JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. :- This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the VII Additional District Judge, Bareilly, dated 20th July, 1977 allowing the appeal of respondent No. 3 tiled under section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The dispute in this writ petition is regarding shop No. 12/111m Chaupla Road Beharipur, Bareilly. The shop in dispute is a part of a building which had two other shops-one of them was in occupation of the brother of Sita Ram, the husband of respondent No. 3 whereas the second was in occupation of Balwant the son of respondent No 3 whereas the third was the disputed one. The third shop was let out to the petitioner some time back. The petitioner is doing business of selling arms and communications in the said premises. 3. An application under section 21 of Act No 13 of 1972 was filed by respondent No. 3 for release of the shop in the tenancy of the petitioners on the ground that the husband of respondent No. 3 who was previously a contractor received a fracture as a result of which he was incapacitated and that he required the premises in question to start cloth business for earning livelihood for himself and his family members. The application was contested by the petitioner. The petitioner alleged that the need of respondent No. 3 was not genuine and that the said application had been filed by her with an ulterior motive to get the premises vacated and thereafter to let it out on an enchanced rent. The petitioner also alleged that respondent No. 3 had another shop in her occupation in which her son was doing business and that Situ Ram, the husband of the petitioner, could start the business in the same. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on the finding that the need of respondent No. 3 was not genuine. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 3 went in appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge by the impugned order. The learned Additional District Judge held that the need of the petitioner was bona fide and that she would suffer greater hardship if the application filed by her under section 21 of the Act was rejected. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge by the impugned order. The learned Additional District Judge held that the need of the petitioner was bona fide and that she would suffer greater hardship if the application filed by her under section 21 of the Act was rejected. The tenant has come to this Court by means of the present petition. 5. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the finding of the learned Additional District Judge about the need of the shop by the respondent No. 3 was erroneous. He pointed out that the application under section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed immediately after the rejection of the application of respondent No. 3 for the enhancement of the rent of the shop and that this shows that the prayer for release of the premises was not bona fide. It was also suggested by the learned counsel that since one of the sons of respondent No. 3 was doing business, the husband of respondent No. 3 was not required to settle in any other business. If he intended to do the same, he could start the same in the shop which was in occupation of the son of Smt. Raj Rani respondent No. 3. All these aspects of the matter were considered by the learned Additional District Judge. It may be true that the filing of the application under section 21 of Act No. 13 of 1972, immediately, after the rejection of the application for enhancement of the rent, would give rise to an inference that the present application was moved with an ulterior motive but in view of the facts of the case the learned Additional District Judge was right in holding that the present application was filed for the purpose of bona fide requirement of the premises by the husband of respondent No. 3. It is not possible to take an exception to the said finding. The finding given by the Additional District Judge, which impressed me most was that respondent No. 3 was in a difficult financial position and that tone of the daughters of respondent No. 3 was required to open a tailoring class for earning livelihood for the members of the family. But the shortage of money respondent no. 3 was not able to get her daughters married. But the shortage of money respondent no. 3 was not able to get her daughters married. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the finding of the learned Additional District Judge holding that shop was required bona fide by respondent No. 3 as erroneous. So far as the son of respondent No. 3 is concerned, it may suffice to mention that the said son was carrying on candy business at a small scale. He was found by the learned Additional District Judge, living separately from respondent No. 3. His earning, therefore, from the business could not be for the benefit of the family. Moreover, the business itself was of such a nature that it is not possible to hold that he was making a substantial profits which could help respondent No. 3 in carrying on the expenses of her family and meeting the marriage expenses of her daughters. 6. The next question that now arises for consideration is whether respondent No. 3 would have suffered greater hardship by the rejection of the application than the likely hardship which would be suffered by the petitioner by grant of the said application. Obviously this raises a question of comparison of the needs of the landlord with that of the tenant. This is basically a question of fact and as the same can be decided only with a reference to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, no rigid formula can be laid down in this respect. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. This should, of course be done with reference to rule 16 made under the provisions of the Act. 7. In the instant case, it is worthy of note that an affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 stating that several accommodations were available. At Bareilly and that the petitioner could shift their business to any one of them. It appears that from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner did not file any reply to the said affidavit. At Bareilly and that the petitioner could shift their business to any one of them. It appears that from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner did not file any reply to the said affidavit. In this view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge accepted the averment made in the affidavit of the respondent No. 3 and held that as the alternative accommodations were available to the petitioner at Bareilly the petitioner was not likely to suffer greater hardship by the grant of the said application than what would have been suffered by the landlady by the rejection of the application. It may be true as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Court below was not justified in taking into account the shops which were situated at Lakhimpur inasmuch as the shop in dispute being situated at Bareilly, the shops of Lakhimpur could not be considered as alternatives to the shop in question. But if the learned Additional District Judge had confined his finding to the alternative accommodation available at Lakhimpur, Some thing could be said against the said finding. But as the finding given was also that the alternative accommodation were available at Bareilly, it is not possible to hold that the finding of greater hardship given in favour of respondent No. 3 was erroneous. Sri. Rajesh Ji Tandon suggested that the shops, even if available they must have been at a higher rent than what was being paid by the petitioner to respondent No. 3 Although he could not point out any evidence to prove the said fact but the correctness of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner may not be doubted. It is a matter of common knowledge that the rent has tremendously increased and the petitioner may have been required to pay more than what he was paying for the shop in dispute. But that alone, to my mind, is not determinative of the controversy. The mere fact that the rent required to be paid by the petitioner should have been more was immaterial. 8. In the result, the petitioner falls and is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to vacate the premises in dispute within eight months and handover the possession of the same to respondent No. 3.