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1978 DIGILAW 341 (MAD)

N. Prema alias Rukmani v. The Record Officer and Special Tahsildar (Tenancy Records), Coimbatore and others

1978-04-26

G.RAMANUJAM

body1978
Order.-The substantial question of law that arises in this writ petition is as to whether a sub-tenant can claim protection of the Tamil Nadu Act X of 1969 -after the tenancy between his lessor and the owner of the land had come to an end. 2. The petitioner herein is the owner of survey field No. 219/1-A of Kuruchi village in Coimbatore taluk. Originally, the land was leased out by the owner to one Velappa Konar and Velappa Konar had sublet the entire land to the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent has been cultivating the lands by contributing his own physical labour. Subsequently, Velappa Konar died. After the Record of Tenancy Act of 1969 came into force, originally the name of Velappa Konar was shown as a tenant under the Record of Tenancy. Subsequently, after the death of Velappa Konar, his son Ramaswami Konar was shown as a tenant. The 4th respondent claiming to be a subtenant in actual cultivation of the land as a sub-lessee applied for deletion of Ramaswami Konar’s name from the record and for substitution of his name in its place. Though the Record Officer after conducting an enquiry found that the fourth respondent was a sub-tenant actually cultivating the lands by his own physical labour, he held that the 4th respondent cannot be treated as a cultivating tenant after the lease in favour of Velappa Konar has come to an end on his death, in view of the decision of a Bench of this Court in Kathaperumal v. Muthiah1 .Thus the 4th respondent’s claim for inclusion of his name as a cultivating tenant in the Record of Tenancy was rejected by the Record Officer. 3. The 4th respondent filed an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer. There, the 4th respondent’s claim that he, as a sub-lessee will come under the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ in the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, was accepted, and he was directed to be recorded as a cultivating tenant in respect of the land. The matter was taken in revision to the District Revenue Officer by the petitioner but without success. Thereafter the petitioner has approached this Court questioning the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer as affirmed by the District Revenue Officer. 4. The matter was taken in revision to the District Revenue Officer by the petitioner but without success. Thereafter the petitioner has approached this Court questioning the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer as affirmed by the District Revenue Officer. 4. As already stated, the view taken by the Record Officer is that though the 4th respondent can claim to be a cultivating tenant so long as the lease between the owner and his lessor continues, he cannot come under the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ after the period of lease between the owner and the lessor had expired. This view was based on the decision of this Court in Kathaperumal v. Muthiah1. But, the Appellate Authority has taken the view that the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ in section 2 (aa) has been amended by Madras Act (IX of 1969), that as per the amended definition the sub-tenant who continues in possession of the land notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant ceased to have the right to possession of such land, will come under the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’, that the explanation also creates a direct relationship between the sub-tenant and the landlord if the lessor of such sub-tenant has ceased to be the tenant of such landlord, and that therefore, the 4th respondent in this case will have to be taken as a cultivating tenant even though his lessor has ceased to be a tenant of the landlord. The question is whether the view taken by the Appellate Authority could be sustained in law. 5. In Ganapathi Iyer v. Ayyakannu2 , a Bench of this Court held that the definition of the term ‘cultivating tenant’ does not include the assignee of a cultivating tenant. Subsequently, in Kathaperumal v. Muthiah1 , another Division Bench expressed: "It is well settled that there is neither privity of estate, nor privity of contract between the lessor and the sublessee, and that, therefore, the sublessee will not be liable for rent nor on any covenants in respect of the lease granted by the head lessor to the chief tenant. But, ordinarily speaking the chief tenant stands in the same relationship to the sub-tenant as his own landlord stands towards him. But, ordinarily speaking the chief tenant stands in the same relationship to the sub-tenant as his own landlord stands towards him. For example, a sub-tenant will be estopped from denying the title of his landlord, namely, the chief tenant to grant the sub-tenancy just in the same way as the chief tenant will be precluded from denying the title of the head lessor at the time of the grant of the lease. The head lessor’s right will not be affected by the sub-lease ; the sub-tenant’s right will therefore stand or fall with the right of the main tenant. For example, if the main lease comes to an end either by efflux of time or by forfeiture, then the sub-lessee will lose his right to possession as well. But the case will perhaps be different where the head lessee voluntarily surrenders in favour of his landlord in derogation of the rights granted by him to the sub-lessee. But, so long as the main lease is subsisting the sub-tenant will have all rights secured to him under his contract with his own lessor as well as those rights which a statute might give him as against the lessor. For example, if a main tenant obtains a lease from the head lessor for a term of ten years and he lets into possession of the land a cultivating tenant for a period of one year, such sublessee would be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and be entitled to all the privileges, for the duration of his lessor’s title". It is this latter decision which has been referred to and followed by the Record Officer. 6. However, it is seen that that decision was rendered with reference to the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ under section 2 (a) which runs as follows:- " ‘cultivating tenant’ in relation to any land means a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied". Subsequent to the said decision, by Amending Act IX of 1969 the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ has been widened so as to include a sub-tenant. Section 2 (aa) defines a ‘cultivating tenant’ and clause (c) of that definition includes a sub-tenant if he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land. Section 2 (aa) defines a ‘cultivating tenant’ and clause (c) of that definition includes a sub-tenant if he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land. Clause (d) includes any subtenant who continues in possession of the land notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant ceases to have the right to possession of such land. The explanation given under the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ states that a sub-tenant shall be deemed to be a cultivating tenant of the holding under the landlord if the lessor of such subtenant has ceased to be the tenant of such landlord. These provisions make it abundantly clear that a sub-tenant will be a cultivating tenant even though his lessor has ceased to be the tenant of the landlord. 7. The scope of the amended definition came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Chandrasekaran v. Kunju Vanniar1 , wherein the Full Bench has observed that the decision in Ganapathi v. Ayyakannu2 , is no longer good law and that on a proper interpretation of the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ it should be taken that a sub-tenant is statutorily treated as a cultivating tenant notwithstanding the fact that the lease granted by the landlord in favour of his lessor has come to an end. According to the Full Bench, the statute gives the sub-lessee a protection if the sub-lessee-continues in possession, and the theory that the lessor cannot confer a higher title than he himself possesses will not apply in view of the statutory definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ which includes a Sub-tenant who continues to be in possession after the tenancy agreement originally entered into by the landlord with his lessor stands terminated. 8. In this case, as already stated, the Record Officer relied on the judgment of this Court in Kathaperumal v. Muthiah1, while the Appellate Authority relied presumably on the amended definition which specifically includes a subtenant. The view taken by the Appellate Authority is in my view quite in accord with the amended definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ as also the decision of the Full Bench referred to above. 9. In this case, the fact that the 4th respondent was cultivating the land when Velappa Konar died is not in dispute. According to the 4th respondent he became a sub-tenant under Velappa Konar. 9. In this case, the fact that the 4th respondent was cultivating the land when Velappa Konar died is not in dispute. According to the 4th respondent he became a sub-tenant under Velappa Konar. Velappa Konar’s son Ramaswami Konar has also given evidence before the Record Officer that the 4th respondent had been inducted as a subtenant by his father Velappa Konar, and that he continues the cultivate the land in that capacity. Therefore, there is abundant material to indicate that the 4th respondent was inducted by Velappa Konar as a sub-tenant to cultivate the lands. Even assuming that the lease in favour of Velappa Konar stood terminated on his death, the 4th respondent will still be a cultivating tenant in view of the Explanation to section 2 (aa). The reasoning given in the decision in Kathaperumal v. Muthiah1, that a person cannot confer a higher right than what he himself possessed cannot apply in view of the amended definition. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the original tenancy in favour of Velappa Konar stands terminated, the statutory rights conferred on the 4th respondent, the sub-tenant will entitle him to the protection of the Act and the 4th respondent will continue to be governed by the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ under Act XXV of 1955 which stands attracted by the provisions of the Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969. In this view the order of the Appellate Authority as confirmed by the Revisional Authority holding the 4th respondent to be a cultivating tenant should be upheld. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs.