JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - The petitioner has challenged the order of approval dated 29th Aug. 1976. as well as the order of termination of her services dated 31st Aug. 1976, by means of the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. Murli Dhar Gajanand Polytechnic, Hathras, district Aligarh, is a college affiliated to the Board of Technical Education, U. P. and is governed by the provisions of the U. P. Pravidhik Shiksha Adhiniyam, 1962. (U. P. Technical Education Act). In 1974, a permanent post of instructor in the Industrial Electrical Engineering College fell vacant. An advertisement was issued for filling up the said vacancy. Smt. Shushama Dixit, the petitioner, also applied for the said post. A selection committee was constituted to hold the selection for the said post. The petitioner also appeared before the selection committee. She was selected and ultimately appointed on one year's probation. The petitioner joined her duties on 13th June. 1974. as an instructor in the college. 3. On 6th Aug. 1976, the Managing Committee of the College presided over by Sri S. K. Mittar, Director, Technical Education, U. P. Kanpur, adopted a resolution for terminating the petitioner's services by giving her one month's pay in lieu of notice. The relevant papers were sent to the Director of Technical Education for approval. The Deputy Director of Technical Education exercising the powers of the Director granted approval to the termination of the Services of the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner's services were terminated by the Principal of the College vide letter dated 31st Aug. 1976. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the decision of the Committee of Management for the termination of petitioner's services was taken under the presidentship of the Director of Technical Education, while at the same time he is the authority designated by the Act to accord approval to the decision of the Committee of Management. The Director of Technical Education was party to the proposal for terminating the petitioner's services and he was the authority who accorded approval to the same. Thus the Director acted as a Judge in his own cause which vitiated the order of approval and termination. The Director of Technical Education was party to the proposal for terminating the petitioner's services and he was the authority who accorded approval to the same. Thus the Director acted as a Judge in his own cause which vitiated the order of approval and termination. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that even though under the Act the Director of Technical Education was empowered to accord approval to the management's proposal for dismissal or termination of service of a teacher, in the instant case the order of approval was granted by the Deputy Director to whom the power of Director had been delegated. He emphasised that since the Director and Deputy Director were two different persons there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and the Deputy Director was not biased and the order of approval of termination is not vitiated. In order to appreciate these rival contentions it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and the nature of the power conferred on the Director of Education. 5. In the year 1962, the U P. Pravidhik Shiksha Adhiniyam was promulgated by the U. P. Legislature to bring about co-ordination in the development of technical education in the State to ensure proper standards of education and facilities in the institutions and to affiliate such institutions with a Board which may hold examinations according to uniform standards and award diploma and certificates which may be recognised on a country-wide basis and to prescribe, standards for accommodation, staff, equipment, curricula and syllabus for them. The Board of Technical Education which is constituted under the Act has the power under Section 12 of the Act to affiliate institutions and to exercise the powers laid down under the Act. Subsequently, it was felt by the Legislature that some limitations be put on the power of the management in regard to the college administration as well as in regard to matters relating to the appointment and dismissal of teachers. It therefore amended the Act by U. P. Act 34 of 1974 and Ss. 22-A to Ss. 22-G were inserted. The newly added provisions laid down that an institution must have a scheme of administration within the period prescribed under the Act in accordance with the principles laid down therein. It therefore amended the Act by U. P. Act 34 of 1974 and Ss. 22-A to Ss. 22-G were inserted. The newly added provisions laid down that an institution must have a scheme of administration within the period prescribed under the Act in accordance with the principles laid down therein. Sec. 22-D confers power on the Director to inspect an affiliated institution and to direct the management to remove any defect or deficiency. He is further empowered to make recommendation to the Board of Technical Education for the withdrawal of affiliation and in case of mismanagement, he is further empowered to recommend to the State Government to appoint an Authorised Controller in place of the management. Section 22-E lays down qualifications for appointment of Principals and teachers Sec. 22-F lays down procedure for appointment of Principal and teachers. A teacher is appointed only after the approval of the Director who is further empowered to disapprove the recommendation of the Selection Committee or the management. Section 22-G lays down that no Principal or teacher shall be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or served with notice of termination except with the prior approval in writing of the Director who is empowered to approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove the notice of termination of service proposed by the management. In case of punishment, the Director is required to give an opportunity to the principal or teacher to show cause against the proposed punishment. These provisions are much akin to the provisions contained in S. 16-G of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The Director of Technical Education has been empowered by the Legislature to exercise control over the affairs and management of the affiliated institutions and particularly in the matter relating to the termination of service of the teachers the Director is required to play an independent role in exercising his power of approval for the termination of service of a teacher. The Director is invested almost with the power of the Appellate Authority over the proposal of the management of the institution on questions relating to punishment or termination of service of a teacher as he has power to set aside, modify or reduce or enhance the punishment. The Director is invested almost with the power of the Appellate Authority over the proposal of the management of the institution on questions relating to punishment or termination of service of a teacher as he has power to set aside, modify or reduce or enhance the punishment. Since the Director is required to give an opportunity to the teacher in case of a punishment before approving the proposal of the management, he acts in a quasi-judicial manner in discharging his functions under S. 22-G of the Act. 6. Murli Dhar Gajanand Polytechnic is an institution imparting technical education. The management of the institution has not framed any scheme of administration as required by the Act, instead the Committee of Management constituted prior to the enforcement of U. P. Act 34 of 1974 is continuing to manage the institution. The Director of Technical Education is the President of the Committee of Management and he is actively associated with the management and administration of the institution. There is no dispute in the instant case that the Director of Technical Education presided over the meeting of the Committee of Management of the institution, wherein a decision was taken to terminate the petitioner's services and that decision was forwarded to the Director of Technical Education for his approval in accordance with S. 22-G of the Act. Since the Director of Technical Education had delegated his power to the Deputy Director of Technical Education Shri G. S. Sharma, he considered the matter and accorded approval to the management's proposal for termination of petitioner's services. It is in the background of these facts that the petitioner has asserted that the approval to the Management's proposal by the Deputy Director is null and void as he was biased because of his subordinate status in relation to the Director who was the President of the Managing Committee. 7. Rules of natural justice consist of three principles: (1) no one shall be judge in his own cause (Nemo debel esse judex in propria causa), (2) no decision shall be given against a party without giving him opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) and (3) decision must be taken in good faith without any bias. 7. Rules of natural justice consist of three principles: (1) no one shall be judge in his own cause (Nemo debel esse judex in propria causa), (2) no decision shall be given against a party without giving him opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) and (3) decision must be taken in good faith without any bias. Earlier these principles were applied to judicial tribunals and quasi judicial proceedings but later on these principles were applied even to administrative authorities who may be invested with powers to take decisions which may affect rights of others. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand ( AIR 1957 SC 425 ), the Supreme Court accepted the dictum laid down by Viscount Cave, L. C., in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, (1926 Appeal Cases 586 (590): "The rule has been asserted, not only in the case of Courts of Justice and other judicial tribunals, but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be called courts, have to act as Judges of the rights of others." In Manak Lal's case (supra) the Supreme Court applied the principle of nemo debet esse judex propria causa to judicial as well as quasi-judicial tribunals. This principle has been further extended now even to all administrative enquiries. The matter was considered in detail by the Supreme Court in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following principles of law : (at p. 157) "Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15-7-1968: ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15-7-1968: ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and I circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." 8. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in G. Sarana v. Lucknow University ( AIR 1976 SC 2428 ) : (1976 Lab IC 1546) the Court analysed the law of bias. Jaswant Singh, J. delivering the judgment for the Court opined as follows: (at p. 1550 para 14) "From the above discussion, it clearly follows that what has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias in respect of a member of an administrative Board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party." The Supreme Court has thus laid down the test that the aggrieved party has to establish only likelihood of bias and not actual bias animating the mind of the member or the authority which may have' decided against him. 9. Sri C. K. Allen in his book 'Law and Orders' third edition, page 244, has defined bias as follows. ".............bias has been very strictly interpreted in our law. In the widest terms, any interest, motive or influence which, in the opinion of the Court, may impair the 'objectiveness' of a decision or, what is equally important, may have the appearance of so doing will invalidate a quasi-judicial determination." 10. In Metropolitan Properties Co. ".............bias has been very strictly interpreted in our law. In the widest terms, any interest, motive or influence which, in the opinion of the Court, may impair the 'objectiveness' of a decision or, what is equally important, may have the appearance of so doing will invalidate a quasi-judicial determination." 10. In Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon, (1968) 3 All ER 304, Lord Denning, M. R. delivering the judgment for the Court of Appeal, explained the extent of the test of real likelihood and observed : 'So far as bias is concerned, it was acknowledged that there was no actual bias on the part of Mr. Lannon, and no want of good faith. But it was said that there was, albeit unconscious, a real likelihood of bias. This is a matter on which the law is not altogether clear; but I start with the oft-repeated saying of Lord Hewart, C. J. in R. v. Sussex Justices, Ex. p. McCarthy (1924-1 KB 256): "........ it is not merely of some importance, but of fundamental importance, that justice should both be done and be manifestly seen to be done." He further observed : "The Court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal or who ever it may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit .............. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman, as the case may be, would, or did favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The Court will not enquire whether he did, in fact favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking; "The judge was biased." 11. The Court will not enquire whether he did, in fact favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking; "The judge was biased." 11. In Hannam v. Bradford City Council, (1970) 2 All ER 690, a decision of the staff sub-committee was quashed on the ground that three governors of the school who sat on the sub-committee which held the enquiry as to whether the Council should exercise its power, were the governors of the school. The resolution of the staff sub-committee was quashed on the ground that no man could be a judge of his own cause as three of the members of the sub-committee who were governors of the school had terminated the services of the plaintiff. The test laid down by Lord Denning MR in Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. (1963-3 All ER 304) (supra) was accepted and it was held that there was a real likelihood of bias and as such the action was set aside by the Court. It was held : "No man can be a judge of his own cause. The Governors did not, on donning their sub-committee hats, cease to be an integral part of the body whose action was being impugned, and it made no difference that they did not personally attend the governors' meeting of 19th December. The fallacy of any contrary view is exemplified by considering what the position would be if there had been a quorum meeting of three members of the staff sub-committee, all of whom had been governors. To say that a decision of such a trio could stand would be to produce an absurdity." 12. In Broom's legal maxims page 68, 10th Edn. while discussing the maxim 'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa' (no man can be a judge in his own cause) the following rule has been laid down: "It is, then a rule observed in practice, and of the application of which instances not unfrequently occur, that where a judge is interested in the result of a cause, he cannot, either personally or by deputy, sit in judgment upon it..............No man can be at once judge and suitor." 13. S. A. de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Third Edition, page 227, has laid down in regard to the participation in appeal against own decisions as follows: "One would have thought it obvious that it was contrary to natural justice for an adjudicator to take part in the determination of an appeal against one of his own decisions, unless he is expressly authorised to do so by statute. At best he is likely to incline towards affirming his earlier decision; at t worst he can be depicted as a judge in his own cause. Yet the superior judge declined to apply such a principle to the exercise of their own appellate functions, natural justice had to be supplied by statute. The general common law rule, applied in administrative as well as magisterial law, is that one who has made a decision having a judicial flavour must not participate or indeed give the impression of participating in such an appeal." On page 215 S. A. de Smith has further observed : "Bracton wrote that a judge was not to hear a case if he was suspected of partiality because Of consanguinity, affinity, friendship or enmity with a party, or because of his subordinate status towards a party or because he was or had been a party's advocate." 14. The principles discussed above clearly show that a person or authority is disqualified to sit in appeal over his own decision. It is immaterial if the said person or authority does not take decision personally, and even if the decision is taken by his subordinate authority the action would be null and void. In a case where a subordinate officer grants approval as required by the statute to the proposal of his superior officers, in all likelihood such a decision would be tainted with bias as any right-thinking person would entertain reasonable apprehension about the fairness of the decision. Keeping in view the principles laid down and the authorities discussed above, it is difficult to held that the Deputy Director while granting approval under S. 22-G of the Act, could act in an impartial and objective manner unaffected by the circumstance that the proposal for termination of petitioner's service had emanated from the Committee of Management which was presided over by his superior officer, namely, the Director of Education. In the circumstances which prevailed in the instant case, no right-minded person could have belief in the impartiality of the Deputy Director. No doubt, there is no material on record to show that the Deputy Director was actually biased, but such a finding is not necessary as by virtue of his position and relationship with the Director of Education there was every likelihood of bias, sufficient to disqualify him. It is well settled that proof of actual bias or malice is not necessary in every case. The real test is the likelihood of bias in the minds of reasonable persons. We have no doubt that in the instant case any reasonable person could have entertained the belief that the Deputy Director was biased. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of approval of the Deputy Director of Technical Education approving the management's proposal to terminate the petitioner's services was null and void. 15. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that it is unfortunate that some of the institutions imparting technical education and affiliated to the Board are still under the management of the old committee of management as no schemes of administration as contemplated by the amended Act have been framed or approved. In the instant case, no scheme of administration has been framed and as such the Director of Technical Education has continued to be Chairman of the Committee of Management and it is under his direct control and supervision that the affairs of the Murlidhar Gajanand Polytechnic are carried on. Since the Director of Technical Education is invested with various duties and functions under the Act it is incongruous for him to continue as President of the Committee of Management. The scheme of administration as existing in the institution is ultra vires and it requires immediate change. 16. In the result, we allow the petition and quash the order of approval dated 29th Aug. 1976, as well as the order of termination dated 31st Aug. 1976. The petitioner is entitled to her costs.