S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This is a revisional application filed by the defendant-tenant against the appellate order of the learned Additional Judge No. 1, Jodhpur dated January 13, 1978 by which he set aside the order of the learned Munsif City, Jodhpur dated January 29, 1977. 2. Briefly put the facts leading to this revision are these: the plaintiffs-non petitioners (landlords) instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant-petitioner in the court of Munsif City, Jodhpur on March 18, 1976. In the suit the plaintiffs claimed rent from March 1, 1975 to January 31, 1976 @ Rs. 80/- per month and damages for use and occupation from February 1, 1976 to March 18, 1976 amounting to Rs. 290 out of which they relinquished Rs. 130/-. It was specifically mentioned in para 7 of the plaint that the previous Civil Original Suit No. 119 of 1972 which was decided by the learned Additional Civil Judge,Jodhpur on March 18,1972, was for the recovery of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 80/- per month from November 1, 1969 to October 31, 1970 to May 18, 1971 and ejectment. It was also stated in para 7 that suit for ejectment was based on the ground of default in payment under Section 13(l)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1950 (No.XVII of 1950) (for short the Act). In that suit, the defendant is alleged to have taken benefit to Section 13(7) (old) of the Act but as defendant has committed default in payment to rent, as mentioned above, it was prayed that the plaintiffs are entitled to evict the defendant from the premises in question and the defendant is not entitled to any protection or benefit. On July 29, 1976, the trial court directed the defendant under Section 13(4) of the Act to deposit in court or pay to the plaintiffs by August 12, 1976 the amount of arrears of rent, costs of suit and interest and further ordered that the file be put up for the decision of the suit on August 12, 1976. A perusal of the proceedings of the trial Court, dated August 12, 1976 shows that the amount was deposited vide tender No. 727 dated August 5, 1976. On that day, the counsel for the plaintiffs intimated the trial Court that this was a case of second default. A perusal of the proceedings of the trial Court, dated August 12, 1976 shows that the amount was deposited vide tender No. 727 dated August 5, 1976. On that day, the counsel for the plaintiffs intimated the trial Court that this was a case of second default. The trial Court ordered that the defendant should file the written statement on October 12, 1976. On November 13, 1976, an application was moved by the defendant under Section 13(6) of the Act stating therein that he has deposited the entire amount in pursuance of the order of the Court dated July 29, 1976 and that the defendant has not taken the additional benefit of sec. 13A of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment Ordinance), 1975 (Rajasthan Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975) or after that of Section 13A of the Act. He, therefore, prayed that the suit of the plaintiffs may be dismissed. This application was resisted by the plaintiffs by filing a reply dated September 13, 1976 on the ground that the defendant had already taken benefit under Section 13(7), as it stood then, and, therefore, since the suit out of which this revision has arisen," was based on second default under Section 13(l)(a), the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 13(6) of the Act. Along with the reply, the plaintiffs submitted the certified copies of the plaint (filed in Civil Original Suit No, 119 of 1972), decree-sheet dated March 18,1972, order dt. February 24, 1972 and application dated March 10, 1972. After hearing the arguments, learned Munsif, by his order dated January 29, 1977, dismissed the plaintiffs suit for eviction. 3. Being dissatisfied with the order of the learned Munsif dated January 29, 1977, the plaintiffs preferred appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur accepted the appeal and set aside the order dated January 29, 1977, passed by the Munsif City and remanded the suit to him for further proceedings in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by him in the order. 4. Being aggrieved by this order, the defendant has come up in revision to this Court as aforesaid. 5. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. 4. Being aggrieved by this order, the defendant has come up in revision to this Court as aforesaid. 5. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. J. P. Joshi contended that in the earlier suit No. ll9 of 1972, compromise was arrived at between the plaintiffs and the defendant and on the basis of the compromise, the suit was disposed of and as such there was no finding of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Jodhpur that the defendant was a defaulter under Section 12 (l)(a) of the Act. He made particular reference to the decree-sheet of Civil Suit No. 119/72. The relevant portion of which reads as under: ^^--------o fMxjh nh tkrh gS fd ekfQd jkthukek izfroknh dks 1815½ rkjh[k 10-5-72 dks vnk djsxk] ,slk djus ij oknh izksehtst eqruktk ls csn[ky ugh djsxk o nkok k[kkjht le>k tk;sxkA ;fn bl izdkj vnk;xh ugh djus ij oknh nkok ds vuqlkj [kwt ,.M vksD;wysku ds 80 :- ekgokj ls eqdnek [kpkZ o izksehtst eqruktk dk dCtk nks ekg ckn ikus dk eqLrgd gksxk [kpkZ viuk&viuk Qjhdsu ik;saxsA^^ ¼ There are some mistakes in the language of the decree½ 6. It was next urged that the defendant in the previous Suit No. 119 of 1972 did not avail of the benefit of Section 13A as it stood then, and therefore, it cannot be said that he took benefit of Section 13 (7) (old) and when he has not taken such benefit, the defendant cannot be deprived of the benefit, available to him under Section 13 (6) of the Act. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I may reproduce here the relevant Sections : Provisions of law which were in force upto the decision of the suit No. 119 of 1972 which was decided on March 18, 1972.Provisions of law which were/are in force upto the decision of the suit and appeal leading to the present revision. Section 13—Eviction of tenant......(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied—(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... (4) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1), with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the tenant shall, on the first day of hearing or on or before such date as the court may, on an application made to it, fix in this behalf, or within such time, not exceeding two months, as may be extended by the court, deposit in court or pay to the landlord an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto upto the end of the month previous to that in which the deposit or payment is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of deposit and shall thereafter continue to deposit or pay, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at the rate. (7) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a), of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the court but the court may allow such costs as it may deem fit to the landlord. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this subsection if having obtained such benefit or benefit under section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation, if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. Section 13-A-Special provisions relating to pending and other matters-Notwithstanding (anything in section 13, sub-sec. Section 13-A-Special provisions relating to pending and other matters-Notwithstanding (anything in section 13, sub-sec. (l)(a), or sub-section (4) and the proviso thereto or sub-section (5) as they existed) before the commen cement of the amending Act— (a) no court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Act, pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in court, within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest therein and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause, (b) in every such proceeding, the court shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act, notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at six per cent per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord, and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the court, and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default. S. 13. Eviction of tenants (1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under subsection (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... .......................................................... (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under subsection (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). (6) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the court against him: Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this subsection, if having obtained such benefit or benefits under section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. Section 13-A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters-Notwithstanding any-thing to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law. Section 13-A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters-Notwithstanding any-thing to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law. (a) no court shall, in any proceeding pending the date of commencement of the amending ordinance pass any decree in favour of landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the land lord, or deposits in court, within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause; (b) in every such proceedings the cou rt shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the amending ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord, and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the court; and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default. 8. The first question, that arises for determination is whether in the absence of a finding that the tenant is a defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 13(1)(a), in a suit which is based on the ground of default in payment of rent and disposed of on the basis of compromise, the defendant can be said to have availed of the benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) of the Act. Similar argument was raised in Sobhraj vs. Bhanwarlal (1). It was contended in that case that proviso to sec. 13(7)(old) could not apply to that case inasmuch as it was not proved that the tenant-appellant had committed default previously. Similar argument was raised in Sobhraj vs. Bhanwarlal (1). It was contended in that case that proviso to sec. 13(7)(old) could not apply to that case inasmuch as it was not proved that the tenant-appellant had committed default previously. The learned Judge observed as under : "It is true that in the previous suit no, enquiry was held into the allegation of default because the appellant had applied under section 13A of the Act within the time prescribed therein and consequently the suit for ejectment was dismissed without holding any enquiry into the allegations made by the parties. The proviso however makes it clear that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section (sub-sec. (7)), if having obtained such benefit or banefit under sec. 13A in respect of any such accommodation for six months. It is not the requirement of law there must be a finding as to the previous default. What is required is that the tenant must have obtained the benefit under sec. 13-A. That the appellant has admittedly done previously. As already held above he has again made a default in the payment of rent for more than six months and consequently he cannot save himself from ejectment by making deposit under sec. 13(4)" I, respectfully agree with the view taken in Sobhrajs case (1). Proviso to sec. 13(7)(old) merely lays down that the tenant must have taken benefit of sec. 13(7) (old)or benefits under sec. 13A in respect of the same accommodation. If having obtained such benefit or benefits under sec. 13A of the Act, he makes default in the payment of rent for six months, in respect of the same accommodation, he is not entitled to the relief as provided under Sec. 13(7) (old). The relief provided in the sub-section referred to above is that in case of deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) and (5) of Sec. 13 (old), being made by the tenant, no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13, can be passed. 9. It is not disputed that suit No. 119 of 1972 was based on the ground of default in payment of rent as envisaged in Sec. 13(l)(a), for the rent due from November 1, 1969 to January 30, 1970 and damages for use and occupation from November 1, 1970 to May 18, 1971. (1) of Sec. 13, can be passed. 9. It is not disputed that suit No. 119 of 1972 was based on the ground of default in payment of rent as envisaged in Sec. 13(l)(a), for the rent due from November 1, 1969 to January 30, 1970 and damages for use and occupation from November 1, 1970 to May 18, 1971. The learned Additional Civil Judge, Jodhpur, in that suit, determined the amount of rent and interest and directed the defendant to deposit the same in court within 15 days from the date of order dated February 24, 1972. The manner and mode of payment of the amount that was determined by the learned Additional Civil Judge, was specified in the compromise arrived at between the parties. It is, therefore, clear that defendant had obtained the benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) and this is a sufficient compliance of it. I, therefore, hold that the defendant had taken benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) in the earlier Suit No. 119 of 1972 and repel the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since finding as to the default was not given in it, it cannot be said that he has availed of the benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) in that suit. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the defendant had neither taken advantage of Sec. 13A, as it stood then, in the earlier suit nor has he taken advantage of Sec. 13A of the Act in this suit, which has given rise to this revision. It was urged that the words such benefit or benefit, used in the provisio to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13, refer to benefit or benefits under Sec. 13A of the Act. The expression such benefit according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not refer to the benefit available to the tenant under Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act. The contention in this regard is futile. Sub-secs. (4) and (5) of Sec. 13(old) were introduced for the benefit of the tenant so that in case of first default he may protect himself against the eviction by making the required deposit or payment, as provided therein. But in case a tenant who has committed a second default, as mentioned in the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 13(old), no such benefit is available. But in case a tenant who has committed a second default, as mentioned in the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 13(old), no such benefit is available. Therefore, in my considered opinion, such benefit used in the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 13 (old) refer to the benefit which the defendant-tenant could take under Sec. 13(7)(old) by making the required deposit or payment as provided in sub-secs. (4) and (5) of Sec. 13(old). This view of mine stands fortified by a decision in Hanuman Prasad vs. Gaindi Lal (2). Such benefit used in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act, refer to the benefit which the tenant can avail of by making deposit of payment as required by sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 of the Act. This proviso applies in the following circumstances : (1) That the same tenant has previously obtained the benefit either (i) under Sec. 13(7) of the Act, or (ii) under Sec. 13-A of the, Act, (2) Such a tenant repeatedly commits defaults in paying the rent for six months or more, (3) The demised premises being the same. It may be stated here that whole of sub-sec. (6) was substituted for the previous sub-sec. (7) by Sec. 8(iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment Ordinence, 1975 (Raj. Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975) w.e.f. 29-10-1975 now replaced the Rajasthan Amending Act No. 14 of 1976. 11. In Ram Chandra vs. Ramesh Chandra (3), Modi, J. held that the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 clearly provides that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under Sec. 13(4) if he having obtained such benefit again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. In Ramchandras case (3), the tenant-defendant had not paid any rent to the landlord for more than six months. He became defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. He subsequently deposited arrears of rent under Sec. 19A of the Act. In Ramchandras case (3), the tenant-defendant had not paid any rent to the landlord for more than six months. He became defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act. He subsequently deposited arrears of rent under Sec. 19A of the Act. A suit had also been previously filed against him for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent under Sec. 13(l)(a) of the Act but that suit was dismissed because the tenant took advantage of Sec. 13(4) (old) of the Act by depositing arrears of rent and interest thereon on the first date of hearing In respect of the same premises, second suit was filed for eviction and arrears of rent. In these circumstances the learned Judge observed: "The subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent by the defendant under Sec. 19A of the Act would have protected him from eviction under Sec. 13(4) of the Act, if he had not taken benefit of sec. 13(4) of the Act in the earlier suit." This clearly shows that such benefit used in proviso to Sec. 13(7)(old) or 13(6) of the Act refer to the benefit availed of by the tenant under Sec. 13(7)(old) or 13(6) of the Act. The use of the word such before the word benefit has a significance and it (such) refers to the benefit availed of by the tenant as contemplated in Sec. 13(7)(old) or Sec. 13(6) of the Act. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge has not committed any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction when he held that the defendand-petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of Sec. 13(6) of the Act as he had already availed of the benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) in the earlier Suit. 12. The net result of the exercise, done hereinabove, is that the defendant-petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference with the order under revision. 13. I, accordingly, dismiss the revision application. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of the revision-application.