Short Note : 1. The plaintiff-appellants instituted a suit against the defendant non-petitioner on the allegations that the non-petitioner M.P. State Sahkari Vipnan Sangh Maryadit, Bhopal had agreed to sell to the plaintiffs 480 bags of Jwar at the rate of Rs. 72/- per quintal The plaintiffs deposited Rs. 300/- in pursuance of the sale agreement between the parties. 2. The defendant non-petitioner supplied 240 bags of Jwar on 16-7-70 to the plaintiff. Thus an amount of Rs. 1,000/- was appropriated by the defendant for aforesaid bags of Jwar supplied to the plaintiffs. 3. On 27-8-70 the plaintiffs asked the defendant. non-petitioner to supply the remaining 240 bags of Jwar. Although in the night of 27-08-70 delivery of the balance bags of Jwar were taken of by the officers concerned from godown of the defendant-non-petitioner yet on 28-8-70 the said bags were neither weighed nor delivered to the plaintiffs. 4. This led to the filing of the suit for the refund of Rs 1,000/- by the plaintiffs after notice to the defendant-non-petitioner. 5. The trial Court has dismissed the suit holding. that the suit is barred from cognisance of the Civil Court by virtue of the provisions contained in section 82 (l) (c) read with section 64 (1) (c) of the Act. Hence this revision. 6. Held: The plaintiff in the instant case do not fall under any category of parties specified in sub-clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of section 64. It is tried to be argued by the learned counsel for the defendant Society that the plaintiffs fall in the category of 'a person' specified in sub-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 64. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs in reply argued that in order to bring the plaintiffs in category of such 'a person' it is necessary to point out that they had business transactions with the defendant Society and there being no evidence on that account the bar of jurisdiction enacted by section 82 (1) (c) read with section 64 (1) of the Act does not apply. This argument has great force. 7. But it appears that the parties were not alive to the legal situation which emerges from the correct analysis of clause (c) Sub-section (1) of Sec. 64 of the Act. This argument has great force. 7. But it appears that the parties were not alive to the legal situation which emerges from the correct analysis of clause (c) Sub-section (1) of Sec. 64 of the Act. The postulate of clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 64 of the Act is in case of 'a person' other than a member of the Society. the Society may have granted a loan. But this is not the case here. The second postulate is 'a person' other than a member of the Society must be such with whom the Society has or had business transactions. The attempt of the learned counsel for both the parties was to bring a case within the second postulate of the aforesaid provision. In the first postulate the words 'a loan' have been used wherein in the second postulate the words 'business transactions' have been used. The principle that singular includes plural and plural includes singular cannot be pursued into service while construing clause (C) of Sec. 64 (1) of the Act because when in the same clause in the context of loan, the contemplation of the legislature is that of a single transaction of loan than in the same clause when the word 'transactions' has been used it cannot be construed to mean a single business transaction. In view of the wording of clause (c) of Sec. 64 (1) of the Act, the words 'business transactions' cannot be construed so as to cover case of a person other than a member who may have a single transaction with the Society'. Plurality of transactions is sine quanon for attracting the second postulate to the situation. Moreover the use of the word 'transactions' in plural clearly suggests a 'continued course of dealing i e. a trade as held in State Bank of 'India Employees Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Raipur v. Nawal Kishore Dave and others, 1971 JLJ 973 , by A. P. Sen, J. (As he then was). 8. The ouster of jurisdiction of civil Court can be only if the dispute in question touches the constitution, management or business of a society. But that is not all. Further pre-requisite for working out an ouster of civil Court's jurisdiction is that the parties must be of categories enumerated in sub-sec. (1) (a) to (f) of Sec. 65. 8. The ouster of jurisdiction of civil Court can be only if the dispute in question touches the constitution, management or business of a society. But that is not all. Further pre-requisite for working out an ouster of civil Court's jurisdiction is that the parties must be of categories enumerated in sub-sec. (1) (a) to (f) of Sec. 65. If in a given case the parties do not fulfil the character specified by Sec. 64 (1) (a) to (f) simply because the dispute touches the constitution, management or business of the society or liquidation of a society will not work out ouster of civil Court's jurisdiction. It is well settled principle of law that ouster of jurisdiction of civil Court cannot be readily presumed. Where there is exclusion of civil. Court's jurisdiction, all the conditions, existence of which is pre-requisite for working out the exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Court must be shown to exist. 9. It appears from the impugned decision that the learned Small Cause Judge has just referred the provisions of section 82 (c) read with section 64 (1) (C) of the Act and has not taken into his view that the postulate of law is to the effect that :- (a) the dispute must be touching the Constitution, management or business of the society; (b) that the parties must be of specified character. namely, for the present purposes, the plaintiff-non-member must be such a person with whom the Society must have or had more than one business transaction. 10. Both these conditions must co-exist. Since the Court and the parties had acted in oblivion of correct legal position and the parties agree for the remand of the case for reconsideration of the matter afresh in the light of the principles laid down herein above, it appears the revision deserves to be allowed. 11. Before parting with this order it has to be observed that the learned Small Cause Judge should not have dismissed the suit after arriving at the finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but return of the plaint should have been ordered. Revision allowed.