Order.- The petitioner is the same in all these petitions. 2. In regard to assessment orders passed against the petitioner under the Karnataka Entertainments Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), there was default committed by the petitioner and as such respondent-1 (The Entertainment Tax Officer, Muddebihal), applied before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Muddebihal, as provided by section 9(3)(a) of the Act and requested the Magistrate to recover the arrears of tax as if it were a fine imposed by the Magistrate. 3. What is narrated in the preceding paragraph is the sum and substance of these petitions. 4. The further fact that needs narration is, as against the concerned assessment orders, the petitioner has preferred appeals before the appellate authority under the Act and it has not granted stay of recovery of arrears of tax, but has already heard the arguments and reserved the appeals for pronouncement of judgments. In the meanwhile the Magistrate has taken action on the application filed by respondent-1 under section 9(3)(b) of the Act. 5. Sri B.V. Katageri, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged that the concerned Entertainment Tax Officer was not legally empowered, according to the provisions of the Act itself, to pass assessment orders in regard to levy of entertainment tax and as such the concerned assessment orders are not legal in law; because, they have been passed by an authority not empowered by law to pass such orders. He argued that this point goes to the root of the question and such an objection was raised before the Magistrate and the learned Magistrate has overruled that objection. In this very connection he submitted that when the concerned assessment orders cannot be in law called assessment orders no question of recovery by following the procedure provided in section 9(3)(a) or (b) of the Act arises and as such the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to recover the same as if it was a fine imposed by him. 6. Section 9(3) of the Act reads as follows: “Any amount of tax, surcharge or additional tax or any other amount including penalty due under this Act may, without prejudice to any other mode of collection be recovered,- (a) as if it were an arrear of land revenue; or (b) on application to any Magistrate, by such Magistrate as if it were a fine imposed by him.” 7. Section 9(4) of the Act reads as follows: “The High Court may, either suo motu or on any application by the prescribed authority or any person aggrieved by the order, revise any order made by a Magistrate under clause (b) of sub-section (3).” 8. These revision petitions are evidently under section 9 (4) of the Act, 9. A plain reading of the aforementioned provisions shows that any amount of tax, surcharge or additional tax or any other amount including penalty due under the Act from a person can be recovered by a Magistrate, if an application to that effect is made to him, as if it were a fine imposed by him, and if in doing so, any Magistrate commits any illegality, irregularity, error or impropriety, this Court has the revisional powers to rectify the same by virtue of section 9(4) of the Act. Sri B.V. Katageri contended that section 9(3)(b) is analogous to section 13(3)(b) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1948, while section 9(4) of the Act is analogous to section 13(4) of the said Act. He further argued that the principles laid down by our High Court and other Courts while dealing with the provisions of the Sales Tax Act would govern the provisions in section 9 (3) and (4) of the Act. 10. He firstly relied on the decision in Sub-ban Beigh v. Government of Mysore1. This decision is under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948. It has been held that if, however, the assessment is found to be not made under the Act, there was no bar in section 22 of that Act prohibiting civil or criminal Courts from considering the correctness of the order. In this connection Sri Katageri pointed out that under the present Karnataka Sales Tax Act, the bar contemplated by section 22 of the 1948 Act is contemplated by section 32. The above principle has been laid down while exercising revisional powers of this Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898; because there was a conviction on Subban Beigh under section 20 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act. 1948, and it was during that prosecution that the contention bad been raised before the Magistrate and the Magistrate had overruled the contention that he was barred from taking into consideration such a contention in view of section 22 of that Act. 11. 1948, and it was during that prosecution that the contention bad been raised before the Magistrate and the Magistrate had overruled the contention that he was barred from taking into consideration such a contention in view of section 22 of that Act. 11. The main distinction is that in the present case there is no prosecution before a Magistrate. The amount of tax, surcharge, etc. due is statutorily made to be fine imposed by a Magistrate, and the only question is the recovery of fine already imposed by the Magistrate. Therefore this principle cannot have any application to the present case. 12. It may be mentioned here itself, that under section 20(1)(b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, failure to pay, within the time allowed, any tax assessed on a person or any fee due from him under the said Act, was made penal and prosecution was contemplated. 13. The next decision relied on by Sri Katageri is The State of Mysore v. B.H. Hariraja Rao1. Here again there was a conviction against B.H. Hariraja Rao under section 20 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948 and a contention was raised before the Magistrate that in view of the subsequent amendment to the concerned provision, no tax was due by him; as such he had not failed to pay the tax and therefore, he had not committed an offence and the learned Magistrate upheld that contention, but the State preferred appeals against the acquittal. Their Lordships dismissed the appeals holding that the Magistrate was right in taking into consideration the contention raised by the assessee as it was his duty to find out whether the assessee had committed any offence contemplated by section 20 of the 1948 Act. 14. Sri Katageri then relied on the decision in K. Burman v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta and others2. That was a case decided by a Division Bench of this Court in. exercise of its writ jurisdiction and all the remedies open to the petitioner under the Sales Tax Act had been exhausted. These facts, in my opinion, plainly show that the decision has no bearing on the question on hand. 15. Sri Katageri cited the decision in M.S. Diwakar v. The State of Mysore and another3, in support of his contention. exercise of its writ jurisdiction and all the remedies open to the petitioner under the Sales Tax Act had been exhausted. These facts, in my opinion, plainly show that the decision has no bearing on the question on hand. 15. Sri Katageri cited the decision in M.S. Diwakar v. The State of Mysore and another3, in support of his contention. The decision was rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in criminal revision petitions filed under sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. The facts as found in the said decision are: that an application under section 13(3)(b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957 had been made to a Magistrate and it was resisted by the petitioner M.S. Diwakar on the ground that he was a transferee of the business and was not liable to pay the arrears of tax that became due prior to the transfer, but the Magistrate refused to entertain the objection and held that no objection could be taken in view of section 32 of the said Act. It has already been pointed out that under section 32 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, as it now stands, the civil and criminal Courts are barred from taking into consideration certain kinds of contentions. The Division Bench held that the view of the Magistrate that the contention was hit by section 32 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, is not correct; because, admittedly there had not been any assessment order to pay tax on M.S. Diwakar and as such there could not be any amount, which could be deemed to be a fine imposed on him so as to bring into application section 13(3) (b) of the said Act. These facts and circumstances show the vast distinction that lies when the facts of the present case are considered . 16. Nextly Sri Katageri relied on the decision in Shri Seshayya and others v. The Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Gangavati4. In the recovery proceeding before a Magistrate under section 13(3)(b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, an objection that the same had been taken only against some of the legal representatives and not against all who represented the estate concerned in the said case, was raised before the Magistrate and the Magistrate did not entertain the objection. Therefore, the petitioners filed revision petition under section 13(4) of the said Act. Therefore, the petitioners filed revision petition under section 13(4) of the said Act. A Division Bench of this Court held after taking: into consideration the provisions in rule 42 of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules, 1957, that recovery proceedings ought to have been thrown out, as all the representatives of the deceased assessee were not on record, that they were to be on record as holders of the assets of the deceased assessee and such assets could not be attached behind the back of the remaining legal representatives. The distinction in facts is easily seen. 17. The last decision relied on by Sri Katageri is the State of Mysore v. S.S. Yalamali1. This Court has laid down that recovery proceeding’s under section 13(3)(a) and (b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, could not be taken up simultaneously and that by virtue of section 32 of the said Act, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction or competence to decide the validity or otherwise of an assessment made under the said Act. Sri Katageri argued that in the absence of a provision in the Act similar or analogous to section 32 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, such a bar does not operate and as such, the petitioner has liberty to raise the contention before the Magistrate and the Magistrate was bound to consider the contention. This argument does not appeal to me; because, according to the plain meaning of section 9(3)(b) of the Act, once an assessment order is passed and the amount remains unpaid, and further an application is made before a Magistrate for recovery of that amount, that amount is, in law, considered to be a fine imposed by the Magistrate as in any other criminal case which has ended in conviction. The Magistrate has simply to proceed as per section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if he commits illegality, irregularity etc., in so proceeding, a revision under section 9(4) of the Act would lie to this Court. 18. For the foregoing reasons I do not see any substance in these petitions and dismiss them.