Short Note : The plaintiff appellant filed the suit on the allegation that the shop in question along with the land was taken on rent on 18-9-1965 by registered rent-deed for Rs. 9.0 p. per month. It was further alleged by the plaintiff-appellant that in a suit filed by the State and the Princess Usha Trust against the present plaintiff in the Court of the Additional District Judge where the respondent also was a defendant he filed, a written-statement denying the title of the present plaintiff appellant and therefore this suit was filed on the ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that what was alleged in the written-statement by the respondent defendant did not amount to disclaimer of title and therefore no ground under section 12(1)(c) of the Act is made out. The learned lower appellate Court held that although the written-statement filed by the defendant-respondent amounts to disclaimer but the learned Judge maintained the dismissal of the suit on the ground that under section 12(1)(c) of the Act mere disclaimer is not enough. The plaintiff had further to allege that this disclaimer might affect the interests of the plaintiff substantially. Held : It is apparent from sections 12(1)(c) of the Act that any act which is in inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein, does include an act on the part of the defendant denying the title of the plaintiff; but it is further necessary that the act should be such which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. It is well settled that every word in a statute has to be taken to have some meaning and when the legislature enacted that an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord would be a ground for eviction it has to be established that the disclaimer of title made by the defendant was such which was likely to affect the interest of the landlord adversely and also substantially. Admittedly, in the present case there is no pleading to the effect that by filing the written-statement as alleged the defendant acted in a manner which might affect the interest of the landlord adversely and also substantially. 2. Whether the denial of title in the facts of a particular case was likely to affect the interest of the landlord, adversely and substantially will always depend upon facts alleged by the plaintiff and proved. Admittedly, in the present case the plaintiff has not even alleged that this denial was likely to affect his interest adversely or substantially. Nor has he pleaded any facts or circumstances on the basis of which it could be inferred that the interests of the landlord were likely to be affected adversely and substantially. Nehraj v. Amrit Kaur, 1973 JLJ 445 and Gulam Mohammad v. Pooranchand, 1969 JLJ 954 discussed. 3. Even looking to the written statement which is made the basis of denial of title the defendant-respondent has only stated "admitted". The suit was filed by the State and the Princess Usha Trust against the present appellant on the basis of title to the suit lands part of which is said to be in possession of the present respondent and a series of facts were alleged by the plaintiff, i.e. the State and the Princess Usha Trust in that suit explaining their title to the property and further explaining as to how the present appellant who was also a defendant in that suit had no valid title acquired And to such statements made in the plaint the defendant present respondent merely said "admitted". In fact this admission is not even a categorical admission of the title of the plaintiff in that suit and it could not be disputed that even such an admission would not amount to a clear disclaimer of title in a suit for eviction where the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted by the respondent. And in this view of the matter, therefore, in my opinion the trial Court was right when it held that there is not even a disclaimer of title because at no place in that written-statement the respondent has denied the right of the present appellant to recover rent from him. And in this view of the matter, therefore, in my opinion the trial Court was right when it held that there is not even a disclaimer of title because at no place in that written-statement the respondent has denied the right of the present appellant to recover rent from him. Consequently, it appears that the learned lower appellate Court without applying its mind to the written-statement which is made the basis of the disclaimer cursorily observed that it amounts to disclaimer of title and it is in this context that it was not possible for the plaintiff-appellant to allege how filing of such written-statement could be alleged to be an act which would affect the interest of the landlord adversely and substantially and therefore nothing more was alleged. Appeal dismissed.