JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J.:- This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the III Additional District Judge, Mathura, dated 3-10-1977. 2. The dispute in this case is with respect to a portion of house No. 463. Chhatta Bazar, Kotwali Gali, Mathura. The aforesaid premises was let out to the petitioners by Radhey Shyam for business purposes where the petitioner were running their repairing business of harmonium. An application was filed under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. III of 1947 for permission to bring a Civil suit for ejectment against the petitioners. The application was rejected by the state Government in the representation preferred under section 7-F of the said Act, in 1972. The respondents Nos. 2 to 7, thereafter, filed an application under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 giving rise to the present writ petition, in 1975, on the allegation that under a partition deed arrived at between the said respondents and their family members in 1967 they were required to vacate the premises in their occupation and, therefore, they needed the premises in dispute for their residence. 3. The application was resisted by the petitioners. They alleged that the need of the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 was not bona fide. They asserted that in Suit No. 141 of 1972 these very respondents had filed a written statement and challenged that the partition deed, referred to above, was sham and fictitious. it was, therefore, contended that the application filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 7 was mala fide. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on the finding that the need of the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 was not bona fide. The matter was taken in appeal under Section 22 of the Act by the said respondents. In the appeal, the learned Additional III District Judge reversed the finding; recorded by the Prescribed Authority and held that the need of the landlords was genuine. The learned Additional District Judge further found that the likely hardship which would be suffered by the respondents landlord would be greater by the rejection of the application than the likely hardship which would be caused the petitioners by the acceptance of this application. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 5. The learned Additional District Judge further found that the likely hardship which would be suffered by the respondents landlord would be greater by the rejection of the application than the likely hardship which would be caused the petitioners by the acceptance of this application. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 5. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the basis of the application filed under Section 21 of U P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was the partition deed alleged to have been arrived at by the ancestors respondents Nos. 2 to 7 and their family members. In pursuance of the aid partition deed, a suit was filed by sons of the co-sharers against the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 and in the written statement filed on their behalf respondents Nos. 2 to 7), the said respondents asserted that the partition deed was fictitious. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that if according to respondents No. 2 to 7 themselves the partition deed was fictitious, the aforesaid respondents could not have any apprehension of being ejected from the premises in dispute, and hence the application filed by the said respondents for the ejectment of the petitioners was only a device with some oblique motive, and the same should have been rejected by the courts below. The submission made was countered by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. It may be mentioned here that the learned Additional District Judge held that the defence filed by the respondents Nos 2 to 7 in the aforesaid suit will not come on the way of the respondents in the filing of the application inasmuch as the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 had taken up the plea advisedly to delay their eviction. 6. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am not prepared to accept the submission made by the petitioner's counsel It appears from the written statement filed in suit No 141 of 1472 that the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 alleged that the partition deed, referred to above, was not binding on them. But, that by itself should not deprive the said respondents of the release of the premises in occupation of the petitioners. 2 to 7 alleged that the partition deed, referred to above, was not binding on them. But, that by itself should not deprive the said respondents of the release of the premises in occupation of the petitioners. It may be correct that the said written statement was admissible in evidence as a piece of evidence as against the respondents Nos. 2 to 7, but the petitioners could take advantage of it provided they established that the allegations made therein were not untrue. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge found that the averments made were made with a designed purpose of merely saving their ejectment. Hence, the same cannot be considered to be an admission binding on the respondents, particularly when the petitioners have not suffered due to the said admission. A party can take advantage of an admission if he has suffered on account of the same, made by the other side although untrue. In the present case, such a position does not obtain. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge was right in holding that the allegations made in the written statement were not binding on respondents Nos. 2 to 7, and that the application filed by the said respondents could not be rejected on that basis. 7. Coming to the second question about the comparative needs of the parties, it would suffice to mention that the learned Additional District Judge held, after consideration of the evidence, that the petitioners had an alternative accommodation available to them, and they could shift their business to the said alternative accommodation. For the purpose of determining the question of requirement of a landlord or that of a tenant, what is necessary to be seen is whether any alternative accommodation is available to him. If it is found that an alternative accommodation is available then the finding regarding likely hardship can be given against the person to whom such an accommodation may be obtainable. In view of the finding of the court below that the petitioners have an alternative accommodation available to them and that they could shift their business of repairing of harmonium there ; the order of the Prescribed Authority was rightly set aside by the learned Additional District Judge. 8. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. 8. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. The petitioners are granted two months' time to vacate the premises in dispute provided the petitioners pay the rent of the premises in dispute due within a period of one month from today.