Short Note : 1. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that although the decree is passed on the basis of a compromise but it could not be said to be a consent decree because the defendant-appellant has disputed that he had signed the compromise. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in Renuka v. Onkar, 5 MPLC 361. Held : It is no doubt true that the defendant-appellant after entering into a compromise has gone back on it and raised all kinds of objections; but on inquiry the findings arrived at by the trial Court were that the compromise was signed by the defendant-appellant with free will and accepted the compromise as entered into by both the parties to the suit. Consequently it could not be doubted that the decree passed is a consent decree as contemplated in section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The decision on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant is of no help because in that case it was laid down that if the finding is that the compromise is not entered into by the defendant then it could not be said to be a consent decree. Admittedly, in the present case the finding arrived at is that the defendant did enter into the compromise and consequently a decree in terms of the compromise has been passed. This question has also been considered in Katikara Chintamani v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu, 1974 (1) SCC 567 where it has been observed that even if by a compromise part of the claim is settled and decree is passed in terms of the compromise against that decree no appeal could be filed because of section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 5 MPLC 361 distinguished, 1974 (1) SCC 567 relied on. Appeal dismissed.