JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application under section 482, Cr. P. C. directed against the order of Additional Sessions Judge No. 1 Hanumangarh, dated 15-4-1978 passed in criminal revision No. 36 of 1976 Bichitra Singh v. Prasan Kaur , whereby the order of tit Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hanumangarh, dated 20.8.1976 in an applicant under section 488, Cr. P. C. (old) fixing the amount of maintenance to the tune of Rs. 250/- p. m., with effect from 23-8-1972, was affirmed. 2. The relevant material facts are that the non-petitioner Mst. Prasan Kaur was married to the petitioner on 7/7/1952 at Mauja Saranwali and after the marriage, they lived as husband and wife at Faridkot and Sangrur. After sometime of the marriage their relations did not remain happy and estrangement started and the applicant Prasan Kaur accused the non-applicant of misbehaviour and a petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was also instituted by the applicant. As a result of reconcilement, the same was withdrawn. After the decision in that case, they continued to live for about six months, but again the non-petitioner started beating and misbehaving the applicant during the period 1971 to June 1972 and 15th June, 1972, she was turned out from the house. Thereafter she started living with her parents at Mauja Masani. The non-applicant neglected her and did not provide any maintenance to her. It was alleged that non-applicant is a Senior Teacher in Government Higher Secondary School having sufficient salary and besides he has also got income from rent and agriculture. It was alleged that the non-applicant is having income of Rs. 20,000/- per annum. In para 8 of the application it was I alleged that the applicant lives at Mauja Masani, Tehsil TB so the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hanumangarh, has got jurisdiction. The applicant prayed for a sum of Rs. 250/- p. m. maintenance. 3. On behalf of the non-applicant, an application raising objection as to jurisdiction was submitted and it was alleged that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the application, as the non-applicant does not reside within the jurisdiction of the court nor he ever resided within its jurisdiction. He is a permanent resident of Punjab. 4. When objection as to jurisdiction was raised by the non-applicant the applicant submitted an application wherein it was stated that the non-applicant has temporary residence in village Masani. He is a permanent resident of Punjab. 4. When objection as to jurisdiction was raised by the non-applicant the applicant submitted an application wherein it was stated that the non-applicant has temporary residence in village Masani. He is living in the house of Mahendra Singh, which still is in his exclusive possession. The non-applicant has been cultivating the land of Mahendra Singh. It was also alleged that the non-applicant has been carrying on cultivation in Ganganagar District as well as in the State of U. P. It was further alleged that at the time of harvesting the kharif crop in the year 1972 he stayed for more than a month in the house of Mahendra Singh working in his field. This application was accompanied with an affidavit of Chansingh. 5. The non-applicant thereafter hied a detailed reply to the main application wherein the allegations made in the application were denied and it was stated that the applicant wants him to reside with her at Masani. With regard to his income he stated that he is a school master working in Government Higher Secondary School, Sangrur, and that it is incorrect that his income is Rs. 20,000/- per annum. He is not getting any income from farming or from any house rent. It was alleged that the application is mala fide and is filed in order to cause harassment to him. 6. No evidence was recorded till the case remained pending with the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hanumangarh and on coming into force of the New Code of Criminal Procedure whereby separation of judiciary from executive was enforced, the case stood transferred to the file of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hanumangarh. 7. The learned Magistrate, recorded the evidence of the parties The applicant Prasan Kaur examined herself and produced Jagjeetsingh (P. W. 2), Kapursingh (P W. 3), Awatarsingh (P. W. 4), Surjansingh (P. W. 5) and Chansingh (P. W. 6). The non applicant Bichitra Singh examined himself as D. W. i, and produced Balwant Singh (D.W. 2), Kripalsingh (D.W 3), Mukhtyarsingh (D.W. 4) and Keharsingh (D.W. 5). 8. The learned Judicial Magistrate, after hearing the parties, held that the non-applicant had temporary residence at village Masani, so the court has jurisdiction to hear the application and further he found that the non-applicant is liable to pay maintenance. 8. The learned Judicial Magistrate, after hearing the parties, held that the non-applicant had temporary residence at village Masani, so the court has jurisdiction to hear the application and further he found that the non-applicant is liable to pay maintenance. Considering the non-applicant to be a person with substantial means having income from salary and other income he fixed the amount of maintenance at Rs. 250/- p. m., from 23-8-1972, the date of the filing of the application. The non-applicant went in revision against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate but without success. Consequently, the present application has been filed. 9. I have heard Shri Munni Lal Garg, counsel for the applicant and Shri Bhagwati Prasad, counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 Prasan Kaur. 10. On behalf of non-applicant No. 2 Prasan Kaur an objection is raised that the present application under section 482, Cr. P. C. is not maintainable. By invoking the provision of section 482 Cr. P. C. the applicant wants to circumvent the provision contained in section 399(3), Cr. P. C. He urged that the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge on revision of the application has become final and the application now cannot be made for the revision of the order under the Code, invoking the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court, and this Court in exercise of its inherent powers cannot embark upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence on record is reliable or not. The two courts below, after appreciation of the evidence on record have held that the court had jurisdiction and on the basis of the evidence further found that the present applicant is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- per month by way of maintenance. 11. Shri Garg on the other hand contended that the applicant is within his right to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and for securing the ends of justice Bar of section 399(3) of the New Code of Criminal Procedure would not in any way affect the applicants right to legitimately approach this Court if the conditions prescribed in section 482 Cr. P. C. are found to exist. P. C. are found to exist. The learned counsel supported his contention relying upon the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (A. I. R. 1978 S C. 47) . He submitted that on merits it is a fit case for exercise of inherent powers. 12. I have considered the preliminary objection. The question is no more res integra and the controversy stands concluded by the decision of Madhu Limaye's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. His Lordship Untwalia, J., speaking for the court modulated the statement of the law propounded in the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ) . His Lordship Untwalia, J., observed that apart from the revisional power the High Court possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists. After referring to the revisional powers under the Old Code and the New Code it was stated that similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court. On reading section 482 His Lordship noticed the following principles in relation to the exercise of power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably barring a few exceptions:- (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 13. In Madhu Limaye's case (supra) application filed by Madhu Limaye, raising question of jurisdiction and taking of cognizance by the court of Session and raising the validity of the sanction given by the Chief Secretary, was rejected by the Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge framed a charge. The same was challenged before the High Court, but the revision application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that it was barred under section 397(2), the order being an interlocutory one. The same was challenged before the High Court, but the revision application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that it was barred under section 397(2), the order being an interlocutory one. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the two questions, one with regard to the exercise of inherent powers vis-a-vis the provision of section 397 (2) and the other as to whether the impugned order is an interlocutory one or not. In the present case I am not concerned with the second question. With regard to the first question their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under:- "On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court." But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2; of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, Then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Audrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible." 14. Their Lordships affirmed the statement of law propounded by Gajendra Gadkar, J. as he then was in R. P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) which has been quoted in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) in Para 11. From the decision of Madhu Limaye's case it would be quite obvious and clear that the provisions which bar the exercise of revisional jurisdiction would not in any way affect the exercise of inherent powers provided the case falls within the situations contemplated by section 482, Cr. P. C. Thus, it will have to be seen as to whether such a situation as contemplated in section 482, Cr. P. C., exist in the present case or not. Outright it cannot be said that application under section 482, Cr. P. C. is not maintainable in view of bar contained in section 399 (3), Cr. P. C. 15. P. C. Thus, it will have to be seen as to whether such a situation as contemplated in section 482, Cr. P. C., exist in the present case or not. Outright it cannot be said that application under section 482, Cr. P. C. is not maintainable in view of bar contained in section 399 (3), Cr. P. C. 15. Shri Garg, learned counsel for the applicant vehemently contended that the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the application under sub-section (8) of section 488, Cr. P. C. (Old) the residence of the applicant does not confer jurisdiction. The only ground on which jurisdiction was claimed in the application, as presented, originally was that the applicant resides at Masani within the jurisdiction of the Court, so the Court has jurisdiction. He contended that the Magistrate ought not to have proceeded to hear the application when ex facie it was clear that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction. He further tried to assail the findings of the two courts and submitted that the two courts were wrong in holding that the present applicant temporarily resided at Masani, which gives jurisdiction to the Court. He also pointed out that the learned Additional Sessions Judge made out entirely a new case when he found that both the parties lived at Masani as husband and wife, which was not the case even pleaded in the application submitted by Mst. Prasan Kaur, after raising objection as to jurisdiction by the present applicant. The learned counsel pointed out that Mahendra Singh is the near relation of the wife of the present applicant. No documents were produced to prove that the present applicant was holding any land of Mahendra Singh on lease and was cultivating the same. Even Patwari was not examined nor Girdawari was produced. In the light of the arguments of the learned counsel for Mst. Prasan Kaur, he also urged that a great prejudice was caused to the present applicant by the trial of the matter at Hanumangarh in asmuch as the present applicant could not examine his complete evidence and he was seriously prejudiced in his defence of the application. He could not remain present on all dates of hearings and could not properly instruct his counsel. 16. He could not remain present on all dates of hearings and could not properly instruct his counsel. 16. Shri Bhagwati Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand, refuted the contentions and submitted that this court should be slow to reappraise the evidence, as it cannot be said that the finding is based on no evidence or perverse. He further argued that necessary facts conferring jurisdiction were alleged in the application submitted after raising of the objection as to jurisdiction and on that application parties went to trial and now it is not open to the present applicant to base his arguments on what was averred in the original application. He further urged that in view of the provision of section 531, Cr. P C. (Old) corresponding to 462 Cr. P. C. (New) the objection as to territorial jurisdiction loses all its importance and the order is not liable to be set aside on the ground that the court had no territorial jurisdiction unless the present applicant makes out a case that such assumption of jurisdiction has in fact occasioned failure of justice. He urged that the present applicant has examined as many, as five witnesses and several opportunities were given for the production of one witness Trilochan Singh. He was even once served, but no legal and proper steps were taken for his production as a witness so ultimately the court closed the evidence. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that any failure of justice has occasioned to the present applicant. Reliance was placed by him in support of his contentions on Mst. Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 1521 ) , R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) and Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh ( AIR 1977 SC 1101 ) . 17. I have carefully considered the contentions advanced before me by both the sides. 18. In Mst. Jagir Kaur's case K. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Court, considered the phraseology of the provision contained in sub-section (8) of Section 488, Cr. P. C. of 1898. After noting the provision of the Code of 1882 it was observed that the jurisdiction under the 1898 Code is wider. It gives three alternative-forums. Jagir Kaur's case K. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Court, considered the phraseology of the provision contained in sub-section (8) of Section 488, Cr. P. C. of 1898. After noting the provision of the Code of 1882 it was observed that the jurisdiction under the 1898 Code is wider. It gives three alternative-forums. This has been designedly done by the Legislature to enable a discarded wife or a helpless child to get the much needed and urgent relief in one or other of the three forums convenient to them It was held that even temporary residence would confer jurisdiction. The word "resides" and the cognate expression "last resided" were considered to mean temporary residence and last temporary residence as well, though it was observed that the expression "resides" however, means something more than a flying visit to or a casual stay in a particular place. Mst. Prasan Kaur had come out with an allegation of temporary residence of her husband at Masani for conferring jurisdiction on the court and both the courts have found in her favour on the evidence on record. It may be stated that it would not be proper for this Court to scrutinise the evidence of the parties minutely and reach to its own conclusion. It has not been canvassed before me that the finding is arrived at without any evidence on record or it is in any way perverse. Rather the submission is that oral evidence led by Mst. Prasan Kaur is not trustworthy and reliable, and the oral evidence is insufficient. In R P. Kapur's case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under:- "In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained " 19. The above statement of law still holds good in accordance with section 482, Cr. P. C. as observed by Untwalia, J., in Madhu Limaye's case (supra). 20. That apart, the matter can be further examined in the light of the provision of section 462, Cr. The above statement of law still holds good in accordance with section 482, Cr. P. C. as observed by Untwalia, J., in Madhu Limaye's case (supra). 20. That apart, the matter can be further examined in the light of the provision of section 462, Cr. P. C. (New), which is analogous to section 531, Cr. P. C. (Old). 21. On this subject as well the legal position appears to be well settled in view of the decision in the case of Smt. Raj Kumari v. Dev Raj (supra). In this case reference was made to Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1961 SC 1589 ) wherein it was stated that there are two types of jurisdiction of a criminal court, namely (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to try particular kinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to the root of the matter and any transgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a peremptory character and is curable under section 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided "just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court." His Lordship Shinghal, J., speaking for the Court observed as under:- "Where a Magistrate has the "power" to try particular application under Section 488, and the controversy relates solely to his territorial jurisdiction, there should, ordinarily, be no reason why Section 531 should not be applicable to the order made by him." "As is apparent, Section 531 does not entitle a Magistrate, who is not a Magistrate of the class referred to in sub-section (l) of Section 488, to proceed with an application for maintenance. In fact even a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class will not be entitled to proceed with such an application, if he knows that the proceedings do not fall within his jurisdiction under sub-section (8) of Section 488. In fact even a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class will not be entitled to proceed with such an application, if he knows that the proceedings do not fall within his jurisdiction under sub-section (8) of Section 488. The true meaning of Section 531 is that while it will not uphold an order passed in proceedings wilfully taken in a wrong place or enable a Magistrate to confer jurisdiction on himself when he knows that he has no such jurisdiction, there is no reason why a Magistrate, who is otherwise, duly empowered to make an order under Sub Section (1) of section 488 of the Code cannot proceed with an application under that sub-section for the purpose of deciding whether he has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application and to decide the application on the merits if he finds that he has the territorial jurisdiction. Section 531 cannot thus be said to be inapplicable to a case where there is a controversy as to the district where the proceeding should be held the parties lead evidence in support of their respective contentions about the correct place of the proceeding then the Magistrate finds it necessary (after taking note of the entire evidence on the controversy) to arrive at a decision on the basis of the balance of probabilities. In other words, there is no reason why, in such a Case, Section 531 should not be applicable merely because the Magistrate, while considering the evidence relating to jurisdiction unwitting makes a reference to Section 531 in passing and not for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction under it. If the Magistrate, in this case, had thought of assuming jurisdiction under Section 531, he would not have proceeded to record the evidence of the parties, on the question of the territorial jurisdiction, or referred to it at length in his order and arrived the decision that he had the jurisdiction." 22. In Raj Kumari's case (supra) an objection as to jurisdiction was taken by way of a preliminary objection. The husband's application for confining the evidence on the question of jurisdiction or to try the issue, jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, was rejected and the Magistrate ordered the parties to lead all their evidence, but the husband did not lead any evidence on merits. The husband's application for confining the evidence on the question of jurisdiction or to try the issue, jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, was rejected and the Magistrate ordered the parties to lead all their evidence, but the husband did not lead any evidence on merits. The Hight Court found that there was obvious prejudice to the husband and a failure of justice was caused and that the Magistrate assumed jurisdiction in the light of section 531, Cr. P. C. (Old) and the High Court also considered that objection as to jurisdiction was raised right at the first instance. On that basis the High Court took the view that section 531 would not be applicable. But the Supreme Court reversed the view of the High Court and stated that section 531 is attracted to the case despite the objection being taken at the first instance and further question of prejudice does not arise as the husband himself did not avail the opportunity to lead his evidence on merits and he did so deliberately and in defiance of the order of the Magistrate calling upon him to lead the evidence on the whole case. 23. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the exposition of law made Raj Kumari's case (supra ) it can be straight of said that section 531, Cr. P. C. (Old) for that section 462, Cr. P. C. (New) can be legitimately invoked in the present case, although in the present case on the date when the application was submitted it can be said that the court had no jurisdiction as the residence of Mst. Prasan Kaur will not confer jurisdiction, but the application subsequently presented mentioning the facts conferring jurisdiction will cure the initial defect in the Magistrate assumed any jurisdiction having regard to section 531, Cr. P. C. (Old). The learned Magistrate has made no reference to section 531, Cr. P. C., rather has based his finding on the evidence led by the parties. Thus, on facts as well it was not found that there was lack of territorial jurisdiction and further in the fact and circumstances of the case it cannot also be said that any failure of justice was caused as a result of the alleged want of territorial jurisdiction. Thus, on facts as well it was not found that there was lack of territorial jurisdiction and further in the fact and circumstances of the case it cannot also be said that any failure of justice was caused as a result of the alleged want of territorial jurisdiction. The present applicant examined as many as five witnesses and sufficient opportunity was given to him to examine his remaining witness, but the same was not availed, so ultimately the evidence had to be closed. Obviously, it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused, say, there has been no failure of justice. In this view of the matter I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Garg. 24. Shri Garg next contended that the Judicial Magistrate could not try the application and the case could not have been transferred from the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the file of Judicial Magistrate, as the pending applications were required to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Old Code in view of section 484 (4) (a) of the New Code. He urged that this provision provides how the pending matters are to be dealt with. They, are to be dealt with under the old law and the forum would not change. When they have to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Old Code, it would mean that the pending matters, as stated in this provision, would be decided by the same forum in which they were pending. 25. I am unable to agree to this contention of the learned counsel. The New Code enforces the scheme of separation of judiciary from the executive. By section 484 (1) the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has been repealed. No doubt Sub-section (2) of this Section is in the nature of a saving provision but this provision has to be read along with the provision contained in section 3. It would be proper that relevant parts of both these provisions are read. By section 484 (1) the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has been repealed. No doubt Sub-section (2) of this Section is in the nature of a saving provision but this provision has to be read along with the provision contained in section 3. It would be proper that relevant parts of both these provisions are read. They are as under:- "484 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, - (a) if, immediately before the date on which this Code comes in to force, there is any appeal, application, trial inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (50 of 1898) as in force immediately before such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code), as if this Code had not come in to force." "S. 3. Constitution of references. (3) Unless the context otherwise requires any reference in any enactment passed before the commencement of this Code:- (a) to a Magistrate of the first class. Shall be construed as a reference to Judicial Magistrate of the first class; (b) to a Magistrate of the second class or of the third class, shall be construed as a reference to a Judicial Magistrate of the second class: (c) to Presidency Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate, shall be construed as a reference respectively to a Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate : (d) to any area which is included in a metropolitan area, as a reference to such metropolitan area & any reference to a Magistrate of the first class or of the second class in relation to such area, shall be construed as a reference to the Metropolitan Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in such area. (4) Where, under any law, other than this Code, the functions exercisable by a Magistrate relate to matters - (a) Which involve the appreciation or shifting of evidence or the formulation of any decision which exposes any person to any punishment or penalty or detention in custody pending investigation inquiry or trial or would have the effect of sending him for trial before any Court, they shall, subject to the provisions of this Code, be exercisable by a Judicial Magistrate ; (b) Which are administrative or executive in nature, such as, the granting of a licence, the suspension or cancellation on a licence, sanctioning a prosecution or withdrawing from a prosecution, they shall, subject as aforesaid, be exercisable by an Executive Magistrate." 26. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether on the enforcement of the New Code the pending matters as provided in section 484 (2) (a) have to be decided by the forum in which they were pending or by the changed forum under the New Code? It may be stated that the Old Criminal Procedure Code has been repealed and with that the old forum or classes of criminal courts have been abolished and new classes of criminal courts have come into existence. Courts of Judicial Magistrates and Executive Magistrates have been created and notification for creation of such court had been issued. Section 484 (2) (a), in my opinion, does not contemplate the continuance of the existing forums by which the matters are to be decided. It only contemplates that pending matters have to be disposed in 5 accordance with the procedure laid down under the Old Code. By what forums, the pending matters are to be decided, the matter has to be examined in the light of the provisions of Section 3 (3) and 3 (4) whereby there has been substitution of forms for the existing 3 contemplates that in all enactments reference to a Magistrate of the first class, or of the second class or of the third class shall be construed as references to the Judicial Magistrate of the First class or to a Judicial Magistrate of the Second class, as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (c) of section 3, and reference to a Presidency Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate in any earlier enactment shall be construed as a reference, respectively, to a Metropolitan Magistrate. Under sub-section (4) of section 3 any matters involving judicial functions have to be disposed of by a Judicial Magistrate and matters which are administrative or executive in nature, have to be decided by an Executive Magistrate. Clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 3 enforces the scheme of separation. If the functions exercisable by a Magistrate relate to matters which involve the appreciation or shifting oi evidence or the formulation of any decision which exposes any person to any punishment or penalty or detention in custody pending investigation, inquiry or trial or would have the effect of sending him for trial before any court, such functions have been made exercisable by a Judicial Magistrate, which were previously exercisable by a Magistrate, under any law. It would appear from this provision that from the date of the enforcement of the New Code functions as enumerated in clause (a) : will cease to be exercised by any Magistrate other than a Judicial Magistrate. Thus there has been a substitution of forum by the enforcement of the New Code, though this substitution has further been subject to the provisions of this Code. That is what we find that cases arising under sections 107, 133 and 145, though may be cases, which may involve appreciation or sifting of evidence, still they have to be dealt with by the Executive Magistrate. It may also be stated that in sub-clause (a) we find the provision disjunctive. It is not only those cases whereby any person exposes to any punishment or penalty or detention or is required to be sent up for trial, have to be dealt with by a Judicial Magistrate, but matters which involve appreciation or sifting of evidence any may not exposes any person to any punishment or penalty or detention, till such matter fit have to be dealt with by a Judicial Magistrate. In view of this provision of section 3 (4), the High Court issued circular letters as to how the handing over and taking over cases from the Executive Magistrate to the Judicial Magistrate should take place smoothly and with facility. In view of this provision of section 3 (4), the High Court issued circular letters as to how the handing over and taking over cases from the Executive Magistrate to the Judicial Magistrate should take place smoothly and with facility. Reference may be made to the Circular letter No. 1/P. I. dated 25.1.1974 whereby it was directed that "on the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on April 1, 1974, it will not be possible for Executive Magistrate to try the criminal cases falling within the purview of section 3 (4) of the new code. All these cases will therefore have to be transferred to the corresponding Judicial Magistrates. It will not however be f permissible to transfer the cases under sections 107, 133 and 145 Cr. P. C. which will continue to be with the Executive Magistrates. The High Court is anxious that the change over should be brought about in a well planned and orderly way, and within the minimum period of time. And instructions were issued to ensure that the files of cases and the articles of each case are booked carefully for purpose of transfer from one court to the other." It may be stated that the intention of the Legislature to bring about the separation is quite evident from the provisions contained in section 3(4), and it cannot be said that the scheme was only prospective in operation. It cannot be conceived that the Parliament contemplated two sets of courts, one for pending cases, and the other for the new cases arising from 1/4/1974. 27. In enacting sub-section 2(a) of Section 484, the Parliament intended that the pending proceedings, as stated therein, be disposed of or continued or held or made according to the procedure under the Old Code and not by the magisterial forums of the Old Code. No one has a vested right in a particular forum Section 3(4)and section 484 (2) (a) have to be read together and have to be harmoniously construed. One conjoint reading and harmonious construction, the intent and meaning appears to be quite plain and explicit that the functions relating to matters falling under Section 3(4) (a) of the New Code shall be exercisable only by the Judicial Magistrates and none else with effect from 1-4-74 except as provided in the New Code. One conjoint reading and harmonious construction, the intent and meaning appears to be quite plain and explicit that the functions relating to matters falling under Section 3(4) (a) of the New Code shall be exercisable only by the Judicial Magistrates and none else with effect from 1-4-74 except as provided in the New Code. If this was not the intendment, the Parliament would have clearly provided that the pending matters shall be heard and decided by the magisterial courts in which they are pending. The interpretation, as is sought to be put, will set at naught the whole scheme of separation for ought we know that the pending matters may not be finally disposed of for a long period and even after their disposal in the original court they may be sent back for further hearing after a lapse of long period and in this way the old forum will have to be continued. Such could not have been the intention of the law makers. 28. Thus, in my considered opinion, the contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any force and the same is hereby overruled. 29. Mr. Garg then next contended that the learned Magistrate has arbitrarily, fixed a sum of Rs. 250/- P. M. as maintenance and he was further unreasonable to order payment of arrears lump sum. The learned counsel drew the support that the quantum of maintenance can be revised and can be ordered to be paid in instalments from the decisions of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Smt. Pushpa (1978 Cr. L R. (Raj) 674 and Smt. Bhanwari Bai v. Bheroon Lal (1972 W. L. N. 373) . In Mohanlal's case the maintenance was reduced from Rs 250 to Rs. 100 p. m. in an application under section 484 Cr. P. C, as it was found that the learned Magistrate fixed an arbitrary amount of maintenance on were conjectures without taking into consideration the means and the paying capacity of husband. In the other case the arrears were ordered to be paid in instalments. 30. The learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 submitted that the present applicant has not come out truthfully before the court with regard to his total income and he has been evasive in his answers. He has stated that he receives a sum of Rs. 602/- p. m., after all deductions from his salary. 30. The learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 submitted that the present applicant has not come out truthfully before the court with regard to his total income and he has been evasive in his answers. He has stated that he receives a sum of Rs. 602/- p. m., after all deductions from his salary. On being questioned as to what is his total salary, he simply stated that he has given out his total income and does not know as to what dearness allowance he gets. Looking to the manner and the mode of his reply, it was reasonable for the learned Magistrate to hold that the present applicant is a man of substantial means and can afford to pay a some of Rs. 250/ p.m. as there are no other depondents on him and he hails from a higher middle class family. His father owns landed property having an income from agriculture and rental income. 31. I have considered the question of quantum of maintenance, in the light of the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. It appears that the parties come from middle family and the present applicant is a Senior Teacher in Government Higher Secondary School. What are his total emoluments, have not come on record and it can be said that he has been little evasive. He should have produced his pay certificate. He has admitted that he gets a sum of Rs. 602/- after making all deductions. There is no satisfactory evidence on record that the present applicant has any other income from farming or rental income The courts below have not found as to what is the annual or monthly income of the present applicant. In Prasan Kaur's evidence it has come that the present applicant draws about a sum of Rs. 1,000/- by way of salary every month. On the basis of this evidence it cannot be positively found that the salary which the non-applicant draws is Rs. 1,000/- and on that basis maintenance can not be fixed. The basis could be the present applicants own admission and maintenance should have been fixed accordingly. On the basis of the admission of the present applicant regarding the amount which he actually draws, it would be reasonable to fix the amount of maintenance at Rs. 1,000/- and on that basis maintenance can not be fixed. The basis could be the present applicants own admission and maintenance should have been fixed accordingly. On the basis of the admission of the present applicant regarding the amount which he actually draws, it would be reasonable to fix the amount of maintenance at Rs. 200/- (two hundred) per month and it would also be reasonable that the arrears may be ordered to be paid in instalments to secure the ends of justice. 32. In the result this application is partly allowed. The amount of maintenance is reduced from Rs. 250/- (two hundred fifty) to Rs. 200/- (two hundred) to be paid with effect from 23-8-1972. The arrears upto November 1978 shall be paid in six half yearly equal instalments. The first instalment shall be payable in the first week of January 1979 and the present applicant shall further pay maintenance every month from December, 1978, payable on the First of every succeeding month.Application partly allowed. *******