JUDGMENT 1. THESE are there appeals from decisions in writ application, two of them are from the decision of sabyasachi Mukharji, J., preferred by the petitioner and the respondent respectively and the other appeal is from the decision of a. K. Janah, J., preferred by the party who was the respondent in the relevant writ application. 2. THE case of Brooke Bond is that it has gix factories in India at the following places : (1) 3, Hyde Road, Calcutta. (2) Tundla in Uttar Pradesh. (3) Kanhan near Nagpur in Maharashtra. (4) Jamnagar in Gujarat. (5) Ghatkeswar near Hyderabad in andhra Pradesh. (6) Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu. The first three factories are exclusively engaged in the manufacturing process of tea whereas the last three factories are exclusively engaged in the manufacturing process of tea and coffee. The company manufactures in its factories at Jamnagar, Ghatkeswar and coimbatore pure coffee as well as coffee chicory mixture. For this purpose, chicory is blended with coffee and sold as coffee blended with chicory. The company does not deal in chicory as a separate item. It is alleged that all the said factories are seasonal factories within the meaning of s. 2 (12) of the Employees' State Insurance act, 1948, and as such, they are not covered by the Act. The head office of the company is located at 9, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta, and its thirty-three branch offices and six accounts offices are spread all over the country. These branch offices and accounts offices are entirely independent of the said factories. The sales staff employed in the branch offices have nothing to do with the purchase of raw materials, blending and packing of tea, nor are they in any way connected with the administration of any of the factories. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation accepted the position that the factories of the company were seasonal factories and were beyond the purview of the Act until the amendment of S. 2 (12), by the amending Act, namely, Act 44 of 1966, which came into force on 28 January 1968. By a letter, dated 23 May 1970, the Insurance Commissioner, employees' State Insurance Corporation, claimed that all the six factories of the company were covered by the Act as amended by the amending Act, namely, Act 44 of 1966, and directed the company to comply with the provisions of the Act. By a letter, dated 23 May 1970, the Insurance Commissioner, employees' State Insurance Corporation, claimed that all the six factories of the company were covered by the Act as amended by the amending Act, namely, Act 44 of 1966, and directed the company to comply with the provisions of the Act. It appears that a correspondence followed between the company and the authorities of the Employees' state Insurance Corporation. In spite of the representation of the company that its factories were seasonal factories and were as such beyond the purview of the Act, the Regional director of the Employees' State Insurance corporation maintained that the factories of the company were not seasonal factories, and by his letter, dated 3 June 1970, directed the company to comply with the various provisions of the Act. The company, being aggrieved by the actions of the authorities of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation in attempting to apply the provisions of the Act to the factories of the company, moved a writ petition and obtained a rule nisi being Civil rule No. 5832 (W)of 1970. An affidavit- in -opposition was filed on behalf of the authorities of the Employees' State Insurance corporation. In that affidavit it was stated, inter alia, that the factories of the company at 3, Hyde Road, Calcutta, was engaged in the process of blending and packing of tea and despatching of the packets of tea. It was further stated that there was a workshop in the said factory doing the work of repairing and maintenance of machinery used in the factory. In the other factories, the company was engaged in the manufacturing process of tea blending, packing or repacking and the last three factories were also engaged in the manufacturing process of coffee as well as coffee and chicory mixture. All the said factories were engaged for more than seven months in a year in the process of blending and packing of tea and blending and packing of coffee as also roasting and grinding of chicory for being blended with coffee. The Lipton (India), Ltd., has a factory at 1, Transport Depot Road, Kidderpore, calcutta, where tea is blended and packed by the company. The Lipton (India), Ltd., has a factory at 1, Transport Depot Road, Kidderpore, calcutta, where tea is blended and packed by the company. In this case also it is contended by the company that its said factory is a seasonal factory within the meaning of s. 2 (12) of the Act and, as such, it is not covered by the Act. As the authorities of the Employees' State Insurance corporation sought to apply the provisions of the Act to the said factory of the company, a writ petition was moved by the company. A rule nisi being Civil Rule No. 5601 (W) of 1970, was issued on the said writ petition. The rule was opposed by the authorities of the employees' State Insurance Corporation by an affidavit- in- opposition. It was pointed out in the said affidavit that the factory of the company at I, Transport Depot Road, calcutta, was normally engaged in the procees of blending and packing of tea. There was another factory of the company at 47, Hyde road, Calcutta, which was engaged in packing tea and also in manufacturing different machines used for manufacturing, blending and packing tea and in repairing those machines. The said factories, it was further contended, were also engaged in such work for more than seven months in a year and, accordingly, they were not seasonal factories. It was contended that the provisions of the Act applied to the said factories. 3. SO far as the rule nisi obtained by the brooke Bond India, Ltd., is concerned, sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who heard the rule held that all the said factories, except the factory at 3, Hyde Road, Calcutta, were seasonal factories and were, therefore, beyond the purview of the Act. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge quashed the order of the Insurance Commissioner as contained in his letter, dated 23 May 1970 (annexure C to the writ petition). The question whether the repairing shop at 3, Hyde Road, Calcutta, was engaged in a process incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process of tea and coffee and the question whether roasting of coffee with chicory was manufacture of coffee or process incidental to or connected with the manufacture of coffee, were not decided by the learned Judge, as in the opinion of the learned Judge, such questions involved determination of facts. The learned Judge, however, granted liberty to the Employees' State Insurance corporation to decide the same. The learned Judge took the view that the other question, namely, whether the employees of the sales department and the accounts section of the company would be covered by the Act was dependent on the determination of the question whether the factories of the comply ere seasonal factories or not and accordingly, the said question did not fall for consideration. The rule nisi was made absolute to the extent indicated above, 4. THE other rule obtained by the Lipton India, Ltd., was heard by Arun Kumar janah, J., who also took the view that the factories of the company both at 1, Transport depot Road, Kidderpore, Calcutta, and at 47, hyde Road, Calcutta, were seasonal factories and so the provisions of the Act were not applicable to them. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge made the rule absolute and quashed the order of the authorities of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation directing the company to comply with the provisions of the Act. Being aggrieved by the said judgments passed in the aforesaid two rules the authorities of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation have preferred two appeals. Brooke bond India, Ltd., has filed a cross-appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Judge in so far as it granted liberty to the authorities in deciding the questions which were not decided by the learned Judge as stated above, particularly the question whether the factory at 3, Hyde Road, Calcutta, consisting of a repairing shop was a seasonal factory or not. 5. BY an amending Act, namely, Act 44 of 1966, the definition of "seasonal factory" appearing in Sub-sec. (12) of S. 2 of the employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, was amended and the main question raised in these three appeals is what is the legal effect of that amendment ? 6. 5. BY an amending Act, namely, Act 44 of 1966, the definition of "seasonal factory" appearing in Sub-sec. (12) of S. 2 of the employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, was amended and the main question raised in these three appeals is what is the legal effect of that amendment ? 6. SUB-SECTION (12) of S. 2 as it stood after the amendment referred to above is as follows: " 'factory' means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power oris ordinarily so carried on but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952, or a railway running shed; 'seasonal factory' means a factory which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the following manufacturing processes, namely, cotton ginning, cotton or jute pressing, de-cortication of groundnuts, the manufacture of coffee, indigo, lac, rubber, sugar (including gur) or tea or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the aforesaid processes [and includes a factory which is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year (a) in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee; or (b) any such other manufacturing process as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify]; the expressions 'manufacturing process' and 'power' shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Factories act, 1948. " By the said amending Act of 1966, the words appearing within the square brackets shown above were added to the definition of "seasonal factory. " 7. SUB-SECTION (4) of S. 1 of the Employees' state Insurance Act, 1948, provides that it shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories. Thus, factories which are seasonal factories within the meaning of the Act are exempt from the operation of the Employees' State Insurance Act. 8. ADMITTEDLY, before the amendment referred to above both the parties concerned proceeded on the footing that the factories of the two companies involved in the present cases were seasonal factories and they were, as such, not subject to the provisions of the employees' State Insurance Act. 8. ADMITTEDLY, before the amendment referred to above both the parties concerned proceeded on the footing that the factories of the two companies involved in the present cases were seasonal factories and they were, as such, not subject to the provisions of the employees' State Insurance Act. After the said amendment, the Employees' State Insurance corporation took the stand that by reason of the change effected in the definition of "seasonal factory," the factories of the companies concerned ceased to be "seasonal factories" and were, as such bound to comply with the requisitions made by the Corporation in terms of the provisions of the employees' State Insurance Act. The two companies, on the other hand, assert that they were "seasonal factories" according to the definition of that expression as it stood before the amendment and that by the amendment the scope of the definition was further extended. Thus, in substance, the case of the two companies is that there was no abridgment of the original definition of "seasonal factory" but there was enlargement of that definition which in effect meant that some factories which according to the old definition would not come within the meaning of "seasonal factory" came to be covered by the definition of "seasonal factory" as it stood after the amendment by virtue of the further enlargement of the definition effected by the amending Act. As already pointed out both the parties concerned maintained that before the amendment the factories in question were seasonal factories within the meaning of the definition of that expression. But that does not, in our opinion, preclude either of them from taking the stand that even before such amendment the factories in question were only factories and not "seasonal factories" and were thus not entitled to the protection that the Act aforded to "seasonal factories. " 9. ADMITTEDLY, the factories in question are engaged exclusively in the manufacture of tea and coffee. It is also the admitted position that the manufacturing process in those factories is being carried on with the aid of power. Thus, there can be no doubt that they are factories within the meaning of the definition of "factory" in Sub-sec. (12) of S. 2 of the Act. The companies also do the work of blending tea or coffee, as the case may be, and of packing them. Thus, there can be no doubt that they are factories within the meaning of the definition of "factory" in Sub-sec. (12) of S. 2 of the Act. The companies also do the work of blending tea or coffee, as the case may be, and of packing them. Thus, the question is whether blending or packing or repacking of tea or coffee is a manufacturing process or if it is not so, whether blending, packing or repacking are processes incidental to or connected with the manufacture of tea or coffee, as the case may be. The expression "manufacturing process" while used in relation to the Employees' State Insurance Act shall have the meaning respectively assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948. "manufacturing process" as defined in CI. (k) of S. 2 of the factories Act means "any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. " The word "blending" is not specifically mentioned in the said definition of "manufacturing process." To blend means, according to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Vol. I, 1959 Reprint], to mix, to mingle, especially to mix (spirits, teas, wines, etc.) so as to produce a certain quality. It is common knowledge that in the process of manufacture of tea the process of blending is a must. The word "blending" is thus inextricably connected with the process of making tea. The word "making" is specifically mentioned in cl (it) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Having regard to all these, it ought to be held that "blending" is comprehended within the meaning of "manufacturing process" of tea. Farther, even if it be conceded for the sake of argument, though I find it difficult to so concede, that as "blending" is not specifically mentioned in the said CI. (k) of S. 2 of the factories Act, 1948, "blending" cannot be regarded as coming within the purview of the "manufacturing process. " There can be no doubt whatsoever that "blending" is a process which is connected with the manufacture of tea. We cannot think of the manufacture of tea without there being the process of "blending." The process of treating or adapting tea with a view to its use or sale, of necessity involves the blending of tea. " There can be no doubt whatsoever that "blending" is a process which is connected with the manufacture of tea. We cannot think of the manufacture of tea without there being the process of "blending." The process of treating or adapting tea with a view to its use or sale, of necessity involves the blending of tea. The word "blending" was accordingly not required to be specifically mentioned in the definition of manufacturing process. Treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use or sale is manufacturing process according to the definition of manufacturing process referred to above. Thus, because of the operation of blending, it cannot be said that the factories ceased to be "seasonal factories" within the waning of the definition as it stood before the amendment referred to above. The word packing" finds particular mention in the definition of "manufacturing process" given in and CL (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. "repacking" is nothing other than packing again. Thus, the fact that the operation of blending, packing and repacking goes on there in the factories concerned cannot make the factories concerned anything other than seasonal factories. 10. SABYASACHI Mukharji, J., in his decision which is the subject-matter of two of the appeals here relied on the observations made in the cases of Ardeshir H. Bhiwdndiwala v. State of Bombay [a. I. R. 1962 S. C. 29], v. P. Gopala Rao v. Public Prosecutor, Andhra pradesh [a. I. R. 1970 S. C. 66] and State of kerala v. Patel [19611 L. L. J. 549], and held that in his opinion blending, packing and repacking were certainly manufacturing processes incidental to or connected with the manufacture of tea or coffee. In view of what we have already stated we cannot but hold that blending, packing and repacking are comprehended within the meaning of manufacturing process as defined in CI (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, and not merely a process incidental to the manufacture of tea. In view of the discussions aforesaid we cannot but hold that the factories in question were seasonal factories within the meaning of that definition as it stood before the amendment. In view of the discussions aforesaid we cannot but hold that the factories in question were seasonal factories within the meaning of that definition as it stood before the amendment. The next question that calls for determination in these appeals is whether after the amendment referred to above the factories in question ceased to be seasonal factories within the meaning of the amended definition of that expression. It appears from the definition as it stood after the amendment that by the amendment there was only the addition of the following to the original definition: " and includes a factory which is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year, (a) in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee; or (b) any such other manufacturing process as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify. " 11. THE contention of the Employees* State insurance Corporation is that after the amendment of the definition of " seasonal factory the factories in question ceased to be " seasonal factories. " The legal effect of the amendment is to be ascertained. In the matter of such ascertainment of the legal effect a reference to a passage appearing at page 218 of Craies on statute Lew, (1971 Edn.), will be quite pertinent and helpful: " There are two forms of interpretation clause. In one, where the word defined is declared to 'mean' so and so, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In the other, where the word defined is declared to' include' so and so, the definition is extensive. " 12. IN the definition of "seasonal factory " as it stood before the amendment the word "means" is used and so the definition as it stood before the amendment was to be considered as explanatory and prima facie restrictive. It has already been pointed out that having regard to the definition as it stood before the amendment the factories in question were found to be seasonal factories. That part of the definition which was introduced by the amending Act must, therefore, normally be taken to have enlarged the meaning of the words "seasonal factory" and cannot be said to have detracted from the meaning that was assigned to it by the definition as it stood before the amendment. That part of the definition which was introduced by the amending Act must, therefore, normally be taken to have enlarged the meaning of the words "seasonal factory" and cannot be said to have detracted from the meaning that was assigned to it by the definition as it stood before the amendment. The words ''and includes" do not in any way restrict the original definition but only seek to enlarge its scope. With a view to showing that the word "include" when used in an interpretation clause cannot invariably in all cases be regarded as a word of enlargement, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in south Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers' association and another v. State of Gujarat and another [19771 L. L. N. 1]. In that case, it was observed that it was true that "includes" is generally used as a word of extension but the meaning of a word or phrase is extended when it is said to include things that would not properly fall within its ordinary connotation. Thus, the general rule regarding interpretation of the word "includes" is not disputed. But in the special circumstances of that case the Supreme Court held that the word "includes" was not a word of extension but was one of limitation. In the Supreme Court case referred to above the question that arose for decision was the true construction of the explanation to entry (22) of Part I of the schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. It was held that the word "includes" was used in the said entry (22) in the sense of "means". and in that view of the matter the word "includes" was not a word of extension but of limitation. Thus, the general rule that the word "includes" is one of extension can be departed from only in cases where the context with reference to which the word is used requires such departure. In the Supreme court case referred to above the explanation to entry (22) says that for the purpose of entry (22) potteries industry includes the manufacture of nine articles of pottery specified in the explanation. In that context it was argued that the articles men tioned in the explanation were intended to be exhaustive of the objects covered by entry (22). In that context it was argued that the articles men tioned in the explanation were intended to be exhaustive of the objects covered by entry (22). In that context the Court declined to hold that the definition would include other articles of pottery than those specifically mentioned. In the present case, the position is otherwise and the context with reference to which the word "includes" was used cannot warrant a departure from the general principle that the word "includes" was one of extension and not of limitation. In the definition with which we are concerned the word "means" was also used and after exhausting the processes the engagement wherein would make a factory a "seasonal factory," the definition included some particular processes the engagement wherein would render a factory a seasonal factory only if such particular processes were carried on for a period not exceeding seven months in a year. Thus, in the present case, there is no reason for regarding the word "includes" as one of limitation. The result, therefore, is that the amendment in the present case can in no way touch those factories which before the amendment were seasonal factories within the meaning of the unamended definition. What then is the effect of the amendment? The amendment cannot be regarded as entirely redundant. The Legislature brought about the amendment with a definite object and that object obviously is to enlarge the scope of the original definition and to bring within its purview some factories which before the amendment were not seasonal factories according to the restrictive meaning assigned to it. by the original definition before the amendment. Before the amendment a factory to become a seasonal factory must be one which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the manufacturing processes referred to therein. But after the amendment a factory which is not exclusively engaged in the manufacturing processes referred to in the original unamended definition of "seasonal factory" but is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee would be regarded as a "seasonal factory. But after the amendment a factory which is not exclusively engaged in the manufacturing processes referred to in the original unamended definition of "seasonal factory" but is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee would be regarded as a "seasonal factory. " There may be factories which are not exclusively engaged in the manufacture of tea or coffee or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the processes referred to in the earlier part of the definition of seasonal factory but which may be engaged in the blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee and in other pursuits but not such pursuits as may bring them within the definition of factories. Such factories not being factories exclusively engaged in the manufacturing processes referred to in the definition of seasonal factories as it stood before the amendment would not be seasonal factories according to the definition as it stood before the amendment. But after the amendment such factories would come within the meaning of seasonal factories provided they are engaged in the process of blending, packing or repacking only for a period not exceeding seven months in a year. In the case of Brooke Bond Company two of the other questions raised before the trial Judge were as follows: "(1) Whether the repairing shop at 3, Hide Road, Calcutta, which was engaged in the work of repairing and maintenance of the machinery used in the factory for the manufacture of tea was comprehended within the meaning of manufacturing process of tea ? (2) Whether roasting of coffee and blending chicory therewith was comprehended within the meaning of manufacture - of coffee or a process incidental to or connected with the manufacture of coffee ? " 13. THESE two questions were left unanswered by the learned trial Judge on the ground that an answer to those questions would involve determination of questions of facts and that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution would not embark upon the determination of questions of facts. We agree with the learned Judge on this point. Further, there was no substantial question raised on either side on this point. We agree with the learned Judge on this point. Further, there was no substantial question raised on either side on this point. Accordingly, the two questions referred to above are not required to be decided and are, therefore, not decided by us. 14. IN view of the discussions and findings aforesaid, we hold that the three appeals before us ought to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.