Order.- These three petitions are directed against the convictions and sentences passed by the First Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gulbarga, in C.C.Nos. 2427 of 1974, 2425 of 1974 and 2426 of 1974 respectively and confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gulbarga, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 of 1977, 12 of 1977 and 13 of 1977 respectively. The convictions passed on the petitioner are by virtue of section 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with section 12(1) of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 2. The few facts necessary for the purpose of these petitions, may be narrated as follows: 3. The petitioner owns a stage carriage bearing registration No. MYD. 4627. Quarterly tax due by 30th September, 1973 was paid by him on 19th December, 1973. Quarterly tax due by 31st December, 1973 was paid on 19th December, 1973 and the tax due by 31st March, 1974 was paid on 22nd February, 1974. In view of these belated payments, the department considered it necessary to pursue the matter and thereafter the petitioner filed application Ex.P-1 praying for nominal penalty being levied. The application was forwarded to the Transport Commissioner at Bangalore for necessary orders. Ex.P-3 is the order passed by the Transport Commissioner and that was served on the petitioner and he paid that penalty also. 4. On 1st October, 1974 the Inspector of Motor Vehicles, Gulbarga, submitted charge-sheets in the Court of the Magistrate. 5. It is seen from the order-sheets maintained in the trial Court that on 4th October, 1974 the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences in the three cases and issued process against the petitioner. Ultimately on 27th February, 1976, i.e., after much progress had been made in these three cases, the Assistant Public Prosecutor filed an application under section 473, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying for extension of period of limitation. The learned Magistrate has disposed of that application by his order dated 20th October, 1976 on hearing both sides. He has recorded in his order that he has excused the delay in launching the prosecution as the same has been properly explained and as such cognizance of the offences already taken was proper in his view. Thereafter he has proceeded to complete the trial and convict the petitioner. 6. He has recorded in his order that he has excused the delay in launching the prosecution as the same has been properly explained and as such cognizance of the offences already taken was proper in his view. Thereafter he has proceeded to complete the trial and convict the petitioner. 6. Miss S. Pramila, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, argued that section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, takes away the powers of a Magistrate in regard to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation as provided in sub-section (1). She pointed out that the offences in question are punishable with fine only and as such section 468(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, applies and, therefore, the period of limitation prescribed for taking cognizance is six months. She nextly pointed out that as per section 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the period of limitation commences on the date of the offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person, whichever is earlier. She argued that the offence was committed by the end of each quarter, and it came to the knowledge of the concerned Regional Transport Officer on 19th December, 1973 in regard to the first two instances, and on 22nd February, 1974 in regard to the last instance and, therefore, the period of limitation commenced from 19th December, 1973 and 22nd February, 1974; and the charge-sheets and the complaints having been filed on 1st October, 1974 clearly showed that it is beyond the period of limitation of six months provided in section 468(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. She lastly argued that the view of the learned Magistrate while extending the period of limitation by his order dated 20th October, 1976 is contrary to the clear provisions of section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because that power as per the said section is available to a Magistrate for being exercised before deciding to take cognizance of the offence and while talcing cognizance of the offence. 7. Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “473. 7. Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “473. Extension of period of Limitation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.” 8. When the provisions in sections 468 and 473 are read together, it is plain that when it is apparent that the period of limitation has expired the Magistrate loses his power to take cognisance and he secures that power back only after extending the period limitation for the reasons mentioned in section 473 of of the Criminal Procedure Code. He cannot much later after taking cognizance rectify the illegality by passing an order under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code and stating that it operates retrospectively. That is exactly what the Magistrate has done is in the present cases while passing his order dated 20th October, 1976. 9. Sri T.J. Chouta, learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State, contended that this question does not appear to have been raised before the Sessions Judge and in this revision petition. I do not see how this contention lies as it is a question dealing with the powers exercisable by Magistrates. When it is seen that the Magistrate had acted without powers while taking cognizance of the offence, the whole trial is vitiated in all the three cases. 10. In view of the foregoing, it is in my opinion, not necessary to go into the merits of the cases. 11. In the result, these revision petitions are allowed and the convictions and sentences passed by the First Additional Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gulbarga, in C.C. Nos. 2427 of 1974, 2425 of 1974 and 2426 of 1974 and confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gulbarga, in Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 of 1977, 12 of 1977 and 13 of 1977 respectively, are set aside. The petitioner is acquitted.