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1978 DIGILAW 338 (MAD)

K. R. Chakrapani v. P. G. Gengammal

1978-04-25

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Judgment :- 1. This is a petition by the tenant filed before this Court under S. 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, against the order of the Appellate Authority dated 10th December 1976 directing the eviction of the petitioner. During the pendency of this Civil Revision Petition, the sole respondent died on 7th March 1977. The petitioner has filed a civil Miscellaneous Petition, C.M.P. No 10200 of 1977, under O. 22, R. 4, C.P.C. for bringing the legal representatives of the sole respondent on record. The said Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed before this Court on 13th June 1977, while as I have pointed out already, the sole respondent died on 7th March 1977. An objection is taken by the proposed legal representatives that the said petition to bring the legal representatives on record is barred by limitation and therefore cannot be entertained. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the time for bringing the legal representatives on record is 90 days as provided in the Limitation Act, while the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents in the Civil Miscellaneous Petition is that the time for bringing the legal representatives on record is 30 days as provided in R. 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974 and that since the petition in question was filed admittedly beyond 30 days, it is liable to be dismissed summarily. Hence, the question for consideration is, what is the correct period of limitation for filing the present petition, namely C.M.P. No. 10200 of 1977,—whether it is 90 days as contended by the learned counsel for petitioner or 30 days as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents? 2. Mr. K. Raman, learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to a Bench Judgment of this Court in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar and another (1971) (1) M.L.J. 223=88 L.W. 758 and contended that that decision has considered the rule corresponding to R. 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974, and held that the said rule had no application to proceedings before the High Court. I an unable to accept this argument, because the said judgment itself does not support that conclusion. In that case the matter arose in execution proceedings. I an unable to accept this argument, because the said judgment itself does not support that conclusion. In that case the matter arose in execution proceedings. S. 18 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 stated that an order of eviction shall be executed in the City of Madras by the Madras City Civil Court and elsewhere by the District Munsif and if there is no District Munsif by the Subordinate Judge. The Execution by the District Munsif has to be carried out as if the order of eviction were a decree passed by him. It was in that context the Bench held as follows: “We do not decide the question whether the capacity in which the City Civil Court Judge or the District Munsif is called upon to execute is in any way different, for no argument has been addressed to us on that point. Treating the District Munsif in the Section as referring to his Court, the fiction enjoined attracts to the eviction order the entire procedure applicable to execution of a decree. When a fiction is created statutorily, it must no doubt be limited to its purpose, but, for the purpose for which it was created, the putative state of affairs should be excluded. In other words, the expression ‘as if it were a decree passed by the District Munsif’ would have the effect of a decree passed by him. On that view we should think, R. 32 would have no application to the execution of an eviction order.” Thus it will be seen that the Bench was considering the applicability of Rule 32 only to execution proceedings and did not consider the applicability to eviction proceedings as such. On that view we should think, R. 32 would have no application to the execution of an eviction order.” Thus it will be seen that the Bench was considering the applicability of Rule 32 only to execution proceedings and did not consider the applicability to eviction proceedings as such. In the present case, as I have pointed out already, the Civil Revision Petition has been filed under S. 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, R. 25 of the Rules states: “Every application for making the legal representative or representatives of a deceased person, party to a proceeding under the Act shall be preferred within one month from the date of the death of the person concerned or the date of having knowledge of the death of the person concerned.” A revision petition filed against the order of the Appellate Authority under S. 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 is certainly a proceeding under the Act, since S. 25 (1) reads as follows: “The High Court may on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority call for and examine the record of the of the Appellate Authority to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly”. Consequently R. 25 of the Rules applies to such a proceeding. If R. 25 applies to such a proceeding, the period of limitation for impleading the legal representatives of the deceased respondent in the present case is only 30 days, and in the present case the Civil Miscellaneous Petition having been filed beyond 30 days is obviously barred by limitation. Hence C.M.P. No. 10200 of 1977 fails and is dismissed. 3. Consequently the Civil Revision Petition which has abated will stand dismissed.