JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule was obtained against an order, dated January 4, 1977 passed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate. Asansol in Jamuria P.S. Case No. 10 (10) of 1976 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. THE petitioner was arrested on the 8th of October 1976 in connection with Jamuria P. S. case No. 10 (10)of 1976 which was started on the basis of a F. I. R. for alleged murder of one Kiran Kumari Sahubala at about 13. 15 hours on the 8th of October, 1976 in the western side of the Honesty rice Mill Dhawa No. 6 in a jungle. The petitioner was allowed ad-interim bail on the 30th of October, 1976 with the condition of reporting to the Police station daily. Subsequently, the condition was modified and the petitioner was required to report to the Police Station twice a week. After the arrest of the petitioner an application was filed by the Officer-in-Charge, Jamuria police Station on the 9th of October, 1976 in which "requirement of medical examination was expressed". On the 19th of November, 1976, a direction was given by the learned Magistrate for taking of sample of blood from the person of the accused by the 21st November, 1976. But no blood was taken during that time. As the time expired on the 28th of November, 1976 another application was made on behalf of the prosecution in which it was prayed, inter alia, that the petitioner was to be detained for taking sample of blood from his body to be collected by S. D. M. O., E. D. Hospital, Asansol. That was necessary for comparison of the mood stained wearing apparels of the accused. On the 4th of January, 1977, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial magistrate passed the impugned order directing the investigating officer to produce the petitioner before the S. D. M. O., Asansol for the purpose of taking necessary sample of blood from his body. The said order is challenged in this Rule. Mr. Dilip Dutt, the learned advocate appearing in support of the rule, referred to the new provisions of section 53 of the Criminal Procedure code which authorises examination of accused by medical practitioner at the request of police officer. The said order is challenged in this Rule. Mr. Dilip Dutt, the learned advocate appearing in support of the rule, referred to the new provisions of section 53 of the Criminal Procedure code which authorises examination of accused by medical practitioner at the request of police officer. The said Section is as follows : "(1) When a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence of such a nature and alleged to have been committed under such circumstances that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence, it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of a police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, and for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such an examination of the person arrested as is reasonable necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and to use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose. (2). Whenever the person of a female is to be examined under this section, the examination shall be made only by, or under the supervision of a female registered medical practitioner." (Explanation is omitted). 3. MR. Dutt submitted that Section 53 was only an enabling provision for examination of the person at the instance of the police officer and the Court had no power or jurisdiction to make an order under Section 53. His second submission was that "examination of person" does not include taking sample of blood from the person of the accused. Examination under the provision means only visible and external examination. Thirdly, he compared Section 53 with Section 54 of the Criminal procedure Code which allows a Magistrate to order examination of arrested person by medical practitioner at the request of the arrested person. Under section 54 the right was given to the accused person to have his body medically examined with a view to enable him to establish that the offence was not committed by him or that he was subjected to physically injury. The examination, Mr. Dutt argued, was; for a limited purpose, viz. to assist the accused. 4. Under section 54 the right was given to the accused person to have his body medically examined with a view to enable him to establish that the offence was not committed by him or that he was subjected to physically injury. The examination, Mr. Dutt argued, was; for a limited purpose, viz. to assist the accused. 4. IT would appear that the learned Magistrate considered "that the sample of blood was required to be taken for ascertaining the similarity of blood seized from the clothing of the accused with that of the blood taken from the place of occurence and from the clothing of the deceased and grouping of blood etc. " He relied on the provision of Section 53 of the Indian penal Code and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jamshed vs. State of u. P. reported in 1976 Cr. L. J. 1680. It was held in that case that "there is no reason for holding that 'examination of a person in S. 53 of the Cr. P. C. should mean only the examination of the skin and what is visible on the body. If it is necessary to make an examination of any organ inside the body for the aforesaid purpose, this is also permitted by Section 53 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was further held that 'there was nothing repulsive or shocking to conscience in taking the blood of the accused person in order to establish his guilt. It was further held that 'pain might also be caused even if the accused is subjected to forcible medical examination". 'it cannot, therefore, be said that merely because some pain is caused, such a procedure should not be permitted other reasonings given by their Lordships to support the conclusion are mainly two. One of the reasons which weighed with the Court was that although there was no specific provision for taking out blood for examination, there was no prohibition. The other ground was that although Section 53 prima facie allows the police only to call for examination by a doctor, the court thought since the police could do it, the Court also could do the same. The other ground was that although Section 53 prima facie allows the police only to call for examination by a doctor, the court thought since the police could do it, the Court also could do the same. Exact words by their Lordships are : "it is true that Section 53 refers only to examination on the request of a police officer, but if such a power is given to a police officer, the Court should have a wider power for the purposes of doing, justice in criminal cases. " As to the last ground it is perhaps not strictly legitimate to assume that the Court can discharge all the functions of the police. Investigation is a task of the police in which the courts usually do not take any part except by holding T. I. Parade and record confession in suitable cases. It is not the function of the Court to step into an arena which is set apart for the police by giving aid for investigation. As the Privy Council observed in the case of Emperor vs. Nazir ahammad. (A 1945 PC 18) the police enjoy a statutory right (under Sections 154 and 156 of the then Criminal procedure Code) to investigate the circumstances of alleged cognisable crime without requiring any power from the judicial authorities. It would be an unfortunate result, the Privy Council observed if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court under Section 561 (A). The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order in only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always of course subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved to give directions in the nature of Haebeas corpus. In the case of cognisable offence moreover the courts function begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It would, therefore, follow that the arena of investigation is a special preserve of the police and the powers given to the police are not necessarily to be exercised by the court. 5. IT is also difficult to accept that in the absence of a specific provision the court may assume powers not provided for in the statutes. It would, therefore, follow that the arena of investigation is a special preserve of the police and the powers given to the police are not necessarily to be exercised by the court. 5. IT is also difficult to accept that in the absence of a specific provision the court may assume powers not provided for in the statutes. The implication of the assumption would lead us to examine the scope of exercise of the inherent power of the court. It may be pointed out that the inferior tribunals have no inherent power and the magistrates can exercise no power other than those specifically provided for in the statute. In the case of Bindeswari prosad singh vs. Kali Singh, reported in 1977 (1)Supreme Court Cases 57 the Supreme court made it amply clear that there is absolutely no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowering the magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. The Code does contain a provision for inherent power which is conferred on the High Court and High court alone. Unlike Section 151 of the code of Civil Procedure the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent power. Moreover even with regard to the High court the inherent power does not confer upon them any arbitrary jurisdiction to act "according to whim or caprice." That statutory power is to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. " The aforesaid observation was made by the supreme Court in setting aside the order of the High Court of Punjab which quashed the first information report. 6. IT is to be noted moreover that the entire stage of investigation is outside the arena of the court. It is a stage when the stage of trial has not commenced and at this stage it would be dangerous to assume that by dint of inherent power the court could override specific provisions or assume power not provided for in the statutes to intervene at the stage of investigation. Having regard to the aforesaid principles, with great respect, i am constrained to defer from the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad high Court in respect of the two assumptions on the basis of which it ordered the blood to be taken for examination. As to the merit of this particular case it was submitted on behalf of State by Mr. Having regard to the aforesaid principles, with great respect, i am constrained to defer from the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad high Court in respect of the two assumptions on the basis of which it ordered the blood to be taken for examination. As to the merit of this particular case it was submitted on behalf of State by Mr. Mondal, the learned advocate, that the impugned order was really no order or direction by the court. Since the accused was on bail the police had no power to ask the Medical Officer in terms of Section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code to examine the accused as he was on bail. The police could not detain him without the permission of the Court. In the circumstances, when the application was made by the investigating officer the order passed by the learned magistrate should be regarded as nothing more than approval or according permission to the police to exercise its power under Section 53. The court actually was not giving any direction but left the police free to do its work. But unfortunately the order passed in incompatible with the aforesaid submission. The learned Magistrate thought "the court has got sufficient power to make an order for taking blood sample from the body of the accused for the purpose of efficient and effective investigation into crimes with a view to bring the criminals to justice." It is further added, "i. O. is directed to produce the accused before the S. D. M. O. Asansol for the purpose of taking necessary sample of blood from his body." 7. MR. Mondal raised another objection that this court was not competent to deal with the matter as the order passer by the learned Magistrate was an interlocutory order. But there does not seem to be merit in the said submission. As the case was in the investigation stage and the court was not yet in season of the matter the question of passing any interlocutory order in the sence contemplated by the criminal Procedure Code under section 397 (2) did not arise. 8. THE question involved has other facets too. As the case was in the investigation stage and the court was not yet in season of the matter the question of passing any interlocutory order in the sence contemplated by the criminal Procedure Code under section 397 (2) did not arise. 8. THE question involved has other facets too. The problem of testimonial compulsions was dealt with by the Supreme Court elaborately while discussing the question of giving thumb impression by the accused in the case of the State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu, reported in A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1808 (paragraph 16). It was held that "to be a witness" is not equivalent to "furnishing evidence" in its widest significance, that is, to say as including not merely of oral or written statement but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Giving thumb impression or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression "to be a witness." It was further held that "to be a witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or statement in writing made or given in court or otherwise. Mr. Dutt, of course, submitted that if taking of blood for examination was allowed the extension of the logic might also indues the courts to force open stomach in cases of smugging where there was likelihood that the accused smuggler had swallowed a diamond or some other valued jewellery. It is not necessary in this case to decide that aspect of the matter, but, Prima fade, on basis of the supreme Court judgment it would appear that taking of blood just like giving thumb impression or impression of foot or palm or finger or specimen writings may not be impermissible and would not come within the mischief of testimonial compulsion. Giving of blood cannot be equated with "imparting knowledge" by statements oral or writing. In that respect, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Dutt. But, as already noted, I find it difficult to follow the decision of the allahabad High Court as well. In my view, on the circumstances of the case the learned Magistrate had no power to make the order it did. In that respect, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Dutt. But, as already noted, I find it difficult to follow the decision of the allahabad High Court as well. In my view, on the circumstances of the case the learned Magistrate had no power to make the order it did. In the circumstances, the impugned order is quashed. The Rule is made absolute. Let the records sent down to the learned Magistrate at an early date. Rule made absolute.