JUDGMENT 1. - This revision application has been filed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Alwar dated April 11, 1978 upholding the order passed by the Munsif, Alwar dated March 25, 1977, striking of the defence of the defendant -applicant. 2. The plaintiff opposite party filed a suit for ejectment on the ground of personal necessity and defaults in payment of rent. On March 25, 1977, the trial court passed an order under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ( hereinafter referred to as "the Act") determining the amount of arrears of rent to be deposited by the defendant -tenant in the court for to be paid to the landlord in respect of the period from December 1, 1974 to March 31, 1977 as Rs. 2950/-. The trial court by its aforesaid order directed the defendant tenant under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act to deposit the above mentioned amount within 90 days in the court for to pay the same to the landlord within such period. It is not in dispute that the period of 90 days expired on June 23, 1977, but at that time the court was closed on account of summer vacation. The tenant deposited the amount of rent determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 on July 7, 1977. As the said amount was not deposited within the time allowed by the court, the landlord plaintiff filed an application under sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act stating that as the defendant -tenant failed to deposit for pay the amount of rent determined by the court within the time specified in the order dated March 25, 1977, the defence of the defendant against eviction should be struck off . Thereafter, on July 12, 1977, the tenant-defendant filed an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act urging that the delay is making the deposit during the period from June 23, 1977 to July 7, 1977 should be condoned. The trial court relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim v. Ramnath, 1958 R.L.W. 138. The trial court relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim v. Ramnath, 1958 R.L.W. 138. and Hiralal v. Haribux,1975 R.C.J. 328, held that the court has no power to extend the time for making the deposit for to condone the delay and directed that defence of she defendant against eviction be struck of in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 13 of the Act. In Hiralal's case, it was held that sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act, as it then stood, did not contemplate extension of time by the Court and that condonation delay in making the deposit of the amount of rent directed to be paid by the court would have the effect of condoning the default of the tenant. On appeal, the leaned District Judge upheld the order passed by the trial court and held that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the case and that the maximum period of three months, as provided by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act, could not be extended by the court. 3. In this revision application, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act allowed the tenant 15 days' time to deposit the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) of section 13 and such time could be extended by the court for a further period not exceeding 3 months. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the maximum period, which the defendant tenant could be permitted to avail of for the purpose of depositing the amount of arrears of rent by the court, under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, is three months and 15 days and it was argued that the decision of the first appellate court that the maximum period allowable under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act is only 3 months is erroneous. Sub-section (4) of section 13, which is relevant for the present purpose, runs as under : "13(4). The tenant shall deposit in court for pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under subsection (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, for within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall deposit in court for pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under subsection (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, for within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court for pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto such determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month for within such further time not exceeding i teen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3)." It appears from a plain reading of this section that initially a period of 15 days is allowed by the aforesaid provision to the tenant to deposit for pay the amount of rent, determined by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act, but such period of 15 days can be extended by an order of the court for a further period not exceeding three months. The language employed by the Legislature in the aforesaid provision is plain and unambiguous and there could be no doubt the it besides the original period of 15 days allowed to the tenant to deposit the amount, determined by the court under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, such time could be extended for a further period of three months. Thus, the total period during which the amount of rent determined by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 13 could be deposited for paid by the tenant could be three months and 15 days, subject to there being an order of the court allowing such extension of time. This interpretation of the first part of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act is fully supported by a perusal of the second part of that sub-section, which initially allows the tenant 15 days' time to deposit the monthly rent from the end of the month in question, but such period of 15 days could be extended by an order of the court for a further period not exceeding 15 days. Thus, the monthly rent can be deposited by the tenant month by month within a maximum period of 30 days from the expiry of the month, subject to there being an order of the court extending the original period of 15 days by another period not exceeding 15 days. If in respect of the second part of sub-section (4t of Section 13, the interpretation sought to be put on the first part of that sub-section by the learned District Judge and strenuously urged by the Learned counsel for the opposite party is placed, then it would mean that the period of 15 days from the date of expiry of the month could not be extended and the words "or within such further time not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the Court" employed by the Legislature in the second part of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act would be rendered nugatory. In my view, such an interpretation would not only cause violence to the language of the enactment but would also lead to an absurd result, because where the Legislature expressly intended that the period of 15 days fixed under sub-section (4) of section 13, for payment of monthly rent, subsequent to the determination under the first part of that sub-section, could be extended by the court by a further period not exceeding 15 days, the same could be rendered nugatory by a process of reasoning that the period given in the first part prescribes the maximum period. It may be pointed out that the similar words, as I have quoted above occur in the first part of sub-section (4) as well as in the second part and the established cannons of interpretation require that the same words employed in two parts of sub-section (4) of Section 13 should be given the same meaning and should not be differently interpreted, unless the subject for context so required. I fail to find any compelling reason to interpret the similar language employed in the two parts of sub-section (4) of Section 13 differently, so much so, that in the first part of that sub-section, it should be held that three months is the maximum period for making a deposit of the amount of rent etc., determined by the court under sub- section (3) of Section 13 of the Act and that period should also be inclusive of 15 days period initially allowed expressly by the framers of the legislation, while in the second part of that very sub-section, the court is empowered to extend the original period of 15 days specified for payment of monthly rent by a further period not exceeding 15 days. It appears that the legislature intended to give a uniform period of 15 days initially for depositing the rent as may be determined by the court under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act, as also the monthly rent falling due thereafter. But in case the amount is excessive for there are other extenuating circumstances then the court may, after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances, extend the period for making the deposit for payment of such amount by a further period not exceeding three months and may extend the period for payment of monthly rent by a further period not exceeding 15 days. The words "within such further time" employed by the Legislature clearly point out to the act that the period of three months for the period of 15 days, which follows these words, is in addition to the initial period of 15 days, which precedes the aforesaid words in both the clauses of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 4. 4. The two courts below have failed to consider the act that after the decision of this Court in Hiralal's case the Legislature amended the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and although in sub-section (4) of Section 13, as it stood prior to the amendment made in the Act by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment Act, 1976, there was no provision for extension of time, so areas the making of the deposit of monthly rent was concerned, yet in the amended provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, the provisions of extention of time have been made, not only in respect of the deposit for payment of arrears of rent determined under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act, but also in respect of the payment of monthly rent by the tenant after such determination has been made by the court. Although, Hiralal's case lays down the correct position of law, so far as the interpretation of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13, as they stood at the time when that case was decided, yet it could not govern the interpretation of the amended provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act. The amended provisions of Section 13(4) were noticed in Lal Chand v. Santram, 1978 (2) R.C.J. 673, wherein it was observed that prior to the amendment of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, the tenant was bound to make payment of rent, during the pendency of the suit month by month by the 15th of the next succeeding month, yet the amended provisions of that sub-section vests a discretion in the court to extend the aforesaid time for making the payment of monthly rent by a further period not exceeding 15 days. It was also held in that case, that an application for extension of time could be made within the period of 15 days from the date of the expiry of the month for even thereafter and the court has a discretion in matter of extension of time for making the deposit for payment of monthly rent by another period not exceeding 15 days, irrespective of the act that the application praying for such extension is made within 15 days from the end of the month for even thereafter. It is unfortunate that the amended provisions of sub- section (4) of Section 13 of the Act have not been noticed by the learned District Judge and he relied upon the decision in Hiralal's case, quite unmindful of the act that provisions of sub-section (4) of section 12 of the Act have since been amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. 5. Thus, under the amended provisions of sub-Section (4) of Section 13, there is an express discretion vested in the court to extend the time for making the deposit for payment of the arrears of rent determined under sub-section (3) of that section by a period not exceeding three months, which is in addition to the initial period of 15 days allowed by the legislature for making such payment for deposit. In my view, therefore, the payment of arrears of rent determined under sub- section (3) of Section 13 could be made within a maximum period of three months and 15 days, subject to there being an express order of the court allowing an extension of time. 6. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application submitted by him for condonation of delay apparently under section 5 of the Limitation Act should have been construed as an application for extension of time under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act and the application should not have been rejected by the first appellate court merely on the ground that such an application is not maintainable and section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. This submission of the learned counsel appears to be well-founded, inasmuch as if an application lay to a court under any provision of law, then it should be construed to have been submitted under such provision of law and merely because the application, under some misapprehension has referred to a wrong provision, the same could not have been dismissed merely on the ground that no application lay under that provision. It is settled law that if an application is presented before a proper forum, to which such application lies in accordance wish the provisions of law then such an application is not rendered invalid nor the same can be dismissed merely on the ground that the said application purports to have been filed under a wrong provision of law, but such an application should be construed to have been presented under the appropriate provision of law under which it lay before that forum. The application of the defendant -tenant, though apparently purported to have been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act should have been construed as one submitted under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act, under which provision such application is properly maintainable, as a discretion is vested in the court under subsection (4) of section 13 to extend the time for making the deposit for payment of arrears of rent, determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act. 7. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the period of 90 days allowed by the court by its order dated March 25, 1977 should be considered as a period of time in addition to the period of 15 days, which is statutorily allowed by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act. A plain reading of the order of the trial court, however, does not support this contention of the learned counsel. The court while passing the order dated March 25, 1977 has not stated that the tenant could deposit the amount of arrears of rent, determined by it under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, within "a further period" of 90 days. It has given the tenant an overall period of 90 days to make the necessary deposit for payment, inclusive of the initial period of 15 days specified in sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act. It is not necessary for the court in each and every case to allow the full period of three months, because the period of 15 days, which is statutorily allowed by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act for making such payment for deposit. It is not necessary for the court in each and every case to allow the full period of three months, because the period of 15 days, which is statutorily allowed by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act for making such payment for deposit. The law vests a judicial discretion in the court to grant as such period, besides the period of 15 days, but not exceeding 3 months, as may be necessary for the tenant to make the payment for deposit of arrears of rent, determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances such as the financial condition of the tenant, the quantum of amount determined, the monthly rent of the premises and so on. It cannot be held after reading the order dated March 25, 1977 passed in the present case, that the court had at all intended to grant the tenant a further period of 90 days besides the period of 15 days, statutorily prescribed under sub-clause (4) of section 13 of the Act. It appears that after considering all the relevant circumstances, the court was of the view that she tenant should make the necessary deposit for payment within the total period of 90 days from the date of the order, passed under sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, which period was inclusive of the period of 15 days specified in sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act. 8. Lastly, the question arises as to whether the period of 90 days allowed to the tenant could be further extended ? 8. Lastly, the question arises as to whether the period of 90 days allowed to the tenant could be further extended ? As I have already observed above that the maximum period which could be allowed to the tenant for making the deposit of the arrears of rent, determined under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act, could be three months and 15 days and in the present case, the trial court had allowed 90 days to the tenant for making such deposit for payment by the order dated March 25, 1977, as such there can be no doubt that the court was still empowered to extend the period further, if in its judicial discretion, it came to the conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for doing so Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that filing of an application is not necessary for extension of time, as it has not been specifically mentioned in sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act that the court can extend time after an application is made for the purpose. Although it is true that the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13 do not specifically mention that an application should be presented for extension of time under such provisions, but after all, while passing an order of extension of time, the court is required to exercise its judicial discretion, which it may be able to do if the relevant circumstances are brought before it and the manner in which such circumstances can be brought before the court by a party is only by means of an application. Thus, in my humble view, the necessity of filing an application, bringing forth the relevant circumstances on the basis of which the tenant prays for the desired enlargement of time, cannot be denied, it the court is required to exercise its judicial discretion under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. 9. It was also argued by the learned counsel that sub-section (4) does not mention that sufficient ground should be made out before an order for extension of time under that provision is passed. But then the question could very well be raised as to how the court should exercise its judicial discretion in the matter ? 9. It was also argued by the learned counsel that sub-section (4) does not mention that sufficient ground should be made out before an order for extension of time under that provision is passed. But then the question could very well be raised as to how the court should exercise its judicial discretion in the matter ? If a party desires the court to exercise its judicial discretion in its favour , it must bring before the court the relevant circumstances, which must be sufficient to convince the court that extension of time for making the deposit for payment would be proper and reasonable in such circumstances, before an order could be passed in that respect. A similar provision, for extension of time for making the deposit for payment of rent, occurs in Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Under sub- section (2-A) of Section 17 of the aforesaid Act, it has been provided that the court may by its order extend the time allowed to the tenant to deposit for pay the amount of arrears of rent for monthly rent. It has been held in Mrs. Gouri Bose v. Sukumar Ghose, 1971 R.C.J. 703, and Sikharani Debi and others v. Nibaran kumar Das, 1974 R.C.J. 425, that the extension of time may be allowed by the court under the aforesaid provision if good grounds, as envisaged by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, are found to exist. The aforesaid decisions also support my view that the tenant should be able to point out sufficient for good grounds for extension of time for obtaining the benefit of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13, otherwise the court will not be able to exercise its judicial discretion in favour of a defaulting tenant, who has not paid for deposited the rent within the time statutorily allowed to him. A tenant is entitled to enlargement of time under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act only if he is able to satisfy the court that he was prevented by sufficient causes from making the deposit within the time statutorily allowed to him. I sufficient cause is not made out, the court will refuse to exercise its judicial discretion in favour of the defaulting tenant. I sufficient cause is not made out, the court will refuse to exercise its judicial discretion in favour of the defaulting tenant. The court must exercise the judicial discretion vested in it under sub-section (4) of section 13 according to the settled principles which have been laid down for the application c the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. In the present case also if the tenant desired a further extension of time, besides the period of 90 days which was originally allowed to him, then such further extension could only be allowed if the tenant would be able to show that he was prevented on account of sufficient cause from making the deposit within the time allowed to him by the order dated March 25, 1977. In Sikharani's case it was held by the Calcutta High Court that if the circumstances of the case so demand and for the ends of justice the court could extend the time upto the maximum period permissible under the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It was also of held in that case that the court could extend time on more occasions then once and there is no reason to hold that the court could extend the period for making the deposit for payment only once. I am in agreement with the aforesaid view. There should be no reason to restrict the power of the court in granting more than one extensions of time to the tenant for making the deposit for payment of rent but the total period should not be allowed to exceed the maximum period provided for by law. There is no reason to import any unwarranted restriction in the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 13, namely, that the extension of time could be granted only once, when there is no such restriction for prohibition contained in the aforesaid provisions. As a matter of act, the aforesaid provisions are in the nature of beneficial legislation and a benevolent and liberal interpretation should be placed thereon subject only to the maximum period provided therein. Thus, the extension of time could be allowed under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, either once for even on more than one occasions, but subject to the maximum limit of time prescribed by that sub- section. Thus, the extension of time could be allowed under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act, either once for even on more than one occasions, but subject to the maximum limit of time prescribed by that sub- section. But the tenant should show his bona fides while seeking extension of time and if the court comes to the conclusion that the tenant has acted bona fide, it has a legal discretion to grant further enlargement of time to him subject to the maximum time limit prescribed by sub-section (4) of Section 13, which in respect of deposit for payment of arrears of rent determined under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act is three months and 15 days, as observed above. 11. Now, the question arises as to whether the petitioner have been able to make out sufficient cause to show his bona fides, so as to entitle him for the extension of time. It would be proper to leave the matter to the discretion of the trial court, which is the court of act, and that court should primarily be allowed to exercise its discretion in the matter. 12. It would, therefore, allow the revision petition, set aside the order passed by the two courts below and remand the case back to the court of Munsif , Alwar with the direction that he should proceed with the matter and decide the application of the tenant-defendant dated July 12, 1977, as if it was an application for extension of time under sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976, after according both the parties a reasonable opportunity of hearing in the matter. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******