JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure has been made for quashing the proceedings before the Judicial magistrate First Class, Damoh, in Criminal Case No. 18 of 1978. ( 2. ) FACTS may be briefly stated; M/s United Transport Company were defaulters in the payment of income tax amounting to Rs. 79,100 for the assessment years 1950-51 to 1964-65. In recovery proceedings, Bus no. M. P. A. 362 was attached on 29-12-1976. The warrant of attachment of movables was issued under the seal and signature of the Tax Recovery officer C. G. Sangamnerkar (applicant No. 1 ). N. K. Kolhe (applicant No. 2), inspector of Income Tax, Jabalpur, was authorized to execute the warrant. He attached the said Bus by affixture of the warrant on its body, in the presence of witnesses, prepared an inventory and kept the bus in the custody of the local police. Suresh Chandra Modi, claiming to be the partner of M/s Development company, Damoh, objected to the attachment. He said that M/s Development Company was the owner of the vehicle though by some arrangement, the bus was being plied on the road permit issued in favour of M/s United transport Company. Such an arrangement, he said, was permissible under the Motor Vehicles Act. The objection was investigated by the Tax Recovery Officer under rule 11 of the II Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tax Recovery officer found that the bus belonged to the defaulters and not to the objectors. The order of the Tax Recovery Officer was challenged in appeal before the commissioner, Income Tax. The appeal was incompetent and was, there fore, rejected. Rule 11 (6) provided for a civil suit to establish right subject to the result of which the order of the Tax Recovery Officer was conclusive. ( 3. ) SURESH. Chandra Modi then filed a civil suit in the Court of Additional District Judge, Damoh. The question of ownership is still subjudice in order that the bus may not remain idle, the same has been released to m/s United Transport Company, the defaulters, and not to M/s Development company, the objectors. M/s United Transport Company have been directed to give security for the value of the bus and also to render true and honest accounts of the profits, the profits to remain in deposit in certain Bank. M/s United Transport Company have been directed to give security for the value of the bus and also to render true and honest accounts of the profits, the profits to remain in deposit in certain Bank. This interim order was confirmed by the High Court with some modification on 26-4-1977 in Civil Revision No. 435 of 1977. ( 4. ) SURESH Chandra Modi then filed the present complaint against the tax Recovery Officer and the Inspector, Income-tax. The allegations in the complaint are that the bus was attached by Kolhe in disobedience of the directions of law, intending thereby to cause injury to the complainant. He was expressly told that the bus did not belong to the defaulters but to m/s Development Company. The papers were shown but Kolhe paid no heed. ( 5. ) THE Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint under section 166 of the Indian Penal Code and issued process. Being aggrieved, the two officers have come to this Court for getting the complaint quashed. ( 6. ) THE first contention raised by the counsel for the applicants was that Sangamnerkar could not be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the Central Government, since he was holding the office of Tax Recovery officer, which was an appointment made by the Central Government and he was not removable from the office save by or with the sanction of the Central government, and since the offence alleged to have been committed by him arose out of some act done or purported to have been done in discharge of his official duty. ( 7. ) THE counsel for the complainant fairly conceded that without the requisite sanction obtained under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cognizance of the offence could not be taken against Sangamnerkar. It is also conceded that in the issuance of the warrant of attachment of movable property against the defaulter, there had been no disobedience of any direction of law. Rule 20 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act was duly complied with. The warrant was in writing, signed in with the name of the Tax Recovery Officer and specified the name of the defaulter and the amount to be realised. ( 8. Rule 20 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act was duly complied with. The warrant was in writing, signed in with the name of the Tax Recovery Officer and specified the name of the defaulter and the amount to be realised. ( 8. ) IN so far as Sangamnerkar is concerned, the complaint must be dismissed for want of sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure and also because there was no disobedience of any direction of law in the issuance of warrant by him. ( 9. ) REGARDING Kolhe, the counsel argued that he was protected under section 293 of the Income Tax Act. The section reads: "no suit shall be brought in any civil Court to set aside or modify any assessment order made under this Act, and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer of the government for anything in good faith, done or intended to be done under this Act. " ( 10. ) BEFORE I deal with the question of immunity given to the officer under section 293 of the Income Tax Act, I propose to deal with the ingredients of the offence under section 166, Indian Penal Code. The ingredients are : (i) that the accused should be a public servant, (ii) that he should conduct himself in disobedience of a direction of law, (iii) that he should disobey the direction of law knowingly and (iv) that in such deliberate disobedience, his intention should be or his knowledge should be that he was likely thereby to cause an injury to the person complaining. ( 11. ) DISOBEDIENCE of the direction of law is not by itself punishable unless the injury is intended to someone or unless the injury is likely and the public servant has the intention or knowledge of it. In the present case, before the complaint came to be filed the complainant had preferred an objection to attachment before the Tax Recovery Officer. The objection was investigated and the Tax Recovery Officer gave his finding that the property attached belonged to the defaulters and not to the objector. The finding, the law ordains under Rule 11 (6) to be conclusive unless the civil Court decides otherwise. The objection was investigated and the Tax Recovery Officer gave his finding that the property attached belonged to the defaulters and not to the objector. The finding, the law ordains under Rule 11 (6) to be conclusive unless the civil Court decides otherwise. The complainant cannot challenge this finding before a Criminal Court and so long the finding stands, the Criminal Court would accept it as binding on itself. The position then is that the attachment has caused no injury to complainant because the property attached does not belong to him. It belongs to the defaulters who make no grievance of any disobedience of any direction of law in the process of attachment. ( 12. ) THE Magistrate is bound to ask a question to the complainant: what injury has been caused to you since the bus, according to the finding of the Tax Recovery Officer in investigation under Rule 11 (5) of II Schedule, belongs to the defaulter and the finding is conclusive so long the civil suit is not decided ? If you did not care to wait till decision of the civil suit and since the Criminal Court cannot go into that question, would the Court not be justified in dismissing the complaint, the element of injury, the intention to cause it or knowledge that it was likely to be caused are automatically taken away once the finding is recordtd that the bus belongs to the defaulters and that finding still subsists ? The answer to the question gives the solution. ( 13. ) IT is conceded that there was no illegality in the warrant of attachment. It was issued by the Tax Recovery Officer,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . who had authority and jurisdiction to issue it. Kolhe had authority to seize the vehicle if it was in possession of the defaulter. The disobedience of the direction of law, the counsel for the complainant contended, lay in noncompliance of Rules 21 and 22 of the II Schedule. The copy of the warrant was required to be served on the defaulter under Rule 21 and if upon service of the warrant the amount was not paid, Kolhe could proceed to attach the movable property of the defaulter. The copy of the warrant was required to be served on the defaulter under Rule 21 and if upon service of the warrant the amount was not paid, Kolhe could proceed to attach the movable property of the defaulter. In the present case, the counsel submitted, the warrant was not attempted to be served on the defaulter and a peculiar mode of service was adopted. The copy was affixed on the vehicle while it was standing at the Petrol Pump. That was no service of warrant on the defaulter. Rule 21 was disobeyed. ( 14. ) I ask the following questions: (i) Would the attachment be invalid because of the omission to follow Rule 21 or is the omission just a procedural irregularity, not invalidating the attachment made under the authority of the warrant ? and (ii) whether a stranger third person should be permitted to raise this objection of non-service of the copy of warrant to the defaulter when he is in no manner concerned with the service or non-service upon him ? a stranger is concerned only with the investigation into his claim over property if that has been attached. ( 15. ) IT is obvious that Rule 21 of II Schedule is meant for the benefit of the defaulter. It is affording him an opportunity to pay the amount specified in the warrant and save himself of the humiliation of attachment. A third person is hardly interested in compliance or non-compliance of rule 21. Non-compliance of Rule 21 causes no injury to a third person. The injury to him, if his property gets attached, is injury as a result of actual seizure done in Rule 23. Rule 21 does not offend him. The injury does not flow out of non-compliance with Rule 21. That being so, another ingredient of the offence under section 166, Indian Penal Code is also taken away. A third person cannot be heard to say that non-compliance of Rule 21 has caused him injury. ( 16. ) I am also of the view that non-compliance of Rule 21 would not invalidate the attachment. That being so, another ingredient of the offence under section 166, Indian Penal Code is also taken away. A third person cannot be heard to say that non-compliance of Rule 21 has caused him injury. ( 16. ) I am also of the view that non-compliance of Rule 21 would not invalidate the attachment. Once the property is attached under a warrant lawfully issued, the property comes in possession of the Court (in the present case, the Tax Recovery Officer) and the only remedy the aggrieved party has, is to get the attachment lifted by filing a claim petition or by paying the amount specified in the warrant; See Teeka v. State of U. P. , (A I R 1961 S C 803. ). ( 17. ) THE learned counsel for the complainant relied on Hira Lal v. Ram dulare , (AIR 1935 Nag. 237. ). The ruling has no applicability. In that case, search was made on the oral order of the Circle Inspector of Police when the law required the order to be in writing. The Court held that immunity was available only when the act was authorized by a warrant lawfully issued and not when the warrant itself was illegal on the face of it. In the present case, the warrant has been issued by a lawful authority and there is no illegality or irregularity on the face of it. ( 18. ) IN this view of the matter, no offence under section 166 of the indian Penal Code is prima facie made out for which a process could be issued. ( 19. ) NOW coming to the protection claimed under section 293 of the indian Penal Code, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the act of attachment was in good faith done under the Act. The finding of the Tax Recovery officer that the bus belongs to the defaulter still subsists and that fully establishes the plea of good faith. It cannot be said on the face of that finding that Kolhe had attached property belonging to a third person in order to injure him. The questions to ask are; Did Kolhe bona fide believe that he could attach the bus in execution of the warrant as the property of the defaulter ? It cannot be said on the face of that finding that Kolhe had attached property belonging to a third person in order to injure him. The questions to ask are; Did Kolhe bona fide believe that he could attach the bus in execution of the warrant as the property of the defaulter ? Did he bona fide believe that the service by affixture on the bus was a good service on the defaulter, inasmuch as the defaulters servants (the driver and the conductor) would carry the information to the defaulter ? did Kolhe bona fide believe that even if the bus was being run by M/s Development Company, they were in such fiduciary relationship with the defaulter that service upon them was bound to reach the defaulter ? Did he bona fide believe that any delay in attachment was going to defeat the warrant and that the vehicle would be beyond the reach by the time he went to the defaulters Office ? Was it wise, therefore, to serve the warrant by affixture on the vehicle itself ? ( 20. ) I am not concerned with the service being good or bad but whether the act is done in good faith. Kolhe earns immunity on good faith being shown and that is apparent on the face of the record. He is protected against criminal prosecution. ( 21. ) IN any view of the matter, the complaint must be and is hereby quashed. ( 22. ) I am also of the view that the complainant deserves to be given a notice to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for an offence under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code for having instituted the criminal proceeding against the applicants knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such proceeding. A separate case be registered by the Office against the complainant and put up after service of notice on him. Complaint quashed.