KASLIWAL, J.—We propose to dispose of all the three above petitions by one single order as the parties in all the three cases are same and relate to matters under section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72 and the points arising in all the above cases are almost identical. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the Income-tax Case No. 199/1975 are that the petitioner moved an application under section 185 of the Income-tax Act for registration of a partnership firm consisting of Shri R. K. Bhargava, Shri Raja Ram and Shri Rahul. The partnership was alleged to have been constituted through a partnership deed dated 3rd November, 1967. Shri Rahul at this time was admittedly a minor. The Income-tax Officer vide his order dated 2nd March, 1972, refused registration, holding that the said partnership was not a genuine one. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who, by his order dated 15th June, 1972, set aside the order of the income-tax Officer and held that the partnership was a genuine one. The department preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which allowed the appeal filed by the Department vide its order dated 26th November, 1973 and upheld the order of the Income-tax Officer. The petitioner submitted an application under sec. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act requiring the Tribunal to draw a statement of the case and to refer the same of this Court. The learned Tribunal however, by its order dated 28th November, 1974, rejected the reference application of the petitioner and hence the petitioner has submitted an application under section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act for giving a direction to the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and to raise and refer the question of law mentioned in the petition. 3. In the case No. 12/1978 the facts are almost identical with a slight variation that Shri Rahul Bhargava one of the partners had attained majority and a fresh deed of partnership was drawn up on 22nd October, 1968. 3. In the case No. 12/1978 the facts are almost identical with a slight variation that Shri Rahul Bhargava one of the partners had attained majority and a fresh deed of partnership was drawn up on 22nd October, 1968. An application submitted for registration of the partnership firm constituted by deed of partnership dated 22nd Oct., 1968 for the assessment year 1970-71, was dismissed by the Income-tax Officer; the order of the Income-tax Officer, was set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on an appeal filed by the Department the Tribunal set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the application for making a reference was also rejected by the Tribunal. 4. In the petition No. 13/1978 which relates to the assessment year 1971-72, the petitioner submitted an application for continuation of registration of the partnership firm. The Income-tax Officer held that as the previous applications for registration having already been refused, there was no question of continuation of registration and assessed the petitioner as an individual. The petitioner filed two appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, one challenging the refusal of registration and the other challenging the validity of the assessment The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the petitioner was entitled to registration, following his order of the earlier assessment year. However, the other appeal was dismissed by him. The Department filed a second appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by which it had granted continuation of registration to the petitioner firm. The petitioner also filed the cross-objection on the question of the validity of the assessment. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the department on the question of registration and dismissed the cross-objections filed by the petitioner. The reference application filed by the petitioner under sec. 256(1) of the Income-tax Act was also dismissed. 5. The admitted facts of the case are that one Shri R.K. Bhargava was carrying on business for some years as a sole proprietor, under the name and style of Messurs. Ranu Bros. The said Bhargava was carrying on business as a contractor and as such he was registered as a contractor with various govern ment departments. One Raja Ram was working as an employee of Shri R.K. Bhargava. Ranu Bros. The said Bhargava was carrying on business as a contractor and as such he was registered as a contractor with various govern ment departments. One Raja Ram was working as an employee of Shri R.K. Bhargava. A partnership firm was alleged to have been constituted by a partnership deed dated 3rd November, 1967 in which the shares of the partners in profits and losses were shown as under: In Profits: 1. Shri R.K. Bhargava 50% 2. Shri Raja Ram 30% 3. Shri Rahul Bhargava 20% (The minor admitted to the benefits of the partnership) In losses: 1. Shri R.K. Bhargava 65% 2. Shri Raja Ram 35% On 22nd October, 1968 another partnership deed was executed in which the shares in the profits and losses were shown as follows: 1. Shri R.K. Bhargava 50% 2. Shri Raja Ram 30% 3. Shri Rahul Bhargava 20% The name and style of the business in the partnership was also carried on in the same name i. e. M/S Ranu Bros. 6. The learned Tribunal after considering the entire facts and circumstances including the surrounding circumstances at the time when the partnership agreement was entered into the manner in which the accounts of the business were kept, the right to receive profits and liabilities, the right to control the business and various other factors relevant with regard to the question whether a genuine partnership had come into existence or not, held that it was not a case of genuine partnership. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has vehemently contended that sec. 4 of the Partnership Act defines partnership and sec, 6 determines that in holding whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties as shown by all relevent facts taken together. His contention is that what facts and circumstances in a given case constituted a firm is a question of a law and this Court should direct the Tribunal to draw up a statement of case. Learned counsel further contended that the inference drawn up by the Tribunal are based on pure conjectures. There was no material for coming to the conclusion that the firm was not a genuine one. The conclusions are also based on irrelevant and, immaterial considerations. Learned counsel placed reliance on Umacharan Shaw & Bros. Learned counsel further contended that the inference drawn up by the Tribunal are based on pure conjectures. There was no material for coming to the conclusion that the firm was not a genuine one. The conclusions are also based on irrelevant and, immaterial considerations. Learned counsel placed reliance on Umacharan Shaw & Bros. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (1), Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa vs. Prakash Ram Gupta (2), T.V. Methew and Sons vs. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax Kerala (3), Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam vs. Maskara Tea Estate (4), Jammula Venkataswamy & Sons vs. Commissioner of Income-tax Orissa(5) and K.D. Kamal, & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax Mysore (6). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the question whether a partnership was a genuine one or not was purely a question of fact and the learned Tribunal has given detail reasons after arriving at this conclusion which is based on the correct appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and thus no question of law arises. The finding of the learned Tribunal is not based on any conjectures but is based on material placed on the record of the case. Reliance is placed on Bhaichand Amoluk & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City I(7). 7. We have given our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire record of the case. We have examined the case in the light of the observations given by their Lordships of the Superme Court in Bhaichand Amoluk Chands case (supra): "We must read the order of the Tribunal as a whole to determine whether every material fact, for and against the assessee, has been considered fairly and with due care; whether the evidence pro and con has been considered in reaching the final conclusion; and whether the conclusion reached by the Tribunal has been coloured by irrelevant considerations or matters of prejudice. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the entire order of the Tribunal as also the relevant materials on which it is based. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the entire order of the Tribunal as also the relevant materials on which it is based. Having examined the order of the Tribunal and those materials, we are unable to agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the order of the Tribunal is vitiated by any of the defects adverted to in Dhiraj Lal Girdhari Lal vs. Commissioner of Income-tax or Umar Salay Mohammed Sait vs. Commissioner of Income-tax. We must take it clear that we do not think those decisions require that the order of the Tribunal must be examined sentence by sentence, through a microscope as it were, so as to discover a minor lapses here or an incautious opinion there to be used as a peg on which to hang an issue of law. In view of the arguments advanced before us it is perhaps necessary to add that in considering probabilities properly arising from the facts alleged or proved the Tribunal does not indulge in conjectures, surmises or suspicious." The Tribunal has observed : "The learned counsel for the assessee conceded before us that the facts stated in the order of the Income-tax Officer are not in dispute." There after Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that no contract was taken in the name of the so called partnership firm, no separate bank account in the name of the firm in question in the year of accounting and it remained in the same name of Messrs. Ranu Bros. of which Shir R.K. Bhargava was the sole proprietor. The assesse firm did not obtain any separate shop or premises for carrying out the business of the so called firm. The entire labour personnel remained the same. From the account-books and other material on record it was clear that the books alleged to have been transferred by Messrs. Ranu Bros. (Individual) to Messrs. Ranu Bros. (Contractors) were also not done on the inspection of the firm. Though it was alleged that Raja Ram invested a sum of Rs. 1000/- in the partnership as his capital but no evidence worth the name was produced before the Income-tax Officer that Raja Ram with a meagre salary of Rs. 150/- was able to save the said amount. During the year of accounting the total withdrawals of Raja Ram for meeting house-hold expenses were only to the tune of Rs. 1000/- in the partnership as his capital but no evidence worth the name was produced before the Income-tax Officer that Raja Ram with a meagre salary of Rs. 150/- was able to save the said amount. During the year of accounting the total withdrawals of Raja Ram for meeting house-hold expenses were only to the tune of Rs. 1,795/- i.e. about Rs. 150/- per month, though according to the books the share of profit in the name of Raja Ram was credited to the extent of Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Tribunal has further held that after having gone through the entire statement of Raja Ram it was also clear that he did not have really the knowledge of the partnership business. 8. It may to some extent correct as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that each one of these circumstances taken into account separately may not be sufficient to hold that the partnership was not a genuine one, but when all the facts and circumstances existing at the inception of the partnership and facts immediately leading thereafter, are taken into account, there remains no manner of doubt that the Tribunal has arrived at a correct conclusion. In any view of the matter we dont find that any question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. 9. In the result the petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.