Judgment :- 1. Two points arise for consideration in this original petition (contempt) filed by the plaintiff in a suit for partition before a subordinate court. They are: (1) In the case of a criminal contempt of a subordinate court can the High Court take suo mote action under S.15 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for short the Act, on a petition by a party to the proceeding in view of the specific provision for reference in S.15 (2) of the Act; and (2) An interim injunction was sought by the plaintiff in a suit for partition against a person who purchased a portion of the plaint schedule property for putting up a house for him to live The court only ordered notice on the application and did not grant any interim injunction: If the defendant proceeds with the construction in the normal course will he be committing criminal contempt as defined in S.2 (c) (i) to (iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. The plaintiff in OS. No. 391 of 1977, a suit for partition, on the file of the Sub Court, Ernakulam, is the petitioner. The petitioner's case as stated in the original petition is as follows: The property scheduled to the plaint in OS. No. 391 of 1977 consists of 52 cents of garden land in which there is a residential house and an out-house. The property was in the possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the petitioner's father as lessee and kudiyirippu tenant. The petitioner's father was having fixity of tenure under the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1 of 1964. On the death of the petitioner's father in December 1973. the property devolved on the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 in the above original suit, who are the only legal heirs of the petitioner's father. The first defendant in the suit in collusion with a sister and a brother and certain others 'fraudulently made a pact among them selves' to dispose of the property and sale deeds were executed in favour of three persons for three parcels of the property. The first respondent in this original petition is one of the above three persons who purchased a portion of the property. On coming to know of the sales, the petitioner filed the above suit challenging the sale deeds and claiming partition and separate possession of his share. The first respondent in this original petition is one of the above three persons who purchased a portion of the property. On coming to know of the sales, the petitioner filed the above suit challenging the sale deeds and claiming partition and separate possession of his share. Along with the plaint, IA No. 5479 of 1977 was also filed before the Sub Court for an interim injunction restraining the first respondent and other defendants in the suit from interfering with or disturbing the condition and status quo of the property pending the final disposal of the suit. The learned Sub Judge did not grant any interim injunction but only ordered notice on the application and posted it for hearing to 20-12-1977. Thereafter, it was adjourned to 21-3-1978 as notices were not served on all the counter-petitioners. Notice was served on the first respondent herein, who is the 14th defendant in the suit, on 16-12-1977 and she entered appearance. It is alleged that the first respondent with the assistance of her husband, the second respondent suddenly brought on the plot assigned to her large quantities of building materials and swiftly built the foundation for a building and is still rapidly proceeding with the construction of the building. According to the petitioner, the respondents thereby are contumaciously and flagrantly disturbing and upsetting the condition and status quo of the subject-matter of the suit while the matter is pending before the court. They are seriously obstructing the court from giving the petitioner the relief prayed for and making a mockery of the rule nisi. 3. The first respondent filed a counter-affidavit controverting the averments and denying the allegations made in the O. P. The filing of the application for injunction was admitted but it is pointed out that only notice was ordered on the injunction application. The petitioner's father was only a tenant to whom the building in the property scheduled to the plaint in the original suit was let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/-which was later raised to Rs. 20/- from 24-7-II28 M. E. on wards. The compound in which the building stood was in the exclusive possession of the landlord and the petitioner's father had no right, title, interest or possession over the compound. 10/-which was later raised to Rs. 20/- from 24-7-II28 M. E. on wards. The compound in which the building stood was in the exclusive possession of the landlord and the petitioner's father had no right, title, interest or possession over the compound. The deceased Xavier filed a petition for purchase before the Land Tribunal claiming himself to be a lessee of the compound and owner of the building. After Xavier's death, neither the petitioner nor any of the other legal representatives of the petitioner got themselves impleaded and the application was dismissed by the Land Tribunal. Thereafter, the legal representatives applied for impleadment and that petition also was dismissed. Then some of the legal representatives filed a petition for purchase before the Land Tribunal and, as far as the first respondent knows, that petition also was dismissed. The first respondent purchased 19.486 cents of the property for Rs. 40,000/- on 29-3-1977 for putting up a building for his residence. After the purchase, the necessary licence for putting up a building was applied for and obtained from the Corporation. Compound walls were constructed in May-June 1977. The work on the foundation of the building was also started in November 1977. Materials for the construction of the building have been gathered. As there was no injunction from the court, honestly believing that the construction of the building can be started, construction was begun. No work has been done after 6-3-1978. The respondent was under the honest belief that if she does the construction after receipt of notice on the injunction application, she will not be violating any order of the court. Construction was started bona fide believing that thereby the respondent is not, in any way doing anything to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings. The suit filed by the petitioner is lacking in good faith. The petitioner has no right to claim partition of the property as the deceased Xavier was only a tenant of the building who had no rights under the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1 of 1964 over the property. The sale in favour of the respondent was for valuable consideration and it was executed in absolute good faith. There is no fraud or mala fides in the sale. One of the three assignees has already put up a building and its construction is in the process of completion. The sale in favour of the respondent was for valuable consideration and it was executed in absolute good faith. There is no fraud or mala fides in the sale. One of the three assignees has already put up a building and its construction is in the process of completion. Even if the petitioner succeeds in the suit, enough vacant land is available for carving out the petitioner's share. No prejudice is caused to the petitioner. The respondent will be put to serious loss if the construction of the building is held up. The petitioner will not be in a position to pay the damages that will be caused to the respondent on account of the delay that will be caused. The contempt petition is filed simply to harass and harm the respondent. The respondent has not done anything to become liable for civil or criminal contempt. The respondent is not interfering with or obstructing the due course of justice and judicial proceedings. Respondent has not also done anything so as to reflect on the impartiality of the court. The 2nd respondent (husband) also filed a counter-affidavit accepting the averment in the counter-affidavit of the first respondent and denying the allegation of contempt made in the original petition. 4. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit asserting once again that the respondents are guilty of criminal contempt and pointing out that the averments in the counter-affidavit only establish that they have committed criminal contempt. 5. The first point that arises for consideration is whether the High Court has power to take action for contempt of a subordinate court under S.15 (1) of the Act on a petition by a party to the proceedings. S.15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, reads: "15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases: (1) In the case of criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in S.14 the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases: (1) In the case of criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in S.14 the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. (The explanation is omitted) S.10 of the Act reads: "10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts: Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 45 of 1860." In V. C. Misra v, S. K. Sarkar (1974 Crl. L. J. 962) in Para.3 of the judgment it is said: "A reading of the application along with the prayer contained therein leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner has only conveyed information to the Court of the contempt alleged to have been committed by the opposite party. L. J. 962) in Para.3 of the judgment it is said: "A reading of the application along with the prayer contained therein leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner has only conveyed information to the Court of the contempt alleged to have been committed by the opposite party. Once the information has reached this Court, it is open to it to take cognizance of it." In Para.15 of the judgment it is said: "The result of incorporating Art.215 in the Constitution is that the power of every High Court as a Court of Record to punish contempt of the subordinate Courts now carries a constitutional sanction behind it and that the power cannot be done away with except through an amendment of the Constitution." In Para.25 the Court further said: "We have, however, already held that S.15(2) of the 1971 Act, properly interpreted, does not restrict the power of the High Court to punish contempt of the subordinate Court on its own motion and that it merely confers a power on the Court of which the contempt is committed and on the Principal Law Officer of the Government concerned also to move the Court for punishing such a contempt." In Misra's case, the Allahabad High Court has referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Singh (1973 Cr). L. J. 453): "The law of contempt, as observed by this Court in the case of B.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. N. Nambiar (AIR. 1970 S.C 2015) stems from the right of the Courts to punish by imprisonment or fines persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all Courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae and by the superior Courts on their own behalf or on behalf of Courts subordinate to them even if committed outside the Courts. Formerly it was regarded as inherent in the powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of India, it is a part of the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court." In In the mater of D. B. Vohra (1974 Crl. Formerly it was regarded as inherent in the powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of India, it is a part of the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court." In In the mater of D. B. Vohra (1974 Crl. L. J. 899) in Para.4 of the judgment it is said; "Until rules are made under S.23 of the 1971 Act providing for any matter relating to procedure, the word 'reference' cannot be given any technical meaning and has to be understood in its normal sense which is 'information' of a particular matter." In Para.5 of the judgment it is further said: "Assuming, however, that sub-section (2) of S.15 cannot be invoked by reason of the fact that there is not a proper reference before this Court, we do not see why in the circumstances of this case, as stated earlier, the notices issued to the alleged contemners cannot be taken to be suo mote notices under sub-section (1) of S.15 of the 1971 Act." In Dharamdeo Rai v. Ramnagina Rai (AIR. 1972 SC. 928) dealing with S.83 of the Registration Act, 1908 the Supreme Court said: "Section 83 is not prohibitory in character and it does not preclude a private person from commencing a prosecution for an offence under the Act without the permission as envisaged in the section. The section provides only for one type of cases, namely, cases in which the commission of an offence under the Act comes to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity and even there, the language of the section is permissive and not mandatory." Under S.10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, every High Court has the same power to punish for contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has in respect of contempt of itself. This is not a new power conferred. This is a power which High Courts in India had from the very beginning as Courts of record. Now there is constitutional sanction for this in Art.215 of the Constitution which reaffirms that every High Court is a Court of record. S.1.5 (1) lays down that in the matter of criminal contempt other than that referred to in S.14. the High Court and Supreme Court can take action suo mote. Now there is constitutional sanction for this in Art.215 of the Constitution which reaffirms that every High Court is a Court of record. S.1.5 (1) lays down that in the matter of criminal contempt other than that referred to in S.14. the High Court and Supreme Court can take action suo mote. First of all, S.15 (1) is not restricted to contempt of the High Court or the Supreme Court. Not only that, what S.10 which confers the power on the High Court, insists is that'the same jurisdiction, powers and authority' has to be exercised and the same procedure and practice has to be followed in the matter of punishment of contempts of High Courts and subordinate courts. So, it cannot be said that the suo motu power of the High Court under S.15 (1) does not extend to contempt of courts subordinate to it. Further, the powers of the High Court as a Court of record recognised by the Constitution cannot be taken away by S.15 (2) of the Act. S.15 (2) only provides that the subordinate court or the Advocate General or the Law Officer also can move the High, Court in the case of a criminal contempt of the subordinate court. It does not prohibit a suo mote action by the High Court. So, if somebody else brings the criminal contempt of a subordinate court to the notice of the High Court by filing a petition before it, S.15 (2) of the Act cannot stand in the way of the High Court taking suo mote action for contempt under S.15 (1) of the Act. 6. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the Respondents have committed criminal contempt of the subordinate court by proceeding with the construction of the house even after receipt of notice on the injunction application. S.2 (c) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which defines criminal contempt reads: "2(c). 6. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the Respondents have committed criminal contempt of the subordinate court by proceeding with the construction of the house even after receipt of notice on the injunction application. S.2 (c) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which defines criminal contempt reads: "2(c). 'Criminal contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." In Dulal Chandra v. Sukumar (AIR. 1958 Cal. 474) on the nature of the jurisdiction in contempt, Chakravarthi C. J. speaking for the Court has said: "The jurisdiction in contempt, as I have said before, is a very special jurisdiction and is certainly a jurisdiction which it is necessary for the superior Courts to have and exercise whenever it is found that something has been done which tends to affect the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to affect public confidence in the ability of the Courts to enforce their orders. At the same time, it is a jurisdiction of a drastic character and its very usefulness depends on the restraint with which it is used and on the refusal of the Courts to use it except when they find that, in addition to failure to comply with their orders which may be punished under the ordinary laws, obstruction has been caused to their primary function of administering justice as authorities charged with that function. I cannot find that there was any impediment caused in the present case to the administration of justice by this Court by what the appellants h: d done after this Court had disposed of the Revision Case and made the order which it considered fit and proper. I cannot find that there was any impediment caused in the present case to the administration of justice by this Court by what the appellants h: d done after this Court had disposed of the Revision Case and made the order which it considered fit and proper. In my view, while it is necessary to exercise the jurisdiction in contempt on proper occasions, it is of equal importance that the integrity of the proceedings in contempt ought to be maintained by taking the utmost care that it is not used on occasions or in cases to which it is not appropriate." In Debabrata v. State (AIR. 1969 SC. 189) the Supreme Court has said: "A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It if is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemner must be punished. Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged." The effect of the Court not granting an interim injunction prayed for in the case on the subsequent proceedings for contempt against the opposite party who was sought to be restrained by the injunction came up for consideration in Malojirao v. C. G. Matkar (AIR. 1953 M. B. 245). The facts of the ease are as follows: The petitioner in the application for contempt and others questioned the validity of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 under Art.226 of the Constitution. The High Court admitted the original petitions and issued interim orders restraining the State from implementing the Act till the disposal of the original petitions. The original petitions were disposed of by the High Court holding that the provisions of the Act except certain provisions in Schedule.1 are valid. The petitioners were granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The High Court admitted the original petitions and issued interim orders restraining the State from implementing the Act till the disposal of the original petitions. The original petitions were disposed of by the High Court holding that the provisions of the Act except certain provisions in Schedule.1 are valid. The petitioners were granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced in the original petitions, an application was made on behalf of the petitioner praying that status quo be maintained and the State be prohibited from issuing notification under S.3 (1) of the Act till the disposal of the appeal which the petitioner proposed to file before the Supreme Court or at least till such time within which the petitioner could obtain an order of injunction from the Supreme Court. The Advocate General present in Court took notice of the application. The application was posted to the afternoon for the reply of the Advocate General. But before the hearing of the application, the State issued a notification appointing a day for the resumption of all Jagir lands under S.3 (1) of the Act. Thereupon, the petitioner moved the High Court for action for contempt committed by the issue of the notification. In Para.6 of the judgment the Court said: "The petitioner's contention that the act of the Government in issuing the notification after receiving a notice of the petitioner's application praying for a prohibitory order and before its hearing amounts to a contempt of court, involves the assumption that the presentation of an application for stay or for a temporary injunction and the giving of the notice of the same to the opposite party itself operates as a stay order or a temporary injunction till the hearing of the application. I know of no authority for any such assumption. No doubt by the issue of the notification the petitioner's application for a prohibitory order was rendered infructuous. I know of no authority for any such assumption. No doubt by the issue of the notification the petitioner's application for a prohibitory order was rendered infructuous. But to say that even in the absence of any interim prohibitory order from the Court, or of an undertaking by a party, it is not (sic) contempt for the party to do any act resulting in some proceedings pending before the Court being rendered infructuous and that if he does, then the act amounts to an interference with the course of justice, is to assert the proposition that a party should anticipate orders of this Court even in his legitimate actions. Such a proposition appears to me wholly unwarranted." In the above judgment, the Court referred to S.P.L.P. Narayanan Chettyur v. Doraikkannu (1941 Rangoon L. R.747) where the Rangoon High Court held that for a party bound by a judgment to do anything which would make that judgment ineffective, was not in itself a contempt of court and that hence the act of the person who was a party to the proceedings and who knew of the decision of the Court to appoint a receiver, in collecting and disbursing moneys did not amount to contempt of court. In Maojirao's case (AIR 1953 M.B. 245) the High Court further said: "It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the issue of the notification by the Government caused a real prejudice to the applicant and thus there was a substantial interference with the due course of justice. The fact that if a different view had been taken by the Court on the question of jurisdiction, then the Court would have found itself hampered by the notification in issuing the prohibitory order prayed for and that the notification, therefore, theoretically tendered to interfere with the administration of justice is not, in my opinion, sufficient to hold that the issue of the notification constitutes such a contempt as this court would be justified in dealing with summarily in the exercise of its jurisdiction in contempt." In Vijai Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad (AIR. 1966 All. 305) a member of the congress party, who filed a suit for a declaration of election to congress bodies as void due to alleged irregularities and mala fides of the election tribunal of the congress, was expelled from the congress for having gone to a court of law to decide election matters. 1966 All. 305) a member of the congress party, who filed a suit for a declaration of election to congress bodies as void due to alleged irregularities and mala fides of the election tribunal of the congress, was expelled from the congress for having gone to a court of law to decide election matters. The expelled congressman moved the city Munsiff for proceeding in contempt. On the Munsiff rejecting the application, he filed a contempt application before the High Court. The High Court said: "On the strength of the general principles laid down by Oswald, it can safely be inferred that the acts and conduct of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 did bring the administration of law into disregard of justice during the pendency of the petitioner's suit in the Court of the City Munsiff, Azamgarh." In Para.26 of the judgment the Court further said: "In the instant case the act and conduct of the two contemners directly interfered with the course of judicial proceeding in as much as they did not merely amount to a threat to the petitioner to withdraw his suit, but were actually meant to non-suit him by expelling him from the Congress organisation and thus removing the very bed-rock on which stood the edifice of the petitioner's claim." 7. In this case, the petitioner's charge is that the respondents committed criminal contempt. The only undisputed facts are: The first respondent and others purchased plots which form part of a property in which the petitioner claims to have some right. The petitioner filed a suit for partition. Along with the plaint an application for 'injunction to restrain the respondents and others from dealing or interfering with or disturbing in any manner the condition and status quo of the plaint schedule properties or any part thereof pending the final disposal of the suit' was also moved. No interim injunction was given. The court only ordered notice on the application. The first respondent who purchased the property to put up a residential house, bona fide proceeded with the construction of the house with the help of the second respondent, her husband. In the normal course, this is an activity Which the first respondent just like any other person who owns and possesses a property can indulge in. The respondents have not done anything prohibited under the law. In the normal course, this is an activity Which the first respondent just like any other person who owns and possesses a property can indulge in. The respondents have not done anything prohibited under the law. There is no law which insists that in the absence of an interim injunction restraining them the respondents should not do anything in the property pending suit. Over and above all these, what is the criminal contempt committed by the respondents. Lawful activities of the owner of a property in the property in his possession in the normal course cannot in any way prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. Such activities cannot in any way lower or tend to lower the authority of any court of law If the petitioner feels that in spite of the fact that only notice has been ordered on the injunction petition the respondent's, hands are tied up, the petitioner is in a dreamland. The respondents have not indulged in any contumacious activities. They have not committed any criminal contempt. 8. In the result, the original petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.