JUDGMENT M.P. Saxena, J. - This is a landlady's petition arising out of proceedings under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. Smt. Kailashwati, petitioner, is the owner of a three storeyed building No. 753 (Old No. 757) Railway Bazar, Haldwani, distt. Nainital). Ram Prakash opposite party No. 2, is a tenant in a shop forming part of this house. He is carrying on cycle repairing work in this shop for the last 10 or 12 years. On 15.12.1971 the landlady moved an application under section 3 of the U.P. Act III of 1947 for permission to file a suit for ejectment against opposite party No. 2 on the ground that the entire building has become in a dilapidated condition and requires to be re-constructed. She also gave out that another building contiguous to it is owned by her husband and she wants to combine both the buildings and make them to suit the increasing demand of her growing family. She also gave out that her family is increasing and there is bona fide need of additional accommodation both for residential as well as business purposes. According to her two other tenants occupying a portion of House No. 757 have already vacated their portions in view of her needs. 3. The U.P. Act XIII of 1972 came into force during the pendency of these proceedings and the application was treated an application as under section 21 of this Act. 4. The tenant opposite party No. 2 contested that application on the grounds that the landlady has no bona fide need either for residence or for business because she has already sufficient accommodation in her possession in the same town ; that the building is not in a dilapidated condition and it is not required to be reconstructed and, lastly, that he is carrying on cycle repairing business in the disputed shop since long and will suffer considerable hardship if he is evicted from it. 5. 5. On, 22.11.1974 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application by holding that the building is in a dilapidated condition and that the landlady bona fide requires it for residential and business purposes for the members of her family, that Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) ; as it existed at that time, was applicable to this case, that the landlady was entitled to its benefit and that she will suffer greater hardship by the rejection of her application than will be suffered by the tenant if the application is allowed. 6. The tenant filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act and the learned District Judge reversed the findings given by the Prescribed Authority and rejected the application for release. Hence this petition for quashing the order passed by the District Judge, Nainital on 14.8.1976. 7. The application for release was obviously moved on two grounds. Firstly that the building in question is in a dilapidated condition and requires to he re-constructed. Secondly, that the landlady and the members of her family bona fide require it for residential as well as business purposes. So far as the first ground is concerned, it is covered by section 21(l)(b) which says that "the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction". Rule 17 applies to an application for release on this ground. It says that "before an application for release of a building under section 21(1)(d) on the ground that it is required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the Prescribed Authority shall satisfy itself : (i) That the building requires demolition ; (ii) That a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition, and new construction has been prepared : (iii) That a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or the regulations of the local authority or other statutory authority under any law in that behalf for the time being in force ; (iv) That the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction." 8. The first question for consideration in this connection is whether the building is in a dilapidated condition. The landlady filed a sale deed dated 1.4.1969 by means of which she had purchased building. A perusal of the contents of this document do not fully support this contention. The first question for consideration in this connection is whether the building is in a dilapidated condition. The landlady filed a sale deed dated 1.4.1969 by means of which she had purchased building. A perusal of the contents of this document do not fully support this contention. It simply says that the building has become old and its condition has deteriorated and it is necessary to reconstruct it. These recitals do not point to an irresistible conclusion that the building is in a dilapidated condition. Before proceeding further it may be stated that a building within the meaning of the expression "is in a dilapidated condition if it is in a damaged or dangerous condition and has fallen into the state of decay or disrepair (R.D. Gupta v. Addl. District Judge, 1976 R.C.J. 502, The same view was taken in the case of Shyam Sunder Lal v. Subhash Chandra Gupta, 1977 All. R.C. 81. In the instant case the landlady banked on the affidavit of Sri Mohan Chandra Joshi, a retired Assistant Engineer who gave out that the building was in dilapidated condition. The learned Additional District Judge rightly attached little importance to his affidavit because from the other side the tenant had produced the evidence of a Civil Engineer who gave out that the building was neither in a dilapidated condition nor required re-construction. Therefore, this evidence was not in favour of the petitioner. Secondly, the landlady has placed her reliance on a notice given by the Municipal Board on 4.7.1977 to the effect that the building is in a dilapidated condition and may be pulled down. This notice was obviously issued during the pendency of this writ petition and much weight cannot be attached to it. In these circumstances the landlady failed to prove that the building is in a dilapidated condition and requires reconstruction. There is no force in the petitioner's contention that the learned District Judge should have issued a commission order to verify this fact and failure to do so has resulted in miscarriage of justice. When both the parties gave evidence of Engineers it was open to the learned District Judge to rely on the evidence of a more qualified engineer. This principle was followed by him and I see no error in this approach. 9. When both the parties gave evidence of Engineers it was open to the learned District Judge to rely on the evidence of a more qualified engineer. This principle was followed by him and I see no error in this approach. 9. The landlady did not even comply with the requirements of rule 17 inasmuch as no estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and construction was filed in this case. It was filed in another case which is said to have been connected with the present case. It was not proper compliance of the rule. Lastly, she did not bring on the record any convincing material to show that she has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is material on the record to show that sufficient income tax is being paid by her. Therefore, the presumption will be that she is possessed of sufficient means. There is nothing on record to show that amount of income tax is being paid by her. That by itself will not be a correct yard-stick to Judge that she is possessed of means sufficient to undertake reconstruction. It will thus be clear that she failed to prove that the building is in a dilapidated condition and also did not comply with the requirements of clauses (ii) and (iv) of rule 17. Hence this application could not be allowed on the ground given in clause (d) of section 21(l). 10. So far as the ground covered by section 21(l)(a) is concerned, the landlady's case has been that she is living with 13 members of her family in an adjoining house which measures 14ft. x 68ft. House No. 753 of which the disputed shop is a portion also has the same measurements. She wants to combine both the buildings so that its dimensions may become 28ft. X 68ft. and she may have sufficient accommodation for residence as well as for business. Her husband and two sons are working as Contractors. x 68ft. House No. 753 of which the disputed shop is a portion also has the same measurements. She wants to combine both the buildings so that its dimensions may become 28ft. X 68ft. and she may have sufficient accommodation for residence as well as for business. Her husband and two sons are working as Contractors. The tenant opposite party met it by contending that she has got several houses in Haldwani and can meet her requirements, if any, from them, that her husband and two sons live out side Haldwani in connection with their business and have no need to reside here and that, in any case, he has been doing cycle repairing business for 10 or 12 years and will suffer considerable hardship if he is made to shift from this shop. 11. The Learned District Judge has analysed evidence on this point also and arrived at the conclusion that the landlady has no bona fide need. Admittedly, she as well as her husband and two sons are owners of four houses two of which are in possession of tenants. One is already in their possession and the other one is the disputed one. In this house she has already got a portion vacated by tenants. She had conveniently re-constructed the house in her possession and the shop which has been got vacated by a tenant. Construction can also be done over them if the shop in dispute can bear the burden of two storeyed building There can be no manner of doubt that it can conveniently have at least one storey over it. On the other hand the tenant has no other place if he is evicted. There is nothing on record to show that accommodation alleged to be with him sufficient and suitable for his business. His business is of the duration of 10 or 12 years and he is bound to suffer sufficient hardship if he is dislodged from there. On the other hand the tenant has no other place if he is evicted. There is nothing on record to show that accommodation alleged to be with him sufficient and suitable for his business. His business is of the duration of 10 or 12 years and he is bound to suffer sufficient hardship if he is dislodged from there. Therefore, the District Judge rightly held that the landlady has no need for this shop and, in any case, her hardship will be less than the hardship of the tenant if her application is rejected As held in the case of Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 29, finding on the question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact and High Court cannot interfere by disturbing the same in writ proceedings. 12. For all these reasons the writ petition has no force and is dismissed with costs, on parties.