JUDGMENT 1. - This is a revision against the judgment of the learned District Judge, Ajmer, dated 6th March, 1973, whereby he partly modified the order passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 2. Brief facts leading to this revision are that the non-applicant was removed from service by the Divisional Commercial Superintendent Western Railway, Ajmer on 29th March, 1966. The non-applicant filed a suit in the court of Munsif and Magistrate First Class, Ajmer city (East) Ajmer on 17th July, 1967, challenging the validity of the order of his removal and for declaring the same to be illegal and inoperative. That suit was decreed on 29th September, 1969 and as the Railway Authorities did not file any appeal, the same became final. 3. After the said decision in favour of the non-applicant, he filed a claim for his wages before the Authority under the payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Authority') and claimed wages at Rs. 150 per month excluding provident fund from 1st March, 1966 to 30th September, 1969 totalling to Rs. 9,300 There was a dispute between the parties about the quantum of the claim, but it is now unnecessary to decide it as the Railway Authorities had filed a statement before the learned District Judge in which Kb. 5,534 35 p. had been shown as payable to the non-applicant in case his claim was accepted. This statement was admitted to be correct by the learned counsel for the non-applicant and as such there is no dispute between the parties regarding the quantum of the claim which is taken to be Rs. 5,534 35 p. The learned District Judge allowed the above claim in favour of the non-applicant and held that the Railway Administration shall pay Rs. 5,534 3.' p minus Rs. 4,76i.35p. already deposited, i e. Rs 173 and further allowed Rs, 240 as compensation and Rs 20 as costs allowed by the authority and further Rs. 30 as costs of the appeal. The present revision has been directed against the above order of the learned District Judge, Ajmer. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the claim filed by the non-applicant was barred by limitation His contention is that the suit of the non-applicant was decreed on 29th September, 19 69 whereas the application before the Authority was filed on 13th December, 1969. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the claim filed by the non-applicant was barred by limitation His contention is that the suit of the non-applicant was decreed on 29th September, 19 69 whereas the application before the Authority was filed on 13th December, 1969. The non-applicant had failed to explain the delay from 29th September, 1969 to 13tn October, 1969 It is further contended that the non-applicant should have claimed the arrears of wages from time to time within limitation by filing applications to the Authority and he should not have waited for the decision of the suit filed by him. It is further contended that the non-applicant filed the civil suit on 17th July, 1967, and till then the wages from 1st March, 1966 to 16th July, 1967 had already become due and the non-applicant should have claimed the amount for this period in the suit filed by him for declaring his order of removal as illegal. The claim in this regard is barred by order 2 rule 2 C.P.C. 5. As regards the controversy whether the limitation would run from the date of the order of removal, or from the date when such order is set aside by a competent court as done in this case by the learned Munsif on 29th September, 1969, it has been set at rest by a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 130 I further find support in this view by a decision of this court in Divisional Personnel Officer v. Mahavir Prasad, 1974 R.L.W. 183 . As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner for claim for the period from 29th September, 1969 to 13th October, 1969. suffice it to say, that no such point was argued before the learned District Judge and when the Authority had allowed such claim, it would be deemed that such Authority was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for filing this application after the above delay. suffice it to say, that no such point was argued before the learned District Judge and when the Authority had allowed such claim, it would be deemed that such Authority was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for filing this application after the above delay. The judgment in favour of the non-applicant was given by the Munsif on 29th September, 1969 and it is quite reasonable to hold that sometime must have been taken by the non-applicant in moving the Railway Authorities for making the payment but when they declined to do so, the non applicant had no other alternative then to move an application before the Authority, on 13th December, 1969. 6. The next question is whether the claim of the non-applicant from 1st March, 1966 to 16th July 1967 be held to be barred under order 2 rule 2 C.P.C. On this point learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on the following observations of his Lordship Joshi, J (as he then was) in Divisional Personnel Officer v. Mahavir Prasad (supra):- "It was next contended that so far as the claim of wages upto the date of the institution of the suit i.e. upto 28-9-1955 is concerned, it is barred by the provisions of O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. The argument of the learned counsel in this behalf is that when the non-applicant filed the suit for declaration and recovery of Rs. 30 it was open to him to claim the entire arrears of wages which had fallen due upto that time, as the cause of action for declaration and the claim for the arrears of wages was ore and the same. This having not been done, submitted the learned counsel, it is now no more open to the non-applicant to claim for the wages antecedent to the institution of the suit. Mr. Ganpatsingh on the other side contended that the non-applicant could not have claimed wages unless and until order of disposal was declared void as the cause of action will only accrue to him In regard to the deducted wages after the order has been declared void. In this regard learned counsel has invited my attention to D R. Jerry v. Union of India . I have given my careful consideration to the submission but I am of the opinion that this case is clearly distinguishable. In this regard learned counsel has invited my attention to D R. Jerry v. Union of India . I have given my careful consideration to the submission but I am of the opinion that this case is clearly distinguishable. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the starting point of limitation for the purpose of an application under sec. 15(2) of the Act and in that connection it was observed that so far as claim for wages under sec. 15 of the Act was concerned that could only be filed after the order of dismissal has been declared void and not otherwise. But that dictum of their Lordships does not apply to the case where a suit has been filed for declaration that the order of dismissal was void along with a fraction of the amount of wages. Indeed in such a case the plaintiff was under an obligation to claim the arrears of wages upto the date of the suit. In this connection I may refer to P.J. Lartius v. Superintendent . In that case suit was filed for declaring the order for dismissal to be void but no arrears of the salary from the date of dismissal to the date of suit was claimed The dismissal order was declared void and therefore application under section 15 of the Act was filed thereafter. The plea was raised that the suit for arrears of salary antecedent to the period of the Institution of suit was barred by the provisions of O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. It was held that it was necessary for the plaintiff to claim in the same suit all the reliefs arising out of the same cause of action unless he postponed claiming the relief with the leave of the court. Their Lordships further held that the suit for the recovery of salary as a consequential relief in a suit for declaration was not barred by sec 22 of the Act as upto that stage the arrears of salary could not have been recovered by an application under sec. 10 of the Act on the basis of deducted wages But when the arrears of salary could be claimed in previous suit but were not claimed it could not equally be recovered under sec. 10 of the Act on the basis of deducted wages But when the arrears of salary could be claimed in previous suit but were not claimed it could not equally be recovered under sec. 15 of the Act in regard to such wages as the same would be barred under the general principle contained in O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. To the same effect is the view in Union of India v. Jagannath . In Works Manager (Carriage) Western Railway v. Smt. Kulwanti Devi (S. B. Civil Revision No. 371 of 1968 decided on 10-1-1972) Hon'ble Jagat Narayan J. has held that a claim for wages could have been made in the suit for declaration and if it had not been done then the claim had become barred under O. 2 rule 2 CPC. This authority appears to be in conformity with the dictum laid down in State of Bihar v. Abdul Mojid where it has been held that the employee could lay claim for the arrears of salary along with the declaration suit as consequential relief Mr. Ganpat Singh pointed out that Lodha J. in Madan Kumar v. Surendra Kumar had taken the view that the payment of Wages Authority had exclusive jurisdiction to determine wages by virtue of sec. 22 of the Act and as a natural corollary suit for wages could not have been filed by the non-applicant. In my view the authority is clearly distinguishable as it relates to a case of the recovery of wagas simplicitor It is true that when the claim is for wages simplicitor then that could be only made before the Payment of Wages Authority under sec. 22 of the Act But that proposition does not held good when the suit is filed for declaration and consequential relief of arrears of salary are claimed I am, therefore, of the view that the claim of wages of the non-applicant so far as they relate to the period prior to 28-9-1955 is barred by the provisions of O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. add both the courts below had usurped the jurisdiction to entertain a claim which was barred by the provisions of O. 2r. 2 C P C and have thus exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity or illegality." Reliance is further placed on Ram Kishore Sharma v. Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1970 Lab. 2 C P C and have thus exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity or illegality." Reliance is further placed on Ram Kishore Sharma v. Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others, 1970 Lab. I.C. 582 , Union of India New Delhi v. P.V. Jagannath Rao, A I.R. 1968 M.P. 204 , Pahilraj Rai v. The Works Manager (Carriage) W. Rly. Ajmer, 1971 W.L.N. 530 , and P.J. Lartius v. Superintendent Printing and Stationery, U. P. Allahabad 1965 A.L.J. 292. 7. It is no doubt true that in the above cases it has been held that the claim of wages upto the date of the institution of the suit If not claimed in that suit is barred by the provisions of O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. but in all these, cases the attention of the court was not drawn to section 18 of, the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1936). Under section 18 every authority appointed under subsection (i) of section 15 shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents, and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1898. Thus the Authority appointed under section 15 of the Act, 1936 does not have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure but is empowered for the purposes enumerated above under section 18 of the Act, 1936. This section 18, therefore, docs not empower the authority under the Act, 1936, to resort to all the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. There is no other provision under the Act, 1936 which may empower to defeat a claim of an applicant under 0.2 r. 2 C.P.C. I find support for the above view from General Manager and others v. Abdul Qayum Khan, 1972 A.L.J. 276 K. B. Asthana J. distinguished the earlier case of the same court P.J. Lartius (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I may refer to the following observations of Asthana J. in the case cited above : "Sri Lalji Sinha then contended that claim of the employee was barred by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the C. P. Code. In this connection learned counsel relied upon a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of P J. Lartius v. Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P. . The ratio of the decision of the case cited again does not held the employer applicant. The provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 2 are attracted where a plain, tiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim. In the instant case the employee as a plaintiff in the civil suit did not omit to put a claim of arrears of salary and allowances for the period from 22-2-1952 to 6-10-1955 He had claimed the salary for that period also. The civil court decided that he was not entitled to it as the claim was barred by limitation. The decision of the civil court will not amount to a relinquishment of the claim. Moreover, in the case of P.J. Lartius v. Superintendent Printing and Stationery, U.P. the attention of the learned Single Judge does not seem to have been drawn to the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act which invests the authority under the Payment of Wages Act with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure only for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents. Thus the Payment of Wages Authority has no power to reject a claim under Order 2 Rule 2 of the C. P. Code as the exercise of such power is not covered by any of the three purposes mentioned. Moreover, in the case of M.C.D. Mathur v. E.I. Rly. Thus the Payment of Wages Authority has no power to reject a claim under Order 2 Rule 2 of the C. P. Code as the exercise of such power is not covered by any of the three purposes mentioned. Moreover, in the case of M.C.D. Mathur v. E.I. Rly. Administration a Full Bench of this Court in paragraph 15 of the reported judgment on page 82 observed as follows : "Clearly, therefore, the Legislature intended that the authority constituted under Sec. (15) Payment of Wages Act should be a Court." The learned Judge was, however, of the view that as no part of the claim had been omitted or relinquished by the employee in the previous litigation between the parties and sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order I in its terms do not apply in the instant case he did not consider it necessary to refer the case to a Division Bench for consideration of the correctness of the decision in Lartious Case (supra). 8. In the case of Divisional Personnel Officer v. Mahavir Prasad (supra) the employee had filed a suit for declaration and had also claimed Rs. 300 as arrears of wages But in the present case the non-applicant had not claimed any wages at all in the suit filed by him for declaring his order of removal as illegal As already held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dilbagh Rai Jerry's case supra) that the cause of action in a case like the present one would arise at the earliest from the date of reinstatement and not from month to month It can safely be said that the cause of action for the claim of wages will also arise after the decision of the suit in favour of the employee The employee can, therefore, wait for the result of such suit filed by him and the question of relinquishing any claim or part of the claim of wages at the time of institution of such suit for declaration of the order of removal as illegal does not arise. It is not incumbent under any provisions of the Act, 1 that an employee should file a claim for arrears of wages along with a suit for declaration of the order of removal as illegal. 9. It is not incumbent under any provisions of the Act, 1 that an employee should file a claim for arrears of wages along with a suit for declaration of the order of removal as illegal. 9. In my view, therefore, the provisions of O. 2 r. 2 C.P.C. cannot be applied in a claim filed under the Act of 1936. In view of the fact that the attention of the Court was not drawn to section 18 of the Act, 1936 in the cases referred to above of this court, I do not think it necessary to refer the case to a larger bench. 10. In the result this revision fails and is dismissed. As nobody appeared from the side of the non-applicant there will be no order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******