Short Note : This is plaintiff's second appeal. The suit related to Khasa No. 286 area 9.05 acres of mouza Chanota, tahsil, Ashta, Dist: Sehore. Plaintiff/appellant claimed to have purchased the same from Hameersingh, acting for self and as guardian for his two minor nephews (brother's sons), Devising and Dalipsingh on 11-4-1951 under a registered sale deed. Though the deed in itself did not give title to the appellant claimed to have perfected the title by adverse possession from the date of sale till the date of dispossession in 1966. There had been an earlier litigation between Peerkhan and Hameersingh and his nephews when the later threatened to interfere with his possession. Peerkhan claimed an injunction against them. The suit was dismissed by judgment dated 24-7-1964 since the Court found that the defendants had not given any such threat to dispossess the plaintiff and since they had admitted that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. The plaintiff/appellant had to file the present suit since in the meantime he defendants. Hameersingh and his nephews, executed a sale-deed in favour of defendants 4 to 7 who ultimately dispossessed the plaintiff in the year 1966. 2. That the plaintiff's claim for possession and mesne profits was decreed by the trial Court. In appeal the Addl. District, Judge, Sehore, reversed the judgment. Hence this second appeal. 3. The only question in the second appeal is whether Peerkhan has perfected his title to the land by adverse possession. Held : The First Appellate Court, under some misapprehension refused to read certain documents saying that they had not been properly proved. In fact all the documents were proved by reliable evidence. The original records were summoned. The documents, of which certified copies had been filed, were shown to the witnesses and they proved their execution. It is really strange how the Addl. District Judge, despite admissions in these documents could come to the conclusion that Peerkhan was not in possession of the land continuously and uninterruptedly till atleast July 1964. His finding is perverse and this Court will interfere with it since he had omitted to see documents that were duly proved I hold that the plaintiff was in continuous and in interrupted possession of the land from 11-4-1951 till dispossession in 1966. 4. Now the question is whether the plaintiff's possession was adverse to the rightful owner. His finding is perverse and this Court will interfere with it since he had omitted to see documents that were duly proved I hold that the plaintiff was in continuous and in interrupted possession of the land from 11-4-1951 till dispossession in 1966. 4. Now the question is whether the plaintiff's possession was adverse to the rightful owner. I must answer it in the affirmative. Though the sale in favour of Peerkhan was invalid, the character of his possession was that of an owner and in his own rights. He would acquire title by adverse possession. State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute society, AIR 1970 SC 1778 relied. If is no doubt true that Hameersingh could not act as guardian to his minor nephews who I am told, had their mother alive. But the minors attained majority in 1955 and 1957 and took no action to get the transfer set aside or to take possession before the transferee perfected his title. 5. It was for the defendants to plead that Peerkhan was not an agriculturist nor a person who had acquired right to occupy land under section 51. For want of pleadings, invalidity of the transaction could not be judged. 6. Before possession could be treated as one of a mortgagee, the Nazim's application of the mind to the transaction and his specific orders were necessary. The possession under an invalid transfer would not automatically be possession as one of a mortgagee. There being no pleadings, the question being a mixed question of law and fact and secondly as I read section 197 of the Bhopal State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, the possession could be so treated only when the Nazim made an order to that effect. Appeal allowed with costs.