JUDGMENT George Vadakkel, J. 1. These appeals concern a motor with its accessories, and the controversy is whether it was pawned to the appellant by the respondents or only deposited by them with him for gratuitous safe keeping. The lower courts accepted the respondent's version of mere deposit, and so decreed their suit for its recovery, O.S. No. 1270 of 1968, and dismissed the appellant's suit for recovery of the debt, O.S. No. 4 of 1969. 2. Admittedly the motor in question belongs to the respondents and they would be entitled to possession thereof unless the appellant establishes his special property in them as a pawnee. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the lower courts brushed aside the evidence in this regard, namely, certain entries in the appellant's books of account, Exts. D2, D3, D9 and D10, by an erroneous application of the rule of evidence governing entries in account books besides omitting totally to consider Exts. C1 and D2(b) wherefore those courts did not have a correct perspective of the cases on hand. These submissions appear to be well founded and so, despite concurrent findings of fact entered by the lower courts, it is my task to assess the evidence afresh without looking for any assistance from the lower courts' judgments. 3. The appellant's wife and the second respondent's wife are sisters of DW 1. DW 1 and the appellant as DW 2, speak to the appellant's case. According to them on 5th July 1967 the respondents who are father and son approached the appellant with a request to help them with Rs. 2,000 since they were short of that much sum to pay the sale price for a property which the first respondent (father) subsequently purchased as per Ext. D6 sale deed dated 10th July 1967 from the wife of P.W. 5. They have sworn that the appellant obliged them by crediting Rs. 2,000 in the account kept by the appellant in the name of P.W. 5 who had timber dealings with the former, that on the same day an amount of Rs. 2,000 was debited in the name of the second respondent, that these were on 10th July 1967 and pursuant to Ext. 2,000 in the account kept by the appellant in the name of P.W. 5 who had timber dealings with the former, that on the same day an amount of Rs. 2,000 was debited in the name of the second respondent, that these were on 10th July 1967 and pursuant to Ext. D5 letter sent to the appellant by P.W. 5 on 8th July 1967 through the second respondent and that the motor in question and its accessories were brought to the appellant's saw mill and pledged to the appellant on 8th July 1967 as security for this amount of Rs. 2,000. Ext. D9(a) entry at page 56 of Ext. D9 Padukuruppu account written by D.W. 1 is the credit entry for Rs. 2,000 dated 10th July 1967 in the name of P.W. 5. Ext. D3(a) is the corresponding entry on page 28 of Ext. D3 day book and Ext. D2(b) is the corresponding posting on page 60 of Ext. D2 ledger book. As is seen from Ext. D9(a), on 10th July 1967 there is a debit entry of Rs. 2,000 against the name of the second respondent. A similar debit entry is seen against his name in Ext. D3(a) also. Ext. D2(a) at page 97 of Ext. D2 is the corresponding ledger posting in the name of second respondent. D.W. 4, a licenced Sales Tax Practitioner swears that Exts. D2 and D3 books of account were written by one of his Clerks, Ramakrishna Pillai, on the basis of Ext. D9 Padukuruppu and that he has audited them and produced them before the Sales Tax Authorities. D.W. 1 who is the yard manager of the appellant's timber yard has sworn that the Padukuruppu is written by him every evening on the basis of slips containing the day's transactions of which either he has personal knowledge or has information from the appellant. (The lower courts appear to have wrongly mentioned Ext. D2 or Ext. P2 for Ext. D9 Padukuruppu). Ext. D2(b) ledger in the name of P.W. 5 is in continuation of Ext. D10(a) ledger in his name on page 122 of Ext. D10 ledger book, also identified by D.W. 4 to be in the handwriting of Ramakrishna Pillai, his clerk. 4. P.W. 5 admits that Ext. D5 is a letter written by him (it is on a letter paper with his name printed thereon). D10(a) ledger in his name on page 122 of Ext. D10 ledger book, also identified by D.W. 4 to be in the handwriting of Ramakrishna Pillai, his clerk. 4. P.W. 5 admits that Ext. D5 is a letter written by him (it is on a letter paper with his name printed thereon). By that letter, informing the appellant that the idea is to register the sale deed (to be executed) by his wife, Devaki, the next day, P.W. 5 directed the appellant to credit in the account of P.W. 5 the balance sale price of Rs. 2,000 agreed to be paid by the appellant instead of paying it in cash. This letter, according to D.Ws. 1 and 2, was brought to the appellant on 8th July 1967 by the second respondent. This letter is undated. P.W. 5 claims that the said letter was written as required by the appellant and what is stated therein is not true. He, immediately after the appellant filed O.S. No. 4 of 1969 on 1st January 1969, on 5th January 1969 swore an affidavit and the defendants in that suit (respondents here) filed it in court in that suit, on 10th January 1969. In that affidavit marked Ext. C1 (neither indexed nor adverted to by the lower courts) P.W. 5 swears that he on 29th December 1968, (that is, after the respondents filed O.S. No. 1270 of 1968 on 18th December 1968) accompanied the appellant to advocate Shri Kunnath Balakrishna Menon's residence where he, as required by the appellant, copied down Ext. D5 letter from a draft given to him on a sheet of letter paper (with his name printed thereon) he had taken from his letterpad and carried to the Advocated residence for that purpose (!) also at the behest of the appellant, and that what is stated therein (Ext. D5) is untrue. As P.W. 5 he says that Ext. D5 letter was written in the manner stated above in order to be of use to the appellant to evade payment of sales tax -- how it would be of any use for that purpose is beyond my comprehension. He also swears that he can't remember whether on 10th July 1967 he paid to the appellant Rs. 2,000 in cash though he adds that it might be possible but then, he is unable to say about the source therefor. His explanation of Ext. He also swears that he can't remember whether on 10th July 1967 he paid to the appellant Rs. 2,000 in cash though he adds that it might be possible but then, he is unable to say about the source therefor. His explanation of Ext. D5 letter seems to be a fanciful story. Nothing turns on the statement in Ext. D5 that the intention is to 'register' (and not to 'execute') the document the next day, for it is common knowledge that people in this country speak of 'registering a document' very often to denote 'execution and registration'. 5. S.34 of the Evidence Act, 1872 makes entries (relating to a matter under enquiry) in account books relevant evidence provided such books have been regularly kept in the course of business, and thus takes such entries outside the ambit of the general rule of evidence that self serving statements would not constitute evidence. The reason is that law presumes that when accounts are maintained systematically, that is to say, following an established practice, or in the language of the statute, where they are kept 'regularly in the course of business', the regularity in or the systematic manner of maintaining such accounts would ensure their general accuracy and would prevent chances of misstatements and falsification. Therefore, if disputed, it has first to be ascertained whether the books of account have been regularly kept in the course of business. The enquiry here is not whether the particular entry is correct and true but as regards the regularity of keeping accounts or in other words the system or practice of maintaining them. Depending upon the system followed and the general accuracy it ensures, the probative value of the particular entry or entries relied on in the case will vary, (grave and serious errors or numerous errors would make particular entry or entries unreliable), but not the relevancy of such entry or entries provided it is shown that the books of accounts have been maintained in accordance with some system, be it an elaborate and foolproof one or not. That the books of account have been regularly kept in the course of business according to some system or established practice ensuring general accuracy is proved by examining the writer thereof or some one competent to speak to these facts. That the books of account have been regularly kept in the course of business according to some system or established practice ensuring general accuracy is proved by examining the writer thereof or some one competent to speak to these facts. In Dwaraka Doss v. Baboo Jankee Doss VI Moore's Indian Appeals 88 at page 98-99 the Privy Council stated this rule as follows:- "It is perfectly true that the regular proof of books and accounts, requires that the clerks who have kept those accounts, or some person competent to speak to the facts, should be called to prove that they have been regularly kept, and to prove their general accuracy. XXXXX But having regard to the fact that the genuineness of those books was not disputed when they were offered to the Inspector, and that their accuracy was not disputed by the Respondent's agent, who attended to examine them but that, on the contrary, their general accuracy was admitted; that the accounts contained in those books had been for several months open to the inspection of the Respondent, with power to him to point out any inaccuracies, if any inaccuracies existed, and that he had in his own possession means at any moment of disproving the accuracy of those books (if inaccurate they were) by the production of his own accounts, books and vouchers, their Lordships are of opinion that there was a Prima facie case for the establishment of those accounts, and that then the only question was whether the particular items objected to had been made out by Appellant, and whether the set off alleged on the part of the Respondent had been established." 6. However, under the latter part of the section, entries in books of account, even after it has been established that the books of account wherein the entries are made have been regularly kept in the course of business, would not by themselves be sufficient to charge any person with liability. This means that such entries though relevant, are not sufficient to hold a person liable without some other evidence. Therefore, even if the entries are relevant, they would not constitute substantive evidence of the transaction which has to be established by some other independent evidence, whereupon the entries can be used as corroborative or confirmatory evidence. This means that such entries though relevant, are not sufficient to hold a person liable without some other evidence. Therefore, even if the entries are relevant, they would not constitute substantive evidence of the transaction which has to be established by some other independent evidence, whereupon the entries can be used as corroborative or confirmatory evidence. It is this aspect that is emphasised by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ganeswara Rao AIR 1963 SC 1850 and in Chandradhar v. Gauhati Bank AIR 1967 SC 1058 where that Court pointed out: "These entries are, however, not by themselves sufficient to charge any person with liability. Therefore, when A sues B for a sum of money it is open to him to put his account books in evidence provided they are regularly kept in the course of business and show by reference to them that the amount claimed by him is debited against B. The entry though made by A in his own account books, and though it is in his own favour is a piece of evidence which the court may take into consideration for the purpose of determining whether the amount referred to therein was in fact paid by A to B. The entry by itself is of no help to A in his claim against B but it can be considered by the Court along with the evidence of A for drawing the conclusion that the amount was paid by A to B. To this limited extent entries in the account books are relevant and can be proved. S.34 does not go beyond that." ( AIR 1963 SC 1850 , 1867) and, "S.34 says that such entry alone shall not be sufficient evidence, and so come independent evidence had to be given by the bank to show that this sum was advanced. What would be the nature of such independent evidence would certainly depend upon the facts of each case; but there can be no doubt that some independent evidence to show that advance had been made has to be given." ( AIR 1967 SC 1058 , 1061). 7. What would be the nature of such independent evidence would certainly depend upon the facts of each case; but there can be no doubt that some independent evidence to show that advance had been made has to be given." ( AIR 1967 SC 1058 , 1061). 7. To establish relevancy of the entries, that is to say, to prove that the account books have been regularly kept in the course of business the appellant tendered D.W. 1 and D.W. 4 as witnesses, but they have not been cross examined as regards the system of writing the accounts or maintaining them nor about the general accuracy that is ensured by the method, followed in keeping those accounts which, method has been sworn to by these witnesses. Therefore the entries in question are relevant evidence. D.W. 1 and the appellant as D.W. 2 have deposed to the transaction evidenced by the entries in question. Ext. D5 letter also proves the transaction. The independent evidence furnished by D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 and the letter, Ext. D5, is substantive evidence of the transaction, and the entries in the account book against the name of P.W. 5 and second respondent corroborate and confirm the same. The Trial Court said: "Here the plaintiff does not admit the correctness of this accounts. According to them this accounts are false and not properly now. D.W. 4 is a sales tax practitioner who keeps this account for the defendant. Exts. D2 and D3 are daily accounts. D.W. 3 admits it was not written by him but by his clerk and his accounts are written on the basis of padukuruppu. So there is no evidence to prove that this Rs. 2,000 mentioned in Ext. D3(a) is borrowed by the plaintiffs and this motor was given as security for repayment of this amount." And the lower appellate court said: "But D.Ws. 1 and 2 have deposed that the padukuruppu is written by either of them. D.W. 2 has stated that the padukuruppu will be sent to the office of the person who writes the account and that on the basis of the padukuruppu the account will be written. Further, D.W. 1 has stated that Exts. D2 and D3 are written by two of his clerks. In such circumstances, it follows that D.W. 4 has no direct knowledge regarding these account . .............. Further, D.W. 1 has stated that Exts. D2 and D3 are written by two of his clerks. In such circumstances, it follows that D.W. 4 has no direct knowledge regarding these account . .............. Also the mere entry in an account book will not be sufficient to cast liability on a party unless that entry is admitted by the party concerned." I am afraid that the lower courts have mixed up the two aspects, relevancy of entries in account books and their function as a piece of evidence which as already explained is only to corroborate and confirm some independent evidence of the transaction. It is also to borne in mind that it is not always necessary that in order to establish that the account books have been kept regularly in the course of business, the person whose hand writes them should be examined and what law requires is that some one competent to speak about it should be tendered as a witness D.W. 4, under whose instructions and directions, his clerk Ramakrishna Pillai writes the accounts is a competent witness to give evidence regarding the keeping of Exts. D2 and D3 accounts, and to establish the entries therein are relevant as contemplated by the earlier part of S.34. 8. There was some debate at the bar as to whether the entries, Exts. D9(a), D3(a) and D2(4) crediting P.W. 5 with Rs. 2,000 on 10th July 1967 are hit by the latter part of S.34 in so far as these entries cannot be stated to be self serving evidence and also because P.W. 5 is not sought to be charged with any liability in these cases. The second limb of the above submission gains some support from the decision of the Patna High Court in Sarangdhar v. Parvati ILR 1953 (XXXII) Pat. 983 The suit there was for declaration that the plaintiffs there were entitled to the money due amongst others under certain insurance polices also as joint family assests on the allegation that it was the joint family who invested the moneys for insurance. 983 The suit there was for declaration that the plaintiffs there were entitled to the money due amongst others under certain insurance polices also as joint family assests on the allegation that it was the joint family who invested the moneys for insurance. This was sought to be established by entries in account books, and the High Court ruled out the objection as regards the admissibility in evidence of these entries as follows:- "It will not be correct to say that these documents are being used in this case to charge anybody with liability in the sense in which those words are used in S.34 of the Evidence Act." After quoting S.43 of Act II of 1855 and S.34 of the present Act, the decision proceeded to say.- "Undoubtedly, the section as it stands now means that when any person has to be charged with liability the statement in the books of account will not be sufficient for the same. But the section lays down that entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the court has to enquire. Here, both parties relied on the entries not for the purpose of charging any person with liability, but for the purpose of showing as to how the items relating to the Insurance policies were entered in the books. In this case, if any person can be charged with liability it is the Great Eastern Life Assurance Company but this company, as they have said in their written statement, are neither interested in the title of the plaintiffs nor in the title of Defendants. Obviously, they will pay the money to the person found entitled and have little interest in this litigation." The same could, perhaps, be said of entries, Exts. D9 (a), D2(a) and D3(a), in so far as the appellant relies on these entries only to show that an amount of Rs. Obviously, they will pay the money to the person found entitled and have little interest in this litigation." The same could, perhaps, be said of entries, Exts. D9 (a), D2(a) and D3(a), in so far as the appellant relies on these entries only to show that an amount of Rs. 2,000 has been credited in favour of P.W. 5 on 10th July 1967, and does not rely on them to make any person, P.W. 5 or the respondents, liable for that amount, though he relies on the entries debiting that much amount in the second respondent's account with him on that day to make the respondents liable for that sum, but I do not think, that in view of what I have held earlier in this judgment, namely, that the said entries corroborate and confirm the independent evidence furnished by D.Ws. 1 and 2 and Ext. D5, I need finally pronounce on this point in this case. 9. In Ext. D5, P.W. 5 says that the appellant had agreed to pay the balance price amount of Rs. 2,000. The evidence of P.W. 5 shows that it was he who was dealing in this matter of sale on behalf of his wife, the vendor, for he says that the agreement for sale was about an year earlier, that the price was paid in small instalments, and that on receipt of advance he (P.W. 5) allowed the vendee to construct a house thereon but did not give possession. If that be so there can be no doubt that vendor received part of the sale consideration, that is Rs. 2,000, from the appellant by allowing the appellant to credit that much sum in her husband's accounts. That Ext. D6 sale deed mentions the consideration as Rs. 4,500 paid in ready cash is of no consequence at all in the light of the evidence of P.W. 5 that the consideration was paid in small instalments and only balance consideration was paid on the execution of Ext. D6. 10. The result is, it has to be held that the appellant paid Rs. 2,000 towards the sale price for Ext. D6. 10. The result is, it has to be held that the appellant paid Rs. 2,000 towards the sale price for Ext. D6 sale deed at the request of the respondents; he paid it no doubt, not in cash but adjusting the said amount against amounts due to him from P. W. 5, the husband of the vendor who was acting in this matter on behalf of his wife. The evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 2 also shows that the motor in question was pledged with the appellant as security for this debt. 11. The case of the respondents is that the motor was deposited on 22nd October 1966 and possession thereof was demanded back after 18th October 1968, and all this time, the motor was kept with the appellant instead of taking it to Moorkanikara which is 7 miles away from the appellant's saw mill and were it was intended to be used first for running a flour mill and then, for irrigation purposes because no electricity connection was sanctioned and because there was no strong room to keep the motor at Moorkanikara. This appears to be highly improbable. No doubt, besides the second respondent, as P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 supports this case. P.W. 2 swears that he took this motor from a workshop in his taxi car and transported it to the appellant's saw mill about 3 years prior to his date of examination which was on 24th October 1969 but he admits that he cannot support the same by trip sheet. However, he says that this was between 20th of October and 25th of October. P.W. 4, a former employee of the appellant also swears that the respondents brought the motor on 22nd October 1966. He left the appellant's service on 10th May 1968. Ext. D4 is a letter dated 6th June 1968 admittedly written by him and that will show that the witness and the appellant were not on good terms from some time prior to his leaving the employment under the appellant. He also deposes that he did not sec the deposit of the motor and that he has no personal knowledge as to why it was deposited. 12. He also deposes that he did not sec the deposit of the motor and that he has no personal knowledge as to why it was deposited. 12. The Trial Court, without any discussion of their evidence, only said that it found 'no reason to believe PWs 1 to 3' P.W. 3 is the workshop man who repaired the motor and his evidence is only to the effect that it was taken back from his workshop on 22nd October 1966 by the second respondent. P.W. 4 has not been adverted to by that court. The lower appellate court has adverted to the evidence of PWs 2 and 4 but has not considered that P.W. 2 was not able to support his evidence with trip sheet and that P.W. 4 admittedly was not on good terms with the appellant as is seen from his letter Ext. D4. 13. It appears to me that the cases on hand where the lower courts have concurred on conclusions of fact come within the mischief of the following rule stated in Balmukand v. Jagan Nath AIR 1963 Raj. 212 . "It is indeed well established that the High Court in second appeal has no jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact of the court of first appeal; but it seems to me to be equally well settled that where such findings are vitiated by errors of law, such as where the judgment of the court of first appeal is founded on an entirely wrong approach of the case, or, where it is based on misreading of evidence or omission to read important evidence on the record, then a judgment of the court of first appeal must be held to involve errors of law, and such a judgment cannot be accepted as final and binding upon this court in second appeal. I have no hesitation in saying that the judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from grave errors of law of the kind I have mentioned above, and, therefore, this second appeal is maintainable." In view of what is stated above I am constrained to set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts in these cases and I do so. I dismiss O.S. No. 1270 of 1968 with costs throughout and decree O.S. No. 4 of 1969 as prayed for also with costs throughout. The appeals are allowed with costs.