisted of driving the vehicle with such reasonable care as would avoid the risk of injury (including injury by shock although no direct impact occurred) to such persons as he could reasonably foresee might be injured by his failure to exercise that care. the third respondent was not within the area of potential danger arising as a result of the drivers negligence if any since the said respondent was not present at the site of the incident. The driver therefore owed no duty to him and he was not guilty of negligence in relation to him. the third respondent was not within the area of potential danger arising as a result of the drivers negligence if any since the said respondent was not present at the site of the incident. The driver therefore owed no duty to him and he was not guilty of negligence in relation to him. In Bourhills case (supra) the House of Lords on the basis of this reasoning declined to award damages to a fish-wife who was standing about 45 feet away from the point of impact and who had heard the noise but not seen the accident although it was proved that she had suffered fright resulting in severe nervous shock which disabled her from carrying on her trade for some time and gave birth about a month later to a child which was stillborn owing to the mental injury sustained by her. Similarly in Kings case (supra) the mother of a child who had suffered trembling fits and who was under treatment for a period of nearly three months on account of her having heard the scream of the child and seen taxicab backing on to the tricycle which he was riding from an upstairs window in a house situate at a distance of about 70 or 80 yards away from the site of the accident was denied damages on the ground that the taxi driver could not reasonably have contemplated that if he backed his taxicab without looking where he was going he might cause to the mother the injury complained of. Both these cases therefore support the view which we are inclined to take herein namely that the driver owed no duty to the third respondent who was far away from the scene of the accident and that he was not guilty of negligence in relation to him. The matter however does not rest merely at this. Damages cannot be awarded to the third respondent under this head also for the reason that there is no positive evidence showing that the said respondent has suffered something more than mere sorrow or gift or mourning that is to say some recognizable psychiatric illness which again has resulted from his having witnessed the accident. Damages cannot be awarded to the third respondent under this head also for the reason that there is no positive evidence showing that the said respondent has suffered something more than mere sorrow or gift or mourning that is to say some recognizable psychiatric illness which again has resulted from his having witnessed the accident. It would thus appear than both the principles referred to earlier and governing award of damages in cases of tort of negligence and particularly in eases of mental or nervous shock and suffering rule out any compen sation being awarded to the third respondent under this head. In our opinion therefore the award in the sum of Rs. 5 0 made in favour of the third respondent under the head of mental shock and suffering is wholly unsustainable. The appeal in so far as it is directed against that part of the award must also therefore succeed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 12 ) THE result of this discussion is that the appeal will fully succeed in so far as it concerns the award made in favour of the third respondent. We will give suitable directions in this behalf in the final part of our judgment. 25 That leaves in field the appeal against the award made in favour of the first and second respondents and the cross objections filed on their behalf. Before proceeding to deal with the appeal as well as the cross objections on merits we would like to make it clear that before us now there are only two claimants left and the principal claim for compensation on their behalf has to be considered under sec. 1a and sec. 2 of the Fatal Accident Act 1855 The claim for compensation under sec. 1 arises out of the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons mentioned therein on account of the death of the deceased. The claim for compensation under sec. 2 arises out of the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the accident. As held in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R. M. K. Veluswami A. I. R. 1962 S. C. I. the rights of action under sec. 1 (equivalent section now being sec. 1-A) and sec. 2 of the Act are quite distinct and independent. 2 arises out of the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the accident. As held in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R. M. K. Veluswami A. I. R. 1962 S. C. I. the rights of action under sec. 1 (equivalent section now being sec. 1-A) and sec. 2 of the Act are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the sections is the same he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In other words in awarding damages under both the heads there shall not be duplication of the same claim that is if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under sec. I-A of the Act that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under sec. 2 and vice versa. As observed in M/s Hirji Virji Transport v. Basiranbibi 12 G. L. R. 783 the claims under the two heads might be different because under the first head the loss assessed is to the dependents while under the second head the loss assessed is loss to the estate. But in a case where there is no dispute that the sums claimed are to be awarded only to the same claimants for the entire loss the loss to the dependents as well as the loss to the estatethe entire claim can be jointly considered and there is no need for any separate calculation. In the present case once the third respondent is out of the picture only the first and second respondents will stand entitled to claim compensation under both the distinct heads covered by section 1-A and section 2 and therefore it would be proper to consider the claims under both the heads jointly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 ) WE have stated earlier that even the Tribunal has proceeded on the footing that the net income of the deceased was Rs. 12000. 00per annum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 ) WE have stated earlier that even the Tribunal has proceeded on the footing that the net income of the deceased was Rs. 12000. 00per annum. What has been overlooked however is that the deceased who was a professional man of young age had many years to go and that having regard to the actual progress made by him even within the short span of two years namely 1970 and 1971 his income would have progressively increased in course of time. Having regard to the longevity in his family and the good health enjoyed by him the deceased could be reasonably expected to be in active practice till he attained the age of about 65 to 70 He had therefore a long career of about 32 to 38 years ahead of him and it would be unrealistic to assume that his income would have continued to be static at the same figure of Rs. 1000. 00 per month. Such an approach would mean closing eyes to the obvious. At the same time certain other factors such as decline in income on account of competition and the professional career coming to an end suddenly on account of various factors not within human control cannot also be over cooled. Having regard to all these circumstance in our opinion for the purpose of assessment of damages under see. IA and sec. 2 it would be taken able to proceed on the basis that for the remainder of his life the average monthly income of the deceased would have been Rs. 1250. 00 that is to say Rs. 15 0 annum. The datum figure which we have arrived at as above takes care of all relevant factors which have to be borne in mind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 14 ) THE deceased accordingly would have had a net amount of Rs. 10 0 available with him per year out of which he would have been required to spend on the maintenance of his family and to lay aside certain amount for the rainy days. It is on the basis of this datum figure of Rs. . . ( 14 ) THE deceased accordingly would have had a net amount of Rs. 10 0 available with him per year out of which he would have been required to spend on the maintenance of his family and to lay aside certain amount for the rainy days. It is on the basis of this datum figure of Rs. 10 60 that we must work out the compensation under both the heads covered by secs. 1-A and 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 15 ) THE Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 15. An attempt was male before us on behalf of the first and second respondents to raise the multiplier from 15 to 18 or 20. We do not think that this is a file and proper case in which we should differ from the Tribunal and raise the multiplier from 15 to any higher figure. In C. K Subramania Iyer v. T. K Nair A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 376 the Supreme Court has cited with approval the passage from Winfield on Torts 7 Edition at pp. 135 and 136 to illustrate as to how in England damages are calculated where the system of basic figure being capitalized by certain number of years purchase is adopted. In the extracted passage it is pointed out that the number of years purchase is left fluid and from 12 to 15 has been quite a common multiple in the case of a healthy man and the number should not be materially reduced by reason of the hazardous nature of the occupation of the deceased man. The principle of course Bill apply where the deceased was a bread winner of the family. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. s case (supra) the deceased was aged 34 at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court maintained the award on the basis that it represented capitalization at 8 years purchase. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1750 one of the deceased was 30 years old. In the said case it was found that since the basic fugure of annual dependency was multiplied by the multiple of 15 the estimate of dama ges was based on correct principles. In M/s Sheikhupura Transport Co. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 1750 one of the deceased was 30 years old. In the said case it was found that since the basic fugure of annual dependency was multiplied by the multiple of 15 the estimate of dama ges was based on correct principles. In M/s Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co Ltd. A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1624 the deceased was aged about 42 and in that case the multiplier of 15 was approved. In Hirji Virjis case (supra this Court in terms referred to some of the above decisions and held that when this common multiplier was accepted in the English decisions as varying normally from 12 to 15 the said factor clearly took into account the element of annuity. That is why the Supreme Court adopted the purchase factor of 15 years in the case of persons who were in thirties and forties. It was pointed out that than was the factor which led the court to apply the outer multiple of 15 bears purchase in that case where the deceased was aged 45. In British India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khagesh Jani 1977 Accidents Claims Journal 416 where the deceased was aged about 29 the multiple of 15 was applied. In Smt. Chandrakanta v. Pravin Mangaldas A. I. R. 1975 Gujarat 142 the multiple of 10 was adopted in a case where the deceased was 42 years old. In first Appeal No 435 of 1970 decided on July 5-6 1972 this Court observed that the Supreme Court had not laid down that the common multiplier cannot exceed 15 in any case. It was possible to collusive of a case where it would be necessary to apply a multiplier of above 15. However even in that case where the deceased was aged about 35 15 was found to be the correct multiplier. ( 16 ) IT would appear from these illustrative cases that the trend has been to capitalize the loss of dependency benefit at 1t years purchase on the order side in the case of persons in thirties and forties when they were the breadwinners of the family. ( 16 ) IT would appear from these illustrative cases that the trend has been to capitalize the loss of dependency benefit at 1t years purchase on the order side in the case of persons in thirties and forties when they were the breadwinners of the family. These decisions must be held as providing the guide line for the determination of the correct multiple in similar cases ( 17 ) IT was urged on behalf of the first and second respondents bow. ever that in some of the later decisions of the Supreme Court a higher multiple has been applied or approved. In Smt. Hardeep Kaur v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1995 an award in which datum figure was capitalized at 20 years purchase when the deceased was about 25 years of age was upheld. Similarly in M. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. Sudhakar A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1189 it was found that the Tribunals award which was arrived at by applying 20 years purchase factor in the case of a deceased who was 23 years old was not too low. It is true that in these two cases a higher multiple has been approved. It may therefore be right to say that no uniform or absolute rule can be laid down and multiplier in each case has to be selected bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the case. However it cannot be gainsaid that by and large the multiplier of 15 has been adopted in cases where the deceased was in the range of thirties and forties. In these later decisions the Supreme Court has not departed from and disapproved its earlier view as expressed in C. K. S Iyers case (supra) that 12 to 15 has been quite a common multiple in the case of a healthy man who was the bread winner. In our opinion therefore having regard to all the circumstances of the case if the Tribunal has adopted the multiplier of 15 we see no reason to disapprove the same. Even by application of the said multiplier we are satisfied that what has been awarded is just compensation. ( 18 ) BY applying the multiplier of 15 to the datum figure of Rs. 10 0 we arrive at a total compensation of Rs. 1 50 0 under both the heads namely sec. 1-4 and sec. Even by application of the said multiplier we are satisfied that what has been awarded is just compensation. ( 18 ) BY applying the multiplier of 15 to the datum figure of Rs. 10 0 we arrive at a total compensation of Rs. 1 50 0 under both the heads namely sec. 1-4 and sec. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 19 ) THEN comes the award of the Tribunal under the head of loss to the estate. As earlier pointed out the Tribunal estimated the loss to the estate at Rs. 30 0 and apportioned the said amount between the first and second respondents on one hand and the third respondent on the other in the proportion of P. s. 20 0 and Rs. 10 0 respectively. While dealing with this part of the award in favour of the third respondent we have pointed out that the Tribunal was in error in separately computing loss to the estate at Rs. 30 0 That apart in the method that we have adopted following Hirji Virji Transports case we have made a global estimate of the loss to the dependents as well as the loss to the estate. Having regard to the adoption of the said method no separate award can possibly be made for the loss to the estate. Under these circurmstances in our opinion the separate award made for loss to the estate will have to be set aside. We would however have to take into account even on the basis which we have adopted the compensation which becomes awardable to the estate on account of the loss of expectation of life which has been cut short so cruelly. The conventional amount of Rs. 3000 as pointed out in Hirjis case (supra) will have to be awarded under the said head. ( 20 ) THE Tribunal has furthermore awarded a sum of Rs. 5t)00. 00 as compensation due to pain and suffering caused to the deceased. The deceased as earlier pointed out survived for about two days after he met with the accident. He had suffered multiple injuries. Under these circumstances if the Tribunal has estimated compensation under this head at Rs. 5000. 00 we see no reason to interfere with it. . 5t)00. 00 as compensation due to pain and suffering caused to the deceased. The deceased as earlier pointed out survived for about two days after he met with the accident. He had suffered multiple injuries. Under these circumstances if the Tribunal has estimated compensation under this head at Rs. 5000. 00 we see no reason to interfere with it. . ( 21 ) THE result therefore is that though the amount of Rs. 20 0 awarded by the Tribunal to the first and second respondents under the head of loss to the estate on the reasoning adopted by it cannot be sustained an amount of Rs. 80q0. 00 (Rs. 3000/- plus Rs. 5000. 00) will become award- able under sec. 2 to the first and second respondents. ( 22 ) THE Tribunal in the last place awarded to the first respondent a sum of Rs. 5000. 00 for her mental shock and suffering on account of the death of the deceased which she had the misfortune to witness. We have discussed the principles in regard to award of compensation for such shock and suffering while dealing with the case of the third respondent. Of course the case of the first respondent stands on a different footing than that of the third respondent inasmuch as she has not only witnessed the accident but was herself so placed that she could as well have suffered physical injury had she not left the pillion and gone forward to warn the driver of the truck in question white he was taking it in the reverse gear. Under these circumstances it must be held that the driver owed a duty towards her and he was negligent in not taking proper care and caution qua her. The first test is therefore satisfied. The difficulty however arises on account of the fact that no specific evidence has been led to show that the first respondent had suffered such mental shock which resulted in any manifest ailment on account of her having witnessed the accident. From the principles to which we have referred earlier it is apparent that unless such specific evidence is led no claim for compensation can be entertained under this head. Mere pain suffering mourning or emotional upset arising out of the death of the dear or near one does not qualify for compensation under this had. From the principles to which we have referred earlier it is apparent that unless such specific evidence is led no claim for compensation can be entertained under this head. Mere pain suffering mourning or emotional upset arising out of the death of the dear or near one does not qualify for compensation under this had. What is required is some kind of psychiatric illness resulting from the shock suffered on account of having witnessed an accident. In the absence of such evidence in the present case we are satisfied that the claim for compensation under this head was not justified and that no amount could have been awarded to the first respondent under the said head. Therefore the award of Rs. 5000. 00 made in her favour will have to be set aside. ( 23 ) THE foregoing discussion results into the following compensation being awarded to the first and second respondents :rs. 1,50,000/- under secs. 1-A and 2 jointly. Rs. 5,000/- under sec. 2 for pain and suffering to the deceased. Rs. 3,000/- conventional amount under sec. 2. Rs. 1,000/- medical expenses. Rs. 800/- damage to the motor-bike. Rs. 1,59,800-We will round up the compensation awardable as aforesaid to the figure of Rs 1 60 0 as against the joint award of Rs. 1 52 30 in favour of the first and second respondents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 24 ) WE find that the Tribunal his apportioned the amount of compensation of Rs. 1 52 300 between the first and second respondents in the proportion of two units and one unit respectively. It has accordingly directed that out of the amount awarded by it Rs 1 1 534 should be paid to the first respondent and Rs. 50 766 should be paid to the second respondent. We are not wholly satisfied that this is the correct apportionment. However we do not propose to disturb that apportionment. In order to adopt a just and fair basis of apportionment we direct that theentire additional amount to which the first and second respondents have become jointly entitled under our decision should be apportioned in favour of the second respondent exclusively. The second respondent as earlier stated is a minor. However we do not propose to disturb that apportionment. In order to adopt a just and fair basis of apportionment we direct that theentire additional amount to which the first and second respondents have become jointly entitled under our decision should be apportioned in favour of the second respondent exclusively. The second respondent as earlier stated is a minor. The first respondent Will therefore receive the said amount on behalf of the second respondent and will keep the amount deposited in a Scheduled Bank until the second respondent attains majority. The first respondent will however be at liberty to receive the interest income and spend it for welfare of the minor second respondent. .