Order.- In this petition filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order dated 30th July, 1977, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nanjangud, in Criminal Case No. 99 of 1975, rejecting the application filed by the petitioner, who was the accused therein, and directing that the proceedings against him be continued under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is challenged. 2. The few facts necessary for understanding the situation that has arisen may be narrated as follows: Respondent No. 2 was working as a second division clerk in the office of the R. D. P. I., Mysore, while the petitioner was working as a first division clerk. Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint against the petitioner alleging an offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Hereinafter, the parties will be referred as ‘the complainant’ and ‘the accused’. 3. The then Magistrate at Nanjangud directed investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The police conducted investigation and submitted their final report. On receipt of the final report, the said Magistrate passed an order as follows: “Charge-sheet filed. Register the case under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and issues to the accused by 15th March, 1975”. 4. Later on, the accused appeared and engaged an advocate. That Magistrate examined three witnesses on behalf of the prosecution. The case was conducted by the advocate engaged by the complainant and was prosecuted by the complainant himself. Later, that Magistrate was transferred and the successor Magistrate, who has passed the impugned order, took over. By 9th March, 1977, he, according to him, noticed certain irregularities in the proceedings conducted by his predecessor Magistrate and, therefore, passed an order to the effect that as the investigation had been done by the police in view of the order under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the further proceedings ought to have been conducted by his predecessor Magistrate as per the provisions contained in sections 238 to 243 and 248 to 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not as per the provisions contained in sections 244 to 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as done by his predecessor Magistrate and, therefore, he cancelled those proceedings and decided to proceed into the case as if it was instituted on a police report and adopted the procedure for trial of summons-cases. Thereafter, he framed substance of accusation and put it to the accused and recorded his plea. At some stage, the advocate of the complainant got refund of the process fee amount that the complainant had paid for issue of processes to his witnesses. From 15th July, 1977 the prosecution was conducted by the Assistant Public Prosecutor. It appears that on 17th March, 1977, an application was filed on behalf of the accused under sections 235, 249 read with section 200, 195 and 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying that all that had happened was illegal and the proceedings against the accused were to be dropped. 5. The sum and substance of the contention on behalf of the accused is that as the case has proceeded as if it had been instituted on police report in view of the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 9th March, 1977, it is not in accordance with law in view of section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the police cannot be a complainant within the meaning of section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to satisfy the ingredients of section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. If a Court takes cognizance contrary to this provision, that would amount to the Court acting without having the necessary power. In the present case, the complainant had filed a complaint before the Court. But, the Court did not take cognizance of that complaint and directed investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. It may be noticed at this stage itself that the offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is a non-cognizable one and, therefore, the proper section to be applied by the then Magistrate to was section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Anyhow, that does not seriously affect the proceedings and, as such, I do not consider it necessary to go deeper into that question. The police investigated and submitted their final report. It is on that report that the learned Magistrate took cognizance and ordered process to be issued against the accused. 8. Anyhow, that does not seriously affect the proceedings and, as such, I do not consider it necessary to go deeper into that question. The police investigated and submitted their final report. It is on that report that the learned Magistrate took cognizance and ordered process to be issued against the accused. 8. ‘Complaint’ is defined in section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows: “‘Complaint’ means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation: A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant”. 9. Even after receipt of the report of the police, after investigation, the then Magistrate ought to have taken cognizance of the offence on the private complaint of the complainant only. 10. Now, it is to be seen whether taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of the police report, as has been done by the then Magistrate, vitiates the proceedings. It cannot be said so because section 460(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, lays down that if any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely, ‘to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190’, erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. This provision saves the situation. It cannot be disputed that the then Magistrate took cognizance on the basis of the charge-sheet erroneously and in good faith. He had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence as it had been committed in an area falling within his jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not possible to set aside the whole of the proceedings on the said ground. 11. After taking cognizance, the then Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions in section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and then ultimately tried, if at all he had thought it necessary, as a case instituted otherwise than on police report. Therefore, it is not possible to set aside the whole of the proceedings on the said ground. 11. After taking cognizance, the then Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions in section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and then ultimately tried, if at all he had thought it necessary, as a case instituted otherwise than on police report. But, the then Magistrate has, after taking cognizance on the basis of the report filed by the police, allowed the complainant to prosecute the case as if he had taken cognizance of an offence on a complaint which is instituted by the complainant and the procedure prescribed for trial of cases instituted otherwise than on police report applied. It is, hence, patent that the then Magistrate has adopted a hybrid procedure. That cannot be sustained in law. 12. The aforementioned position in law has been clearly misconceived by the present Magistrate and, because of such misception, he has passed the order dated 9th March, 1977. He had, by himself, no power to cancel the proceedings that had been conducted until then as there is no such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowering a Magistrate to do so. 13. In spite of the aforementioned defects being seen in the procedures adopted by the two learned Magistrates, the request of the petitioner-accused that the proceedings be dropped, cannot be sustained on any principle of law. But, at the same time, when the irregularities are noticed, even when the trial is going on and is not complete, they cannot be permitted to go on because the law is that later on they would be curable. This is the principle laid down by this Court in State of Mysore v. Tavara Naika1, while dealing with section 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 14. Hence, I pass the ‘following: Order.- The proceedings that have taken place in this case from the stage of issue of process to the accused are quashed. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nanjangud, is directed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is made clear that the decision to take cognizance of the offence is left untouched. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nanjangud, is directed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is made clear that the decision to take cognizance of the offence is left untouched. Therefore, what the learned Magistrate has now got to do is to record the statements on oath of the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, and then decide whether process should be issued or not against the accused and, if the decision is in the affirmative, he is to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of cases instituted otherwise than on police report and dispose of the case according to law.