JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been preferred against the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar dated Sept. 7, 1978. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision petition are that on April 12, 1975 Veer Singh, Food Inspector, Raisingh Nagar checked the milk of accused petitioner Richhpal in two drums alleged to have been kept for sale & purchased 660 M.M milk by marking a payment of Rs. 1.32 paisa. The sample of the milk was taken in three bottles and the formalities for sealing and packing of the bottles in the presence of the Motbirs were observed. One of the bottles of the sample was given to the accused, & the other was sent to the Public Analyst. On analysis the sample of milk is said to be found adulterated. The charge sheet against the accused was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Raisinghnagar. The learned Magistrate proceeded with the trial and by his judgment dated March 21, 1977 held the accused guilty for the offences under sections 16(1) (a) (i) read with section 7(1) of the Prevention, of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,) and sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/.; in default to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment. The accused went ire appeal and the learned Sessions Judge while maintaining his conviction reduced the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment to three months rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of fine was maintained. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the judgment tinder revision on two grounds: firstly, that the sanction accorded by the Chair man, Municipal Board, Raisingh Nagar is not according to law, and secondly on the ground that the mandatory provision of Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules) has n it been complied with. Advancing his argument on the first point the learned counsel contended that by the Notification No. F 8(17) MPH/74, Gr. Advancing his argument on the first point the learned counsel contended that by the Notification No. F 8(17) MPH/74, Gr. ISO, 148 dated March 11, 1974, published in the Rajasthan Gazette, Part IV (Ga)(II) dated May 14, 1974, P. 154, the State Government authorised all the Collectors and the District Magistrates in their respective jurisdiction to give written consent for initiating prosecution for the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and there by impliedly took away the power of giving sanction from the Local Bodies. According to the learned counsel the authority to give sanction cannot be exercised by two persons simultaneously and therefore after this notification there was no legal sanctity in the sanction accorded by the Chairman. 4. Controverting this argument the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the power still remains with the Local Bodies and therefore the validity of sanction cannot be challenged. 5. The provisions of section 20 of the Act are for initiating, the prosecution with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a Local Authority. In my opinion, the notification referred to above simply authorises the Collectors and District Magistrates to give sanction but it does not in any way can be interpreted to snatch the power of the Local Authority or a person authorised by the Local Authority to give sanction in the matter. Hence, in this case the sanction given by the Chairman in pursuance of the resolution by the Board authorising him to do so is valid. 6. Advancing arguments on the second ground of attack the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the provision of Rule 9 (j) is mandatory in nature and should have been strictly complied with Placing reliance on the principle enunciated in the case of Bhola Nath v. State, 1977 Cr. LJ 154 and State of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa, 1978 Cr. LJ 427 , the learned counsel emphasised that the very idea of inserting this mandatory provision in the rules is to give an opportunity to the accused to exercise his right of getting the sample analysed by some other public analyst and therefore its noncompliance vitiates the whole trial. 7. LJ 427 , the learned counsel emphasised that the very idea of inserting this mandatory provision in the rules is to give an opportunity to the accused to exercise his right of getting the sample analysed by some other public analyst and therefore its noncompliance vitiates the whole trial. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor controverting this argument-submitted that in this case from the evidence of the Food Inspector Veer Singh it is evident that the report of the Public Analyst was sent by Band to the accused, and, therefore, the compliance of the provisions of Rule 9(j) of the Rules is complete, and, therefore, it is not a case, which any prejudice has been caused to the accused. It has been contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that once this fact having come in the statement of the Food Inspector no further evidence was required to prove it. 8. This is the admitted position that the copy of the report of the Public Analyst was not sent by post to the accused. The Food Inspector has stated that the report was sent to the accused. The Food Inspector proved the signatures of the accused on Ex P8 by way of receipt. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is that a copy of the report having reached the accused, it should be deemed to be compliance of Rule 9 (j). No question has been put to the accused in his statement under section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, on this point and therefore he had no occasion to refute the contention of the report, of the Public Analyst being received by him. The learned Public Prosecutor fairly concedes that because there is a specific, provision about the report of the Public Analyst being sent to the accused a question in that concern not being put to the accused is a serious mistake and the case may be remanded to the trial court with the direction that the accused may be asked this question and then the trial court may proceed according to law. The matter is not so simple. This argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is devoid of force, because clause (j) of R.9 has been amended by a notification dated 13.2.1974 and there is markable distinction between the rule prior to this amendment and subsequent to it. The matter is not so simple. This argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is devoid of force, because clause (j) of R.9 has been amended by a notification dated 13.2.1974 and there is markable distinction between the rule prior to this amendment and subsequent to it. It is also to be noted that there was a specific object behind this amendment. In order to understand that object it will be convenient to quote this clause of rule 9. Rule 9(j) prior to February 13, 1974 reads as under:- "To send by hand or registered post a copy of.the report received in Form II from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken in case it is found to be not conforming to the Act or Rules made thereunder as soon as the case is filed in the court." After the amendment it is as follows:- "To send by the registered post a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report. However, in case the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder then the person may be informed of the same and the report need not be sent." A clear distinction between the two is omission of the words "by hand" and insertion of the words "within 10 days of the receipt of the said report'' instead of the words as soon as the case is filed in the court". The intention of the provision of clause (j of Rule 9 is, that the accused may be provided with an opportunity to get the sample with him examined through the Public Analyst of his choice. In order to avoid the delay this rule appears to have been amended and the time limit of supplying a copy is fixed to be within 10 days of the receipt of the copy from the Public Analyst. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is that this part of the amendment is mandatory and the provision about sending a copy through post should be considered to be directory. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is that this part of the amendment is mandatory and the provision about sending a copy through post should be considered to be directory. On the face of it, it may appear alright that the substantial compliance may be made by handing over a copy but taking into consideration the amendment of the rule the matter does not remain so simple. There is no dispute on the point that the rules which were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 4 and sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act have statutory force and form part of the Statute. If the intention of the framers would nut have been to attach any importance to the words "to be sent by registered post" and "sending the copy of the report by hand" would have been considered as substantial compliance of the Rules then there would not have been any necessity of omitting the words "by band" from clause (j) of Rule 9 of the Rules. This is a well settled principle of law that when a power is given to a person to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way only. In the present case, if the omission of the words "by hand" in the amended Rule 9(j) would not have been there, there would have been scope to think that substantial compliance of the rule may be made by sending the copy of the report of the Public Analyst by hand but in view of this intentional omission of the words "by hand" I am of the opinion that all other modes of supply of the copy to the accused except by registered post were prohibited. The reason for avoiding supply of copy by hand by omitting the words 'by hand' and restricting the mode of supply by registered post is not far to seek. The reason for avoiding supply of copy by hand by omitting the words 'by hand' and restricting the mode of supply by registered post is not far to seek. It appears that in order to avoid the complications that may very often arise regarding actual receipt of the copy by the accused and the date of such receipt, the framers of the Rules in their wisdom might have thought it proper to provide a safer course by which the date of despatch of the copy of the report and the receipt of the same may be authentically asserted and ascertained by the prosecution and the chances of grievance of the accused on this point may be minimised. Hence clause (j) of rule 9 of the Rules was intended to be mandatory. 9. In view of the above discussion, I am constrained to hold that in the present case as the mandatory provision of clause (j) of rule 9 of the Rules were not complied with, the conviction of the accused petitioner cannot be justified. Hence I accept the revision petition, set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-petitioner and a quit him of the charge. He is on bail and need not surrender to it. His bail bonds stand cancelled.Revision accepted. *******